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This thesis examines the phenomenology and significance of agoraphobia for its 
mostly women sufferers, principally by means of in-depth individual and group 
interviews. It argues that agoraphobia, typically characterised by fear and avoidance 
of social spaces, can be usefully conceptualised in terms of a 'crisis' in the boundaries 
of the embodied self. That is to say, the disorder radically problematizes the 
distinction individuals 'normally' experience between 'inner' self and 'outer' space, 
initiating a profound sense of exposure and insecurity in the face of many social 
situations. In response, sufferers retreat from the social sphere to the seclusion of their 
homes, whose walls serve to reinforce their weakened and fragile boundaries. 
The initial impetus behind this project stems from the fact that, while there has been 
no shortage of clinical research conducted on agoraphobia, it has received very little 
attention outside bio-medical and psychological contexts. Chapter l reviews relevant 
bodies of literature and highlights some of the gaps the project seeks to address. 
Chapter 2 offers a detailed account of the research design, and the ways in which data 
were generated and analysed, while chapter 3 offers reflections on what was found to 
be the 'processual' nature of qualitative research. In each of the five substantive 
chapters that remain, the thesis interweaves experiential accounts with existential 
problematics, and presents a general movement from concerns with theory to therapy. 
It also follows the unfolding development of the existential and phenomenological 
tradition. 
Chapter 4 links the more esoteric and subjectivist existentialism of Kierkegaard with 
experiential accounts of consumption, and chapter 5 explores the socially grounded 
work of Sartre in relation to sufferers' accounts of extreme discomfort in the public 
eye. Chapters 6 and 7 utilise the explicitly spatial, embodied, and inter-subjective 
account of existentialism presented by Merleau-Ponty to present first, a case study, 
and second, an analysis of sufferers' accounts of pregnancy. In this way the thesis 
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also moves from abstract philosophical arguments about the human condition per se 
to a more nuanced feminist geography capable of accounting for the diversity of 
experiences of agoraphobia and its gendered relations to pa11icular times and places. 
In its final chapter, the thesis turns to an explicit discussion of treatment, and critiques 
the unacknowledged predominance of and reliance on masculinist Cartesian 
conceptions of selfhood within self-help resources, questioning what treatment based 
on models of embodied subjectivity more inclusive of unusual spatial relations might 
look like. 
In its conclusion, the thesis suggests that by taking account of personal narratives of 
agoraphobia, and of its wider social contexts and relations, a sensitive, sympathetic 
and fully spatialised account of the disorder more faithful to the way sufferers 
actually describe their experiences can be offered. 
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Introduction 
Notes on Stories, Selves and Spaces 
Robin Kearns has described one role of the geographer as a 'teller of tales' ( 1997: 
269). In this thesis, I aim to take up this positioning in order to communicate 
something of the stories told by a largely neglected group - agoraphobic women -
about their restricted and debilitated 'life-worlds' (Dyck 1995; Edwards and 
Uhlenhuth 1998). Agoraphobics tend to fear and avoid social space and women 
account for around 89% of diagnosed agoraphobics (Clum and Knowles 1991; Bekker 
1996), a proportion comparable to those suffering from anorexia nervosa (Battersby 
1998: 46. See also Bordo 1993). But, while there has been considerable interest in 
anorexia by feminists and social scientists concerned to explain its gendered 
distribution, the same cannot be said for agoraphobia. And, although there has been 
no shortage of clinical research into agoraphobia and related anxiety disorders, these 
have as yet attracted relatively little attention outside of their medical and 
psychological contexts. This thesis constitutes the beginnings of an attempt to remedy 
these shortcomings. 
My aims in this thesis are twofold; to provide non-clinical, specifically geographical 
insights into agoraphobia of relevance for its sufferers, and, complementarily, to 
expand human geography understandings of the relations between gender, 
embodiment, space and mental health, via a study of agoraphobia. It will be argued 
that, through its quest to fulfil these aims, the project reveals innovative potential in 
terms of both therapy and theory. 
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Therapeutically, I suggest that a study conducted from a feminist geographical 
perspective can improve existing models of agoraphobia, in ways that could have 
valuable implications for treatment. Existing treatment models tend to be based on 
clinical and psychological research and literature that is necessarily limited by 
particular disciplinary concerns, focused around, for example, bodily symptoms, or 
learned behavioural responses. I argue that a critical geographical perspective is better 
placed to take account of the importance of wider social contexts and relations, and 
can give a fully spatialised account of the disorder more faithful to the way sufferers 
actually describe their experiences. It may thus go some way toward providing 
agoraphobic subjects with the means to re-conceptualise, re-articulate and possibly 
re-structure their problematic relations with the social world. 
Theoretically, I would suggest that an investigation of agoraphobia can address and 
expand some of the core themes of human geography, such as geographies of gender, 
of women's fear, of disability and impairment, mental health and illness, and of 
embodiment. By drawing attention to some of the more unusual ways that people 
relate to each other, and to their environments, we can illuminate some ordinarily 
taken for granted aspects of personal geographies. People and places are intimately 
interconnected, they shape and affect each other, and I argue that a condition like 
agoraphobia emphasises, exaggerates, and has the potential to elucidate this dialectic. 
The voices of agoraphobic sufferers that emerged through my ethnographic 
interventions have impacted substantially on my textual approach to the subject and 
subjects of agoraphobia. This reflexive process had effects that ramified far beyond 
methodological considerations (see chapter 2) affecting both the theories used and 
even the final structure of the thesis itself. So, although the general trajectory of this 
thesis is from theory to therapy it also records some of the revisions and re-
envisioning of these theoretical insights in the light of my increasing familiarity with 
subjects' own stories and through the need to relate such abstractions to their 
everyday experiences. 
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In each substantive chapter, theoretical problematics and experiential stories are 
identified and brought together to explore certain aspects of agoraphobic experiences. 
Some chapters deal with 'philosophical' issues that seem very far indeed from most 
people's everyday concerns, yet in every case I try to link these theoretical 
considerations with sufferers' embodied experience of a world perceived by them to 
be an intensely problematic place. While each successive chapter calls upon its 
predecessor to elucidate the nature of agoraphobia, each also has a quite different 
thematic dimension. Each explores an issue that emerged through respondents' 
comments as related or relevant to their condition in ways that may not be 
immediately obvious (for example, stories about supermarkets, or about pregnancy). 
In this way, chapter by chapter, the thesis also follows what might be termed the 
'adventures of the dialectic' between people and places as previously unforeseen 
aspects of this relationship are incorporated into an increasingly grounded theoretical 
framework. 
However, before this process could even begin I faced an initial difficulty in choosing 
a theoretical staiting point capable of being adopted and adapted to account for the 
relation between agoraphobic subjectivities and social spaces. This was made doubly 
difficult by the fact that, as respondents' stories made obvious, agoraphobia is not a 
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definitely bounded condition but an amorphous, complex and varying 'cluster' of 
fears experienced in different ways and in different social circumstances by sufferers 
(Marks 1987: 324 ). Nonetheless, despite the intensely personalized nature of each 
experience, and the apparent lack of a single causative factor, research reveals certain 
networks of similarities running through this condition. For these reasons Isaac 
Marks, a clinical psychiatrist writing prolifically for professional and lay audiences on 
this subject, is amongst those who prefer to refer to agoraphobia as a syndrome ( 1987, 
esp. ch. 1 O; see also Gournay 1989). 
One way of envisaging the sheer diversity of experience and 'stories' encountered in 
my studies on this agoraphobic syndrome is in terms of Wittgenstein's notion of a 
'family resemblance'. This conception enables us to avoid the tendency to reify 
particular aspects of the agoraphobic experience as 'essential' characteristics present 
in all cases. Wittgenstein points out that there does not have to be a single common 
identifying feature in order for us to recognize the relationship between family 
members. We recognize their affinity by the various networks of resemblances 
between them in terms of items as varied as "build, features, colour of eyes, gait, 
temperament, etc. etc." So too, when comparing the experiential accounts of 
agoraphobic subjects, we find "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and 
criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail." 
(Wittgenstein 1988: 66) Each has their own nuances, their own phenomenology 
(vertiginous, visual, bodily, emotional), aetiology (architectural, existential, social, 
psychological) and so on. We may find, for example, agoraphobic tendencies to 
respond to certain kinds of spaces and places in one (perhaps fearful and avoidant) 
way rather than in another (more 'positive' or protected). We will not find, however, 
universal reactions to any location or situation, not even those as apparently clear-cut 
as 'homes' or 'funfairs'. 
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Crucially, this complexity and diversity of experience strongly suggests that the study 
of agoraphobia would benefit from the kind of multi-faceted theoretical 
(geographical, sociological, philosophical) as well as methodological approach 
employed here. In this way we might tease apart some of the constitutive fibres of the 
agoraphobic syndrome before we attempt to reweave them into a meaningful pattern. 
This is precisely what the thesis attempts to do chapter by chapter. Just as "the 
strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some fibre runs through its whole 
length, but in the overlapping of many fibres", so the explanatory strength of any 
eventual theoretical synthesis will lie in extending the "concept of [in this case, 
agoraphobia] as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre." (Wittgenstein 1988: 67) 
Perhaps the most persistent pattern that emerged as one story became woven with 
another was a picture of agoraphobia as a disorder that problematized sufferers' 
experience of themselves as bounded and well-defined entities, as individual(ized) 
subjects. This experience is crystallized in the panic attack(s) that all respondents 
(without exception) had experienced in some form prior to the onset of their condition 
(see chapters I and 2). Panic, as I will argue throughout this thesis, is experienced as 
an unbearable attack on one's sense of self in space, constituting an unmitigated 
existential threat. That is to say, it destroys one's sense of relatedness to other people, 
and locatedness in place, alienating the subject from the practices of everyday life. 
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In describing these attacks and their subsequent repercussions sufferers frequently 
utilized complex spatial imageries that referred to their felt inability to control the 
boundaries between 'inner' subjective and 'outer' social worlds. Many spoke of the 
way space seemed to intrude on their consciousness and/or a feeling of their own self-
identity' s dissolution and dispersion, of a confusion, vertigo and intense anxiety that 
emanates from the sudden feeling of lacking a secure ground for their existence in the 
face of panic. Concentrating on the phenomenology of what appear to be accounts of 
a 'boundary crisis' seemed to offer a novel geographic approach to agoraphobia as a 
disturbance of subjects' otherwise taken-for-granted ability to mediate the relation 
between subject and social space. It also suggested that a possible theoretical starting 
point for thinking through this relation might be found in the accounts of existential 
anxiety presented by thinkers like Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-
Ponty. 
Existentialism, as a philosophical tradition, not only deals directly with the relation 
between anxiety (Angest for Kierkegaard, Angst for Heidegger, angoisse for Sartre) 
and existence, it also offers detailed accounts of the inseparable relation between 
person-hood and place, what Heidegger articulates in a single term as our "Being-in-
the-World" (Heidegger 1988). 1 For Heidegger human existence is characterised as 
Dasein - quite literally as a 'there-being', where 'being' is a verb - an activity, 
namely, existing. Thus the relation between place and person is not characterised in 
terms of those between a ready-formed subject and their 'objective' environment. 
Rather, the nature of our existence is such that we are always, already, gathered 
together in (as) a locus. 'Being-there' is more like 'being-the-there'. In Giorgio 
Agamben's (1991: 5) words "being its own Da (its own there) is what characterizes 
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Dasein (Being-there)". Or, we might say, human existence is about being able to 
constitute oneself as (in) a specific place. This obviously opens up all sorts of possible 
connections for geographies of the subject. And, while Heidegger's own work does 
not feature prominently in this thesis, the processual nature of this work also traces 
and testifies to my own intellectual engagement with the existential tradition, from 
Kierkegaard through to those heavily influenced by Heidegger, like Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty. 
To reiterate then, while each substantive chapter has a separable thematic content, the 
thesis generally moves from theory to therapy. It also follows the unfolding 
development of the existential and phenomenological tradition in its movement from 
the more esoteric and subjectivist existentialism of Kierkegaard, through the socially 
grounded work of Sartre, to the explicitly spatial and embodied and inter-subjective 
account of existentialism presented by Merleau-Ponty. In this way the thesis also 
moves from abstract philosophical arguments about the human condition per se to a 
more nuanced feminist geography capable of accounting for the diversity of 
experiences of agoraphobia and its gendered relations to paiticular times and places. 
Chapter 1 of this thesis is devoted to a critical review of the various bodies of 
literature deemed relevant to this enquiry, a review intended to highlight a number of 
gaps that this project seeks to address. By critiquing existing understandings of 
agoraphobia, I will begin to introduce the kind of theoretical and conceptual resources 
that are required for this project, feminist, phenomenological, existentialist, etc., a 
discussion that prepares the ground for presentation of my methodological approach 
in chapter 2. 
Recent years have seen an increase in social science debates on methodological 
issues, and this trend has been well represented in feminist geography, notably in 
symposia such as 'Women in the Field' (in The Professional Geographer (46, 1 )) and 
'Focus: Feminism as Method' (in The Canadian Geographer (37, 1 )). In chapter 2, I 
outline how the contributors to these debates draw on their own research experience 
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in ways that illustrate potential flaws in 'traditional' methods, with their emphasis on 
objectivity and distance, developing alternative approaches based around principles of 
intersubjectivity, reflexivity, and positionality. I then explain how and why the 
methodology I devised for this project in advance was largely based on my 
interpretation of such attempts to negotiate ethical relations between researcher and 
researched while collecting valuable data appropriate to the research question. In 
addition to discussion of research design, detailed information is provided about the 
ways in which project data was generated, managed and analysed. 
Chapter 3 offers some reflections on the process of actually doing research, and 
focuses in particular on the negotiation of one's positioning in relation to respondents. 
My experience reveals that, no matter how carefully such issues have been thought 
out in advance, the subjects of our research may have ideas and plans that do not 
coincide with, and effectively thwart, our own. The chapter explains how one group in 
particular presented a degree of 'resistance' to my role as temporary group member, 
resistance that was enacted through humour, but which was taken seriously enough to 
prompt the emergence of an alternative, 'processual' approach to the project. My 
manner of involvement with groups was thereafter a continual 'work in process', my 
'method' an evolving response to subjects' 'jocular' policing of the boundary between 
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insider/outsider status. The course of action this chapter outlines was thus intended to 
enact (and accept) positional change according to shifting dynamics between and 
among researcher and researched. 
As outlined above, the shape of this thesis partially embodies the processual unfolding 
of my theoretical interactions with the subject(s) of agoraphobia. Chapter 4 presents 
my engagement with one predominant experiential theme in relation to an early 
existentialist appraisal of human being. In particular it focuses on the phenomenology 
of the panic attack (characterized in terms of an existential crisis) and its relation to 
social space. The social spaces that recurred most frequently in women's narratives 
were, perhaps unsurprisingly, those associated with the everyday (and gendered) 
activity of shopping. This chapter therefore draws on and develops existentialist 
insights to help articulate something of the inherently spatialized nature of 
agoraphobia in order to investigate why consumer spaces, and shopping malls in 
particular, should present such a substantial threat to many sufferers' boundaries and 
self-identity. Despite what one would imagine to be the relatively trivial place of 
'shopping' in an existentialist worldview, I argue that the (psychologicai2) works of 
Kierkegaard can be utilized to explain why consumption should present sufferers with 
difficulties. Sufferers' debilitating experiences of such consumerist 'pathoscapes' are 
contrasted with their largely positive experience of the home, a space often perceived 
to be protective, rather than corrosive, of the agoraphobic' s sense of self. This contrast 
is intended to underline one inescapable outcome of this research - that selves and 
spaces impact on and interact with each other. 
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Chapter 5 continues this existentialist exploration of the self I space dialectic, and 
shifts the theoretical focus from Kierkegaard to Sartre, examining the latter's account 
of the centrality of Angst to our being-in-the-world, again in close relation to 
respondents' own tales of social and spatial anxieties. In particular, it considers 
subjects' fears of being unable to maintain self-identity in the face of the 'look' of 
others, and their means of handling such experiences. In a move toward recognizing 
the importance of therapy for this thesis, it is argued that the techniques of 'front 
management' and 'self-presentation' posited by Goffman can be regarded as a form of 
coping mechanism for dealing with the anxieties of social existence outlined by 
Sartre. Further, that one, potentially useful way of understanding agoraphobia might 
be as a failure to utilise these coping mechanisms. By thus bringing sociological 
insights to bear on this existentialist approach, the chapter suggests that sufferers 
might benefit from re-learning how to use particular coping mechanisms to strengthen 
their weakened and fragile boundaries. In this way, it underlines the increasingly 
socially grounded nature of existentialist approaches to being human in contemporary 
society. 
In chapter 6, I call on Merleau-Ponty to further extend the exploration of the nature of 
agoraphobic fears of social spaces, focusing particularly on the phenomenological 
implications of these fears for spaces of the self. Merleau-Ponty highlights both the 
mediating role of sensations in acquiring a sense of identity, and the importance of 
recognizing the social (as opposed to merely individual) construction of lived space. 
Perhaps even more impo1tantly his work critiques and provides an alternative to 
dominant Caitesian presuppositions of mind/body dualism. For Merleau-Ponty the 
self is not only social but is inextricably embodied. This chapter thus provides a vital 
link bet ween existential accounts of being-in-the-world and 'being embodied' that 
become the focus of theoretical and therapeutic concerns in this and later chapters. 
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The second part of chapter 6 addresses the potential relevance of this approach for 
sufferers from agoraphobia through a specific case study that serves to emphasize the 
embodied nature of agoraphobic experience. Inevitably, this strategy means that we 
come to know 'Linda' rather better than the other respondents in this thesis. However, 
the intention behind this approach is not to claim that Linda is somehow a typical 
agoraphobic (since no such 'typical' person exists) or to marginalise other 
respondents' accounts - some of whose experiences are also presented in some detail 
throughout the thesis. (See also table 2: 1 which contextualises respondents' 
backgrounds.) Rather, Linda's individual story in this chapter is intended to provide a 
particular insight into her agoraphobic experience(s), helping to draw out and 
illustrate the implications and importance of a 'spatial understanding of mental 
health', the links between phenomenological and existentialist approaches, and the 
limitations of Cartesian mind/body dualism. Focusing on the personal narrative of just 
one individual also allows therapeutic concerns to begin to emerge from theory 
through what might be termed an 'existential analysis'. 
Chapter 7 further develops the thesis' increasingly geographical, and explicitly 
feminist take on existential phenomenology. Calling on Sartre's insights regarding 
objectification (chapter 5) and the account of Merleau-Ponty advanced in chapter 6 it 
seeks to draw out some of the project's thematic fibres relating to a gendered 
phenomenology of embodiment and bodily boundaries. In particular it explores 
possible connections between the gendered 'conditions' of pregnancy and 
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agoraphobia by linking my own work with Robyn Longhurst's recent research on the 
embodied experiences of pregnant women in public places. There are, I suggest, 
commonalties and possible synergies between pregnancy and agoraphobia since both 
can be interpreted as entailing severe disruptions to bodily boundaries and might 
usefully be seen as experiential intensifications of the problems associated with 
maintaining a stable sense of self-identity by women. In both cases, subjects 
experience a heightened awareness of socially problematic aspects of womanhood, 
and raised sensitivity to the feeling of being 'out of place' in the public sphere. 
The last chapter completes the grounding movement from theory to therapy and draws 
us back into the research context itself, namely the self-help groups that remain the 
methodological focus of the project. The purpose here is to begin to suggest ways in 
which a feminist geography of agoraphobic existence might elucidate generally 
overlooked aspects of issues regarding sufferers' treatment. In particular it suggests 
how an analysis of self-help resources from the perspective developed within this 
thesis might offer new insights and different possibilities for recovery. While self-help 
resources are often overlooked and undervalued in academic studies they actually 
constitute an important part of sufferers' attempts to mitigate their condition. 
However such texts are far from unproblematic, since they often presuppose a notion 
of the 'self that is overly, and often overtly, reliant on the individualistic, yet 
internally dualistic Cartesian concepts criticized by this thesis. By critiquing this 
limited and limiting Cartesian notion of self, and questioning what self-help resources 
of a more inclusive hue might look like, I offer an account of subjectivity more 
sympathetic to the 'unusual' spatial relations encountered here. This perspective is 
also less likely to pathologize agoraphobic experience. This chapter thus begins to 
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rethink spaces in, of and around the self that have been explored and entwined 
throughout the thesis, and highlights the unacknowledged centrality and influence of 
existential philosophies for 'real world' situations. 
In 'conclusion', this geographic story attempts to draw together the various strands 
that have contributed to this re-telling of tales about agoraphobic life-worlds. There is 
no singular 'meta-narrative' here, no intention to encompass the totality of 
individuals' experience within a restrictive and reductive framework, but rather, a 
collage and collection of 'minor' (Katz I 996) stories told around particular themes 
from particular perspectives, one that amounts to a (re)composition of agoraphobia, 
and potentially also, of agoraphobic subjectivities. There may be no clear end in sight 
to many of the tales told here. The theses I put forward are only steps on the way 
toward an understanding of agoraphobia, steps that will almost inevitably include the 
occasional wrong turn. As for agoraphobics themselves, their lives frequently seem to 
be part of an ongoing saga, one that I have come to realize, often requires great 
heroism in fearful circumstances. 
But what is important in any tale is that it should offer some hope, a hope that can 
only emerge by providing insights into the nature of our being-in-the-world, into what 
Hannah Arendt (I 958) calls The Human Condition. Agoraphobic narratives express 
both something general about this condition, in terms of exposing our underlying 
existential anxieties and something very specific about the gendered geographic 
particularity of women's positioning, their 'there-being' in the modern world. 
Agoraphobia makes explicit Arendt's (1958: 184) claim that "nobody is the author 
and producer of his [sic] own life story"; it highlights the implicate order of our 
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embodied existence in social spaces. But in doing so it also offers the hope that 
through understanding agoraphobia's implications the possibility arises of an analysis 
of, and a therapy for, the self (and society) that might help alleviate some of the 
symptoms of this particularly debilitating condition. 
1 "That which anxiety is anxious about is Being-in-the-World itself' (Heidegger 1988: 232). 
2 "The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death are aptly enough called Kierkegaard's 
psychological works" (Hannay 1982: 157). 
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Chapter One 
What Is Agoraphobia? 
Introduction 
The condition of agoraphobia is said by one of the foremost clinical researchers on the 
subject, Isaac Marks (1987: 323), to be "the most common and most distressing 
phobic disorder seen in adult patients". Since the late 1970s, there has been a "surge 
of interest" (Chambless 1982: 1) in agoraphobia and panic among clinicians, and 
publications on the subject often begin by drawing attention to its contemporary 
prevalence (McNally 1994: vii; Hallam 1992: 114). Rachman (1998: 115) has gone so 
far as to describe agoraphobia as "the prototypical modern neurosis", and the 
centrality of related anxieties to contemporary life has not gone unnoticed beyond 
clinical circles. Feminist geographer Linda McDowell, for example, points out ( 1996: 
30) that "anxiety is a central theme in a great deal of current work", while historians 
Sarah Dunant and Roy Porter ( 1996) explore contemporary mental life in what they 
see as an Age of Anxiety. Social theorist Jackie Orr ( 1990) describes panic disorders as 
arising in response to 'postmodern existence', and philosophers Kraker, Kraker and 
Cook ( 1989) speak of 'panic postmodernism'. 
In this chapter I intend to review the various bodies of literature of relevance to 
agoraphobia and panic from a particular, and necessarily partial, perspective, 
presenting a discussion structured around certain themes. Some of these, relating, for 
example, to gender, embodiment and boundary issues, have been a constant 
preoccupation throughout this project, even influencing my initial interest in 
agoraphobia as a subject for research. Others have emerged as being of crucial 
importance as a result of the research process itself, via a combination of and 
interaction between my theoretical and ethnographic engagement with the subject(s) 
of agoraphobia. By reviewing the literature in relation to these influential themes I 
intend to re-present the genuinely interdisciplinary 'frame' or context within which 
this thesis was shaped. It is hoped that this discussion helps the reader to position 
themselves relative to the project's perspective, and clarifies its place in and 
contribution to contemporary geographical research. 
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First, I will outline definitions of agoraphobia, drawing particularly on clinical 
literature that accounts for, for example, its precipitants and prevalence, and attempt 
to expand overly narrow psychological definitions through references to the social 
and spatial aspects of agoraphobia. This task extends to the following section, in 
which I consider the phenomenology and embodiment of the condition, examining 
the various ways in which it is actually experienced by sufferers, and how this 
experience is often marginalised in clinical accounts. I make some tentative 
suggestions about how feminist theories and methods might help rectify this failing; 
suggestions that are taken up in detail later in the thesis. I also indicate how an 
examination of the phenomenology and embodiment of agoraphobia has the potential 
to expand and augment feminist insights into geographies of 'the body.' 
Since agoraphobia is, as the definitions indicate, a spatially mediated anxiety, the 
problematic nature of social space is obviously crucial to an understanding of 
agoraphobic experience. Sufferers' inability to engage with the social arena obviously 
imposes severe restrictions on their life-worlds, and I next consider how and why 
certain kinds of spaces and places are considered so difficult and threatening, drawing 
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on geographical, sociological and architectural writings. Additionally, geographical 
research on health, illness, and disability has produced valuable understandings of the 
potentially disabling nature of social space, and I indicate how this project can benefit 
from such findings, as well as contribute to academic and social awareness of the 
importance of the topic. 
It is a significant and pervasive concern of this thesis that the overwhelming majority 
of agoraphobics are women, and the final section of this chapter examines 
perspectives on the gendered incidence of the disorder. Existing accounts of women 
and agoraphobia, both clinical and non-clinical, fail to give satisfactory explanations 
as to why women are more susceptible to the disorder than men. This section suggests 
that feminist geographical perspectives, influenced by phenomenological theory and, 
to an extent, object relations psychoanalysis, can go some way toward helping us 
conceptualise and comprehend the gendering of agoraphobia. Here agoraphobia is 
characterised as a disorder that affects sufferer's sense of bounded identity. The 
review thus aims to emphasise the nature and importance of links that this project 
makes between these various bodies of literature and how the thesis as a whole, in 
turn, feeds back into separate strands of geographical research. 
De fin it i ans 
1. agora - Gk. Hist. An assembly; a place of assembly, esp. a market place. 
2. phobia - (A) fear, (a) horror, (an) aversion; esp. an abnormal and irrational 
fear or dread aroused by a particular object or circumstance. 
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3. agoraphobia - [f. Gk. AGORA n. +-PHOBIA.] Irrational fear of open spaces. 
(Shorter Oxford English Dictionary) 
Contrary to popular opinion, the condition of agoraphobia actually relates to public 
and social, as opposed to 'open' spaces. Although such widely held misconceptions 
are supported by dictionary definitions of the disorder, the SOED notes on the term's 
origins do in fact provide substantial clues as to the realities of agoraphobia for its 
many sufferers. Exactly how many sufferers there are, however, is a matter of some 
debate, and estimates range from between 6 per 1000 (Mathews et al 1981: 12), to 6 
per 100 (NIMH in McNally 1994: 26). 
In Lewis Mumford's account of The City in History, the agora is characterised as an 
essential part of ancient Greek city life. It is "the formal marketplace [ ... but also] the 
convenient open space where the elders met, big enough for the whole village to 
gather in." (1991: 158) It was "laid out deliberately to serve alike as market, as place 
of assembly, and as festival place; and though one part of the agorn was often 
reserved for housewives, the agora was pre-eminently a man's precinct." ( 1991: 177, 
emphasis added.) Significantly, to this day, it is women who tend to have difficulties 
of a phobic nature with such public and arguably still masculine realms. 
The first usage of the term agoraphobia can be dated to 1871, when it was introduced 
by German psychiatrist Karl Otto Westphal to describe the fearful condition he found 
common to three of his patients. Agoraphobia was the term he chose to capture "the 
impossibility of walking through certain streets or squares, or the possibility of doing 
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so only with resultant dread of anxiety." (Quoted in Marks 1987: 323. See also Marks 
1975~ l 987a.) In the previous year, the term platzschwindel - dizziness in public 
places - was coined by Benedikt to describe what is surely another incidence of 
agoraphobia (Mathews et al. 1981: l ). Psychiatrist Diane Chambless ( 1982: l) points 
out that descriptions of what she claims to be the same disorder were provided in the 
seventeenth century by Burton in his famous Anatomy of Melancholy (although she 
provides no textual evidence or specific references to justify this claim.) Since then, 
she claims, agoraphobia "has suffered from a plethora of labels: anxiety hysteria, 
phobic anxiety depersonalization syndrome, peur d' espace, horreur de vide, and most 
recently, endogenous anxiety." To this extensive list of labels Isaac Marks (1987: 
325) adds platzangst and kenophobia, before concluding, "agoraphobia is the least 
unsatisfactory of those [labels] proposed so far." Despite Marks' recognition of the 
numerous descriptive terms applied to "the same mental event" over the years, he 
states that in fact, "the phenomenology of agoraphobia has not changed since it was 
described by Westphal in 1871 ". ( 1995: 107) While the experience of sufferers 
themselves may have remained the same, health care professionals' descriptions and 
diagnostic criteria continue to evolve. 
In the contemporary context, the definition of agoraphobia employed in clinical 
practice and publication tends to be drawn from the American Psychiatric 
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. The most 
recent edition (DSM IV) was published in 1994, and its concept of agoraphobia 
differs in several important ways from the past two editions. DSM III was the first 
edition to distinguish and provide separate criteria for agoraphobia, as distinct from 
simple phobia and social phobia (defined below). Prior to this 1980 publication, all 
three conditions had been included under the general category of phobic neurosis. 
DSM III introduced a new distinction between agoraphobia with or without panic 
attacks, and between generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and panic disorder (PD). 
Previously, both had been classified as anxiety neurosis, and the division was newly 
drawn to highlight the presence or absence of panic (McNally l 994: 4 ). Further 
differences accompanied the publication of the next revised edition (DSM IIIR) in 
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l 987. McNally (1994: 4/5) states that "[b ]y then it had become apparent that most 
cases of clinical agoraphobia developed in the wake of panic, and rarely otherwise", 
and that "[t]hese observations suggested that agoraphobia does not constitute a 
distinct syndrome in its own right, but instead emerges as a consequence of the core 
disorder of panic." The former condition was, therefore, subsequently considered a 
sub-set of the latter, and clinicians currently acknowledge panic disorder with 
agoraphobia (PDA) or panic disorder without agoraphobia (PD) (Baker 1995; Gelder 
et al. 1996). 
Consequently, the name currently applied to the condition examined in this thesis is, 
as defined by (DSM IV) criteria, Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia. The disorder 
involves "recurrent unexpected Panic Attacks" (APA: 402/3), followed by "persistent 
concern about having additional attacks [and/or. .. ] worry about the implications of 
the attack or its consequences (e.g., losing control, having a heart attack, 'going 
crazy') [and/or. .. ] a significant change in behaviour related to the attacks." Crucially, 
and predictably, the condition must also involve the presence of agoraphobia, which is 
defined (AP A: 39617) as; 
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anxiety about being in places or situations from which escape might be 
difficult (or embarrassing) or in which help might not be available in the event 
of having an unexpected or situationally predisposed Panic Attack or panic-
like symptoms. Agoraphobic fears typically involve characteristic clusters of 
situations that include being outside the home alone; being in a crowd or 
standing in a line; being on a bridge; and travelling on a bus, train, or 
automobile. 
DSM IV further stipulates that these situations are then avoided "or else are endured 
with marked distress or with anxiety about having a Panic Attack or require the 
presence of a companion", and that the anxiety or phobic avoidance is not better 
accounted for by another disorder, such as 
Social Phobia (e.g., avoidance limited to social situations because of fear of 
embarrassment), Specific Phobia (e.g., avoidance limited to a single situation 
like elevators), Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (e.g., avoidance of dirt in 
someone with an obsession about contamination), Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder (e.g., avoidance of stimuli associated with a severe stressor), or 
Separation Anxiety Disorder (e.g., avoidance of leaving home or relatives). 
(APA: 402/3) 
Despite the specificity of the definition outlined, this thesis will henceforth refer to its 
central subject simply as 'agoraphobia'. While this strategy is adopted primarily for 
purposes of simplification, it is justified by the fact that only one form of the disorder 
has been encountered, persistently and exclusively, throughout this research. The 
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agoraphobic condition confronted is one that, despite its aetiological and 
phenomenological differences always involves experience and fear of panic (but see 
Bankey 200 l on alternative usage of the term). 
As mentioned above, the vast majority of agoraphobia sufferers - around 89% - are 
women (Clum and Knowles 1991 ). This issue will be dealt with at length in the 
following section of this chapter, but does in fact constitute a core concern of the 
thesis as a whole. For those (women and men) who develop agoraphobia, the onset 
tends to occur between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. Burns and Thorpe ( 1977) 
found the mean age of onset to be 28 years, Buglass et al. ( 1977) 31 years, Ost ( 1987) 
28 years, and Solymon et al. ( 1986) 25 years 1, and the condition tends to be chronic. 
Michelson and Ascher ( 1987) found the average duration of agoraphobia is eleven 
years. There is, however, evidence that a degree of agoraphobia may remain with the 
sufferer for life. Kevin Gournay ( 1989: 1 ), for example, reports that not one of the 132 
patients who took part in his long term trials achieved "anything amounting to a total 
abolition of symptoms", and according to Chambless and Goldstein ( 1980: 120), 
"[t]ransient improvements aside, once the symptoms begin, they generally persist over 
a life-time with fluctuating severity". Many sufferers will themselves attest to the fact 
that one can never be entirely 'cured' from agoraphobia, but must rather learn to cope 
with it on a continuing, daily basis (see also Chambless and Goldstein 1982). To this 
end, sufferers' frequently adopt certain tactics and strategies, which, as I argue in 
chapter five, function to reinforce weakened boundaries and to discourage social 
contact. Commonly used methods of partially managing anxiety, such as wearing dark 
glasses or holding a newspaper, have been noted by clinicians (e.g. Marks 1987: 337-
9). 
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Clinical research on the issue of particular causes has not been entirely conclusive, but 
there is evidence that higher than usual levels of stress tend to be experienced prior to 
the onset of agoraphobia (Barlow 1988: 32~ Michelson and Ascher 1987: 217). While 
the nature of such stressors and negative life events vary between individuals, 
Rachman ( 1998: 118) suggests, in a provocative insight to be taken further by this 
thesis, that what they may have in common is an ability to "undermine one's sense of 
safety". 
With regard to issues of treatment of agoraphobia, reviews of recent literature suggest 
that the form most likely to be successful is a multi-faceted approach capable of 
recognising and tackling each problematic aspect of the disorder (Rachman 1998). 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) advocates Barlow and Cerny ( 1988: 28) 
criticise earlier treatment models they describe as "one dimensional" (including 
narrow psychological and biological approaches), but recognise that drug treatments 
may at times still be appropriate as pait of a larger programme of treatment. Referring 
to the currently dominant (DSM IV) view of agoraphobia as an outcome of panic 
disorder, they argue that management of panic itself should be treated as a matter of 
priority. This view is based on the understanding that agoraphobic subjects are 
primarily afraid of panic - of fear itself, and not particular places. Thus, it is thought 
that if the subject can learn to control their experience and fears of panic, issues of 
agoraphobic avoidance will be resolved much more easily, by the traditional means of 
controlled excursions into difficult places (Rapee 1987). Such treatment models do, 
however, tend to assume a simplistic, liberal humanist version of the self, one that is 
predicated on the subjugation of one (female) side of hierarchic dichotomies. While 
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this claim is elaborated, and the implications of such models of treatment discussed at 
length in chapter 8, 'Enlightenment' conceptions of subjectivity are problematised 
throughout this thesis. 
It seems then that while the definitions and descriptions of agoraphobia to be found in 
the clinical literature acknowledge much of the disorder's complexity (in terms, for 
example, of its interconnections with other phobias) its representation tends to be 
simplistic in certain impo11ant respects. In particular, the model of the subject that 
such writings employ tends to be somewhat philosophically na'ive. Also, while 
recognising that agoraphobia is socially and spatially mediated, understandings of 
what this might mean for sufferers and how social and spatial theory might be of 
benefit are, as one might expect, limited. In the chapters that follow, I want to suggest 
that some of these limitations might be at least partially rectified by the careful 
inclusion of sufferers' own voices (conspicuously absent from clinical accounts) and 
resolved further with reference to a sympathetic theoretical (feminist, geographical 
and phenomenological) perspective. The thesis thus aims to refine and improve 
existing 'definitions' of agoraphobia, by offering a more spatialised and experientially 
influenced perspective that can better account for and understand the nature and 
(potentially pathological) implications of person/place relations. 
In the following section, I want to begin the task of constructing a more 'intimate' 
picture of experience and meanings of agoraphobia, by considering its implications 
for spaces of the self. I will first provide a brief, clinical account of the 'defining' 
experience of agoraphobia - panic - before broadening the discussion to include non-
clinical perspectives. While the definitive clarity of the former is not mirrored in non-
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clinical writings on agoraphobia, many of the latter are immensely valuable precisely 
because they eschew clinical precision in favour of socio-spatial and experiential 
significance, and cultural/historical context (de Swaan 1981 ). 
Phenomenology and the Embodiment of Agoraphobia 
The phenomenological aspects of agoraphobia of overwhelming and terrifying 
significance for its sufferers relate to the experience of panic. A panic attack is 
defined by DSM IV (APA: 395) as being: 
A discrete period of intense fear or discomfort, in which four or more of the 
following symptoms developed abruptly and reached a peak within ten minutes: 
1. palpitations, pounding heart, or accelerated heart rate 
2. sweating 
3. trembling or shaking 
4. sensations of shortness of breath or smothering 
5. feeling of choking 
6. chest pain or discomfort 
7. nausea or abdominal distress 
8. feeling dizzy, unsteady, lightheaded, or faint 
9. derealization (feelings of unreality) or depersonalization (being detached from 
oneself) 
10. fear of losing control or going crazy 
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11. fear of dying 
12. paresthesias (numbness or tingling sensations) 
13. chills or hot flushes 
Throughout this thesis, my interest in symptoms such as these relates to the effect on 
sufferers' experience of embodiment and environment, that is, the ways in which 
symptoms of panic problematise subjects' understanding of themselves as clearly and 
distinctly separate from the world around them. I contend that the symptoms listed 
above cause sufferers to question their ordinarily taken for granted sense of 
themselves and their bodily boundaries, and that exploration of such phenomena is of 
crucial importance for understanding experience and meanings of agoraphobia. To 
warrant such interpretations, and expand existing views, it is clearly necessary to 
move beyond the clinical literature. In the discussion that follows, it will become 
apparent that sufferers' own accounts can powerfully, if alarmingly, bring clinicians' 
dispassionate descriptions to life. 
Derealization and depersonalization (listed above, no. 9), for example, are commonly 
understood to involve strange and disturbing feelings relating to both 'inner' and 
'outer' reality. During such experiences, according to Marks ( 1987: 342) "one feels 
temporarily strange, unreal, disembodied, cut off or far away from immediate 
surroundings". (See also Chambless & Goldstein 1982.) We can usefully compare this 
po11rayal with the following quotation (taken from a self-help book) in which one 
sufferer describes personal experience of the phenomenon. The tenor of their 
description provides deeper insight, and puts a disturbing twist on our understanding 
of what it means to feel "faint": 
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"[S]uddenly everything around me seemed unfamiliar, as it would in a dream. 
I felt panic rising inside me ... I felt totally unreal , ... Two people came along 
and I almost stopped them to ask if they could see me - was I really there." 
(Melville 1979, 13) 
In another self-help book, Law ( 1975, 53) communicates further the intensity of the 
experience. 
"Suddenly, sensations stronger and stranger than any I had previously known 
charged through my body .. .I turned and twisted and tried to remove the 
devilish feelings that possessed me ... this evil thing threatened to rob me of my 
identity ... Everything seemed to disintegrate." 
This sufferer feels that reality is "tearing in on him", as if he were receding into an 
abyss, with a mighty hand trying to "squeeze the breath, and every particle of self 
identity from [him]."(Law 1975,72) This quotation, and the one above, reveal that 
panic entails a horrendous sense of dissolution of self into one's environs, and a 
simultaneous feeling of invasion by one's surrounds. Panic severely disrupts our 
unconscious sense of ourselves, throwing the relation we have with our bodies, our 
selves, into profound question. As the (DSM IV) list of symptoms itself reveals, some 
aspects of agoraphobic panic can be described as of an existentialist nature (esp. nos. 
10 and 11 ), causing sufferers to question the very grounds of their existence, to fear 
outright loss of control over themselves, or the ultimate loss of death itself. 
Existentialist philosophies have thought that such anxiety (Angst, angoisse) provides a 
key to understanding the human condition. In his introduction to S¢ren Kierkegaard's 
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The Concept rd' Anxiety ( 1980), Reidar Thomte writes that "[t]ear is a threat to the 
periphery of one's existence and can be studied as an effect among other effects. 
Anxiety is a threat to the foundation and center of one's existence. It is ontological 
and can be understood only as a threat to Dasein" (xvii). Anxiety then, on this view at 
least, disrupts the very essence of our 'being-in-the-world'. We might expect then that 
existential philosophies like Kierkegaard's might be able to shed some light on the 
nature of agoraphobic anxiety and panic. Interestingly clinical and (especially) 
experiential depictions of such episodes are in many ways reminiscent of certain 
salient portrayals of existential Angst. Nausea, for example, Sartre's ( 1965) semi-
autobiographical novel, describes the central character's increasing 'alienation' from 
various objects, and culminates with this disturbing account of an encounter with a 
tree in a park. 
It had lost its harmless appearance as an abstract category: [ ... ] the root, the 
park gates, the bench, the sparse grass on the lawn, all that had vanished; the 
diversity of things, their individuality, was only an appearance, a veneer. This 
veneer had melted, leaving soft, monstrous masses, in disorder - naked, with a 
frightening obscene nakedness. (p. 183) 
For Nausea's protagonist Roquentin (and by extension, Sartre\ even parts of his own 
body could appear bizarre and disturbing, his hand as a 'fat slug' resting on the table 
before him, his face, some alien thing in the mirror. 
Following the onset of anxiety, of 'fear and trembling' (Kierkegaard 1985) as a way 
of life, there is a loss of trust in the integrity of the body. The accounts of agoraphobic 
respondents (see chapter 2) utilised throughout this thesis repeatedly emphasise that 
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the individual sufferer fears being betrayed by their body, and is constantly on the 
look out for breaches of bodily boundaries that might be visible to others. These 
include for example, minor discrepancies such as blushing, trembling or sweating, in 
addition to more extreme examples, such as screaming out loud, or the loss of bowel 
or bladder control, manifestations of their fear on the surface of their bodies which 
would be thoroughly humiliating. The intensely embodied nature of these 'emotional' 
states necessitates a reconfiguration of the subject's conception of herself. The 
disorder seems to initiate a sense of separateness from one's body, not just 
momentarily, as in the fleeting depersonalisation of the panic attack but in the more 
general sense of creating a constant anxiety which hovers over the question of our 
bodily and mental identity. 
Precisely because something seems to have gone wrong agoraphobic anxiety forces 
our bodily and mental states to the forefront of our attention; we are no longer 'at one 
with' our body, and our relationship with it is no longer unconscious or 
unproblematic. We might, following Drew Leder, ( 1990) speak of a sense of 
dysembodiment. For Leder, the body is ordinarily 'absent', only in the event of some 
dysfunction does it become immediately present to us, it dysappears. Thomas 
Csordas, accepting Leder' s portrayal, characterizes it thus; "the vivid but unwanted 
consciousness of one's body in disease, distress or dysfunction is a kind of dys-
appearance, a bodily alienation or absence of a distinct kind." (Csordas 1994: 8) In 
agoraphobia, our sense of embodied subjectivity is inescapably conspicuous, as 
indeed it is with many other manifestations of chronic illness and disability (Butler 
and Parr 1999; Dorn 1998; Moss and Dyck 1999). But, given the ease with which we 
normally 'take for granted' our status as clearly defined individuals, as solid bodies 
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which contain (and also constitute) our personalities, it comes as something of a shock 
to realize that, in Elizabeth Grosz's terms, we might inhabit 'volatile bodies'. For 
Grosz ( 1994), mind and body alike are not static or impervious to our surroundings 
but labile and at least semi-permeable; "[t]he limits or borders of the body image are 
not fixed by nature or confined to the anatomical "container," the skin. The body 
image is extremely fluid and dynamic; its borders, edges and contours are "osmotic" -
they have the remarkable power of incorporating and expelling outside and inside in 
an ongoing exchange" (Grosz 1994: 79). 
When the ability to unconsciously regulate these processes of incorporation and 
expulsion slip from our control then our very existence is thrown into doubt. "I was 
startled awake one day to realize that I was almost entirely gone. What woke me was 
my body, whose very being in the world suddenly shifted and changed everything." 
(Bordo 1998: 80) The difference between the sufferer and normalcy is epitomised in 
Bordo's account of her recovery from agoraphobia. "Being outside, which when I was 
agoraphobic had left me feeling substanceless, a medium through which body, breath 
and world would rush, squeezing my heart and dotting my vision, now gave me 
definition, body, focused my gaze." (Bordo 1998: 83) From a phenomenological 
position it is unsurprising that anxiety should manifest itself both 'bodily' and 
'mentally' since theorists like Merleau-Ponty assume a model of identity which 
regards the body as the self, the 'self expressed'. (Merleau-Ponty 1962) Such 
phenomenological insights continue to influence feminist theory both within and 
beyond the philosophy discipline, and have a significant and recurring role to play in 
this thesis, a significance that stems precisely from the phenomenological 
understanding of embodiment and self-identity as inextricably interconnected. This 
insight is crucial, I argue, to interpreting and potentially understanding the meaning 
and experience of agoraphobia. 
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In contradistinction to the dominant cognitivism of most post-Cartesian philosophy 
there is something of a consensus among contemporary feminist theorists, 
geographers included, that the subjectivity or sense of self of each and every 
individual is thoroughly, absolutely, embodied. This re-emphasis on the body has 
drawn on numerous sources but, as Borda ( 1993, p.17) notes, owes as much if not 
more to the body-politics of second wave feminism as it does to the theorising of 
Foucault. Whatever its origins, all agree that this long overdue acknowledgement of 
the inter-relatedness of self-identity and corporeality opens new questions. As soon as 
we recognise that the body and not just the mind is "a medium of culture" (Bardo 
1993, p. 65) then the question of how women's self-identities and bodies are 
maintained and disciplined in and through the agency of an (often hostile) cultural 
environment becomes crucial. The question becomes one of the consequences for 
self-identity of the relative (im)permeability of that subject's boundaries to influences 
that are partially constitutive of, and yet potentially corrosive to, that identity. These 
boundaries can themselves no longer be envisaged in entirely physical or mental 
terms - as dependent, say, upon a 'strong constitution' or a 'weak will' - but as an 
inextricably complex combination of both. The question that is constantly asked of 
each of us is, how 'thick-skinned' can/should we be in the presence of others? This 
question seems to be absolutely central to an understanding of the nature of 
agoraphobia and also, to the gender specific incidence of agoraphobia in society. 
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I argue that a feminist approach that draws on phenomenological, as well as 
existentialist theory, is particularly suited to the aims of this project for a number of 
reasons. First it initially requires that we 'bracket' epistemological questions, and 'go 
back to the things themselves' - the 'phenomenological reduction' described by 
Husserl as 'epoche'. Phenomenology thus allows us to return to, and concentrate on, 
the accounts of women's actual lived and embodied experiences, to take seriously 
their own voices and the stories they tell, rather than requiring us to posit specific 
external causes. This, as Merleau-Ponty' s (1962) account of the 'lived body' (or 'self 
expressed') shows, in no way necessitates that we ignore the influence of the material 
and social world. On the contrary, it acts as a reminder that this world is always a 
world·:for-us, interpreted and experienced through our positioning within it. The 
individual's particular perspective is, therefore, of the utmost phenomenological 
impo11ance, and this approach thus subverts the Cartesian tendency to divide the 
world into an internal mental realm and an external physical realm. And, as I argue 
below, this fits perfectly with women's own accounts of their embodied experience of 
the world (whether phobic or otherwise), which can never be fully or faithfully 
conceptualised in terms of one side of this dichotomy. (See also Battersby 1998; 
Leder 1990; Young 1990. An account of phenomenology is developed more fully in 
chapter six.) 
However, of the feminist theorists called upon in this thesis, several might align 
themselves more closely with post-structuralist than phenomenological thought (e.g. 
Butler 1992; 1993, Grosz 1994 and Longhurst 2000a), and my own inclination toward 
phenomenology, viewed as more sensual than textual, thus requires some explanation. 
As Moran (2000) has argued, phenomenological and post-structuralist perspectives 
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are not so different as they might initially seem. Not only does post-structuralism owe 
a historical debt to phenomenology - particularly in the shape of Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty's writings - that often remains unacknowledged, but both are also 
conspicuously engaged in a critique of scientistic naturalism. 3 Thus phenomenological 
references to embodied experiences should not be interpreted as positing a pre-
discursive body, a body uninfluenced by and beyond the reach of language's 
circumlocutions. They do not deny the role and import of the linguistic mediation of, 
or contribution to, our experiences. 
Phenomenology does though explicitly deny that all being is language, that there is 
nothing beyond the text. While the post-structuralist insistence on the discursive 
nature of embodiment has much to offer feminist politics and theory we must make 
sure that we do not ourselves fall prey to a 'tyranny of the concept'. The fact that 
language is the main medium of expressing ourselves to others does not mean that the 
self is nothing more than a narrative structure, that my life can be understood simply 
as the word become flesh. In calling upon us to pay attention to the phenomena 
themselves, phenomenological descriptions try to bring to the attention of others, to 
bring into language, sensory experiences that have as yet been insufficiently or 
improperly articulated. This difficulty in communication, in finding the right words to 
express one's embodied experiences, is something of which agoraphobics frequently 
complain. 
In this sense the phenomenological feminism advocated here can be genuinely critical 
of phallogocentrism - of the power of the word (logos) to order and apportion 
meaning to women's experiences in a patriarchal society, and comes close to the 
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difference feminism of Luce Irigaray, who is herself frequently regarded as 'post-
structuralist' (lrigaray, 1985). Irigaray too considers women's embodied experiences 
as being denied expression in the dominant symbolic order and as providing a (non-
naturalistic) 'ground' from which women might speak of the otherwise inarticulable 
differences of their experiences (Davidson & Smith 1999). One of the explicit aims of 
this thesis is to make room for the previously unheard voices of agoraphobic women, 
to allow unusual stories about selves and spaces to be articulated, and truly 
appreciated by (phobic and non-phobic) others, all of whom, at one time or another, 
will have experienced some discomfort in the face of social space. The thesis aims to 
help make such strange socio-spatial experience intelligible, and perhaps also more 
acceptable. That is to say, it aims to challenge the stigma associated with unusual, 
even 'delusional' geographies (Parr 1998), by rendering them more comprehensible 
and comparable to 'normal' everyday life. The phenomenological aspects of this 
investigation thus expand geographical critiques of the (dis)embodied subject, and 
enhance our understanding of its inherent spatiality. 
There has been substantial focus on geographies of embodiment in recent years, with 
many, often feminist, geographers pointing out that (the) bodies of theory in fact tend 
to be white, male, heterosexual, middle class, and otherwise normative, not 'normal' 
(Rose 1999: 249). By this I mean that, despite the frequency with which we encounter 
such hegemonic, supposedly unmarked and 'neutral' ·representations of embodiment, 
they fail to correspond with the experience most of us have of our own and other('s) 
bodies. In response, such researchers have attempted to re-place predominant and 
proscriptive approaches to thinking about 'the' body, and bring the live and fleshy 
diversity of real individual bodies to the theoretical fore. By drawing attention to 
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those that are, for example; young, pregnant, classed, 'raced', sculpted, tattooed, built, 
bulimic, sexed, queer, disabled, fit, obese, cyber-, grotesque, psychiatrised, old and 
dead (examples of most, if not all, of which can be found in collections edited by 
Butler and Parr 1999; Duncan 1996; Teather 1999, and Nast and Pile 1998), 
geographers aim to initiate conceptual and material change. That is to say, such 
research can challenge the way we think and thus the way we treat bodies, and so also 
selves. I want to suggest that studies of agoraphobic embodiment have potentially 
significant contributions to make to this expanding field. This thesis thus argues that 
agoraphobia's experiential and conceptual excess, its stress on the emotional 
dynamics of embodiment in place(s) constitutes constructive refusal of the dis-
embedded bodies of 'tired' and, all to often, un-tested theory. 
One particularly useful sociological approach to embodiment that draws extensively 
on phenomenological theory is advanced by Williams and Bendelow in The Lived 
Body ( 1998). Like these theorists, I have found that attempts to extend and apply 
phenomenological understandings of embodiment to particular lived bodies in 
particular social contexts benefit considerably from an infusion of the sociological 
insights of Erving Goffman. For Williams and Bendelow, Goffman's carefully 
observed and empirically based 'carnal sociology' gives further practical credence to 
phenomenology, and his work is clearly of geographical significance, in its focus on 
the social settings in which bodily encounters occur. Goffman's work has been 
inspirational for this thesis (see especially chapter five) because of his attempts to 
elucidate the nature of social anxieties, including stigma and embarrassment, and the 
tactics by which they are 'managed'. 
In a statement that highlights Goffman 's relevance for this project, Williams and 
Bendelow ( 1998: 56) write that, 
"[f]or Goffman, successful passage through public space, whether it be the 
street, the supermarket, or a busy shopping mall, is both a practical problem 
and skilful accomplishment for the human agent, involving specific social 
rules and rituals which facilitate this passage and 'repair' disruptions to the 
micro-public order of social interaction." 
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Precisely because of this focus on the largely taken-for-granted 'minutiae' of social 
encounters in practical(ly) 'everyday' situations - for the non-phobic at least -
Goffman' s work will be taken up in order to 'flesh out' philosophical treatment of the 
phenomenal difficulties suffered by phobic selves in social space. 
Social Space 
In 'Spatialising Feminism', Linda McDowell ( 1996: 29) emphasises the need to 
perform the perhaps obvious but oft-avoided geographical task of defining space, and 
indeed Doreen Massey elsewhere ( 1993: 142) asserts that a discussion of this topic 
"never surfaces because everyone assumes we already know what the term means". 
Clearly, however, 'space' is used in geographical literature in a number of diverse and 
at times conflicting ways. Against this ambiguous background, McDowell begins her 
attempt at clarification by highlighting the impo1tance of viewing space as "relational 
and constitutive of social processes", and crucially, in her view, as inextricably 
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connected with time (I 996: 29; see also McDowell 1999, Massey 1992, 1993; Soja 
1989). In McDowell's sense 'space' is not Newtonian, it is not an abstract pre-
existing void, an empty container waiting to be filled by people, objects etc. Space is 
something that in Lefebvre' s (1994) terms is 'produced' through a (culturally 
mediated) dialectic between things and people. 
Referring to spaces as relational need not imply that they are somehow less concrete, 
that they lack "permanence" or "solidity" and therefore cannot operate to anchor 
cultural meanings and symbols. This is precisely why McDowell wants to emphasise 
that space need not be conceived only as a 'set of flows' but can also be regarded as a 
'set of places' which are specific locations that operate as territories, bounding and 
fixing these relations in culturally variable ways. 4 Thus, while this characterisation 
allows a sense of space as "social morphology" (Lefebvre 1994 ), crucially, it does not 
preclude discussion of 'sets' of places of potential import for this thesis - the spaces, 
for example, of subjects' homes, train stations, or malls - so long as the particular 
context is explained. For McDowell, "spatial configurations, connections between 
places are significant only in the context of a specific question or investigation of 
specific sets of relationships." (1996: 31) Such relational articulations of space have 
an important role to play in human geography research and the specific question and 
particular purpose of this thesis - to explore and illuminate the nature of certain socio-
spatial anxieties - are facilitated by an appreciation of space that emphasises relations 
between subjects. 
Putting the subject centre-stage is explicit in Gillian Rose's (1999) account of 
'Performing Space'. Rose advances an experientially focused understanding of space 
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that takes seriously the possibility of complex and unusual spatial experiences. 
Moreover, it allows for, indeed 'fits' with agoraphobic narratives of deeply personal 
and confused, but evidently inter-relational and dynamic experiences of space. Rose 
argues ( 1999: 248) that, as with Butler's ( 1990; 1993) account of gender, "space is 
also a doing, that it does not pre-exist its doing, and that its doing is the articulation of 
relational performances". Further; 
Space then is not an anterior actant to be filled or spanned or constructed, and 
to claim it is runs the risk of making a contingent spatial articulation of 
relationality foundational. Instead, space is practised, a matrix of play, 
dynamic and iterative, its forms and shapes produced through the citational 
performance of self-other relations. Which is not to say that space is infinitely 
plastic. Certain forms of space tend to recur (Rose 1999: 248). 
The thinking and making of space is, for Rose, phantas(ma)tically complex. The 
processes involve emanations from and interactions (including revolts, refusals, 
inscriptions and investments) between three spatial modalities - the discursive, the 
fantasized and the embodied - and cannot be separated from the operation(s) of 
power. In relation to agoraphobic situations, the powerful forms of space that tend to 
recur are, as we shall see, spaces infused with and reproductive of frightful patriarchal 
ideologies and conceits. The perspectives, power and (often behind the scenes) 
performances of others can combine with subjective sensitivities to make space 
anxious and aversive, domestic, dull and drab, or oppressive and exclusive. And, for 
the agoraphobic subject caught up in the performance of such antagonistic space, it 
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rarely feels like she has much say in its making. Rather, she perceives herself a 'bit 
player', reacting against and retreating from the marginalizing performances of others. 
This conceptualisation of space as performative thus goes some way toward setting 
the context for addressing one question critical for this project. When we ask what 
causes certain spaces to be.felt, by certain subjects, in a threatening way, we clearly 
need to consider the role, activities, intentions - the performances - of others. These 
performances, combined with one's own (perhaps anxious) contribution, bring 
particular spaces into being~ "particular performances articulate their own spatialities" 
(Gregson and Rose 2000: 441 ). Kathleen Kirby's view of subjective felt spatiality 
seems at least partially compatible with this account, and also with those of 
agoraphobics. She writes, "the problem with space isn't just space~5 it is the fact that 
there are other people in it - other people who are creating it, determining it, 
composing it...is it surprising then, that space could seem a bit hostile?" (1996, 99) 
This statement implies that space is charged somehow, populated with the 
constructions of others. However, most individuals most of the time are quite literally 
impervious to these un-wholesome attributes of space. Space, as Elspeth Probyn 
points out, "presses upon bodies differently" (Probyn 1995, 83), to which we must 
add; bodies, too, press differently on space (Valentine 1996). 
Clearly, it is not only feminist geographers who reco·gnise that space is "filled and 
animated by the reciprocal relations between individuals." (Vidler 1991: 39) Opening 
his fascinating excursus on the damaging effect of particular (city, and thus 
manufactured) spaces on individual health and identity, architectural theorist Anthony 
Vidler makes the modest assertion that he wants to write a 'small history of modern 
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space'. Following social and spatial theorists such as Benjamin, Simmel and 
Kracauer, Vidler conceives of space as "the expression of social conditions" ( 1991: 
39), and yet "reciprocally interdependent with society" ( 1991: 32). In accordance with 
the feminist geographical approach introduced above, and advanced by this thesis, 
Vidler conceives of spaces and selves as mutually constitutive, affecting and at times 
afflicting each other. We can and indeed do create, and are (at least pa11ially 
re)created by, disturbing and pathological landscapes. In some respects then, Vidler' s 
account of self/space relations resembles that of another architectural theorist, who 
states that agoraphobia, "like other urban pathologies, tells us something about the 
way space is constitutive of personality" (da Costa Meyer 1996: 141). 
For Vidler, space is "of course, no more than a cultural and mental construction; for, 
in historical terms, like the body, or like sexuality, space is not a constant". Rather (as 
Victor Burgin also notes) "space has a history." (Vidler 1993: 31) If, then, we are to 
produce the particular history he has in mind - a 'sociopsychological history of 
metropolitan space' - we ought, Vidler claims, to begin in 1871, the year that the 
"essentially spatial disease" of agoraphobia was first identified (1991: 34 ). As for the 
geographical starting point for this history, we must look to the pathoscapes of 
modernity's monstrous cities. 
The nineteenth-century city had been understood to harbor dangerous diseases, 
epidemics, and equally dangerous social movements; it was the breeding 
ground of the all-levelling masses, of frightening crowds, the insanitary home 
of millions, an asphalt and stone wilderness, the opposite of nature. The 
metropolis carried forward all these stigmas, but added those newly identified 
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by the mental and social sciences. It rapidly became the privileged territory of 
George Beard's neurasthenia, of Charcot's hysteria, of Carl Otto Westphal's 
and Legrand du Saulle's agoraphobia, of Benjamin Ball's claustrophobia. It 
sheltered a nervous and feverish population, over-excited and enervated, 
whose mental life as Georg Simmel had noted in 1903 was relentlessly anti-
social, driven by money and haunted by the fear of touching. (Vidler 1991: 34) 
Georg Simmel was in fact crucial to the project of theorising the mental life of 
modernity and the metropolis. On Vidler's reading, he 
staged the 'sensitive and nervous modern person' in front of the backdrop of 
'jostling crowdedness and motley disorder', and argued that an inner 
psychological barrier, a distance was essential for protection against despair 
and unbearable intrusion. The 'pathological deformation of such an inner 
boundary and reserve', Simmel noted, 'was called agoraphobia: the fear of 
coming into too close a contact with objects, a consequence of hyperaesthesia, 
for which every direct and energetic disturbance causes pain'. Simmel's 
diagnosis was at once spatial and mental: [ ... agoraphobia] was a product of 
the rapid oscillation between two characteristic moods of urban life: the over-
close identification with things, and, alternately, too great a distance from 
them. (Vidler 1991: 3617) 
This conception of 'distance', and the implications for subjects of its 'deformation', 
provides crucial insights into the subject's vulnerability when faced by crowds of 
others, and links with my own usage of 'boundaries' in this thesis. The above account 
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makes clear that social spaces of the city at this particular period in time were 
especially dangerous for 'sensitive individuals', especially given the emergence and 
increasing impo1tance of 'space conquering techniques', such as radio and railway 
(Schivelbusch ( 1980). See also da Costa Meyer ( 1996) on the connections between 
agoraphobia and the Industrial Revolution). Such technologies effectively conquer 
spaces between, robbing individuals of their comforting and insulating distance from 
others: "For even as electricity overcame distance, it also worked to annihilate that 
Denkraum which was the zone or space of reasoning, destroying the only protection 
against the experience of phobia, the falling into unreason." (Vidler 1993: 47) 
The city (and its performance) thus entail a potentially disabling proximity with 
others, eroding "any possibility for a stable distance of reflection" (Vidler 1993: 
4617). When robbed of this 'distance', the invasive proximity of others is perceived by 
sensitive individuals to weaken their boundaries. Significantly, this proximity also 
creates far greater potential for objectification, the opportunity to be looked at, yet not 
engaged with as a subject, as in a conversational exchange. As Simmel explains, 
social life in the modern city "shows a great preponderance of occasions to see rather 
than to hear people ... Before the appearance of omnibuses, railroads and streetcars in 
the nineteenth century, men were not is [sic] a situation where for periods of minutes 
or hours they could or must look at each other without talking to one another" 
(Simmel in Vidler 1991: 41 ). This insight, taken up more recently by Goffman, is 
crucial to understanding the difficulties posed by social space for agoraphobics, who 
harbour intense fears of others' looks. 
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Agoraphobia, a condition inseparable from and inconceivable outwith its socio-spatial 
context, is clearly a source of fascination for Vidler. His account helps us to 
historically and geographically situate the disorder in relation to the "social 
estrangement that seemed to permeate the metropolitan realm", the form of alienation 
described by Georg Lukacs as the "transcendental homelessness" of the modern 
world. Agoraphobia was considered as proof that modern cities were in their very 
form unhealthy. Camillo Sitte, in fact, used the disorder to justify his proposals to 
create "small, protective city squares" in his native Vienna. Although he was simply 
mistaken in placing the problem with cities in their wide, open spaces, his recognition 
of the emotional importance of walls was indeed most perceptive (da Costa Meyer 
1996: 145). Around the turn of the century, agoraphobia was considered, along with 
other newly emerging 'nervous diseases', to be 'characteristic' of city life, "endemic 
to urbanism and its effects". For the modern city's particularly female subjects, its 
effects were noisome and unnerving; disconcerting effects no doubt related to the fact 
that modernist space was 'constructed by and for men' (Deutsche 1990). 
This thesis recognises that the symptoms (and performances) of agoraphobic panic 
have serious repercussions for individuals' perception (and creation) of the 'external' 
spaces of their life-worlds as well as the 'internal' spaces of their bodies. Agoraphobic 
panic can in fact, as I argue throughout, induce a crisis in the 'boundary' between self 
and space that throws the existence of both into doubt. The dissembling, dissipative 
effects of agoraphobia can thus be seen to create a garbled geography, where that 
'closest in', the body (Rich 1986) is no longer safely delimited from the outside 
world. The fearful fantasies projected and performed by agoraphobic panic create a 
social space corrosive to the subject's boundaries. In an extraordinarily vicious circle 
of performance I perception of panic, she subsumes the surrounding confusion, and 
fears that she is 'losing her grip' on reality. 
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Kirby ( 1996: 99) writes similarly and insightfully of another spatial phobia, vertigo, 
that it involves "a rift between subject and reality, the mobilisation of the internal 
processes of the subject, and a new fluidity of the external realm." In vertigo "the 
internal/external relation breaks down, resulting in a degeneration of interior 
organisation, and finally - one could imagine, in advanced stages - in a confusion of 
the external order too." (Kirby 1996: 102). There are, then, other affects and effects of 
garbled spatial experience. Related to and perhaps arising from the problematization 
of bodily boundaries, is a crisis of location. The subject of phobic panic, whatever its 
'object', evidently cannot connect normatively with her surroundings and feels 'out of 
place' in a disconcertingly alien world. Phobic accounts have shown that when panic 
surfaces, it threatens the dissolution of self such that the individual seems, quite 
literally, 'lost'. She no longer knows where she is, both in the sense that her 
surroundings have become unfamiliar and threatening and in the sense that she cannot 
locate or delimit her own identity, she feels 'spaced-out'. In Bordo's words "[e]ach of 
us [herself and her sisters] has suffered, each in her own way, from a certain 
heightened consciousness of space and place and our body's relation to them: spells 
of anxiety that could involve the feeling of losing one's place in space and time". 
(Bordo 1998: 74) Somewhat simj}arly, describing his own spatialised 'boundary 
crisis', Roger Caillois recounts a feeling of "depersonalization by assimilation to 
space". (Caillois 1984, in Grosz 1994: 47, emphasis added). 
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Given this crisis state of spatial affairs - of boundaries, distance and location - it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the subject should eventually become more or less 
temporarily housebound. Her boundless vulnerability means she may have no choice 
but to remain exclusively within the home, assuming its protective boundaries as 
reinforcement and extension of the psychocorporeal boundaries of the self. The 
agoraphobic thus incorporates her "own four walls" as an essential element of her 
'ontological security'. Clearly, the association of this sense of security with the home 
is not a universal experience, but for some at least, the home is "a truly safe place, the 
container and springboard for integrated living [ ... ] the foundation of an ontologically 
secure existence." (Marilyn K. Silverman, in Bordo et al. 1998, 90; compare 
Valentine 1998). 
Agoraphobic accounts suggest a powerful contrast between meanings attaching to 
home spaces and the world beyond, a contrast of potential import for this project. 
Feminist geographers have explored such issues in relation to distinctions between 
'private' and 'public' spaces, arguing that the contours of this binary formation are as 
much a product as a reflection of binary constructions of gender (Bondi and Domosh 
1998; Dowling 1998; Duncan 1996). Perhaps especially for the agoraphobic, whose 
condition "straddles the fault line between public and private" (da Costa Meyer 1996: 
141 ), the boundaries between these spheres are very much fluid and unfixed. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the home space traditionally conceived as 'private' can 
itself become threatening and dangerous when, for example, relatives converge at 
Christmas. Likewise, the 'public' space of the town centre can be experienced as 
comfortable and safe when no one else is around. (Ironically, given the common and 
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legitimate concerns of non-phobic women for their safety, this is often when darkness 
provides calm and cover from the 'socialising' presence of others.) 
The agoraphobic' s experience of home can be ambiguous in other ways; for some, 
home becomes so 'secure' that they are rendered incapable of leaving, and it can thus 
simultaneously be experienced as both prison and asylum. But, despite the 
ambivalence of feelings, it is clearly the space of the home that is overwhelmingly 
perceived to be safe, the (anti)social space beyond its confines that menaces and 
disturbs. It thus seems relevant that, despite the achievements of feminisms in 
expanding women's horizons, the gendered identities of women in general are still 
more likely to be enmeshed with the fabric of the home than those of men. In this 
context, agoraphobic women's tendency to experience home as a place of safety, of 
refuge, might be viewed as a retreat into a normatively feminine space where 
gendered boundaries are protected and potentially reinforced. However, it must again 
be emphasised that there is no 'universal' experience of agoraphobia, and we will 
occasionally encounter individuals who have experienced panic within, as well as 
outside their homes. 
In the discussion of difficult spaces and places that follows, I will tend to resist 
employing the loaded and potentially problematic distinction between public and 
private space (see Duncan 1996), and suggest that we can better place and understand 
agoraphobic concerns in relation to the sociality of space. 6 The invasive kind of 
'sociality' I have in mind tends to be encountered most consistently beyond the home, 
in, for example, social (and performative) spaces of consumption, where sheer 
numbers of others can oppress and confuse, and efforts of design are made to 
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( over)stimulate subjects' senses. Such spaces are, arguably, epitomised by large-scale 
shopping centres and malls, where stimulants and performances are taken to 
something of an extreme. 
In clinical literature, we regularly find references to and lists of the kinds of spaces 
and places that agoraphobics will tend to avoid. These predictably often include shops 
of many kinds, busy streets, restaurants and public transport, and are accompanied by 
statements about the rationale for agoraphobic avoidance. We can summarise and 
paraphrase such explanations (detailed above) in terms of the agoraphobic' s apparent 
fear of the consequences of panicking in such environments, that is, of being trapped 
and humiliated in public. I would, however, suggest that we require a more nuanced 
understanding of the nature and constitution of social space such as that outlined 
above. There is more at stake here than subjects' anticipation of an aversive and 
fearful response. The agoraphobic's apparent gut reaction to social space should 
rather be seen as an interaction, as an embodied, emotional exchange, arising from a 
complexity of meanings, meetings and movements between particular selves and 
spaces. Clearly, this approach moves beyond the search for either internal (self) or 
external (space) explanations of agoraphobia, and is open to relational reconfiguration 
of both. I would suggest that by thus adopting a receptive, expansive attitude to space 
as 'performative', we would be better placed to conduct a sympathetic and 
meaningful exploration of agoraphobic landscapes, those spaces and places that 
partially 'produce' (and are partially 'produced' by) feelings of panic in susceptible 
individuals. 
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In summary, this section has shown that a view of space as 'performative' can help 
develop geographical understandings of the nature of agoraphobia. By examining the 
socio-spatial circumstances surrounding experience of panic in particular, 
geographers can illuminate the growth of dis-ease out of the fluid and shadowy 
contours between people and places. Clearly, subjectivities and social spaces interact 
to 'produce' disorder, and agoraphobia is particularly well placed to underscore the 
character and power of this socio-spatial interaction. 
Gendered Boundaries 
From the outset urban phobias were assigned a definite place in the gendering 
of metropolitan psychopathology[ ... and] were thought of as fundamentally 
'female' in character. (Vidler 1993: 35) 
Reviews of clinical, experiential, and interpretative literature reveal that the sex of any 
individual subject is far and away the most reliable predictor for the occurrence of 
agoraphobia. Thorpe and Burns' ( 1983) analysis of ten different agoraphobia studies 
found the average percentage of female sufferers to be 80%. Tian et al. ( 1990: 317) 
claim that "[r]eview of the literature suggests on an average 82% of the agoraphobic 
patients have been female", while Clum and Knowles (1991) review of twelve 
different agoraphobia studies puts the figure at 89%.7 In this section I want to 
consider why this might be the case. What is it about the gender(ing), situation(s) and 
treatment of women that entails heightened susceptibility to agoraphobia? 
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One perhaps obvious place to begin would be with a consideration of gender role 
stereotypes, which for women, involve characteristics not dissimilar to those found in 
agoraphobia. As Joy Reeves (1986: 154) points out, a woman's place is "in the home, 
and not in the market place" (though it should, however, be noted in advance of this 
discussion that such 'home-based' approaches to understanding agoraphobia are 
particular and partial; more boundary focused alternatives will be considered below). 
Such notions about 'proper' behaviour and roles for women are culturally pervasive to 
the extent of being cliches; they po1tray and arguably partially construct women as 
more dependent, emotional, passive, fearful, home-based etc. (see Moi 1999), a 'fact' 
not entirely lost on clinicians (Brehony 1983). For example, in response to Clum and 
Knowles' (1991) finding that men are almost as likely to suffer from panic disorder as 
women ( 41 % ), but are far less likely to go on to develop agoraphobia ( 11 % ), McNally 
(1994: 170) suggests that "[s]tereotypical gender roles may [ ... ] foster agoraphobia in 
those who experience panic". Mathews et al. ( 1981) point out that the social role 
expected of women is consistent with the higher incidence of agoraphobia, and 
educational psychologist Iris Fodor (1974) suggests that the key to the gendered 
distribution of the disorder must lie with the socialization of girls towards 
'helplessness' and 'dependence'. She writes that in later life, "women are reinforced 
for their avoidant behaviour, since it is consistent with the stereotypic feminine role. 
Since women's place is 'in the home', a woman who avoids leaving the home isn't so 
abhorrent". 
Psychiatrists Dianne Chambless and Jeanne Mason (1986: 231) concur with Fodor' s 
view that sex-role stereotyping predisposes women to agoraphobia, and suggests that 
women are less likely to be practised at being outside the home and coping on their 
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own. Further, she suggests that because fearful behaviour is incongruous with the 
male sex-role stereotype, men are more likely to approach a feared object than 
women, even when both describe themselves as "equally fearful" (Chambless I 992: 
4). Behaving fearfully is, she argues, more acceptable for women and "a society that 
does not teach women to be instrumental, competent and assertive is one that breeds 
phobic women" (Chambless 1986: 234). 
Referring to research which attempted to test sex-role stereotyping of agoraphobics, 
Chambless ( 1982: 4) reveals that the study "did not find agoraphobic women to test as 
excessively feminine, although the males' scores were high on femininity, according 
to clinical norms". Chambless also speculates about possible biologicul explanations, 
for example, the link between testosterone and dominant, Jess-fearful behaviour. 
Unusually, she even casts doubt on the very existence of sex difference in 
agoraphobia. She writes ( 1982: 4/5) that "agoraphobia in men may often be masked 
by substance abuse. [ ... ] Given the prevalence of alcoholism in Western society, it 
may be expected, then, that large numbers of male agoraphobics are to be found, not 
in phobia societies and psychiatric clinics for phobia treatment, but in bars, Alcoholics 
Anonymous, and alcoholism treatment centers". This study does, as Chambless 
suggests, warrant careful replication. The fact remains, however, that the 
overwhelming majority of individuals presenting with, trying to articulate, and 
requiring help for agoraphobic symptoms are women. It is with this group of subjects 
that I am concerned in this thesis. 
Clearly, any issue relating to gender, susceptibility to agoraphobia included, can never 
be considered apart from political/historical context. That is to say, any explanatory 
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account of even individual women's experience requires some understanding of the 
position of women in patriarchal society. Consequently, in relation to mental health 
issues, there is a significant tradition of feminist theorists who have explored why 
women apparently experience problems and 'disorder' to a far greater extent than men 
(Pugliesi 1992). Feminist theorists of women's lives and health in general, often begin 
by pointing out that definitions of 'normality' are constructed in accordance with an 
always masculine (rational and autonomous) ideal. Women are thus, by definition, 
always already deviant. When we relate this to issues of mental normality and health, 
we find that definitional reliance on conceptual opposition is, however, more than 
usually explicit. That is to say, mental health is characterised in terms of mental ill-
health (Bondi and Burman forthcoming), which in turn, is characterised in terms of 
'feminine' traits and behavior; the irrational, emotional, and of course typically, 
hysterical. But, as Joan Busfield ( 1996: 118) points out, the links between gender and 
mental 'health' are more complex. "[W]hilst gender is embedded in constructs of 
mental disorder, the constructs of disorder which are developed and elaborated by a 
range of mental health professionals, incorporating ideas about causation and 
treatment as well as about symptoms, in turn contribute to the way in which gender is 
itself constructed" (see also Bus field 1984 ). Conceptions of feminine delicacy and 
derangement underpin and feed into each other. 
Attempting to summarise the diversity of approaches taken by feminist theorists, 
Pauline Prior ( 1999: 78) writes that "[r]easons given for the overrepresentation of 
women in psychiatric statistics have included arguments about the intolerable 
constraints involved in traditional female roles, the acceptability of illness as a mode 
of protest and attention-seeking for women, and the inability of a male dominated 
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society to accept creative but different female behaviour". (See also Showalter 1987; 
Usher 1991; Astbury 1996 and Shimrat 1997.) More pithily, Busfield ( 1996: 139) 
arguably encapsulates feminist concerns when she asks "[d]oes women's oppression 
drive them mad?" A question somewhat similar in nature has in fact been fairly 
prominent in my mind throughout this research, shaping its course and influencing my 
choice of theoretical resources for this thesis: Does women's oppression (in terms of 
their gender(ing), situation(s), and treatment) drive their phobic retreat from the social 
world? 
Of those few social theorists who have offered gender sensitive insights into 
agoraphobia specifically (for example Gardner 1984 and Garbowsky 1989), some 
have attempted to contextualise its emergence, occurrence and experience in terms of 
wider cultural (e.g. Reeves 1986), economic (e.g. Brown 1987) and political (e.g. da 
Costa Meyer 1996) circumstances. For example, Abram de Swaan 's ( 1981) 
'socio genesis' of agoraphobia provides an account of the historical restrictions on 
women's movement in public. That there is surprisingly little historical literature on 
the subject is perhaps, he speculates, because these limitations were considered too 
unimportant or too self-evident to warrant description, much less discussion. In fact, 
he claims, the richest source of information concerning the "gradual disappearance of 
women from the streets during the first half of the nineteenth century" (de Swann 
1981: 362), that is, during the initial phase of industrialisation, is to be found in 
etiquette manuals. The injunctions contained within highlight effectively the extent to 
which 'public' places had become strictly the preserve of men alone. Joy Reeves also 
notes that, around the time of the 'discovery' of agoraphobia, women were seriously 
discouraged from venturing outside the home on their own. However, "[t]oday we are 
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faced with the paradox of women who were originally prohibited by law and custom 
from entering public areas of activity and who are now diagnosed as phobic when 
participation in the public arena makes them unduly anxious" (Reeves 1986: 154 ). It 
is her contention, and one which this thesis supports, that "[t]he cure for agoraphobia 
may ultimately be sociological, which includes the political dimension" ( 1986: 157). 
Reeves' article is valuable in that it emphasises the need to view agoraphobia as part 
of a larger picture. She argues that simply "[t]reating symptoms leads to trivialization 
of human problems and the people who have them" ( 1986: 156), and that we therefore 
need to develop alternative, non-clinical approaches: "When we understand social 
structures and structural changes as they bear on more intimate experiences, we are 
able to understand the causes of individual conduct and feelings of which people in 
specific milieux are themselves unaware". (Reeves 1986: 153, referencing Mills 1959: 
163) Issues of sex inequality and its effect on social institutions are, on this account, 
particularly relevant. Consequently, in accordance with feminist aims and objectives, 
putting the beginnings of a 'cure' into place for Reeves would involve the creation of 
'real options' for both sexes, in the home as well as the market place, and the wide 
scale reduction of sex inequality in institutional structures. 
One alternative avenue of enquiry I would like to explore here relates less to the 
socialisation and treatment of women than to chronologically (developmentally) 
earlier questions of boundary formation. Given the centrality of boundaries to the 
phenomenology of agoraphobia, and the fact that the corrosive aspects of social space 
seem to impact more severely on women than on men, I want to question whether we 
might usefully frame our inquiry in terms of the engendering of subjects' boundaries. 
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Are, we might ask, women's boundaries different, perhaps less protective than those 
of men? 
Perceptive and potentially useful work on boundary issues has been carried out by 
geographers informed by psychoanalytic theory. Human geographers such as Bondi 
( l 999a), Rose ( 1993) and Sibley ( 1995) have looked to the objects relations approach 
taken by, for example, Klein and Winnicott, to help explain the "dynamic 
uncertainties" and "instabilities" that characterise subjectivity. (Rose 1993: 78) 
Consideration of some of this work can perhaps further our reconceptualisation of the 
embodied self beyond the limitations of the Cartesian rational and masculinist ideal. 
For, as Sibley ( 1995) points out, conceptualising the central developmental processes 
of projection and introjection enables object relations theory to produce a more 
'ecological' model of the self, by emphasising the constructive nature of links 
between selves and spaces. 
Object relations theory offers an account of the emergence of social selves and their 
protective boundaries in environmental and relational context. On this view, the new 
born child has no initial sense of itself as separate from its surroundings. Only 
gradually does it begin to recognise a distinction between what is 'me' and 'not-me', 
through a process Winnicott describes as 'personalisation' (Davis and Wallbridge 
1981: l 00). The boundary that emerges during this process protects the individual 
from dissolution into its environs, and its maintenance is crucial for a sense of mental 
health and well being. However, these boundaries are never fixed once and for all, but 
must be continually renegotiated in a dynamic interaction between inner self and outer 
space. How we, as adults, 'manage' this interaction will be influenced by our 
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experience of this initial phase of boundary formation. As Liz Bondi (l 999b: 4) 
explains, the process of personalisation - becoming a person - "generates a 
framework that, in one way or another, resonates through all future relationships" 
(See also Bondi l 999a; Latham 1999), including, one imagines, relations with places 
as well as persons. Importantly, for object relations theorists, the sex of the child has a 
central role in this process, and may help explain why "some people will have a 
greater boundary consciousness than others" (Sibley 1995: 7). 
In her early ( 1978) account of object relations theory, Nancy Chodorow argues that 
the very gendered nature of personalisation means women tend to have a greater 
sensitivity to the fragility of their boundaries than men. She explains that boys are 
required to develop a greater sense of autonomy, separateness and distance from 
others, as a result of the different gender of the primary carer (still overwhelmingly 
likely to be a woman) from whom they must distinguish themselves. In contrast, 
"because they are parented by a person of the same gender, girls come to experience 
themselves as less differentiated than boys, as more continuous with and related to the 
external object-world, and as differently oriented to their inner object-world as well." 
(Chodorow 1978: 167) Simply put, "the basic feminine sense of self is connected to 
the world [while] the basic masculine sense of self is separate" (Chodorow 1990: 
119). 
Chodorow's theory may go some way towards explaining some aspects of women's 
increased susceptibility to agoraphobia. For example, she argues that "women's 
relational self can be a strength or a pitfall in feminine psychic life: it enables 
empathy, nurturance, and intimacy but threatens to undennine autonomy and to 
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dissolve se(l into others" ( 1990: 121, emphasis added), precisely the kind of fluid 
phenomena feared by agoraphobic women. Feminist psychotherapists Luise 
Eichenbaum and Susie Orbach ( 1992: 165), following object relations theory, in fact 
suggest that agoraphobic women have "had to create false boundaries because the 
possibility of genuine separateness was not available to her in her development. A 
woman may fear that if she steps outside the home she may lose the physical 
boundaries she has come to rely on and hence she will lose herself'. On this account, 
women's boundaries simply do not offer them the protection afforded by men's, and it 
is this vulnerability to (the effects of) one's surrounds that engenders panic and 
avoidance in the face of social space. While Chodorow, among others (for example 
Dinnerstein 1978; Gilligan 1982) has been criticised for "reproducing the familiar 
structure of binary oppositions in conceptualisations of gender" (Bondi and Burman 
2001: 13), she has, in more recent work (Chodorow 1994; see also Flax 1990), taken 
account of the 'multiplicity' and 'ambiguity' of gender. 
Williams and Bendelow ( 1998: 118) are among those who emphasise that there are 
certain disadvantages to such dualistic approaches, and to conceptualising women's 
boundaries negatively, as not simply different from the masculinist 'ideal', but less 
than, inadequate in comparison. This is one of the problems we encounter in Iris 
Marion Young's (1990) 'Throwing Like a Girl', a remarkably spatialised account of 
women's embodiment, but one which, nevertheless, portrays femininity as a 
'liability'. Young argues that either through women's 'training', or an awareness of 
'objectification' by the male gaze, women are likely to demonstrate styles of bodily 
comportment that are more restricting and restrictive than those adopted by men. 
They are unable to 'master' their environment, and more likely to interact with it 
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cautiously, rather than confidently. As women, we are 'physically handicapped' in (or 
perhaps by) a 'sexist society' (Young 1990: 153). 
Clearly, it is difficult to think beyond predominant masculine models of embodiment 
portrayed as the 'norm', when powerful masculinist discourses and practices continue 
to permeate social and academic life. (For example, as Williams and Bendelow ( 1998: 
115) point out "contemporary medical textbooks continue to portray the male body as 
the standard against which the female body is judged, and comparative references to 
female anatomy continue to employ terms such as 'smaller', 'feebler', 'weaker', 'less 
well developed', to demonstrate how women differ from men".) But, and as I discuss 
in chapter seven, Young elsewhere attempts to subvert the masculine norm in essays 
dealing with 'breasted experience' and 'pregnant embodiment' (1990), a 
'gynocentric' phenomenological project also taken up by Christine Battersby (1998). 
Battersby' s explicit concern in The Phenomenal Woman is to "ask what happens to 
the notion of identity if we treat the embodied female as the norm for models of the 
self," ( 1998: 38) suggesting we might thus subvert the rigidly contained androcentric 
norm. In a critique allied with much contemporary feminist geography, Battersby 
( 1998: 57) argues that boundaries do not "need to be conceived in ways that make the 
identity closed, autonomous or impermeable. We need to think individuality 
differently, allowing the potentiality for otherness to exist within it, as well as 
alongside it. We need to theorize agency in terms of patterns of potentiality and 
flow". 8 This account, reminiscent of Irigaray' s (1985) conception of 'fluid 
mechanics', could be particularly useful here. Battersby shows, as I myself repeatedly 
argue in this thesis, that women simply do not experience themselves, and their 
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'place' in the world, in the limited manner suggested by the dominant and pervasive 
Cartesian model of subjectivity. Feminist theorists and therapists thus need to create a 
more inclusive conceptual framework, what Battersby terms a 'revolutionary space' 
in which more fluid selves and spatial relations can be envisaged, articulated, and 
perhaps, more comfortably managed. 
Fluid boundaries need not, then, necessarily be conceived and thus perceived -
actually felt and experienced - as deviant and pathological. By rethinking subjectivity 
through the bodies of women, particularly 'disordered' agoraphobic women, we can 
highlight and (un)fix the limitations currently in place. The point to be emphasised 
here is that any 'other' experience of the world cannot be understood if we stick with 
a Cartesian view of the individual as fenced off and radically separate from their 
environs. Embodied and especially spatial difference must be able to be thought, if it 
is to be subjectively integrated and 'handled'. However, I want to emphasise that my 
aim here is in no sense to 'celebrate' 'disordered' subjectivity. Rather, my intention is 
to sympathise with, and synthesise agoraphobic experience within more inclusive 
conceptions of selves in space. 
I want to close this section by emphasising the importance for geographers of 
recognising that experiences of space and place in patriarchal societies are necessarily 
gendered, and moreover, that this is stressed by experiential accounts of agoraphobics. 
A study such as this can, therefore, help geographers understand and theorise the 
ways in which women and men conceptualise and negotiate their place in social 




In conclusion, it is hoped that this study will make an original contribution to wider 
debates in human geography, and connect some existing areas of research on, for 
example, space and subjectivities, bodily boundaries, and gendered, disabled and 
'fearful' experience of space. By conducting in-depth research on some of the more 
extreme ways in which people, and women in particular, relate to their environments, 
we might shed some light on some of the more taken for granted aspects of 'normal' 
(that is, non-pathological) person I place relations. The substantive chapters of this 
thesis will thus present a constructive and philosophically informed engagement with 
agoraphobic experiences. This constitutes a partial critique of existing geographical 
accounts of everyday interaction between people and places, and aims to forge a path 
through agoraphobia towards more open ways of thinking and treating spatial 
relations. By thus developing an increasingly nuanced and feminist philosophical 
geography, the thesis demonstrates the potential importance of existential 
phenomenology for fully spatialized understandings of subjectivities, of use for 
phobics and non-phobics alike. First though, I will present two chapters dealing with 
the methodological aspects of this project, explaining exactly how it was conducted, 
and reflecting on what lessons were learned. 
1 
There are however exceptions; Thorpe and Burns (1983) study found 9% of their respondents 
developed the disorder before age 16, and 13% after age 40. Marks and Gelder's (1966) study suggests 
there may be two peaks in age of onset, the first in late adolescence, the second around age 30. Most 
studies have found that agoraphobia in childhood is very rare indeed, though some links have been 
suggested with school phobia (Bowlby 1973) or separation anxiety in childhood (Brier and Charney 
1985). Marks ( 1987: 328) suggests that "f t]wo compatible explanations are that such childhood 
anxieties sensitize someone to later agoraphobia, or that both problems reflect a generally fearful 
disposition". 
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2 In Words, Sartre wrote, "I was Roquentin; in him I exposed, without self-satisfaction, the web of my 
life; at the same time I was myself, the elect, the chronicler of hells" (in Moran 2000: 367). 
3 For example, Merleau-Ponty explicitly suggests, like Lacan, that the unconscious is structured like a 
language. Moran (2000: 432) also outlines the influence of phenomenology on Foucault and Deleuze 
and reiterates Derrida's views on Merleau-Ponty's intellectual "brilliance" (2000: 432). While his 
contribution has been "almost completely ignored'', there are, Moran claims, grounds to argue that 
Merleau-Ponty is actually the "father" of post-structuralism . 
.i Although perhaps McDowell ( 1996: 32) might sometimes be regarded as tending to replace an 
absolute notion of space with an abstract notion place as an "absolute location", as somewhere static. 
5 
However, for Gregson and Rose (2000: 441 ), there is no 'just space'; '"stages' do not preexist their 
performances, waiting in some sense to be mapped out by their performances; rather, specific 
performances bring these spaces into being". 
6 Where the term 'public' is used, I refer to spatial situations stereotypically or colloquially conceived 
in such terms, for example, public parks, public transport, the public eye; generally speaking references 
to 'public', should be read as designating 'social' space. 
7 Some researchers have pointed to evidence of cultural specificity in the sex distribution of 
agoraphobia; Barlow ( 1988: 28) writes that "women are strikingly more afflicted with anxiety in 
Western cultures, while males seek treatment in equally remarkable numbers in Eastern cultures". 
Seemingly supporting this view, Marks ( 1987) points to a study by Chambers et al. ( 1982) which found 
78% of agoraphobics attending a psychiatric clinic for treatment in India to be men. Marks does not, 
however, accept that the findings are representative of actual incidence, suggesting that they are 
reflective of referral patterns and that it is culturally more acceptable for women to be afraid of public 
places. (Though the issue of cultural difference is rarely the subject of clinical discussion, Last and 
Herson ( 1988) suggest that agoraphobia should be treated exclusively as a culturally bound disorder of 
Western origin; it is not, they claim, to be found in Botswana.) 
8 In contrast with more extreme poststructuralist views, however, Battersby ( 1998: 57) sharply rejects 
calls for "abandonment, transgression or deconstruction of boundaries". She does not, contra Williams 





Following the previous chapter's review of the various bodies of literature deemed 
relevant to this investigation, this chapter turns to methodological issues. I outline the 
nature of the methodological framework employed in some detail, describing its 
underlying assumptions, how the project was designed, how data was collected, and 
finally, how this data was organised and analysed. 
Research Design 
Given the nature of the research question, a qualitative, rather than quantitative, 
approach is clearly most appropriate, allowing questions to be tackled in sufficient 
depth, and crucially, with sensitivity to the deeply personal nature of the issues at 
stake (Britten 2000). In contrast, an approach that was, for example, questionnaire 
based, would imply that I had decided in advance what were the important issues to 
be tackled and questions to be asked (Corbin and Strauss 1990; Morse 1992). Given 
the lack of attention to individual narratives in the existing literature (outlined in 
chapter I) I wanted to focus my research on the issues that were deemed important by 
sufferers themselves. However, 'qualitative methods' is a broad term, covering a 
multitude of approaches. It therefore requires refinement in relation to this particular 
project, and I now turn to the next level of methodological decision making. 
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Heidi Nast ( 1994: 58) asserts that research design requires "critical and reflexive 
questioning of what the research/researcher hopes to accomplish, why a particular 
area was chosen, and for whom we are working". In relation to my own project, my 
initial aims were primarily and explicitly to explore the meanings of agoraphobia.far 
its sufferers, and in so doing, allow them to voice their own concerns and perhaps also 
raise public awareness about their condition. As a feminist researcher, I had chosen to 
study agoraphobia - deemed it "significant for inquiry" (Christopherson 1989, cited in 
Rose 1993: 57) - as it appeared to be an under researched and largely 'hidden' 
condition that overwhelmingly affects women (Clum & Knowles 1991 ). In fact, as 
noted in the introduction, the gendered nature of agoraphobia mirrors that of anorexia 
nervosa (Bardo 1993), but this latter disorder has been explored and exposed by the 
social sciences, as well as the mass media, to a far greater degree over recent decades 
than the former (Bardo 1988, 1993; Bruch 1979; Chemin 1981). The attention given 
by the popular press to eating disorders is doubtless in part due to the celebrity status 
of many of its sufferers. In contrast, any media figure that became agoraphobic - that 
is, fearful of social space - would be likely, almost by definition, to rapidly lose their 
celebrity status as anything other than a recluse. 1 There were additional personal 
reasons for my choice of research since for a limited time I had previously 
experienced some of the symptoms associated with agoraphobia. 
The overwhelmingly gendered distribution of agoraphobia suggests that explicitly 
feminist, qualitative methods are most suited to addressing this project's research 
question. It should however be stressed that no decision had been taken to exclude 
male agoraphobics from this project. Rather, I intended simply to recruit volunteers, 
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and the gendered distribution strengthened expectations that this group would contain 
significantly more women than men. 
Feminists have stressed the political and ethical importance of research that is for 
women, and not simply 'of or 'about' them (Smith 1987). There must be give as well 
as take in the course of our research, and I see the notion of 'intersubjectivity' 
(discussed in McDowell 1992) as being crucial to this approach. Intersubjectivity 
serves to re-conceptualise the exchange between interviewer and interviewee(s) in 
terms of dynamic relations between two or more subjects. It involves recognition that 
data is not simply 'collected' - there can be no 'object' of dispassionate study - but 
rather generated as a result of the interaction between researcher and respondent 
(Tooke 2000). The interviewer is enjoined to be "critical and reflexive" about this 
relationship (Nast 1994 ), and must be sensitive to contextual factors in each 
individual case if she is to produce quality research. While I touch only briefly on the 
nature of intersubjectivity at this stage, the concept raises a number of complex issues 
that I will return to in chapter 3. 
Following Maynard's (1994: 17) contention that "the legitimacy of women's own 
understanding of their experiences is one of the hallmarks of feminism", I resolved 
that the data constituted by this project should largely consist of contributions from 
women with personal, embodied knowledge of agoraphobia, rather than, for example, 
the secondary testimony of non-phobic health care professionals or other merely 
interested parties. In formulating a method for data-generation, I followed the 
suggestion that "ethnographic methods, including participant observation and in-depth 
interviewing, are powerful in allowing us to both describe women's actions and reveal 
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the meaning of these actions .for them" (Dyck 1993: 53, emphasis added; see also 
McDowell 1992: 406). I felt that one-to-one interviews would allow for sensitive 
exploration of difficult issues, and that these should be open-ended and largely 
unstructured, to allow participants to construct their narratives in the manner, depth 
and at the length of their own choosing. I wanted to avoid specifying themes, or 
making assumptions about respondents' life-worlds in advance (Maynard 1994: 13 ). 
Consequently, my initial first round interview 'schedule' was loosely constructed 
around broad opening questions, e.g. "how long ago did you become agoraphobic?", 
and prompts to encourage, but not compel respondents to provide more detail, e.g. 
"could you tell me a bit about what happened at that time?" Questions such as these 
facilitate narration of subject's life histories in a shape of heir own 'choosing', 
enabling implicit but potentially significant autobiographical themes to emerge. 
I originally planned to conduct interviews with twenty people, and to undertake 
follow-up interviews with half of them, to pursue emerging themes and explore issues 
raised in more depth (Ackroyd and Hughes 1992; Kvale 1996; McKenzie, Powell and 
Usher 1997). I hoped to recruit these respondents through 'snowballing', via contact 
with agoraphobic support organisations, for pai1ly pragmatic, but primarily ethical 
reasons. By audio tape-recording these interviews, I aimed to facilitate high quality 
analysis based on verbatim transcripts. I also thought this strategy would be less 
intrusive than continually taking notes, and would help the interview to proceed 
fluidly, in a conversational, rather than halted style, more comfortable for respondents 
(McCracken 1988). All respondents in this project agreed to this strategy, after I 
assured them of complete confidentiality, and that the recordings would be available 
only to myself. I further explained that subsequent reports and publications using 
interview material would disguise their identities by means of pseudonyms and 
imprecise biographical detail. 
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Clearly, as Maynard and Purvis ( 1994: 3) point out, effective and ethical techniques 
for interviewing and analysis require that one continually endeavour to translate 
theoretical concepts into research practice. It was thus felt that 'intersubjectivity', and 
'critical reflexivity' should actively shape the nature and course of my fieldwork on a 
day-to-day basis. Consequently, I chose not to conduct my fieldwork as a discrete and 
limited block to be analysed at a later date. Rather, each individual interview was 
followed by transcription and reflection on the issues raised. This strategy of 
conducting 'sequential' or 'interim' analysis (Pope, Ziebland and Mays 2000; 76) 
helped subsequent interviews to be carried out in a more informed, sensitive and 
constructive manner. (See also Bailey, White and Pain 1999 on the impo1tance of 
'ongoing evaluation'.) Additionally, in follow up interviews, respondents were given 
the oppo1tunity to respond to my interpretations of previous interview material, and 
some of the data was thus reconstituted and enriched over time. This methodological 
approach enables a more faithful re-presentation of respondents' contributions during 
subsequent discourse analysis of the transcripts, one that "'fits' the reality of the 
respondents' lives" (Bailey et al. 1999: 175).2 
There are clearly many methodological pitfalls to avoid in feminist research (England 
1994) and much about interviews in particular that can be emotionally dangerous for 
respondents. The 'give' and 'take' of these 'exchanges' can each all too easily be 
unidirectional, leaving one party enriched, the other exposed and vulnerable (Katz 
1994; Kobayashi 1994 ). Consequently, I struggled at length with thoughts of a 
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conversational ideal, the possibility of 'conducting' the interviews in a non-
hierarchical and non-exploitative way, perhaps even in a manner that would be 
beneficial or enjoyable, rather than stressful or embarrassing for the women who take 
part. This ideal drew on previous feminist research by Maynard ( 1994) who 
somewhat encouragingly suggests that it is at least possible for interviews to be a 
rewarding experience for respondents. She recognises the potential for respondents to 
be personally empowered by their participation in a research project, via "their 
contribution to making visible a social issue, the therapeutic effect of being able to 
reflect on and re-evaluate their experience as part of the process of being interviewed, 
and the generally subversive outcome that these first two consequences may generate" 
(Maynard ( 1994: 17). Chapters by Skeggs and by Phoenix in the same volume 
(Maynard and Purvis 1994) also point out that women can experience pride and 
enjoyment as a result of telling their stories to an interviewer, and need not 
necessarily (be made to) feel vulnerable. 
One would imagine, however, that in order to come close to achieving such positive 
outcomes, something approaching a trusting and comfortable relationship must exist 
(or be brought to existence) between interviewer and interviewee (Skeggs 1994). Of 
crucial importance to this enterprise is the development and deployment of enhanced 
listening skills on the part of the interviewer (Bingley forthcoming; Bondi l 999a, 
l 999b; Devault 1990). Ethical imperatives require us to engage sensitively and 
appropriately with the subtleties and nuances of respondents' contributions, knowing 
when to probe further, and more importantly, when not. In relation to my own 
interviews, the overarching aim, put simply, was to refine my listening and interactive 
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skills to create a 'rapport' that can facilitate what the respondents themselves desire to 
make known. 
The emergence or otherwise of such 'sympathetic space' will, however, inevitably be 
affected by the numerous similarities and differences that exist between 'researcher' 
and 'researched'. Rapport may be enhanced or debased according to subject(ive 
perceptions of) factors such as gender, class, ethnicity, and so on. My own 
respondents, I knew, would almost ce1tainly all be women. However I did not expect 
much in the way of experiential or emotional 'closeness' to be borne of gender 
identity alone (Dyck 1993: 54) and in fact, our experiences as women were inevitably 
revealed to be very different. As it turned out, I, for example, was the unly woman 
involved in this project who did not have children (see also Gilbert 1994: 92) and 
when there was a sense of connection between myself and a respondent, it was far 
more likely to stem from, for example, our shared 'ethnic' (Scottish) or (working) 
class backgrounds than from our experience of gender. The existence of any such 
'conunon ground' (Dyck 1993: 54) is clearly desirable, and can provide 'ground' on 
which rapport can more easily be constructed and maintained. As audiotapes 
subsequently revealed, my inclination to stress similarities between respondents and 
myself was such that, in some cases, I (unwittingly) stressed similarities in my accent. 
I thus learned to guard, at least partially, against such effectively misleading strategies 
that would perhaps encourage over-identification. It must be stressed, however, that 
this guarding can only ever be partial; there is no singular 'true' self one can present 
to respondents, and aspects of one's 'voice', for example, will inevitably vary 
according to context. 
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Clearly, the researcher and researched in this project were not 'equal'. As an 
academic researcher in an established university, a predominantly middle class 
institution, I felt keenly aware of my distance from my (working) class background 
(see also Skeggs 1994\ While issues of class background and current socio-
economic status was not always explicitly addressed, the majority of respondents in 
this project were identified by myself as working class, primarily on the basis of 
accent and speech patterns, but also because of the content of their narratives. As 
Mies (1983: 67) points out, researchers should realise that while as "women, they are 
effected by sexist oppression together with other women [ ... ] as scholars they share 
the privileges of the (male) academic elite." Whilst I thought it both patronising and 
dishonest to 'play down' these and other potentially significant differences, I wanted 
to handle the power differential stemming from my university position sensitively, 
and in no way exacerbate the traditional exclusion of the working class from the 
academy. I thus intended to undermine the objectifying impact of my work by 
stressing respondents' active role in shaping the course and content of my research. 
The centrality of respondents' own experience and opinions was to be made clear, and 
I aimed to query the manner in which they themselves would like their views 
represented. But, at the same time, I also aimed to emphasise (what I perceive to be) 
the very limited power and reach of the researcher and research, in terms of its 
influence beyond the academy. In response to group discussion, I have been brought 
to discuss with respondents the process of disseminating research findings, for 
example, via departmental research groups, conference presentations, and 
journal/book publications. (See also Skeggs 1994: 86.) By means such as these, I thus 
aimed to demystify the university based research process for the subjects of this 
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research as far as possible, in the attempt to "deconstruct the barrier between the 
academy and the lives of the people it professes to represent." (Kobayashi 1994: 73.) 
As McDowell ( 1992: 409) makes plain, we must "recognise and take account of our 
own position, as well as that of our research participants, and write this into our 
research practice rather than continue to hanker after some idealized equality 
between us." Without ever ignoring issues of difference, I aimed to forge connections 
with these agoraphobic women, and to be open about my research in a way that would 
foster an awareness of empathy, and crucially, of "conscious partiality" (Mies 1983: 
68). I wanted to allow space for commonalities between us to emerge (McDowell 
1992: 405) and aimed to do so by providing honest answers to questions regarding my 
own 'positionality' in relation to the research project. Put simply, while I knew that I 
would be positioned always somewhere between (England 1994) insider and outsider 
status, I aimed to be closer to the former than the latter whenever possible. 
Respondents were to be kept informed about my background, opinions, experience, 
and so forth, in accordance with the extent to which they demonstrated their desire to 
be thus informed.4 This, at least, was the theory. In practice, I can think of at least one 
occasion when issues of complexity and/or personal discomfort led me to respond in a 
limited, though not evasive way to respondents' questions, relating, for example, to 
my child-free status. 
Despite this advance consideration of, and commitment to, the centrality of ethics in 
the interview process, I still felt that, given that the material I had access to could be 
of a deeply personal and highly sensitive nature, there was a risk I might initiate or 
exacerbate distress by negotiating difficult moments inappropriately (Chaplin 1997). I 
was also concerned that respondents might be led to experience anxieties after I had 
left the field, and therefore considered it essential to ensure that the respondents I 
recruited had access to an adequate support network to help them manage any 
traumatic issues that might arise. The most obvious place for the search for 




By choosing to approach physically situated groups, rather than, say, mail or 
telephone based organisations, I aimed to make as sure as possible that each 
respondent would not be isolated, and that they were involved with an established and 
solid source of suppo11 (Rapping 1996). I initiated the project of contacting self-help 
groups in my target area, East/Central Scotland. Aside from its status as a densely 
populated area likely to yield access to sufficient numbers of agoraphobic 
respondents, this area was selected for pragmatic reasons, relating to necessary time 
and financial constraints on a graduate project based at the University of Edinburgh, 
and the fact that I myself live in Stirling. Also, however, my familiarity with 
particular locations within this area, for example, shopping complexes and centres for 
public transp011, meant that respondents could reasonably assume that I shared a 
degree of background knowledge about their personal geographies. I felt that having 
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this 'in common' might aid the process of building a rapport and potentially improve 
the quality of interviews. 
At the outset of the empirical phase of this project, I began writing journal entries 
detailing the research process, intending this as a record of the steps taken and a form 
of data collection in itself. As Parr (2000: 228) makes plain, "[ e ]thnographic diaries 
are now a more acceptable form of 'data collection', with contemporary 
commentators noting [here she quotes Cook 1997: 146] 'that these are no more nor 
less 'objective' or 'subjective' than any other forms of information brought back from 
the field'." Diary entries were intended for personal use only, and were therefore 
written in an informal style, often before, but always after encounters with 
respondents, recording as much detail about personal expectations, and actual 
outcomes, situations and exchanges as possible. These notations were made in, and 
filled, an A5 hard-backed note-pad, which could be continually carried and frequently 
consulted with ease. I was thus able to reflect on my previous experience of, for 
example, individual or group interviews immediately before each subsequent meeting 
took place. In the case of follow-up interviews, this helped to enhance relationships 
and increase the quality of ensuing discussions by refreshing my memory of those that 
had previously taken place. In advance of initial meetings with new respondents, I 
was able to reflect on earlier exchanges and to refine my manner of, for example, 
introducing and explaining the nature of my research. In the longer term, this research 
diary has proven to be an invaluable aide memoir, helping to keep many events, 
characters, and informal (and thus un-taped) conversations alive for this project over 
time, supplementing, contextualising, and enriching eventual analysis of other data 
collected throughout this phase of the project. 
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The initial process of identifying groups operating in my target area was more 
difficult than first anticipated. Consultation of the self-help section of public libraries 
in Edinburgh and Stirling reveal a range of books dealing with agoraphobia, some of 
which contained information about national self-help organisations. The Manchester 
based National Phobic Society, Triumph Over Phobias (TOPS), PAX and NO 
PANIC, do not, however, have groups meeting in Scottish locations, though I was 
able to subscribe to these organisations' newsletters. These have in themselves 
provided an extensive (secondary) source of data, in the form of autobiographical 
letters and articles from sufferers, information about and reviews of new self-help 
resources, including books, tapes and videos, as well as 'natural' remedies such as 
aromatherapy. The newsletters also offer a between members contact service, through 
which I have requested, received and replied to letters concerning sufferers' views on 
fictional representations, and 'thus' popular public perception, of their disorder. 
However, the data collected in this manner has not been utilised in this thesis. The 
public library also held one listing for a local phobia self-help organisation, We Are 
Seeking Progress (WASP). The telephone numbers and details of group meetings 
proved to be out of date, but a letter was in any case sent to the group organiser in the 
hope that it would be forwarded appropriately. 
Initial telephone contacts with district associations for mental health also failed to 
identify local self-help groups.5 My first productive contact in this regard came via a 
District Council, West Lothian, 'Mobility Initiative' (WLMI) listed on the Health 
Education Board for Scotland (HEBS) computer database. In a telephone 
conversation with its director, I found that the organisation had been established five 
years previously with the intention of providing "travel training for various people 
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who have difficulty using public transport." The director went on to explain that her 
organisation offered "a person centred, step by step approach, designed to suit the 
needs of the individual, whether they're short-sighted, or have learning difficulties, or 
whatever." In fact, what they found was that many of the individuals coming forward 
with mobility difficulties were suffering from agoraphobia: "Due to lack of staff, and 
because [treating agoraphobia sufferers] proved to be very time-consuming, we 
decided to set a mutual-support group [and to] provide transpo11 for those who can 
cope with coming to the group." The director agreed to speak to group members about 
my research, and later confirmed that three women had volunteered to be interviewed 
in an adjoining room at the next group session. Reflecting the gendered distribution of 
agoraphobia, only one man attended these meetings of around eight to ten sufferers. 
Though this male sufferer did not initially wish to participate, I was able to conduct an 
interview with him at a later stage of involvement with this group. 
Individual interviews 
I spent several hours at the centre on the date agreed, meeting with the director, the 
counsellor who facilitated the group sessions, the transport manager, and a volunteer 
driver, all of whom provided valuable data which was duly recorded in ethnographic 
diaries. I did not attend the group meeting itself, but was provided with a separate, 
private room to interview three volunteers, each of whom agreed to be contacted 
again with a view to possible follow up interviews to take place at a later date. 
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The director of this Mobility Initiative supplied me with contact numbers for 
Stress Watch Scotland, formerly 'Phobic Action'. In this way I made contact with the 
only other male respondent involved in this project, who described himself as an 'ex-
sufferer', and now produces resource material for StressWatch and edits their monthly 
newsletter, 'Serenity' (to which I also subscribe). He agreed to be interviewed, by 
telephone, and provided valuable information about his personal experience of 
agoraphobia and continued involvement with self-help groups over the last ten years. 
Additionally, he recommended getting in touch with one of the founders of 
StressWatch Scotland. She in turn agreed to be interviewed, and to negotiate contact 
with other committee members on my behalf. 
During informal telephone interviews and face to face meetings with individual 
committee members, I became informed of the history and current situation of some 
of the twenty groups currently operating throughout Scotland. These were in locations 
ranging, for example, from Glasgow and Edinburgh city centres, to more isolated 
towns in the highlands and islands, such as Thurso, and Kirkwall in Orkney. As well 
as physically situated groups, Stress Watch were also in the process of setting up 
'telephone recovery systems', in which sufferers can take part and receive support 
from home, a service with obvious benefits for particularly housebound individuals. 
The Stress Watch founder agreed to provide contact numbers for self-help group 
organisers, with whom she suggested I negotiate access to individual group members. 
I conducted telephone interviews with two long-term sufferers in another part of 
Scotland, one of whom organised the self-help group to which they both belong. Both 
were given my home telephone number and agreed to be, (and subsequently were) re-
interviewed at a later date. 
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The possibility of conducting interviews by telephone was given serious consideration 
following discussions with respondents from Stress Watch Scotland and the West 
Lothian Mobility Initiative. Given the nature of the disorder, sufferers clearly may be 
unwilling or unable to meet beyond the location of the self-help group, and I would 
have ethical reservations about asking them to compromise their sense of safety by 
meeting with me in any other location. Further, the group meeting place itself may be 
unsuitable for individual meetings to take place; not all would be able to provide a 
small private room, as was the case with WLMI. I also recognised that some 
respondents may be reluctant to have this relatively 'safe space' intruded upon by a 
complete stranger, and that this consideration may apply even more st1ongly to the 
space of their own homes. Sensitivity to such concerns would therefore be of crucial 
importance, and the decision was taken to present respondents with a choice as to how 
they wished to be interviewed. 
Telephone interviews, when chosen, were found to yield high quality data, possibly 
due the fact that the respondents were to an extent shielded from distress in what was 
clearly an unusual and potentially anxiety provoking situation. They could 
communicate, from their own homes, with an unknown person in a manner that 
facilitated a sense of anonymity, and moreover, a manner that, as their disorder 
dictates, they are more accustomed to than face to face meetings. Recordings of these 
interviews were made using a small telephone pick-up microphone, and these proved 
to be of high quality due to lack of background noise. A record of those interviewed, 
referred to by pseudonyms used consistently throughout the thesis, is included in 
Table 2: 1, below. This table further details how they were interviewed, either by 
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telephone or face to face (FtF), how many times they were interviewed, and when the 
interviews took place. I have also included the age at time of interview, at onset of 
agoraphobia, and social (working or middle) class. On those occasions when 
respondents did not themselves explicitly provide this information, and it has been 
inferred on the basis of accent, or anecdotes about family life and background, the 
datum is prefixed by a question mark. Table 2:2 provides additional contextualising 
information about respondents' lives. 
77 
Table 2: 1 
~ Pseudon ~m Set f-Hel12 Age at Age at Onset Social Class Number of Date of FtF I 
Grou12 Interview Interviews Interview Tel. 
~ 
Carron WLMI 62 22 Working 3 I 0/2/98 Ftf 
29/12/98 
20/11/99 
Lynn WLMI 44 Early 20s ?Working I 10/2/98 FtF 
Lizzy WLMI 48 18 Working I I 0/2/98 FtF 
Gordon (m) SW Inverness 53 40 ?Middle I 13/1/98 Tel. 
Fran SW (founder) 82 31 Middle I 14/1 /98 Tel. 
Kilmarnock 
Fiona SW Perth 52 23 Middle 2 19/1 /98 Tel. 
5/10/99 
Maggie SW Perth 54 24 Working 2 28/1/98 Tel. 
11/10/99 
Mary WASP 57 20 ?Middle I 6/2/98 FtF 
Susan WASP 33 21 Working 2 I 0/3/98 Tel. 
18/4/00 
Moyra SW 50 17 ?Working I 1/12/99 Tel. 
Cumbernauld 
Linda WASP 39 17 ?Working I 11/5/99 Tel. 
Nora WASP 54 19 Middle I 12/5/99 FtF 
Brenda WLMI 52 29 Working I 19/10/99 FtF 
Ruth WLMI ?70s 64 Working I 19/10/99 FtF 
Iris WLMI ?40s 18/19 Working I 4/10/99 FtF 
Jane WLMI ?50s ?30 Working I 12/10/99 Tel. 
Terry ( m) WLMI Late 50s Late 40s Working I 5/10/99 FtF 
Carron 
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Table 2:2 (All respondents are married with children unless otherwise stated) 
Carron describes herself as a 'struggler' in (preference to the term 'sufferer'), and began seriously challenging 
health care professionals' for appropriate treatment when her grandson was born several years ago and she wanted 
to be involved in his care. She has since experienced marked improvements, managing, for example, to pass her 
driving test, but has also had more than one severe setback which caused extreme frustration and some depression. 
Aside from accompanying her husband on brief postings abroad, she has always lived in Scotland, working for a 
number of years as a clippie (bus conducter), a job she enjoyed a great deal. 
Lynn Lynn became agoraphobic following her move to Scotland from England, when she experienced panic connected 
with withdrawing from tranquillisers, on the advice of her new GP. She is able to leave home to walk her dogs, who 
she describes as her 'saviours', and occasionally to visit family in the South. Since this research took place, she 
attends WLMI less frequently, feeling that she is managing sufficiently well without the group's regular support. 
Lizzy The severity of Lizzy's agoraphobic symptoms have varied a great deal during the course of her disorder. At one 
stage she was able to make a temporary family move to South Africa, though she has repeatedly been housebound 
for substantial periods of time. She has two sisters who have experienced panic, though neither became 
agoraphobic. She has at times held down part time jobs, within walking distance of her home - public transport 
remains out of the question. 
Gordon Gordon describes himself as an ex-sufferer, who for a period of around 3 years, became depressed and suicidal as a 
result of his agoraphobia. He now devotes a substantial amount of time to organising self-help groups and 
producing self-help resources for sufferers. He is involved with the running of StressWatch Scotland. 
Fran Fran was one of the founding members of StressWatch Scotland, and continues to be heavily involved with its 
organisation. Although she had a supportive family, Fran describes many difficulties associated with suffering from 
a nameless (undiagnosed) condition, as she herself did for many years. She repeatedly refused prescriptions for 
tranquillisers, and consulted many health care professionals before finding one sympathetic and willing to help 
establish a support organisation. 
Fiona As organiser of her local branch of Stress Watch, Fiona feels she is managing her disorder fairly well, and manages 
to work as a care assistant in a local nursing home. She finds the job helps her confidence, which was badly dented 
by a husband she found to be unsupportive, and the subsequent break up of her marriage. She found the support of 
her GP to be invaluable when her condition was at its worst. 
Maggie As a teenager, Maggie had occasionally panicked and passed out during church services, but it was some years later 
that she became agoraphobic. She feels very isolated by a condition she feels few people understand, and struggles 
to live as normal a life as possible, working part time as a cleaner in her home village. 
Mary Mary is the current organiser of WASP, and finds her condition has improved in recent years following a change in 
medication. When her children were small, she stayed at home while her husband took them on holiday, and she 
regrets that she missed out on much of their upbringing. Her own difficulties focused around a fear of vomiting, and 
a reduction in this particular fear means that she is able to contemplate leaving home with greatly reduced anxiety. 
Susan Susan left home at an early age, following an extremely difficult relationship with her parents. She has lived with 
Moyra 
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her husband since then, and she worked as a legal secretary for a time before having her first child. Soon after this, 
she became agoraphobic, and has felt overly dependent on her husband ever since. Susan has commented that her 
husband has become accustomed to this lack of independence. Aside from her agoraphobic difficulties, Susan 
thinks she is confident and outgoing, and hopes to be able to return to work some time in the future. 
The issue of the stigma surrounding mental or emotional difficulties is a source of preoccupation for Moyra, who 
tends to keep her difficulties hidden as much as possible. She is keen to protect her young children from this and 
other negative aspects of the disorder, and struggles to 'keep up appearances' by attending school functions, etc. 
She obtains much comfort and support from a close friend who suffers from similar difficulties. 
Linda Linda has suffered degrees of agoraphobia since its onset that seem to vary in accordance with stressful events in 
her life, such as first leaving home, and the break up of her relationship with her children's father. Linda's narrative 
is used as the basis of the case study in chapter 4. 
Nora Following the death of her mother during her own birth, Nora was brought up be her grandparents, and experienced 
the childhood trauma of extended hospitalisation due to polio. She believes that her early experience is somehow 
linked with her later development of agoraphobia, and was always concerned that her own children should receive 
as 'normal' an upbringing as possible. She resents the many restrictions the disorder places on her social life, but 
does manage to participate in sporting activities such as badminton where social interactions seem manageable. 
Brenda Brenda's symptoms have fluctuated greatly since she became agoraphobic, but the onset itself was experienced as 
very sudden rather than gradual. She explains that, having been 'stuck at home for months' because of illness, when 
she 'recovered', she was unable to leave home, even to empty her bin at the bottom of the garden. Previously, she 
had given much of her time to voluntary work in her community. She is now a core member of WLMI, which she 
finds an enormous source of support. 
Ruth Ruth did not develop agoraphobia until she was in her mid sixties. Her condition deteriorated markedly following 
the death of her husband a few years later; without his arm to hold on to, she was unable to leave home for some 
time, but is now able to visit her local group with the help of sympathetic friends. 
Iris A practising social worker when her difficulties began, Iris describes gradually realising that she was allowing her 
back log of home visits to build up because she was uncomfortable being out of the office, and following a period of 
sick leave, became reluctant to leave her home. She is acutely aware of the limitations the disorder imposes on her 
life, and contrasts her current situation with that of her youth, when she had the confidence to perform in folk clubs 
with her friends. Iris was the first member of her family to attend university. 
Jane Jane's difficulties gradually developed from avoidance of snowy or frosty conditions following a panic attack on a 
Winter's day, to full blown agoraphobia. She has a grown daughter living in a remote part of Scotland, who she 
would like to be able to visit more often. Long enforced periods of confinement because of back pain have at times 
added to her anxieties about leaving home. 
Terry Terry was forced to give up driving because of his panic attacks, but, though anxious about leaving home, was 
never entirely housebound. He now attends WLMI meetings intermittently, but believes his troubles to be 
connected with a recent diagnosis of pernicious anaemia, as well as with asthma. He regrets that his difficulties have 
disrupted the social life of himself and his wife during their retirement. 
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My involvement with the third organisation began following a reply from the current 
organiser of WASP in Edinburgh. This individual agreed to be interviewed about her 
own experience of agoraphobia, and suggested that I contact one group member 
mostly at home with young children, whom she thought would enjoy being 
interviewed. I was able to meet with these and other WASP members during a 
Stress Watch work shop/conference held in Glasgow in April 98. Although WASP has 
regular contact with StressWatch, it is largely independent, organising its own fund-
raising events, and so on. Here, I also met with and informally interviewed committee 
members, discussing, for example, changes to StressWatch organisation, funding, 
policy etc., and attended sessions. These concerned setting up new groups; telephone 
counselling; relaxation techniques; anxiety disorders and primary health care, and 
there was also a presentation by Stress Watch patron, Royal Edinburgh Hospital 
consultant psychiatrist, David Weeks. These sessions were attended by both sufferers 
and health-care workers, and provided opportunities to meet with sufferers and other 
interested parties, and to discuss their concerns. It was here that I met a member of 
another Stress Watch group I had not yet contacted, who agreed to participate in the 
project. 
Observing and interviewing self-help groups · 
In early December 1998, I started to attend W ASP's fortnightly group meetings as a 
'participant observer'. While this strategy had not been anticipated by my research 
design, I began attending at the suggestion of the group organiser, who felt it might 
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improve my understanding of agoraphobia, and of how the group itself actually 
operates. This method of data generation did indeed prove invaluable, and thus 
emphasises the importance of the researcher's willingness to modify research design 
according to the particular circumstances of the project. (Burgess 1984; Lilley 1998. I 
reflect on this 'processual' aspect of research in more depth in chapter 3.) Attending 
this group allowed for a broadening of the database, and the arrangement regarding 
participant observation continued until the end of March 1999. At this time, I 
concluded that saturation point had been reached, given that data collected was 
becoming less rich and more repetitive with each session. Throughout this period, I 
made detailed contributions to my research diary, including rough transcripts of 
dialogue. I later conducted individual interviews with two particular members, 
selected because of their enthusiasm for the project, evidenced by their approaching 
me during coffee breaks, before meetings started etc. to discuss my work and their 
own experience of agoraphobia. 
During the time that I attended WASP meetings, I had contacted WLMI members to 
request follow up interviews, and was invited to become involved with their re-
formed group meetings. WLMI had ceased to function due to withdrawal of council 
funding, but around eight of its members resolved to continue meeting despite the 
lack of official support. In an individual interview, one member explained the group's 
current and changing situation. In addition, she provided me with three years worth of 
'progress diaries', from which I took extensive notes, with her permission, and 
returned. Notes from these diaries have since provided a valuable source of data in 
their own right. 
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The nature of my attendance of this group's meetings developed in a very different 
way from those with WASP. Interacting with and responding to what I interpreted as 
group members' expectations and desires regarding my presence, these meetings 
often took the form of in-depth group interviews. Sessions with this group were tape-
recorded, with members' permission (indeed, encouragement), and numerous excerpts 
of tape were fully transcribed. It was not always possible or desirable to transcribe all 
tapes in full due to simultaneous discussion and occasional irrelevance to the thesis. 
During one group meeting, members watched and discussed two self-help videos I 
had brought to the group. All respondents were given my home telephone number 
when I ceased to attend meetings at the end of March 1999, a date agreed with 
respondents in advance for reasons of clarification about the research process and also 
to discourage expectations regarding my continual involvement. The five 'core' 
members agreed to be individually interviewed at a later date. 
The sufferers whom I interviewed might be described as self-selecting, in that they 
responded to a request made by me, through a 'gatekeeper' - the organiser of the 
group they attended. As a result, my sample could not be described as representative 
of women who suffer from agoraphobia. They tended to be long-term members of the 
self-help groups, and to be 'coping' with their disorder well enough to be comfortable 
talking about it at length. Without exception, the women who presented themselves 
were loquacious and articulate in their attempts to convey just how much the disorder 
has impacted on every aspect of their lives. All were accustomed to talking about 
agoraphobia; at times, they may even have been relaying aspects of a narrative that 
had already been constructed as they struggled over time to make sense of a life 
fragmented by their agoraphobic experiences. 
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There was considerable variation in the age of the respondents attending self help 
groups; the youngest interviewee, whom I've called Susan, was thirty three, and Fran 
at eighty two, was the oldest. All were married, though one was separated from her 
husband, and all had children. There is no representation of ethnic minorities; all of 
the respondents were white and, with the exception of one English born participant, 
Scottish. While class background and current social status were not always discussed 
(see above), some diversity was apparent. More than one member in fact commented 
that the phobia may be the only thing they had in common. Clearly, my selection 
strategy entails that those sufferers dissatisfied with self-help groups were effectively 
screened out of my sample. The ethical implications of intervening in the lives of 
women without access to a suppo1t network were, however, thought to outweigh the 
potential benefits to the project of widening the sample base. 
Se(f-help resources in group discussion 
The use of self-help resources in the context of group discussion provides another 
example of a fruitful strategy for data-generation that was not included in the original 
research design. Following a period of working with groups, and observing the 
frequency with which self-help resources were discussed, I enquired whether group 
members would be interested in discussing particular examples. While members of 
WASP initially expressed an interest, enthusiasm for the proposal seemed to wane, 
and I chose not to pursue the matter. WLMI, however, expressed more immediate 
interest, and a session was arranged where it was agreed that we would watch and 
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discuss two self-help videos that I would bring to the meeting. Chapter 8 of this thesis 
is devoted to an analysis of these texts and the discussion they provoked. 
The videos we viewed and discussed are of very different kinds. Not all in the Mind is 
an 'amateur' production, collaboratively made by eight previous members of WASP 
(video A). It is twenty minutes long, and just over two minutes of that time is given 
over to 'expert' opinion. This is in marked contrast with the second video, which 
continually intersperses two sufferers' accounts with the opinions of two health-care 
professionals. Fight or Flight (video P) was professionally produced in Australia by 
'Monkey See Productions', and lasts for forty-eight minutes. 
I watched these videos with a group of five women members of WLMI. Prior to the 
showing, I explained that my intention was not to 'teach' them anything about their 
disorder, that I was rather asking them to evaluate the usefulness of these texts, and to 
consider the 'truthfulness' of their re-presentations of agoraphobia. To this end, 
respondents were encouraged to comment on or stop the videos at any time. The 
viewings, and the discussions that took place afterwards, were audio-taped with 
respondents' permission, and, as with all interviews, the recordings have been 
transcribed verbatim. The transcripts have been used to inform and supplement my 
analysis of the self-help texts in question. 
The decision to focus on video recordings, rather than audio or printed literature 
requires some explanation. Books and pamphlets especially are perhaps more 
commonly used than any other self-help resource, and they certainly tend to be more 
accessible in terms of both availability and cost. The main factor influencing my 
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neglect of these alternatives is that video material is the most amenable to a shared 
and participatory 'reading'. We could watch, and comment on these texts together. An 
additional reason for favouring the visual medium is that sufferers had frequently 
commented on the difficulty of articulating the appalling horror of the panic-attack, 
the experience that sows the seeds of agoraphobic avoidance (see chapter 1 ). 
Respondents in this project have drawn on a wide range of metaphors in the attempt 
to verbalise the experience, likening it, for example, to such diverse phenomena as 
'drowning', or 'receiving electric shocks'. I have repeatedly been told that unless you 
experience it yourself you couldn't begin to grasp what it feels like (though one 
respondent qualified this by saying she wouldn't wish it 'on her worst enemy'); "its 
like trying to explain red to a blind person" (Moyra). Given such barriers to 
communicating the experience, I was interested to see how the producers of these 
videos might attempt to re-present panic visually, and whether or not the outcome 
would be meaningful for agoraphobic viewers. 
As for my selection of these particular products, video A seemed an obvious choice, 
for reasons such as familiarity of location, accent etc. to members of the group. 
Additionally, I rightly suspected that the group would be keen to engage with a text 
produced by individuals described by one member of the audience as "people like us" 
(Ruth). Video P was chosen because it came most highly recommended of those 
currently available, by a recent newsletter produced by No Panic. It advocates a form 
of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) which, as I argue in chapter 8, sits firmly 
within, and does not problematise, the Cartesian tradition of selfhood. Additionally, 
and significantly, both videos opt to locate their portrayals of panic in shopping 
spaces, which, as discussed in chapter 4, are often a central focus of many sufferers' 
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personal narratives of agoraphobic experience. 
Summary 
In summary, the data on which this thesis is based was generated through various 
forms of involvement with agoraphobia support groups and their members. I have 
attended one group (WASP) as a participant observer for just over three months, and 
attended sessions and conducted four in-depth group interviews with another (WLMI) 
over roughly the same time period. With regard to individual interviews, I have 
conducted one interview with thirteen agoraphobic members of these groups, two of 
whom were male (and one of whom was currently relatively free from agoraphobic 
symptoms); two interviews with three, and three interviews with one agoraphobic 
women. The tendency not to conduct follow-up interviews with the majority of 
respondents, in contrast to the intentions outlined in my research design, emerged 
largely as a result of the extensive, and initially unplanned work that was carried out 
with groups. This strategy of attending and conducting group discussions created a 
wealth of data that rendered further individual follow-ups largely unnecessary for the 
purposes of this thesis, and also meant that it was acceptable to interview less 
individuals than I originally planned (seventeen as opposed to twenty). Those follow-
up interviews that did take place were conducted in order to discuss an issue of 
potential import that I felt, in these particular cases, could productively be explored in 
greater depth. My major concern here related to agoraphobic women's experience of 
pregnancy. In the one case where three interviews took place, the decision was taken 
as an appropriate response to the subject's explicit enthusiasm for the project. These 
modifications to research design that took place were further justified by the fact that, 
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as transcripts reveal, follow-up interviews tended to include substantial repetition of 
aspects of narratives collected in the first round. 
Respondents were in all cases recruited via their self-help group. Around half (eight) 
of these attended WLMI meetings, four belonged to WASP, and the remaining five 
were members of one of four branches of StressWatch Scotland. This diversity 
enabled the collection of important data regarding the value and variety of self-help 
groups available for sufferers in Scotland. Interviews were on average around one 
hour in length, but varied between 35 minutes and 3 hours, depending largely on 
(what I interpreted as) the subject's own preference, and willingness or otherwise to 
talk at length (Kvale 1996). 
The resulting transcripts have been supplemented by research diary entries recording 
additional informal meetings and conversations. I have spoken with, for example, 
several group organisers, Stress Watch committee members, health care professionals, 
producers of resource materials, and occasionally, family members. I have followed 
developments in StressWatch Scotland by attending meetings and workshops, and 
keeping in touch by telephone with several of those involved in its organising. In 
add it ion to my research diaries and interview transcripts, I have collected other 
relevant data in the form of agoraphobia progress diaries, newspaper cuttings, and an 
array of self-help resources including newsletters, books and, in particular, videos (see 
above). 6 
Unfruitful contacts and avenues of enquiry during this time included an anxiety group 
I attended in Stirling with no agoraphobic members, and letters to a number of clinical 
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psychologists and psychiatrists with requests for assistance. For example, Eve 
Johnstone in psychiatry at Edinburgh University, and Chris Freeman at the Royal 
Edinburgh Hospital, were both unable to help with information about access to (or 
existence of) transcripts of interviews with, or self-help groups for, agoraphobia 
sufferers. Similarly, Guy Fielding at the London Institute of Psychiatry was unable to 
help, and Isaac Marks was "unable to answer questions due to extensive travelling 
commitments". 
Coding and Analysis 
The twenty-two individual interviews, and four taped group (WLMI) discussions 
were transcribed by myself in a style that attempts to remain faithful to respondents' 
own voices and manner of expression. Marjorie Devault ( 1990: 107) refers to other 
approaches that "translate slang and vernacular into standard English in order to 
highlight the content rather than style of respondents' speech". The justification for 
this practice is often that readers might be "prejudiced, or simply distracted, by speech 
that reveals lack of education or a particular or regional class background". However, 
such prejudice is rarely challenged or subverted by standardising practices that 
'smooth out' difference, practices that may also be a way of distorting respondents' 
words, of "discounting and ignoring those parts of women's experience that are not 
easily expressed". Rather, the method of transcription adopted was intended to 
preserve the particularity of accent and the oral subtleties of what were always highly 
personalised accounts. 
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In accordance with my research design, each interview was transcribed as soon as was 
practically possible after the event; in most cases, transcription was completed within 
a week or two of the interview taking place. In this way, I was able to supplement 
transcripts and diary entries with additional information from memory, and include 
immediate and intermediate reflections on each particular interview (Bailey, White 
and Pain 1999; Bartlett and Payne 1997). This fruitful stratagem would not have been 
possible had interviews been transcribed en bloc a matter of months after the event, 
when voices and narratives may have partially merged, and contextual nuances been 
lost. Periodic transcription thus helped to enrich interpretation and analysis at a later 
date (Pope, Ziebland and Mays 2000). Further, I was able to refine my approach to 
each subsequent interview by reflecting on the content and quality of the last. 
When all interviews had eventually been transcribed, I began the task of explicitly 
identifying the themes that 'emerged' (Glaser and Strauss 1967) during the 
interviewing I transcribing process, expanding this list through in-depth reflection on 
the transcripts. As Pope, Ziebland and Mays (2000: 78) point out, coding, or indexing 
(their preferred term to avoid the numerical connotations of coding), "is a lengthy and 
sometimes tedious process" that basically involves "reading and rereading" the 
material. This process may be time consuming, but given that, according to Strauss 
( 1987: 27), "the excellence of the research rests in large part on the excellence of the 
coding", the task must be done carefully and completely. 
The choice, or construction, of the particular codes I adopted for this data was based 
on the frequency with which topics or concepts occurred, the extent to which they 
recurred among other respondents' accounts or group discussions, and the 
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significance which respondents themselves seemed to, or explicitly, attached to these 
topics (Bartlett and Payne 1997: 185-7, Rossman and Rallis 1998: 178/9). Some are, 
therefore predictably obvious; for example, experiences of panic and anxiety, 
possible causes of agoraphobia, and issues relating to treatment, were predominant 
themes throughout the interviews. Respondents would often also talk at length of the 
effect of their disorder on the geographies of their everyday lives, structuring their 
discussion around the themes of home, family life and domestic duties, and the 
distinctions between what was perceived as this personal, vs. social space. In relation 
to the latter arena, respondents often dwell on discussion of shopping and consumer 
spaces, and of the protective strategies they adopt to help them manage their 
experience. Finally, experience and ideas of embodiment and self-identity are, as 
chapter l suggests, central to an understanding of agoraphobia and its meanings for 
and effects on sufferers' lives. My approach to the development of codes was thus 
derived from 'grounded theory' (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990), 
in that the emphasis was placed on those concepts perceived by myself to be 
important to the respondents (Bartlett and Payne 1997, McCracken 1988). However, 
my interpretation and labelling of these priorities are inevitably influenced by my own 
theoretical perspectives, and codes are thus partially also conceptually derived. 
Having identified these themes, I set about the task of manually collating and colour 
coding the data accordingly. By this I mean that, in addition to a complete hard copy 
of each transcript, I used pencils of a colour I linked with particular codes to mark 
passages and highlight relevant themes. These coloured excerpts were then removed 
and reordered, that is, physically cut from their original context, and re-placed in files 
labelled with the relevant code. The data was thus re-presented and re-organised 
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thematically, rendering it more manageable and amenable to theoretical and discourse 
analysis. 
Recently, much attention in methodological literature has been devoted to the relative 
merits of manual versus computerised coding (e.g. Rossman and Rallis 1998). 
Clearly, I have opted for the former method, largely on the grounds that "[software] 
packages cannot do anything that could not be done with several copies of your data, 
a pair of scissors and gallons of glue; they do not 'do' the analysis for you, they 
merely make the mechanics of analysis easier and quicker" (Bartlett and Payne 1997: 
185). More importantly, however, and in agreement with Pope, Ziebland and Mays 
(2000: 80) I felt that that "whilst considered somewhat old-fashioned, this repeated 
physical contact and handling of the data has much to recommend it; the process of 
rereading the data and sorting it into categories means that the researcher develops an 
intimate knowledge of the data, even if the process is laborious". 
During the coding process, each excerpt of transcript was clearly marked and 
identified with the pseudonym of the pa1ticular interviewee, in order to facilitate re-
contextualising of quotations in relation to their original background. While it is 
clearly necessary to strategically de-contextualise research data for the purposes of 
analysis, we must continually re-contextualise this information within the individual 
narratives which provide the frame of reference, and to a very large extent, the 
meaning of respondents' contributions (Wittgenstein 1988). Separated from its 
situational context, quotations constitute little more than disembodied data, and we as 
researchers have an ethical duty to maintain the situated integrity of the respondents 
who enable our research. In this regard, I also found it helpful to replay the tapes of 
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interviews at intervals during analysis. This helped bring to mjnd aspects of narratives 
that were ostensibly 'irrelevant' to the research, for example, anecdotes about family 
members or decorating and DIY, but which nonetheless helped to 'flesh out' the 
verbally mediated, spoken subjectivity of respondents~ to keep them embodied, 
embedded and palpably complex. 
Each code derived from the data has substantial relevance for the thesis as a whole, 
and at least one is used in each individual chapter to link respondents' experiential 
accounts with theoretical, particularly feminist and phenomenological perspectives 
that are largely neglected in, but arguably crucial for agoraphobic research. The 
theoretical approaches I have adopted have been briefly outlined in the previous 
chapter, and will become increasingly evident in the context of particular substantive 
chapters. While these differing theoretical approaches were identified, adopted and 
adapted according to their suitability for particular themes, the method of discourse 
analysis utilised for the empirical component of this thesis is broadly similar for each 
chapter. 
My understanding of 'discourse' is compatible with that outlined by Deborah Lupton 
in Medicine as Culture (1994: 18). She writes that discourse can be described "as a 
pattern of words, figures of speech, concepts, values and symbols. A discourse is a 
coherent way of describing and categorising the social and physical worlds. 
Discourses gather around an object, person, social group or event of interest, 
providing a means of 'making sense' of that object, person, and so on. [ ... ] All 
discourses are textual, or expressed in texts, intertextual, drawing upon other texts and 
their discourses to achieve meaning, and contextual, embedded in historical, political 
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and cultural settings." (For similar definitions/characterisations, see also Parker 1992; 
Fairclough 1992.) 
The analysis of videos in chapter 8 will draw more heavily and explicitly than other 
chapters on the critical discourse analysis of Norman Fairclough, whose recent ( 1995) 
work has tended to focus on 'communicative events' such as newspaper editorials and 
television documentaries. With respect to their representations of the world, 
Fairclough states that "media texts do not merely 'mirror realities' as is sometimes 
naively assumed; they constitute versions of reality in ways which depend on the 
social positions and interests and objectives of those who produce them." (1995: 
103/4) Various, but unacknowledged choices will have been made, and it is the task 
of the analyst to bring these choices to light, to reveal "what is included and what is 
excluded, what is made explicit or left implicit, what is foregrounded and what is 
backgrounded, what is thematized and what is unthematized [and] what process types 
and categories are drawn upon to represent events" (Fairclough 1995: 104; cited in 
Duley 1997: 42\ Fairclough's approach suits the purposes of chapter 8, where the 
excluded, implicit, backgrounded or unthematized elements I am concerned to bring 
to light relate to notions of selfhood, and in particular, the ways in which selves are 
conceptualised in dualistic and gendered terms. Fairclough's method enables a 
reading that can unearth the unacknow !edged discourses of self that underpin self-
help resources. 
In the broader context of this research as a whole (which clearly deals with a number 
of texts of varying character, including diary entries, newsletters, etc.) the discourse to 
be analysed most frequently and closely takes the form of individual narratives, 
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interview transcripts in which sufferers tell the story of their disorder. In seeking to 
refine an appropriate method for analysing respondents' narratives, perhaps the most 
immediately obvious focus for concern is that such an approach should be feminist in 
nature, that is, it should be sympathetic to various circumstances and difficulties of 
women's lives. In addition to this concern with the significance of wider contexts 
within which individual narratives are constructed - the socio-cultural and political 
situations in which women live - I was concerned that my approach be sensitive to 
respondents' manner of expressing and describing themselves and their lives. Exactly 
how are particular concepts and metaphors mobilised, and might such linguistic 
'choices' be significant? Do respondents' stories tend, for example, to make use of 
gender role stereotypes, or draw on wider discourses relating to the historically 
subservient positioning of women, and might this tendency be seen to affect their 
conception of their own phobic (and feminine?) self-identity? 
What this feminist concern suggests is that sufferers' stories should indeed be closely 
read and interpreted, but that they should always be seen as existing in mutually 
constitutive relation with respondents' wider situation. Sufferers' stories affect and 
are affected by the social world. As with all texts, they do not simply 'mirror' the 
'material' of their lives, but re-present objects and situations according to particular 
perspectives and concerns. Feminist theorists such as Judith Butler ( 1990; 1993; 
following post-structuralist insights) insist that there can be no unmediated access to 
the world in itself; it simply cannot exist for us pre-discursively. Thus, language 
matters. It has a crucial role to play in the experience and (at least paitial) 
construction of our particular life-worlds. And so, given what we understand to be the 
mutually constitutive nature of relations between selves, spaces and stories, might 
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these relations be productively re-conceptualised, such that the world could become a 
more comfortable place for sufferers to be? 
Capps and Ochs (1995: 17) do in fact suggest that "one way to help [those] suffering 
from psychological distress is to listen to their stories, delve into their plot structure, 
and bring to conscious awareness the connections and theories they establish. " 8 They 
state that "[s]tories have an architecture that begs to be dismantled and mined for 
meaning. Because speakers the world over use narrative structure to make sense out 
of their experiences, it behoves us to look closely at how stories are built to penetrate 
the sense-making process." (Capps and Ochs 1995: 12) By thus approaching and 
analysing these stories from an empathetic and feminist viewpoint, we can perhaps 
approach an understanding of the phenomenology of agoraphobic life-worlds. If we 
can uncover something of what it feels like, and what it means to be agoraphobic 
through narrative analysis, we can perhaps go some way towards reweaving these 
narratives into a form with explanatory and perhaps therapeutic potential. 
1 Panic attacks, though not agoraphobia per se, have recently been the subject of an article in the 
popular Scottish tabloid, the Daily Record, due to the fame of several recipients willing to discuss their 
experiences. "Denise Welch, who plays Coronation Street landlady Natalie Barnes, and Sarah 
Lancashire, ex-Coronation Street barmaid have suffered panic attacks." This cutting (no date) was 
passed on to me by an interviewee who felt strongly that such publicity would challenge the stigma 
associated with her condition. 
2 For detailed discussion of the issues raised here, see especially the focus on 'Feminism as Method' in 
The Canadian Geographer (Moss et al. 1993). On the importance of sensitivity to women's usage of 
language, see Devault ( 1990) and Davidson and Smith ( 1999). See Parr ( 1998) for discussion of 
suitable methodologies for 'post-medical geography' 
3 
Beverley Skeggs writes that, "[t]hough there were similarities in class background[ ... ] I had also 
escaped. By the time of the research I was highly educated and most of my accent was gone." She 
continues, "it was precisely because of my autobiography that I began the research and I constantly 
moved between an awareness of similarities and of our acute differences" ( 1994: 80). 
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This approach required that I remain responsive to group and individual needs beyond this stage of 
my physical involvement. To this end, all respondents were given my home telephone number, and 
encouragement to make contact if they had any queries or concerns about the project with which they 
are involved. 
5 Early enquiries thus suggested that it is relatively easy to access printed literature; but, this might not 
be what sufferers actually want or need. The Health Education Board for Scotland (HEBS), for 
example, send me a pamphlet titled 'Talking about Agoraphobia', which seemed ironic given the 
problem likely to be facing sufferers in the area would be finding someone willing and able to listen to 
them. I recorded in my research diary at the time that ''I'd hope someone phoning the same numbers 
claiming to be suffering from, rather than academically interested in panic attacks would be treated 
with a bit more urgency." Perhaps sufferers' GPs would have more information and contacts to offer to 
those approaching them directly, though it would seem preferable to offer more anonymous access to 
sources of information and services. 
6 For examples of self-help books for agoraphobics, see Savage 1987, Marks 1980 anJ Vines 1987. 
7 Duley ( 1997) has adopted Fairclough' s method to provide an exemplary account of the construction 
of New Zealand national identity through analysis of a series of television broadcasts. 
8 Capps and Ochs ( 1995: 175) in fact describe therapy as a 'collaborative re-authoring' of subjects' 
lives, a notion that may have well have useful implications for our understanding of the interview 
process. 
Chapter Three 
'Joking Apart. .. ': 
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A 'Processual' Approach to Researching Self-help Groups 
"Every joke is a tiny revolution" 
(Orwell 1968) 
The previous chapter outlined the methodological presuppositions underlying this 
research, described how these influenced the practical methods employed and 
indicated the way in which the material was analysed. But this is really only part of 
the methodological story, since it presents a fairly static picture of what was, in fact, a 
dynamic and changing research process. Reflecting upon and responding to the 
research subjects' comments and behaviour actually played a major role in shaping 
the project. This chapter attempts to document some of the ways in which I came to 
regard this kind of qualitative feminist research as a dialectic where those being 
researched affected the form as well as the content of the 'finished' work. This is what 
I have termed a 'processual methodology'. 
There were many ways in which the women interviewed affected my original 
presuppositions, requiring a re-appraisal and re-adjustment of my research role and 
alterations in the research methods employed. Some of these adjustments were 
relatively minor and needed only subtle variations in research practice. For example, 
as the last chapter indicated, it came as something of a surprise that many of the 
women responded much more loquaciously to, and even preferred, telephone 
interviews because these avoided intrusive, and potentially traumatic visits to their 
home-space. 
1 
Since the quality of the material gathered in these 'conversations at a 
distance' far surpassed my expectations I was inevitably led to conduct more 
telephone interviews than I had originally anticipated. These interviews became an 
increasingly important and integral aspect of the project. 
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Other changes were more profound. As the previous chapter explained, my 
investigation of the experience and meanings of agoraphobia entailed varying degrees 
of involvement with several sufferers' self-help groups in East Central Scotland. The 
initial reason for contacting members of self-help groups had nothing to do with 
trying to understand the role and dynamics of these groups themselves. Such groups 
simply seemed to be an appropriate medium for contacting people who would 
otherwise be difficult to identify and approach. They also offered the additional 
advantage of limiting any distress caused during and after interviewing. What I failed 
to take into account, and what subsequently required a substantial shift in my research 
focus and methodology, was the fact that respondents' identification with such groups 
might actually problematize my initial presuppositions about the manner and degree 
of attaining the kind of 'communicative ideal' valued by feminist approaches. 
By this I mean that, theoretically speaking, I had understood feminist research 
methodologies to presuppose the researcher's ability to organise their activities in 
such a way that they purposefully narrow the 'communicative distance' between 
themselves and their respondents. However, I soon found that I had seriously under-
estimated the degree to which membership of the self-help group itself could become 
an important factor in mediating the women's sense of self and group identity. The 
self-help group can offer its members a collective identity based on the mutual 
99 
recognition of shared experiences and a shared 'form of life'. This collective identity 
is not only important as a topic for research, in terms of the relations between the 
group-members themselves. It also has other methodological implications because the 
'communicative distance' between researcher and researched becomes brokered 
through group dynamics. This chapter thus seeks to explain how and why the 
recognition of self-help groups' importance in respondents' lives triggered changes in 
the research focus and methodology. In particular I seek to do this by highlighting the 
deployment of humour as a key element of the discursive process. 
Given the seriousness of agoraphobia as a condition it may seem odd to focus on 
humour, but there are good reasons for doing so. First, the ability to share a joke can 
itself act as an indicator of the degree of group-identity, since joking depends upon 
those involved being able to call upon a tacit knowledge that others may not possess. 
That is to say, 'getting the joke' is dependent upon one recognising the relevance of 
what is being said about the 'object' of that joke (e.g. agoraphobia), making a 
particular kind of link to that 'object', and so on. Second, in calling upon this tacit 
knowledge, jokes (often inadvertently) make explicit the things that matter to that 
group, things that might otherwise remain impl.icit or un-remarked. Jokes can thus 
provide the researcher with novel topics for reflection that may influence their lines of 
enquiry. Third, humour can also re-present and indicate 'communicative distance' in 
another way because it is often employed tactically in ways that concretize or 
problematize group-identities. Humour can certainly help bind people together but it 
is also a tool that can be deployed to signify someone's exclusion or distance from a 
particular group. 
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Humour is then an element of, and a way of communicating, a (self-help)group-
identity. This group-identity provides an alternative locus of discursive power that 
can, in certain circumstances, operate in an exclusionary fashion. When necessary a 
joke can be used to put the unwary, inexperienced, or over-confident researcher 'in 
their place'. At other times the joke can be used in such a way as to include the 
researcher, to make them party to what is happening. Reflecting upon the way in 
which jokes are employed thus provides a way of ascertaining the degree to which a 
researcher has, or has not, successfully reduced the communicative distance between 
themselves and their respondents. 
To summarize, this chapter recounts the processual changes in my own research 
program in relation to the various ways in which different individuals in different 
groups deployed humour (understood as a measure of communicative distance) over 
the course of the project. In pa1ticular it tries to show why agoraphobic self-help 
groups themselves, rather than just agoraphobic individuals, became a necessary focus 
of study. I conclude by trying to draw out some of the methodological implications of 
this study as they might impact on feminist research in general and work with self-
help groups in particular. 
Agoraphobia and the Self-Help Group: Some Introductory Remarks 
Many of those who took part in this project had suffered from agoraphobia for a 
number of years before eventually obtaining a diagnosis. While diagnosis is in no 
sense equivalent to a cure, feelings of immense relief, of recognition and legitimacy 
IOI 
are common among newly diagnosed agoraphobics. For example, when I ask Carron, 
who developed agoraphobia over thirty years ago while living in Germany on a 
posting with her husband, if her own diagnosis after almost a decade of suffering was 
helpful, she replies; "Oh aye! Well what do you think? You're getting all these weird 
feelings, nobody's telling you what's wrong with you, you think you're going mental. 
If somebody says you've got, puts a name to it, uhuh, you feel, you feel bloody good 
[laughs] but it doesnae make it better". Having something nameable gives sufferers 
something to work on, a new linguistic category with which to organise their 
experience, and offers new hope that it is also treatable. To such ameliorative ends, 
many newly diagnosed individuals are given the opportunity to access support from 
self-help organisations and groups. Such information is not always provided 
immediately, at the primary health care level, but there are many ways in which 
sufferers can, sooner or later, discover the existence of support networks.2 For the 
respondents in this study at least, finding a group to attend has been an 
overwhelmingly positive experience. However, it must again be stressed that my 
strategy of recruiting respondents through self-help groups effectively screens out the 
negative responses of those dissatisfied individuals who no longer attend. 
Self-help groups perform a number of important services for their members, including 
the provision of practical help and advice about managing day-to-day tasks. As Fiona, 
a divorced grandmother, part time care assistant, and organiser of a Stress Watch 
support group explains, 
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"once you get into a group, and everybody knew what, exactly what you were 
talking about, you know. Everybody knew, and they were giving me wee ideas 
[ ... ] 'why don't you try this or try that?', you know, and its been great." 
Among the services and benefits of the group, perhaps the most obviously valuable is 
quite simply the understanding of others who have personal experience of 
agoraphobia, and who thus know exactly what its like. "The biggest thing about self-
help groups" according to Carron, "is they've all been there, they all know what 
you're talking about [ ... ]They're no' gonnae ridicule you, they're no' gonnae look at 
you funny, they're no' gonnae think you're an oddity, cause they all know." 
Despite the otherwise diverse membership of the groups, their accounts repeatedly 
reveal a high degree of commonality and mutual recognition among individual 
members of self-help groups, so much so, that it seems agoraphobia shapes and 
permeates most aspects of sufferers' lives, in very similar ways. The disorder can then 
be said to constitute a shared and substantive background against which sufferers' 
lives are lived. Although numerous and significant differences remain between 
individual sufferers, this agoraphobic 'background' could be characterised, in 
Wittgensteinian terms, as being constitutive of a common 'form of life'. This idea of a 
'form of life' was developed by Wittgenstein to designate in non-essentialist terms 
"what it is about a community that makes possible meaning" (Ruder-Baker, 1984: 
288). 3 Its precise meaning is difficult to specif/ precisely because it does not define 
any essential features that are identical in all cases, but rather points to the myriad 
ways in which a shared life-world is called upon and given expression in a common 
language. 
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Agoraphobia, I would suggest, constitutes an experiential background that means one 
will tend to conceptualise and respond to situations in certain ways rather than others. 
According to Baker ( 1984: 278) "forms of life rest finally on no more than the fact 
that we agree, find ourselves agreeing, in the ways that we size up and respond to 
what we encounter." If one suffers from agoraphobia, an invitation to a wedding, for 
example, will be greeted with dread, never pleasure, and even lunch at a local cafe 
with one or two close friends can be felt a pa1ticular kind of torture. Such 
commonalities of experience enable participants to take a certain amount of mutual 
understanding for granted in their conversational exchanges. That is to say, they may 
draw (implicitly or explicitly) on particular and shared (micro)cultural references, and 
need not continually explain themselves, or 'spell out' their emotions and reactions to 
the situation being discussed. Precisely because of significant overlaps among their 
experiences of the world, fellow sufferers will often simply understand what is being 
said in a way that might leave non-sufferers entirely mystified. 
That respondents do have shared concerns, despite significant experiential 
differences, is felt very strongly. Susan says of her own group membership; 
"it's very mixed as well, social backgrounds, religious backgrounds, its such a 
broad spectrum of people. And I mean its interesting as well, cause we've all 
had such different lives, but we've all got this one thing in common." 
This commonality of agoraphobic experience is strongly felt, but not easily 
communicable to 'outsiders', whose non-phobic form(s) of life render them partially 
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deaf, or indifferent, to agoraphobic discursive accounts. Despite sufferers' best 
efforts, it can feel as though the linguistic means of bridging the experiential gap are 
non-existent. In one sufferer's phrase, describing agoraphobia to a non-phobic is "like 
trying to explain red to a blind person" (Moyra). For this reason, many sufferers 
would agree with Carron's conclusion (in an individual interview). She states; 
"you tend no' to talk to, - unless they're really interested [laughs, nods toward 
interviewer], - you tend no' to talk to people about agoraphobia. What's the 
point? They don't understand it so what's the point?" 
That group members partially share an outlook on the world is evidenced by their 
ability to share jokes based around their agoraphobic experience, jokes whose 
meaning would be lost on a non-phobic 'outsider' (as I myself was to discover). 
Indeed jokes can act as a perfect indicator of belonging to, or being excluded from, a 
shared community of meaning. If a joke is to work, if it is to be humorous, then we 
need to be able to 'get it', to understand what it means, to what it refers. Even if you 
were the kind of person who appreciated surreal humour it would be difficult to find 
anything funny about an allusion to a Monty Python sketch if you hadn't already seen 
one. In our everyday lives, whether at work, within the family, or through watching 
television, we become party to, or excluded from, jokes that others share around us. 
Humour often entails a form of dramatic irony, it is a case of 'being in on it' or 'in the 
know' (knowledge) about something someone else might not yet be aware of. There 
are private jokes that might, for example, entail the repetition of a particular phrase 
that have some special meaning only because of previously shared experiences. Those 
who have not lived through these experiences, or have not had them recounted to 
them, will inevitably fail to find them funny, indeed they may not even recognise 
them as a joke at all. 
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The joke makes reference to a particular context, often an everyday context, but one 
that is approached from an unusual angle, or one revealed, through a sudden change in 
circumstances or perspective to have alternative meanings. The delivery of the punch 
line is often a matter of revealing just what this alternative perspective entails or how 
it came about - the shock of this revelation is the cue for laughter. Not getting the 
joke is a matter of failing to contextualise it, to see the difference between the 
everyday and the way the everyday has been transformed through this 
recontextualization. To take a trite example, I once repeated the following joke in the 
context of a feminist discussion group. 
Q - How many.feminists does it take to change a light bulb? 
A - That's not.funny! 
It has to be said, there wasn't much laughter, which some might consider ironic in the 
extreme. However, I would prefer to think that this was not because, as the joke 
suggests, feminists lack a sense of humour (especially about ourselves), but because 
our collective experience of feminism was anything but humourless. 
The ways in which we react to jokes are very complex, precisely because the joke, 
like language itself, can call upon many different aspects of a form of life in many 
different ways. A joke has the character of 'depth' precisely because it can be likened 
to a 'misinterpretation' of normal linguistic usage. Such misinterpretations, call upon 
and reveal "deep disquietitudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our 
language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language" 
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(Wittgenstein, 1988, # 111 ). By this I ce1tainly don't mean that we should, like Freud 
( 1976), necessarily understand jokes as a form of cathexis, as being associated with 
the retention and subsequent discharge of pent up psychic forces concentrated upon a 
disturbing object (in this case the subject's agoraphobia). No one denies that telling a 
joke can relieve the tension or that being able to laugh about something can be 
therapeutic in certain circumstances. (There may well be a kind of 'joke-work' 
analogous to 'dream-work' to use Freudian terminology. 5) But the 'light bulb' 
example also points to another frequently experienced element of jokes, namely the 
fact that they can also be discomforting (Powell 1988) I do not simply mean that some 
jokes can be judged as being in bad taste, but rather that one is sometimes unsure 
whether or not it is appropriate to laugh. This is especially true when someone seems 
to be making a joke at their own expense and/or when that joke relies upon drawing 
attention to some aspect of their lives in which we apparently do not or cannot share. 
Here the 'meaning' of the joke is ambiguous because it seems to express a set of 
circumstances that are not our own and may not normally be regarded as a suitable 
subject for humour. Our flustered reaction is not a matter of failing to get the joke but 
of being unsure how to react. We are unsure precisely what message is being 
communicated to us. To what degree and how should we respond to the serious 
subtext contained within and transmitted by the joke? To simply read the joke at face 
value is to risk laughing at and not with others and thereby risk further distancing 
ourselves from them communicatively. In this sense then, I wish to emphasise the 
'social' rather than the 'psychoanalytic' aspects of the respondents' employment of 
humour. 
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People are, of course, well aware that humour can induce such discomfort and in 
certain circumstances can deliberately employ this ambiguity to indicate difference or 
demarcate a boundary between ingroups and outgroups. On my first day of empirical 
research, the first person who entered the ante-room of the support group to be 
interviewed was Carron, who immediately states, "they [the other group members] 
sent me in first cause they said I'd scare you [laughs]." Carron then goes on to suggest 
that I reposition my chair and my tape-recorder. "If you turn it round this way and 
bring your chair over a bit it'll be able to hear both of us." Later, having spent around 
thirty minutes recounting her tale of agoraphobia with much passion and eloquence, 
Carron is apparently satisfied with her contribution, at least for the time being. She is 
also concerned to make way for the next subject who has volunteered to take part, and 
so brings the 'interview' to a close. "That's just about all I can tell you [ ... ] You' 11 get 
a lot fae the other ones too because everybody has a different perception of it." And 
on this note, she requests that I keep her abreast of the project, and departs. 
From the outset, Carron's tactics enable her to take a degree of control over the 
situation. Before having met me, she and the other group members had apparently 
collectively decided that I was most likely of a kind who needed 'put in their place', 
perhaps intimidated a little and so 'brought down to size'. Her opening statement, 
revealing that Carron could, or even should scare me, is said light-heartedly, and is 
clearly, explicitly, intended as a joke - that it is encompassed by laughter makes this 
plain. However, there is perhaps implicitly a suggestion of another meaning, a serious 
matter underlying the humorous facade. Carron is thus - to use an old but pithy Scots' 
phrase - 'half joking, hale [whole] earnest'. And, at the time of her utterance, I did 
indeed feel that there was more jibe than jest, and understood Carron's joke (as 
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partially intended?) to show that group members were calling (at least some of) the 
shots. Indeed, Carron' s 'performance' as respondent in this interview is characterised 
by assertiveness throughout, and it appears Carron is not about to let herself be 
victimised, belittled, or exploited by my research. 
At this point, it would be helpful to situate Carron' s 'social' style in relation to 
background information about her life and experiences that emerged in later meetings. 
Carron, it seems, has developed an assertive, at times almost aggressive 
conversational manner in partial response to the very difficult and distressing long-
term relationship she maintains with her mother-in-law. It is Carron's conviction that 
the latter believed that she, working class, and a 'clippie' (or, also in Carron' s words, 
"just" a bus conductress) when they met, was never good enough for her son; "she 
didnae like me and she made it quite clear she didnae like me[ ... ] she wanted him to 
marry this librarian". Carron had, however, previously been confident and outgoing, 
and this reaction "didnae bother me [ ... ] it just run off my back, like water off a 
duck's". It was only later, when she had returned to Scotland with experience of more 
serious (phobic) attacks on her person, that her mother-in-law's negative attitude 
really began to take effect. Carron explains; 
"when I really got into the phobia, your self esteem is, on the ground, you 
know it just is, on the ground, and if you've got no self esteem, then anything, 
everything anybody ever says about you, you know it goes really deep". 
Eventually, and awfully, what she perceived as almost constant manipulation and 
emotional abuse led Carron to believe that, well, "maybe I am nothing". However, a 
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somewhat defensive, self-protective sense of pride would never allow Carron to give 
public expression to such (ontological) insecurities, and, she feels, she developed an 
increasingly 'hardened' manner to cope with her few social engagements as a result. 
Carron is clearly aware that her manner can be off-putting, but, as on the occasion of 
described above, realises this need not always be a disadvantage, that it can be useful 
to take control. 
At the time of our first meeting, Carron's assertive tone is initially set by the bold 
manner of her entrance, and the intention to (re)position us both - quite literally - in 
particular ways. I did indeed feel soundly put in my place, slightly on edge, and any 
preconceptions I might have had about timid phobic personalities were already being 
thoroughly undermined. Carron's entrance did in fact remind me of the only joke I 
can recall concerning agoraphobia, which occurred in an episode of the British 
television sit-com, Father Ted. Speculating as to the reasoning behind the half-crazed 
Father Jack's prolonged retreat to a cardboard box, nice-but-dim Dougal suggests, 
"maybe he's agro-phobic". "No way!", says Ted, "I've never known Father Jack to 
run away from a fight". And so, in a matter of seconds, Carron had successfully 
challenged the anticipated hierarchical relationship between researcher and 
researched, and she continued to maintain a degree of control throughout the 
interview. For example, when I suggest that the interview should be shaped by those 
issues Carron herself considers important, she responds: "That's good[ ... ] It's much 
better to come in wi' no questions, like, you take it fae the person that knows cause 
you'll learn much more that way." In this way, I am shown that Carron is assessing 
my approach for its appropriateness; clearly, she and other group members are willing 
and able to comment when they see room for improvement in the nature or direction 
of the project. I am firmly positioned as learning at their hands; it is they who are 
knowledgeable, and who should be respected as such. 
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It struck me as significant in this first meeting that, while I had been concerned not to 
highlight differences between researcher and researched, that is, not to stress my 
outsider status, it seemed that this was precisely what Carron intended to do. Her 
comment ('they sent me in to scare you') introduced a gap between us, and served to 
emphasise her closeness with, as opposed to my distance from, the group. This issue 
recurred in the interviews with the other two members, who repeatedly emphasised 
their sense of belonging within the group, pointing out similarities between 
themselves and fellow sufferers. It seemed clear (at least with hindsight) that they felt 
a shared identity that I was very much apart from, outside of, and was repeatedly told 
I couldn't possibly comprehend. (To provide one more illustrative example; "with the 
best will in the world, unless you've been there yourself, there's no way you'll 
understand".) It was strongly felt and voiced that one has to have personal experience 
of agoraphobia in order to appreciate what the disorder means, and respondents could 
only expect this embodied comprehension from other group members. 
Following some reflection on these initial individual interviews, I became convinced 
it would be remiss not to alter my data collection strategy to incorporate groups into 
my research. This position was strengthened by Maria Mies' (1983: 73) contention 
that 
"the emphasis on interviews of individuals at a given time must be shifted 
towards group discussions[ ... ]. This collectivization of women's experiences 
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is not only a means of getting more and more diversified information, but it 
also helps women to overcome their structural isolation in their families and to 
understand that their individual sufferings have social causes." 
I clearly had to respond to the way in which the women constantly demonstrated 
through their words and actions that their agoraphobic identities should be seen in the 
context of the group as a whole. The best way to achieve this now seemed to require 
ethnographic involvement with group sessions since this appeared to offer an 
appropriate and potentially valuable way to open the research to an inside (if not 
insider's) view of agoraphobia. In this way the project's processual methodology, its 
need to respond to circumstances and change tack at different points, was born of 
necessity. 
The Dynamics of Self-help Groups and Communicative Distance 
In late 1998, I began attending the sessions of the group (WLMI)6, to which Carron 
belongs, and additionally began to visit a second _group (WASP). When I first 
attended WLMI's meetings, members extend a manifestly generous and genuine 
welcome. But, it was clear I should not mistake my physical presence within the space 
of the group with what it means to be a 'true' insider. Often, it was members' use of 
humour that functioned as a reminder of this fact. 'In-jokes' worked as markers of 
group members' shared experience, and as resistance to the imposition of my 
influence on the group. 
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In an early meeting with WLMI, a passing mention by Ruth, the eldest member of her 
group, of the fact (previously known to all but me) that she had a heart attack during a 
'therapeutic' trip to Lourdes some years ago caused much hilarity among all group 
members. To be entirely honest, I was more than a little taken aback by what I 
perceived to be a very black humorous episode (and, with hindsight, wondered if this 
indeed might have been at least part of the point). I was unsure how to respond, but 
felt that laughter on my part might be overstepping the line of acceptable behaviour 
from a relative stranger. There was clearly a level of intimacy between these women 
that I was not privy to, a closeness that was emphasised by their ability to share 
laughter about a dreadful experience without being seen as unsympathetic. For a mere 
acquaintance to have 'made light' of such tragic circumstances would surely have 
risked causing offence, and this was not the only 'humorous' episode to occur during 
my first few meetings when I was unsure how (I was expected) to react. I felt that 
such ambiguous positionality in relation to 'shared' jokes illuminated my status as 
neither fully inside nor outside the group (Katz 1994: 72). 
During these meetings, and also later, when listening to tape recordings of this group, 
I have been struck again and again by the predominance of laughter, despite (or 
perhaps because of?) the fact that the substantial content of group discussion is often 
of an ostensibly distressing nature. For the 'outsider', it can come as a surprise that 
group members frequently discuss difficult issues with a remarkably light touch. The 
following extract, for example, is taken from Ruth's account of a trying period in her 
marriage. (Ruth's husband has since died, and the group in fact helped her through the 
difficult period of her bereavement.) 
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"I got that angry I put my coat on and I said 'right that's it, I'm outa here and 
I'm not coming back'. He says, 'thhaat' s awwright'. He says tae [their 
daughter] 'don't worry hen, she'll be back in before ye know it'. [pause] I only 
got to the end of the building." 
All of the women laugh at this point (no doubt Ruth's contribution is funny because 
they understand what she means) and Carron states "that's the other thing Joyce, you 
cannae threaten tae leave your man because he knows you're no' gonnae get very far 
[laughs]." Such humorous exchanges are associated with those occasions, relatively 
rare in day-to-day life outside the group, when agoraphobia sufferers can take 
pleasure from their difference from others, and commonality with each other. Their 
'abnormality' is not usually the stuff of laughter and there is a tangible sense of 
cathartic release in the group's atmosphere at such times. The very 'irrationality' of 
their fears becomes a source of amusement in itself. Carron's effort to let me in on 
this joke also indicated that she, and perhaps the others, were becoming more 
accustomed to and comfortable with my presence. It suggests an expectation that I 
will understand rather than judge, sympathise with rather than dismiss accounts of 
their 'disordered' experiences, views and behaviours. As protective barriers are 
gradually lowered, it becomes increasingly likely that one of the women will help me 
to share the sentiments of jokes I appear not to 'get'. 
One aspect of their lives that was frequently referred to by group members was the 
in/ability to dispose of rubbish outside the home. This was used as a measure of the 
severity of agoraphobia on numerous occasions, and was itself often considered 
'laughable'. One respondent states, "I couldn't even step outside the door to empty 
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the bucket"; another, "the dustbin had to be right at the back door", and a third, "I 
couldnae empty the rubbish". Given the frequency with which this seemingly trivial 
activity - disposing of household waste - was discussed in individual and group 
interviews, I was brought to reflect on its possible significance. One can speculate 
that, for some agoraphobic individuals, the space within their home is perceived to be 
the only area over which they have almost total control. In stark contrast, almost all 
space beyond the threshold of their home seems unmanageably complex and 
unpredictable. Under circumstances such as these, the ability to expel the detritus and 
disorder of daily life from the space of the home is perhaps attributed with heightened 
importance. Agoraphobic narratives in fact reveal that the characteristic desire to 
manage the space of the home is at times taken to something of an extreme, and 
sufferers' ( over)concern with domestic matters can result in an exaggerated 
expression of a stereotypical, 'housewifely' version of femininity. 7 Humour is then 
used to linguistically manage what sufferers themselves perceive to be an 'abnormal' 
state of affairs. For example, Iris, a trained social worker, (shaking her head as if to 
acknowledge the pointlessness) describes obsessively combing out the fringes of a 
particular rug before she could be content that her living room was sufficiently tidy. 
In a similar vein, (ex-)community volunteer Brenda jokes about hovering around 
visitors with dust-pan and brush, and continually exchanging used with clean 
ashtrays. They are not alone in their intolerance of perceived disarray, or 'chaos'. 
As I became a more regular attendee at these meetings my relation to the group 
shifted and the women's attitude towards me also seemed to change. On a later 
occasion, for instance, group members discussed their experience of a local screening 
programme for breast cancer. The 'mammogram' constitutes an instance of 
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intolerable entrapment for agoraphobics, characterised by Brenda as being 'anchored'. 
By this, she means, 'pinned down' (in this instance almost literally) and unable to 
escape. 
Brenda - "I mean when you're getting a mammogram you're stuck" 
Ruth [to interviewer] - "they've got your chist between a machine [laughs, 
and uses hands to illustrate clamping action on breast]" 
Carron - "so, you get a panic then, you cannae get out the damned thing, what 
do you do?" 
Ruth - "[laughs] see their faces, you're running about wi' your chist hanging 
out!" 
While it was clearly felt that I still required some explanation concerning the source 
of their shared humour, it was the experience of the manunogram rather than panic 
they saw fit to elaborate. Knowing I had not undergone the former ordeal they offered 
additional descriptions and information, clarification they felt was no longer required 
with regard to the latter. I was, to an increasing extent, expected to apprehend parts of 
their phobic experience, even if I could not comprehend all of it fully. The women's 
recognition of, and expectations regarding my growing awareness and understanding 
had, I felt, shifted my status somewhat closer to that of 'insider'. Consequently, less 
contextualising information, and explanations of jokes were thought to be necessary. 
The fact that I did get the jokes, that I began to think certain things funny in much the 
same way as the group members also illustrates how humour can operate as an 
indicator of communicative distance. Sharing jokes entails an ability to call upon a 
tacit understanding of a shared 'form of life'. A regular target for phobic humour 
concerns the tactics some women have adopted for coping with the outside world, 
tactics that they themselves perceive to be 'irrational' and therefore laughable. For 
example, it is fairly common for sufferers to 'shield' themselves with, and hide 
behind, sunglasses or umbrellas, which help them feel less exposed to scrutiny and 
intrusion by others. More unusually, however, Ruth feels intolerably vulnerable 
without her hat, and consequently wears it for protection at all times. "I wear it to 
keep my head on [laughs] I know its laughable [ ... but] I could nae go to the bin 
without it". Ruth offers no explanation for this statement, but all of the women 
present, including myself, find it funny and join in her laughter. We do not need to 
have the joke explained to us, we just find it funny, and in a way that perhaps defies 
rational explanation. Intriguingly, and appositely, Freud (1960: 102) observes that 
when we laugh at a joke, "we do not know what we are laughing at". 
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Clearly, it is a rare and suppo1tive space in which one can describe such unusual 
sartorial habits and receive knowing, never mocking laughter in response. Ordinarily, 
even thinking about the prospect of having a panic attack, losing control and making a 
spectacle of oneself could drive an agoraphobic to anxious distraction. Here, however, 
the women clearly enjoy their conversations, and it is difficult to convey the pleasure 
and sense of sharing they appear to experience. One of the main benefits of group 
attendance is clearly derived from a sense of shared experience, and being able to 
discuss difficulties with others who understand. Much in the way of background 
knowledge can be assumed in conversation with 'fellow sufferers', as opposed to the 
numerous experiential gaps that have to be filled in when recounting tales of panic to 
the uninitiated. 
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There was, however, a contrast between my experience of WLMI group meetings, 
and those of WASP. Here, attendance was again negotiated through the group 
organiser, Mary, a middle class agoraphobic in her late fifties, whose difficulties 
initially stemmed from her fear of vomiting in public. However, as it turned out, the 
dynamics and demands of individual members meant that my methodological 
approach evolved differently. The WASP group was by far the more formally 
organised. Members gathered in a church hall, where sessions were actively 
structured, largely by Mary, who would direct questions to individuals regarding their 
experience or 'progress', and facilitate any discussion that subsequently arose. In such 
circumstances, it seemed appropriate to take a metaphorical back seat, and cause as 
little disruption to ordinary group proceedings as possible. I tended to see my role 
here fairly straightforwardly, as that of a 'participant observer,' attending meetings 
with a prominently placed note-book to remind others of my status as researcher, but 
otherwise keeping a relatively low profile. I tried always to be responsive to signals 
from individuals that they wanted to know more about my research, my own 
experience of panic, or to talk about themselves or their problems. This would usually 
happen before meetings began, or during coffee breaks rather than in the course of the 
sessions themselves. During this time, I tended to speak only when spoken to, or on 
the odd occasion when it seemed appropriate. 
Before every meeting we had agreed that Mary would explain my presence. She was 
also asked to remind those present that they could ask me to leave at any time. I had 
also agreed to leave the meeting ten minutes before the others to enable and 
encourage discussion about my involvement 'in private'. This could then, if desired, 
118 
be relayed back to me anonymously via Mary. In practice, to avoid disrupting things, 
I usually took advantage of natural breaks in the proceedings to make my exit. Here 
and in many other instances one has to avoid employing hard and fast rules. I had to 
remain alert and sensitive to the significance of, or changes in, group dynamics or 
individuals' moods, and to be willing to react accordingly. Given the formal nature of 
WASP group meetings, these aims were relatively easy to achieve. I felt there was a 
requirement, perhaps an expectation that I perform 'professionally', and keep some 
'distance' between myself and group members. There was never any real challenge to 
the boundary between (their) insider and (my) outsider status, from either side of the 
fence. In fact, my attempt to follow respondents' lead throughout the procession of 
WASP meetings meant our relations evolved in a way that, if anything, strengthened 
the divisions between us. 
Having said this it seemed that the WASP group was itself somewhat lacking the 
strong sense of internal coherence that characterised the WLMI group. This may have 
been for a number of reasons. Perhaps the more formal organisation and the 
centralised role of the facilitator occasionally restricted horizontal channels for 
communication between members. People may also have had less in common. 
Individual membership and attendance also seemed to exhibit a greater degree of 
variation from session to session and, being centrally located in a major city, this 
group also drew on people from a wider variety of backgrounds. (The WLMI group 
had been predominantly working class.) But perhaps more importantly than all these 
things was the fact that the group was not entirely composed of agoraphobics. During 
discussions certain members sometimes spoke about personal circumstances in ways 
that were quite distinct from the concerns of agoraphobic members and seemed to 
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have been indicative of other, quite different, psychological problems. This of course 
meant that they were not always calling upon a shared 'form of life' and did not 
comprise such a tight community of shared meanings. 
As one might expect this meant that humour did not feature prominently in the group. 
When jokes were made I found that it usuaJly seemed appropriate to simply smile 
rather than laugh out loud. This conformed to the behaviour of most others in the 
group and to the stereotype of professional detachment expected of me. This is not to 
say that no one ever made jokes with agoraphobic associations. Some jokes revealed 
exactly the same concerns and behavioural patterns exhibited by members of WLMI, 
such as the tendency to be excessively house-proud (taken up further in chapter five). 
For example, screwing up her face in apparent disgust, working class mother of four 
Susan states, "I don't like mess. I have a real problem with mess, dirt, untidiness, 
mess." She then goes on to relate her anxieties about visitors 'disrupting' her home, 
one of whom recently "made crumbs. Honestly, I had to practically sit on my hands to 
stop myself bringing the Hoover in." However, the response to such jokes was more 
restrained and they were few and far between. This was partly no doubt because it 
took a great deal of confidence in this setting to counter the group's formal structure 
and 'hold the floor' but also because of a need to explain and rationalise the joke to 
others in terms that a non-agoraphobic might understand. Susan could not rely on the 
unspoken complicity and tacit knowledge so characteristic of the WLMI group. She 
states, "I was striving to be this perfect wife, perfect mother, perfect little home-
maker, perfect this, perfect that. [ ... ] I was so, so anxious, right? Striving for this 
perfection, all the time." Speculating herself as to the reasons for her behaviour, Susan 
turns to the group, "but that's years of being in the house isn't it? You've got nothing 
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else to do cause you're so frightened of going outside. My way of distracting myself 
from panicking is cleaning, shampooing carpets, anything." 
At the time (and also with hindsight) I recognised that the members of WLMI were 
challenging and resisting my mentally rehearsed performance of sensitive, feminist 
research in a very different way from WASP. Whereas my positioning in relation to 
the latter tended to be more passive than I anticipated (as a somewhat peripheral, 
'foreign' body), members of WLMI demanded more active, direct involvement in 
their meetings. This may seem paradoxical but it is indicative of the way in which the 
WLMI' s close-knit community operated to empower them and enable them to 
intervene directly in the research process. On the first occasion of my meeting the 
WLMI group, Brenda set the initial (assertive) tone for the meeting, getting the 
discussion off the ground by questioning me about my attitude towards her disorder. I 
had met Brenda just minutes before, and had spent a few moments, following 
introductions, explaining to the group as a whole (there were six women present on 
this day) that I wanted to disrupt their usual proceedings as little as possible, to simply 
'sit in on' their meeting. Brenda's first response to my contribution was as follows; 
Brenda - "Can I ask you what your opinion is o' people that have got 
agoraphobia?" 
Joyce - "My opinion?" 
Brenda - "Aye. What you think. D'you think we're off wur heids?" 
So much for just sitting in! In this way, Brenda explicitly and effectively positions me 
in relation to herself and the rest of the group, highlighting my separateness from 
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herself and then making an explicit demand upon me. Her statement; "what do you 
think of us", draws attention to my outsider position, and feels in no sense like a 
deferral to my supposed authority as an academic or researcher (compare Longhurst 
1997: 37). Brenda clearly feels that, as an outsider, assumptions cannot reliably be 
made about my views, nor can my sympathy/empathy be taken for granted. (Brenda's 
narrative features more prominently in chapter five.) I have entered into, in a sense 
intruded on, her group, disrupting its safe, predictable and manageable space, and 
Brenda quite reasonably wants my views brought out into the open. In this way my 
research is made answerable to WLMI' s members. This positioning is maintained 
hereafter by, for example, explicit assessment of my contributions by group members. 
By responding, for example, "that's an interesting question, but ... ", respondents are 
able to reshape my contributions, and refocus discussion according to their own 
interests and priorities rather than my own. While such evaluations are never, in the 
event, entirely negative, they do function as a reminder that my continued presence is 
entirely due to group members' tolerance. In fact, as one respondent pointed out, the 
women are not taking part in the project "for completely altruistic reasons. People like 
you can help publicise the thing." 
In effect then, once again my methodological expectations had been confounded and I 
had been forced to adopt quite different research strategies with each group to achieve 
the desired ends. This even affected the way in which I chose to collect material for 
my project. The absence of a leader to actively shape conversations in the WLMI 
group meant that the women present tended to be equally involved in their discourse. 
Each could direct questions to the others, myself included, so there was no sense in 
which I could take a back seat and 'observe' the proceedings. It thus seemed less 
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appropriate to use a notebook in sessions with WLMI, but members consented to have 
sessions tape-recorded, explaining that "we're no' a secret society". While the 
respondents would at times carry on discussions seemingly regardless of my presence, 
they could also channel their discussion towards me explicitly, and expect substantial 
responses and involvement. The situation was therefore far less 'controlled', from my 
point of view, than my largely predictable meetings with WASP~ in effect, I could be 
called to account at any time. 
Conclusions: A Processual Approach to Spaces of Self-help. 
This chapter has described the ways in which a methodological approach has evolved 
from its initial textbook character through the need to engage in a more responsive 
way with those involved in my research. Engaging with the priorities of respondents 
led to a move away from a focus on individual interviews towards ethnographic 
involvement with two agoraphobic self-help groups, each of differing form and 
content. While I performed the relatively passive role of participant observer in one 
formally organised group (WASP), my manner of involvement in the other's, less 
formal sessions, was far more active, and would change from week to week. In 
response to such variable circumstances, I have suggested that one should be willing, 
at times, to follow respondents' lead. The researcher cannot anticipate and plan for 
every possible eventuality in the interview situation. At some stage, it seems, you -
the researcher - might have to fall back on 'common sense', and hope that you have 
enough in the way of sensitivity and basic social skills to get both you and your 
subject through the interview relatively harm-free (Parr 1998). My own experience 
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reveals that, no matter how carefully such issues have been thought out in advance, 
the subjects of our research may have ideas and plans that do not coincide with, and 
effectively thwart, our own. Such circumstances demand that we enact what Skeggs 
( 1994: 88) terms a "counter-hegemonic approach to research" recognising a need to 
respond to respondents' (often unpredictable) requirements rather than cleaving to a 
pre-formulated design, regardless of how carefully it was planned or how suitable it 
may have seemed in advance. 
Throughout the course of this project, my method increasingly came to be seen, in this 
light, not as a pre-existingframework, but as a 'work in progress', or rather, process. 
That is, my method was neither firmly established and fixed, nor 'progressing' in one 
direction toward a particular end. Rather, it evolved as a continually shifting set of 
methods that had to respond to changes in my understanding of agoraphobia, my 
recognition of respondents' relation to their groups and the dynamics of those groups 
themselves. As Kim England ( 1994: 82) observes, "research is a process not just a 
product. Prut of this process involves reflecting on, and learning from past research 
experiences, being able to re-evaluate our research critically". One of the things I 
hope that this chapter has done is outline and defend the suitability of what I would 
term this 'processual' methodology, particularly for working with groups. 
I want to conclude by making some methodological points that may prove relevant to 
feminist qualitative approaches in general, but may be particularly important to future 
work with self-help groups. It seems clear that researchers must recognize the very 
important differences in researching what might be termed 'natural' groups from 
'artificially' constructed groups like focus groups (Longhurst 1996). This point is 
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made in a different context by Holbrook (1996: 141) who argues that "groups with 
people who already know each other and share a sense of common social identity 
have different strengths and weaknesses from research with groups of comparative 
strangers." Rather than being brought together for research purposes, the participants 
in my research had themselves actively chosen to belong to suppo1t groups to help 
them make sense of and manage their disordered lives. A self-help group like WLMI, 
where all of its members might be said to share a 'form of life' that sets them apart 
from others and who all occupy a (quite literally) meaning-full community poses 
particular methodological problems. It requires us to reassess the degree to which the 
researcher is actually in control of the research environment and, in particular, reveals 
how negotiating the communicative distance between researcher and researched is a 
two-way and uneven process. Where the agenda of the focus group is set prior to the 
meeting by a researcher who regarded themselves as facilitating and directing 
discussion, the dynamics of the self-help group are radically different. Not only do the 
discussions tend to be more diffuse and the issues addressed less predictable but the 
members of the group themselves actively direct the conversations and regulate 
(through the use of humour amongst other things) the relations between researcher 
and researched. (Sometimes it almost appears as if it is the researcher who ends up 
being researched.) 
Self-help groups thus problematize in a rather different way the 'communicative 
ideal' that is often thought to underlie feminist research methodologies. As outlined in 
the previous chapter, many feminists have pointed out that the relationship between 
researcher and researched can never be equal. However, my previous reading had led 
me to expect that it would necessarily be the researcher who occupied the privileged 
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position. I was thus prepared, as Kobayashi (1994: 73), suggests, to try to demystify 
the university based research process as far as possible. 8 I expected to be able to 
simply reject the positivist model of a standoffish objectivity and employ a "conscious 
partiality" (Mies 1983: 68) in order to break down communicative barriers. But in the 
case of WASP I found the formal structure and dynamics made this almost 
impossible. In the case of WLMI I simply hadn't bargained for the extent to which 
membership of a self-help group could change the balance of power in the research 
process. Its members (at least initially) were largely in control of regulating the 
communicative distance between us, and of deciding when and how to construct and 
deconstruct barriers. 9 I was, then, largely unprepared for the possibility that my 
respondents might not enter the situation in the 'submissive' spirit I had anticipated, 
that they might rather actively resist my positioning, obstruct (albeit 'wittily') any 
move toward insider status, and reconstruct the interview situation in particular and 
unpredictable ways. 
This brings us to the role of humour in context of 'natural' groups. Humour, here as 
elsewhere, serves a number of ends. First, as is widely recognised, it is a form of 
coping mechanism, a way of 'making light' of difficulties, and therefore rendering 
them more manageable. 10 Second, it is a way of affirming shared experience - the 
women understand each other and jokes emphasise this. Indeed, as psychologist Jerry 
Palmer ( 1994: 58) notes, humour is "a form of ethological integration [that] aids 
social bonding [and] the creation and preservation of group identity." Third, and 
perhaps most relevant to my methodological concerns, jokes serve as a kind of 
resistance against my 'authority'. Members' 'performance' of humour articulates and 
protects agoraphobic subjectivities from outside(r) influence and intrusion. 
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I have argued that the manner in which humour is employed in all these ways can act 
as an indicator of the communicative distance between researcher and researched and 
of the group dynamics itself. This is because, in order to work, humour has to call 
upon a basis for shared meanings. The degree to which the joke strikes a chord with 
those within the group is thus an indication of the depth of these shared meanings. 
Whether the joke's meaning has to be made explicit or can remain entirely implicit is 
also indicative of the degree of communality within the group and of changes in the 
researcher's relation to that group. It is in this sense that each joke can represent a 
'tiny revolution' in the research process. Thus humour should be recognised as 
playing a potentially significant pait in such processual exploration. We as researchers 
should take care to respond sensitively to jokes as expressions of something of wo1th 
rather than dismissing them as mere humorous 'asides' to the more serious stuff of 
research. Otherwise, the joke could well be on us. 
In the following chapter, I intend to shift from methodological concerns to conceptual 
issues, that is, to the question of how we might understand the experience of 
agoraphobia as expressed in the words of agoraphobics themselves. It is perhaps 
appropriate that chapter four begins with a discussion of the phenomenology of the 
panic attack since this seems to lie at the origin of sufferers' development of 
agoraphobia and at the centre of their anxieties. These anxieties are addressed through 
the philosophy of S0ren Kierkegaard, generally regarded as the earliest thinker of the 
existential tradition, a tradition to which this thesis continually returns. In particular, 
the next chapter relates the onset of the panic attack to spaces of consumption like the 
shopping mall and the supermarket. These are aspects of every-day 'being-in-the-
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world' commonly and closely associated with women's roles, and ones that loom 
large in agoraphobic lives and narratives. 
1 Carron, for example, reported that she would probably suffer from exhaustion and heightened anxiety 
as a result of my visit to her home; "this'll happen to me when you go away today, at some point it'll 
hit me .... because this is a change in my routine. I'm no', no' trying to make you feel bad or anything, 
I'm trying to explain." Carron did, however, remain determined to be interviewed despite this 
additional risk. 
2 Should the individual's GP be unaware of agoraphobic support groups, the recommendation may 
come further down the line of treatment via a community psychiatric nurse (CPN), clinical 
psychologist, counsellor or therapist. Alternatively, sufferers might see a group advertisement in their 
local newspaper, a poster in the town library, or news may be passed by word of mouth (a friend of a 
friend etc.). Television talk shows and radio phone-ins occasionally feature discussion of agoraphobia, 
and provide telephone numbers for national organisations such as No Panic, Pax, and StressWatch, or 
the Scottish Association for Mental Health, who each pass on details of local points of contact. 
These information sources are clearly not comprehensive or fail-safe, and there is no way of knowing 
how many individuals slip through this supportive net. (For more information on self-help resources, 
see the essays collected in Gartner and Reissman ( 1984; see esp. Katz); Smith ( 1980) and Rapping 
( 1996). 
3 Although commentators on Wittgenstein's work disagree about the meaning of his concept of 'form 
of life', the interpretation developed by Lynn Rudder Baker seems to fit most comfortably with 
Wittgenstein's own anti-essentialist philosophy (see Davidson and Smith 1999). 
4 Baker states "[i]t is no more promising to attempt to describe what would constitute a 'form of life' 
per se than to attempt to describe what would constitute a background per se" (Baker 1984: 277). 
5 In the context of the group meeting, humour can clearly serve a number of positive ends. Recent 
psychological and psycho-therapeutic literature has suggested that humour has the capacity to reduce 
anxiety (Palmer 1994: 58), even that it is the 'opposite' of stress (Martin 1997). 
6 At this stage, when I began to attend Group A sessions, they were meeting on a less formal basis than 
previously, without a facilitator in a housing estate based community centre equally (if not easily) 
accessible to all members. (These changes were entirely due to a much-resisted withdrawal of council 
funding.) 
7 There is a sense, I would suggest, in which agoraphobic women involved in this project compensate 
for their inability to manage some (outdoor) aspects of 'doing gender' (Butler 1990; 1993) - for 
example shopping, family outings etc. - by doing other (indoor) aspects to extremes, and thus 
performing an exaggerated stereotype of the western 'housewife' (Tseelon 1995). It seems that for 
some home-oriented women such as these, the 'private' space of their very own domestic sphere comes 
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to equal the 'public' (appraisable) face of their femininity. Home, for the agoraphobic, can be 
experienced as an expression and even extension of their self, and negative judgement by (non-phobic) 
others is thus considered to be no laughing matter. 
8 One way of achieving this is ironically to emphasise very limited power and reach of the researcher 
and research, in terms of its influence beyond the academy. 
9 Though of course other factors may have played part in this including the fact that I was considerably 
younger that the majority of members of WLMI and that I had a relatively low academic status as a 
postgraduate student. 
10 Psychotherapist Marie Adams (2000: 160) for example, suggests that humour can provide "a means 
of accepting the painful, a way of absorbing and acknowledging what otherwise might be too terrible to 
bear[ ... ] laughter can also be used to distance ourselves from an experience, to diminish its 
significance or be used as a displacement tool to distract ourselves from discomfort." (See also Lemma 
2000.) 
Chapter Four 




The preceding three chapters have been concerned to describe exactly why and how 
this investigation into the meanings and experience of agoraphobia was conducted, 
and to offer reflections on the experience and implications of the dynamics of the 
research process. What I want to do now is embark on the first stage of in-depth 
discussion of the project's findings, by tracing certain significant aspects of 
agoraphobia strand by strand. 
The current chapter developed directly out of agoraphobics' accounts of the initial 
panic attack(s) that seemed to presage the development of their condition. As I 
listened to these accounts a number of commonalities seemed to emerge, in terms of 
the descriptions of the panic attack itself, the ensuing anxiety experienced by 
sufferers, and the environmental contexts of their occurrence. The problem of how to 
develop a geographical understanding of the descriptions I was offered seemed to 
coalesce around what might be termed an 'existential' problematic. In other words, it 
seemed to me that the phenomenology of the panic attack itself, the respondents' 
experiences of anxiety and the manner in which certain places were associated with 
such experiences all seemed indicative of what might be termed an 'ontological 
(existential) insecurity' in social space. 
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Hopefully, my reasons for making this claim will become apparent in this and 
following chapters as I extend and develop the ideas outlined below. However, as the 
introduction has already suggested, one way of understanding agoraphobia is in terms 
of an anxiety concerning a failure in our (usually unconscious) ability to manage the 
boundaries of our self-identity, that is, to manage our existence as a self. In these 
terms the panic attack might be seen as an expression of a 'boundary crisis', a 
temporary loss of self-identity and self-control, that can be induced by a wide variety 
of circumstances but is usually precipitated by and/or entails feelings of being 
overwhelmed in crowded social spaces. The agoraphobic thus comes to associate such 
spaces with feelings of panic and becomes anxious about the loss of control such 
spaces might induce, leading them to avoid them whenever possible. 
Since its inception existentialism as a philosophical tradition has concerned itself with 
the anxieties associated with the emergence of self-understanding and the concomitant 
possibility (certainty) that this self can (will) cease to exist at some point. As I try to 
show below there is thus a prima facie case for linking existential anxiety with the 
fear of loss of self that is frequently expressed in agoraphobics' discourses. Put 
simply, my argument is that agoraphobia might be interpreted in terms of the anxiety 
that arises out of the problematizing of everyday 'Being-in-the-world' in/through 
experiences of social space. 
In this chapter, I embark on an existentialist exploration of agoraphobic Being-in-the-
world by giving careful consideration to the significant place of shopping in 
respondents' everyday lives. The desire to do so results in part from the predominance 
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of the subject in respondents' own narratives about panic and anxiety. However, I also 
want to suggest that spaces of consumption are emblematic of what we might call 
'agoraphobic landscapes', those arenas ostensibly 'productive', and subjectively 
representative of the most acute anxiety and ardent avoidance. Such sites are thus, it is 
argued, well placed to provide substantial insights into the geographies of 
agoraphobic women's fear. 
In late twentieth century Western cultures, shopping has become one of the organising 
principles of our lives. In Jon Goss's (1993: 18) words "planned retail space is 
colonising other privately owned public spaces such as hotels, railway stations, 
airports, office buildings and hospitals, as shopping has become the dorn\nant mode of 
contemporary public life." The relative lack of attention paid to shopping is puzzling; 
until, that is, we consider the extent to which the activity is seen as gendered (Miller: 
1997). As feminist theorists have forcefully demonstrated, for an activity to be 
feminised is equivalent to being trivialised, denigrated, and often relegated to the 
'private sphere' (Bondi 1992). 
That shopping is still largely seen as a 'feminine' pastime is beyond a doubt, as recent 
empirical research has demonstrated (Falk & Campbell 1997). Colin Campbell claims 
that children are socialised to believe that "shopping is basically part and parcel of the 
activities that help to define the female role, and especially of that distinctive sub-role 
of housewife." (1997: 167) This stereotype has some basis in reality, in that, as Nicky 
Gregson writes, "it is still overwhelmingly women who shop [ ... ]just as much as it is 
women who form the majority of retail sales workers" (Gregson 1995: 137; also see 
Moore 1991; Lowe and Crewe 1991 ). Given the centrality of shopping to the feminine 
sex-role stereotype, indeed, to women's gendered identities, we can imagine extra 
difficulties for the agoraphobic woman in her exclusion from this symbolically 
private, but physically very public, realm. 
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Thus this chapter marks the beginning of my attempt to employ a feminist take on 
existentialism in order to understand agoraphobia as a gendered condition mediated 
through modern (consumerist) environments. It draws on interview material in order 
to focus on those experiences of 'panic' that respondents associate with the initial 
development of their agoraphobic anxieties. Given that the chapter thus intends to 
'begin at the beginning' - of the theoretical interpretation, and at the onset of the 
agoraphobic condition itself, it is perhaps appropriate that it should also begin by 
calling on the work of the earliest existentialist - S0ren Kierkegaard. In what follows I 
argue that his development of an (albeit esoteric) existentialist analysis of human 
experience and emotion is in fact peculiarly apposite to the subject in question, and 
can help us understand the threatening nature of phobic space. 
Kierkegaard and all-Consuming Anxiety 
The concept of anxiety (Angest) is central to the existential thought of the Danish 
philosopher S0ren Kierkegaard ( 1813-55). For Kierkegaard anxiety is an ontological 
characteristic of being human, of human existence. To be, and to be aware of one's 
being, is also to be aware of one's mortality, of the finiteness of that existence. That 
is, in being properly human, and in reflecting on our human condition, we are struck 
by the possibility of our ceasing to exist at any moment and the certainty that one-day 
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we will indeed die. This threat to our existence is expressed in anxiety. Anxiety is that 
which brings to our attention a concern with the limits of our existence, with the 
nothingness that lies beyond the boundary of our life and at the very heart of our 
being. Anxiety is thus a consequence of an existence that is constantly threatened with 
ceasing to be, it is a correlate of being in the face of non-being, of nothing. Thus 
anxiety differs from fear, because fear is always fear of some-thing - anxiety is a 
relation to nothing, it cannot be pinned down, it has no object, but is a generalised and 
pervasive feature of our existence. 
Anxiety is thus linked to the limits (boundaries) of our existence, to our self-
awareness as a (mortal) being. At the same time it is also a consequence of being able 
to think beyond those boundaries, of our freedom of thought. Without being able to 
think the possibility of our own deaths there could be no true self-awareness, no 
awareness of the limits of our being and thus no anxiety. From Kierkegaard's 
religious perspective anxiety is thus linked to the Fall - to the origin of the human 
condition - to the attainment of know ledge of self and of the mortality that is a co-
requisite of that knowledge. In eating from the Tree of Knowledge humanity becomes 
self-aware and is simultaneously expelled into a world of death and anxiety. 
Kierkegaard thus recognizes anxiety's essential ambiguity. It presages both the 
possibility of freedom and of the 'fall'. "[T]he greatness of anxiety is a prophecy of 
the greatness of the perfection," ( 1980: 64) - of the infinity and boundlessness of 
thought. But, for the finite and bounded individual, freedom's infinite possibilities 
carry untold risks (see also chapter 5). 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, given these religious associations, Kierkegaard also offers us 
a (rather unattractive) gendered perspective on anxiety. For Kierkegaard, anxiety is a 
temptress that 'disquiets' and 'ensnares' the unwary individual, a "feminine 
weakness" that "is reflected more in Eve than in Adam." (Kierkegaard 1980: 64) 
Anxiety is a product of woman's more 'sensuous' nature, the 'immediacy' and 
openness she exhibits to the felt experiences of her bodily being and to her worldly 
surroundings. 2 And yet, despite, or perhaps because of, its close relation to sex and 
sexuality, Kierkegaard's misogyny will not allow him to follow his logic to its own 
conclusion; woman's sensuous proclivities do not, it seems, signify her greater 
potential for freedom. Rather they merely indicate that her role is to mediate between 
the world and man-kind; "only through Eve could Adam be seduced by [the 
possibilities offered by] the serpent" (Kierkegaard 1980: 66). Women are then, 
Kierkegaard thinks, both more susceptible to, and less able to cope with, anxiety. 
Ironically, the very sensitivity of those most permeable to anxiety's effects means that 
they are in danger of being overwhelmed to such an extent that their freedom of 
thought and action is compromised. Thus Kierkegaard claims, "[a]nxiety is a feminine 
weakness in which freedom faints" (Kierkegaard 1980: 61 ). 
Even this brief introduction to Kierkegaard's thought illustrates that there is some 
potential here for understanding (agoraphobic) anxieties in terms of what we might 
term the 'boundary conditions' of human existence. He also seems to offer an initial 
account (however unattractive) of why women's freedom might be compromised 
though their very sensitivity to anxiety. Of course, as chapter 1 showed, studies 
actually reveal no appreciable difference in the incidence of disorders associated with 
intense anxiety between men and women. 3 But the gendered incidence of 
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agoraphobia does indeed seem to suggest that this particular form of anxiety is a 
predominantly feminine 'weakness' and it ce1tainly does effect women's freedom. 
There is certainly nothing liberating in the disorientating and disabling repercussions 
of anxiety for the women who suffer its almost constant presence. 
Thus, while Kierkegaard's 'conceptualization of anxiety' in this esoteric and 
misogynist form is far from ideal for a feminist geography, it might still prove a 
useful starting point for analysis. Kierkegaard not only links together conceptions of 
the self and anxiety but explicitly does so in terms of a spatial metaphorics, a 
language of limits and boundaries. In what follows I want to suggest that this 
language might express something of women's experiences of anxiety as well as 
describing its practical (geographic) effects. In other words, agoraphobia does not 
only result in a gendered 'geography of exclusion' (Sibley 1995) that confines women 
to their homes. It is also, as I argue throughout this thesis, a form of anxiety best 
expressed in a spatial terminology. In this I agree with Marilyn Silverman's 
existential claim that "[s]patial metaphors are well suited to capture the 
phenomenology of the particular form of panic that occurs when the most 
fundamental sense of existence and connection is at stake" (Silverman in Bordo et al. 
I 998: 89/90). 
However, I intend to go further than Silverman and argue that the relationship 
between space and agoraphobia is not merely 'metaphorical'. The boundary 
conditions of existence, between 'internal' and 'external' space and between being 
and non-being are very real and constantly re-worked. As chapter 1 argued, "space is 
also a doing [ ... ] the articulation of relational performances" (Rose 1999: 248) and 
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agoraphobia seems to express an anxiety about one's ability to regulate and control 
the performative dialectic between permanence and impermanence, permeability and 
imperviousness. Accounts of agoraphobic anxiety suggest that it seems to be spatially 
mediated, agoraphobia is in essence an im/mediately spatial affair. The non-locatable 
fear (that anxiety not of any-thing) which typifies agoraphobia, that oppressive, yet 
inherently intangible 'something in the air', is, I claim, a quality of the dynamic 
relationship between se(f and space, person and place. For the agoraphobic, anxiety 
becomes all-encompassing, (overwhelming) affecting those spaces in, of, and around 
the self. 
Kierkegaard's phenomenal psychology too recognises similar requirements for a 
balanced self which has to be seen not as a 'given', atomic and autonomous 
individuality but a "process of becoming"( 1989: 60) a "project that occurs in 
time"(Hannay 1989: 23). "A human being is" he says "a synthesis of the infinite and 
the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity" (1989: 43). For 
Kierkegaard, "[p ]ersonhood is a synthesis of possibility and necessity. Its manner is 
therefore like breathing (respiration)"( 1989: 70) and like breathing it usually 
continues unnoticed and unremarked unless problematized. The problem is that once 
panic has drawn the agoraphobic' s attention to the unstable morphology of the self 
then she becomes focused wholly on monitoring the self in the face of existential 
anxiety. As one respondent, Susan, remarked "I think people with this disorder are 
very, very selfish. You don't mean to be selfish, but you're constantly tuned into your 
body, your self, all about you, all the time." Anxiety becomes all-consuming. 
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Kierkegaard invokes a spatial metonymics that echoes sufferer's accounts of 
agoraphobic anxiety. For when the self looks "down into its own possibility" ( 1980: 
61) its anxiety increases, "phantasms succeed one another with such speed that it 
seems as though everything were possible, and this is the very moment the individual 
himself [sic] has finally become nothing but an atmospheric illusion." ( 1989: 66) The 
world begins to spin and the individual must grab "hold of finiteness to support 
itself'. (1980: 61) As we saw in chapter 1, agoraphobia had, prior to Westphal' s 1871 
introduction of the term, been referred to by Benedikt as platzschwindel - literally 
'dizziness in public places.' (Mathews et al. 1981: l) Thus Maggie describes the onset 
of a panic attack "Your heart starts thumping, you feel you 're choking in your throat, 
you can't swallow and you feel all dizzy and giddy, and like if its in a shop, or the 
church or what, you just feel you want to run." For Kierkegaard too "[a]nxiety may be 
compared with dizziness." (1980: 61) "He [sic] whose eye happens to look down into 
the yawning abyss becomes dizzy." (1980: 61) This 'abyss' is not a geographic 
feature of the landscape of one's everyday life so much as a rift in its fabric. Nor is 
anxiety simply an 'internal' reflex to specific external stimuli. Rather anxiety is 
evoked by an existential challenge to what for most of us, most of the time, is a well-
defined presumption of our concrete self-identity. "I couldn't control it when I was 
out there? You know, really, you honestly believe you are on the brink of death." 
(Susan, emphasis added.) 
'Dizziness' is, if anything, too mild a term for the intensely disorientating personal 
experience of the sufferer as she seems to 'lose touch' with her surroundings, to stand 
at the edge of the abyss. The sufferer feels isolated from all external assistance; 
sucked into a vacuum that threatens to engulf her very being in an overwhelming 
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panic. "When you have this you feel you're on your own, you feel ... nobody else has 
got it, you' re in this situation, and its just like a situation you' 11 never get out of, a 
black hole that you'll never get out of." [Ann, emphasis added] 
"But what", Kierkegaard (1980: 61) asks," is the reason for this" dizziness? Where 
does this feeling come from? The source of anxiety is not easily located. "It is just as 
much in his [sic] own eyes as in the abyss, for suppose he had not looked down?" The 
panic attack comes just as much from within as without and its unpredictability may 
be one of its most terrifying features; "[ o ]ften they come completely out of the blue. A 
lot of people who come [to the group] say 'I was just perfectly fine, and I was walking 
down the road, and then, all of a sudden, you know, the pounding and the racing 
heart, and the sweating'." (Mary) An everyday situation can suddenly lose its 
familiarity as the sufferer is caught in a vortex that spins her out of control. 
Silverman's description of the panic attack is revealing. "Suddenly the stage 
disappears. The floor drops out. The players and set vanish or persist as unfamiliar 
figures in another script in which you have no part" (Silverman in Bordo et al. 1998: 
90, emphasis added). In such circumstances the sufferer longs for something solid to 
grab hold of. Susan Bordo describes her own agoraphobic experience thus, "I was 
stranded on the edge of an enormous [iceberg], rising high out of the sea, perched, 
precarious, desperate for walls to plant my hands against." (Bordo in Bordo et 
al.1998: 80 emphasis added) This too can be described in Kierkegaard's terms. Since 
he believes that our freedom to act as individuals depends upon imagination - "the 
medium of infinitization", ( 1989: 60) the danger is that "when emotion becomes 
fantastic in this way, the self is simply more and more volatilized and eventually 
becomes a kind of abstract sensitivity which inhumanly belongs to no human [ ... ] the 
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person whose emotions have become fantastic [ ... ]becomes il~finitized [. .. ]he [sic] 
loses himsef:f more and more" ( 1989: 61, emphasis added). This description is very 
close indeed to the phenomenon recognised in the clinical literature as 'derealisation' 
and/or depersonalisation associated with panic attacks involving disturbing and 
sometimes bizarre changes in one's feelings of embodiment. (Chambless & Goldstein 
1982, Marks 1987) Roger Caillois refers to this problematization of the individual's 
boundaries as "depersonalization by assimilation to space" (Caillois, cited in Grosz 
1994: 47). According to Isaac Marks "[d]uring depersonalisation one feels 
temporarily strange, unreal, disembodied, cut off or far away from immediate 
surroundings." (Marks 1987: 342, emphasis added.) 
This sensitivity to the infinite, the unbounded, is abstract precisely because the self 
seems to have nothing solid to latch onto; "the object of anxiety is a 
nothing."(Kierkegaard 1980: 77) And yet precisely because that anxiety is non-
locatable it attains a terrible reality. "Its fear of fear. Its fear of what. .. this feeling 
that's gonnae come. It absolutely petrifies you, and you just don't want to 
face ... because it's a terrible feeling." [Carron] This 'nothing' is the abyss above 
which the self, made conscious of its possibilities, balances, fearing to look down lest 
it should fall and be annihilated. Yet ironically, this nothing is also the open landscape 
against which the self can choose to define its own existence. It is for this reason that 
Kierkegaard claims "anxiety is the dizziness off reed om." (Kierkegaard 1980: 61, 
emphasis added.) 
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Consumer/ Consuming Culture 
"The biggest danger, that of losing oneself, can pass off in the world as quietly as if it 
were nothing; every other loss, an arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife, etc. is bound to be 
noticed"( Kierkegaard 1989: 1 ). 
For Kierkegaard there are two ways of losing oneself, the first in the swirling 
maelstrom of the imagination's unbounded possibilities, the second by never 
becoming aware of oneself at all, for example, by focusing one's attention on being 
someone else. 4 The former is, for Kierkegaard, preferable since it is more reflexive; at 
least the sufferer has become aware of the pliant morphology of their existence, of 
freedom's possibilities and dangers. In the second case, the individual may often 
appear untroubled, though this is a result of their having suppressed their own 
potential by continually misrecognizing who or what they might be. This he refers to 
as an impotent "consumption of the self' ( 1989: 48).5 The fact that the person seems 
untroubled is, according to Kierkegaard merely a sign of "a sickness that [ ... ] hasn't 
yet declared itself." ( 1989: 50) 
Kierkegaard's reference to the 'consumption of the self is doubly pertinent given 
agoraphobics' constant references to consumer spaces..._ shops, streets, supermarkets, 
and especially shopping malls - as sites associated with panic attacks. Indeed, perhaps 
we might argue that the subject who ventures into the shopping mall or supermarket 
risks losing herself in both of the ways Kiekegaard identifies. On the one hand, faced 
with so many disparate versions of what the self is or could be, she directs herself 
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towards something she is not; she is compelled to seek an identity behind the idealised 
images modelled in window displays and advertisements. But, even if she resists the 
imperative to consume subjectivities, to be an 'identity shopper', (see Langman 1994, 
and Gabriel & Lang 1995: ch.5) she must still negotiate those avenues of corrosive 
space which seek to break down her resistance to buy, to manipulate her values and 
emotions, and to forget herself in the momentary pleasures of satisfying desires 
manufactured by others. 
Spaces of consumption present grave dangers to the identities of phobic and non-
phobic subjects alike. They are assemblages of numerous and overlaid attempts at 
sensory stimulation, which can render the atmosphere excruciatingly intense. Susan 
Bardo describes a panic attack in a crowded supermarket, when everything feels alien 
and frightening to her, "the noise, the crying children, the pushing and shoving." 
( 1998: 84) Clearly, this effect is not accidental, the charged space is intended to have 
a certain impact on the subject. From market stalls to mega malls, shopping sites are 
deliberately organized to encourage us to buy, to weaken any resolve we have not to. 
A great deal of energy, not to mention finance, is expended in attempts to pin-point 
vulnerabilities to be exploited, and ways to elicit particular consumer responses. This 
kind of manipulation is indubitably more intense in larger shopping centres and malls 
where sociability takes second place to sales. Whilst every agora (market place) has 
characteristic sights, smells, sounds, tastes, and objects to be picked up and handled, 
the mall is arguably more single-minded in its orientation toward consumption (see 
Goss 1992, 1993; also Kowinski 1985; Shields 1989; 1984; Hopkins 1990). 
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This kind of analysis of shopping spaces is not new. The attempt to draw connections 
between spaces of consumption and the deconstruction and reconstruction of self-
identities has a pedigree that goes back at least as far as Walter Benjamin's Paris 
Arcades project. Burgin explains how, according to Benjamin, the arcades represent 
an image of space latent in all of us, "the pre-Oedipal, maternal, space. [ ... ] In this 
space it is not simply that the boundaries are 'porous', but that the subject itself is 
soluble. This space is the source of bliss and of terror, of the 'oceanic' feeling, and of 
the feeling of coming apart; just as it is at the origin of feelings of being invaded, 
overwhelmed, suffocated." (Burgin 1996: 155) Shopping in the mall can thus be said 
to be contradictory; "it is an experience that yields both pleasure and anxiety, a 
'delightful experience' that can quickly become a 'nightmare "'(Falk & Campbell 
1997: 12). It is also clearly an experience that problematizes the boundaries of self-
identity. 
Recent sociological approaches concur with Burgin' s psychoanalytic reading in 
recognising the impact of spaces of consumption upon self-identity. For example, 
Bauman describes the subject of consumption as someone who is engaged in "self 
construction by a process of acquiring conunodities of distinction and difference", 
( 1988: 808) that is to say, buying an identity. We interact with consumer products, as 
part of what has been called the reflexive project of the self, asking questions of 
ourselves such as, "'Am I like that?'; 'Could that be (part of) me?"' (Falk and 
Campbell 1997: 4), For these reasons the mall is, I would argue, the site of boundary 
crises par excellence as we try to build a secure identity in an environment which 
continually erodes it. 
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In this sense at least the shopping mall can be regarded as both symptom and cause of 
the Joss of stable social anchorings. Not only does the "mall-based allocation of goods 
and dreams, gratifications and identities, [provide] no more than intermittent 
palliatives for underlying anxiety and appropriation of, if annihilation of subjectivity" 
(Langman 1992: 67) it is actually complicit in developing an architecture of abjection. 
In the space of the mall, one is subject to more than mere 'sensory stimulation', there 
is rather a continual perceptual bombardment which, bizarrely, is intended to 
simultaneously stimulate and sedate. Crawford claims that "the mall presents a 
dizzying spectacle of attractions and diversions." (Crawford 1991: 3, emphasis added; 
see also Williamson 1992) that can bring on an attack of mal de mall, a "perceptual 
paradox" characterised by "disorientation, anxiety and apathy" (1994: 14 ). The mall is 
a place where "confusion proliferates at every level" ( 1994: 4 ). In it, we find "dream-
like illusions and spectacles, eclecticism and mixed codes, which induce the public to 
flow past a multiplicity of cultural vocabularies which provide no oppo11unity for 
distanciation ( de-distanciation) and encourage a sense of immediacy, instantiation, 
emotional de-control and childlike wonder." (Featherstone 1996: 103) 
The consuming subject is channelled in a certain direction, passing a bizarre mix of 
design features which have been extricated from any historical or geographical 
context. For Goss, the mall is "effectively a pseudoplace which works through spatial 
strategies of dissemblance and duplicity." ( 1993: 19) The spatial and symbolic 
architecture of the mall is conducive to the production of agoraphobic like anxieties 
precisely because it is an extreme exemplar of that "amusement society" which, as 
Langman writes, both "fosters panic and provides commodified means for its 
alleviation in ever more consumption" ( 1994: 68). 
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The mall in particular, and the shopping experience in general, simultaneously breaks 
down boundaries and offers a way of re-fashioning them, namely, by buying the 
consumer goods with which we identify and which stamp a transitory identity on us. 6 
Given the close relations this thesis outlines between agoraphobia and conceptions of 
bounded identity, it is not surprising that agoraphobics should be especially 
susceptible to detrimental effects of the shopping experience. Its contradictions and 
juxtapositions render the space incomparably intense, and are meant to problematize 
our boundaries; its space is so thoroughly charged as to be incomparably corrosive to 
the secure, as well as the agoraphobic, sense of self. As Jane notes; "it's very stressful 
for anyone .. . no' just people that have ... agoraphobia". 
The relationship between places of consumption, especially supermarkets and 
shopping malls, and agoraphobia was a constant theme of discussion at meetings and 
in interviews. In one discussion group, sufferers had an enthusiastic, if inconclusive 
conversation about the puzzling nature of their extreme, and shared difficulties with 
'the Gyle' (an Edinburgh mall they had all attempted to negotiate); 
Ruth - "I was only in ten minutes!" 
Jane - "If I go into the Gyle, even if I go in with someone with me, I start 
getting this ... I want to go home." 
Lizzy - "How do we all get it in the Gyle?" 
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They go on to discuss various possibilities, including lack of exits, shape and layout, 
and the effect of different types of lighting. They cannot, though, put their finger on 
why exactly it horrifies them so much, and struggle to articulate the nature of their 
anxieties. I would argue that the apparent intangibility of their shared experiences can 
only be explained by taking into account the ambience and effects of the 'mall 
experience' as a whole on subjectivity. Clearly, this must include considering the 
manner in which the mall is intentionally constructed, so as to over-determine the 
breakdown of consumer resistance, to undermine the boundaries of the self. 7 
For example, agoraphobic subjects clearly derive comfort from the knowledge that 
they are free to move as they please, and leave if they need to. This requires careful 
positioning relative to an escape route at all times. Spaces of consumption, however, 
do not allow for easy enactment of this defence. Even if one succeeds in negotiating 
the lines of 'goods' it is still necessary to stand in line and present one's purchases at 
the till before reaching the exit - "there's a queue in the shop and you think, I must get 
out of here, I just can't stand in that queue" (Lynn). 8 
Shopping seems to wrest control from the agoraphobic at all levels and, for the 
subject of uncertain boundaries, shopping is a risky business, best avoided. Avoidance 
may however be particularly difficult for those with roles as 'wife' and 'mother' and, 
since it is still culturally coded as a feminine pastime (see for example Campbell 
1997; Langman 1994 and Miller 1997), shopping is top of respondents' lists of 'things 
you should be doing'. In this case shopping is not only a practical necessity but a 
moral 'duty' inextricably linked with their gendered identity. The inability to perform 
this duty may be perceived as a disturbing personal failure and initiate serious and 
debilitating doubts about their self worth. "One thing I will say, it destroys your 
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confidence. It takes your confidence, I mean it really does, it knocks it right out you 
[ ... ] it really screws you up." (Susan) "You feel like a wee ball of nothing. You 
wonder what you're on the planet for, when you can't do any of the things you should 
be doing." (Carron) 
The agoraphobic subject suffers from her inability to shop in more ways than one. She 
can neither 'do' the shopping (for necessities, i.e. her 'job') nor 'go' shopping (for 
pleasure, or contact with friends) and the inability to perform these basic tasks can be 
very demoralising, depriving women of the opportunity to reconstruct their identities 
in crucial ways. As the following quotations illustrate, they feel deprived of the 
chance to lead 'normal' lives, in a society where predominant ideologies dictate that 
to be normal is to be a consumer (but see Dyck 1995 and Park et al. 1998 for critiques 
of such ableist assumptions). 
"Your family are suffering. You're doing nothing that a woman [pause] a 
mother and a wife should do." (Carron) 
"You feel like, you know, a bad parent, because you couldn't do all the things 
that the other parents were doing [ ... ] I just felt that I wasn't doing my so-
called-job properly." (Susan) 
"I'd love to just meet my daughter on a Saturday afternoon, and just have 
lunch, and go shopping. I can't do it." (Nora, group discussion.) 
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This part of the sufferer's 'job' as a wife and mother, which requires her to go outside 
the home, is singularly the most difficult activity for her even to contemplate. When it 
comes to shopping, for example for food, or clothes, or even birthday presents for the 
kids, the agoraphobic woman has a real problem on her hands, one that almost 
certainly requires some ingenuity, and outside help, to cope with. 
"So then I sort of, if I was going to the shops I would wait for my husband so 
that he would come with me, you know I found all these different ways. Or I 
would get somebody else to go to the shops for me, so that basically I didn't 
have to go to the shops." (Susan) 
Other interviewees recount a similar kind of dependence on various friends and 
family members. Fran, for example, describes her mother as having to "stand in for 
her"; in Lynn's case "the kids had to go to the wee shop across the road", or her sister 
(who also had some experience of panic episodes) would help out. Eventually, Lynn's 
sister started to encourage her to leave the house herself ("you can't live the rest of 
your life looking at four walls"), first to visit her at home, two bus stops away, then to 
go on shopping trips together. "The first day I got the bus down to her, I was 
hyperventilating when I got off the bus and it was a nightmare .... but I made it." Very 
gradually, Lynn was able to build enough confidence to try her hand at shopping; 
"although I felt uncomfortable[ ... ] you don't enjoy shopping, you don't enjoy these 
kind of things, but she was with me and she helped me." 
It is in recounting their experiences of 'consumer affairs' that the respondents reveal 
most about the effect of the disorder on their everyday lives. "Non-phobics take a lot 
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for granted. I did too when I was non-phobic. You take it for granted that you just go 
out and get on a bus and you go. I mean I could never take for granted that I'm going 
to lift my shopping bag and go and get some shopping. I cannae do it." [Carron] Thus 
'shopping' provided a recurring, even unifying theme to their narratives that 
instantiated both the moment of the first panic attack - their existential crisis - and in 
their 'geographies of exclusion' - their social and physical confinement. It also recurs 
in other contexts, for example in Maggie's case, her ability to cope with shopping is 
an indicator of her degree of recovery 
"So I gradually started going into [nearest large town] with my husband. And 
I'm no saying it was easy, sometimes I was sitting away down on the floor in 
the back [of the car] ... things like that. But then gradually it did get better and I 
was staying longer in the shops." 
Maggie can then be seen to measure the extent of her recovery by her ability to stay in 
shops for increasing amounts of time. Even as her tolerance builds and her defences 
grow stronger, the smallest details of her grocery requirements continue to be of 
tremendous significance; the replenishment of the larder, even the bread-bin, will 
never again be taken for granted. 
"I can go the shopping an' that now, and I go down the street every day for the 
wee ... I do a big shop once a week, and then I have to go down through the 
week if I need fresh bread or milk or whatever. And I can do that." (Maggie) 
For Carron, too, attempts to develop spatial strategies which enabled her to cope on a 
day to day basis, and to regain some control over the geography of her life were 
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communicated around the theme of shopping. She was put in contact with a 
community psychiatric nurse (CPN) who helped her to cultivate a tolerance of 
consuming places. By coming to her home, and after careful preparation, taking her 
out, then into a shop, then a shopping centre, she gradually and gently increased the 
time spent there on each occasion. Having prior knowledge of exactly how and when 
she would leave, a degree of control over the proceedings, made the experience 
(barely) tolerable. Forewarned, and tentatively forearmed, sufferers can just about 
manage to contain the rising tide of terror until it is time to make their escape. 
Sharing accounts of their problems with shopping can also be seen to form a frequent 
focus for the self-help groups. 
"Just the knowledge that other people suffer the way you do is so ... helpful. 
When I'm in the supermarket and I start having a panic attack, and I think 'oh 
oh', and then I think, 'M will have had these bad turns too', and it just makes 
me feel so much better." (Fiona) 
This is one of the reasons why attending the self-help group can be so very 
constructive. As we saw in chapter 3, the sufferer learns that they are not alone in the 
world. The other members know exactly how difficult it is to place yourself anywhere 
near shopping spaces, and will give you credit for your painful efforts. 
"We can give support, and understand ... if you do manage to do such a simple 
thing. [ ... ]We can rejoice with them. But if you don't know what its like and 
what its cost that person, to pluck up the courage to do it [laughs], you know if 
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you tell someone that isn't a sufferer, they think, you know, 'well, big deal'." 
(Ann) 
However, it must be stressed that for many agoraphobics, talking about this issue is all 
that they can do~ actually going shopping, at all, is simply not an option. When the 
women I interviewed move on to discuss their experiences of gradually regaining 
entry to the forbidding, consuming realm of shopping spaces, it is in many cases only 
after having spent years in the attempt. Only when they determine to set out on the 
road to 'recovery' can they begin to think about being a consumer. 
Conclusion 
To enter the mall without 'fear and trembling' one must become sure of onese(f - of 
the self that you are - rather than those myriad others that are offered as alternatives. 
One must also feel secure in oneself, at ease in the body's bounds. But, the shopping 
mall epitomizes those architectures of alienation that undermine security, seeking to 
play upon the feminine imagination as consumer and, at the same time realize the 
misogynist imagery of the woman as that which is consumed by/for others. The 
woman who dares to enter spaces of consumption is forced to accept a subject 
position structured by these two poles, to abandon hope of being herself. Inside the 
new churches of consumer capital the feminine self is sacrificed according to a 
patriarchal logic which (in Kierkegaard's words) regards "[a] woman who is happy 
without se(f-abandonment, that is, without giving all of her self, no matter what she 
gives it to, [ ... as] altogether unfeminine." (1989: 81, emphasis added.) 
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But perhaps hope is not entirely lost. As the respondents in this study show, though 
they may never become carefree consumers, neither must they remain confined 
within the four walls of their personal domestic realm. It is possible for a path to be 
forged between these poles, for the agoraphobic to re-constitute herself as a bounded 
individual in the face of infinite possibilities and the finality of non-existence, who 
can avoid the 'consumption of the self. In part this might depend upon coming to 
recognise the paradoxical nature of the relationship between anxiety, freedom and 
selfhood. 
This paradox is at the heart of Kierkegaard's philosophy. To be aware of oneself is to 
be aware of the selfs possibilities, of its freedom to be otherwise. It is this freedom 
that makes us autonomous (human) rather than automatons. Through self-reflexivity 
we become aware of our-selves as selves, as a synthesis of the finite (a bounded and 
embodied subject) and the infinite (freedom), of 'actuality' and the 'potentiality'. But 
this synthesis is difficult to achieve, for freedom can be a terrifying prospect and 
looking upon it we are subject to that supposedly 'feminine' weakness, 'anxiety'. 
Never having the potential to be a self in her own right, 'woman' seems destined to 
remain in anxious purgatory. But, Kierkgaard' s misogynistic exegesis of the self 
entirely ignores the feminine predicament and in so doing he misrecognises both the 
etiology of and the potential cure for such existential anxiety. Kierkegaard forgets that 
sensitivity to the self also entails sensitivity to the selfs surroundings. Sensitivity to 
the selfs possibilities also 'brings home' the manner in which the external world 
threatens to intrude upon and call that self into question. In other words anxiety is not 
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simply "the dizziness of.freedom." (Kierkegaard 1980: 61, emphasis added.) Anxiety 
can also be a mark of the self's recognition of those external forces which threaten to 
subvert its autonomy, to restrict or undermine its hard-fought freedoms. The struggle 
to maintain a conception of one's se~f-identity is made harder for a woman by her 
recognition that, in a masculine economy, her surroundings selectively seek to isolate 
and/or dissipate her identity, that they constantly call her to deny her-self. Indeed the 
feminine sensitivity to her surroundings which Kierkegaard makes so much of might 
itself be a product of this recognition of an environment that treats her as consumer 
and/or seeks to consume her. 
If this is true, then there lies the potential for a reflexive recognition of the self, 
despite the manner in which the masculine economy mediates and disto1ts the 
feminine dialectic between freedom and anxiety. In part at least this might come from 
an understanding that the same phenomena that previously seemed to call her being 
into question can also serve to enhance her feeling of embodied identity. Susan Bordo 
writes; "[b]eing outside, which when I was agoraphobic had left me feeling 
substanceless, a medium through which body, breath and world would rush, 
squeezing my heart and dotting my vision, now gave me definition, body, focused my 
gaze." (Bordo et al. 1998: 83) The feelings associated with panic can begin to be 
translated as excitement. Like the child who spins in circles, manufacturing dizzyness 
for the delightful disorientation it creates, the agoraphobic can learn that temporary 
loss of one's 'normal' perspective can be liberating. To open oneself up to 
excitement, to learn to endure and even enjoy the potentiality of panic without giving 
oneself over to it completely is the phenomenal freedom to which the agoraphobic 
aspires. (Indeed, as we will see in chapter 8, the ability to let go in the face of 
potentially threatening experiences is one of the aims of certain therapeutic 
strategies.) 
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However, this process of re-definition is slow and often arduous. It is usually only 
achievable via a process of acclimatisation to threatening space, and the patience to 
persevere through almost imperceptible improvements. Very gradually, her feelings 
of isolation and abandonment may become transformed and even re-placed by a sense 
of freedom and independence. Social space that challenged her boundaries can begin 
to be experienced positively, and need not entail a descent into the void. Bardo 
explains how, when overcoming her agoraphobia, she began to enjoy her 'freedom', 
the "charge of leaving home, knowing that your body has been cut loose from the 
cycling habits of the domestic domain and is now moving unrooted across time and 
space, always to something new, alert to the defining gaze of strangers". (Bardo et al. 
1998: 81) Similarly, Maggie describes her elation after having successfully negotiated 
a trip to hospital to visit her mother~ "Once I got back in [her home town] on that bus, 
I felt like shouting in the square 'I've done it!' you know you just feel so good." 
Anxiety, despite, or perhaps because of, its association with the abyss, can be 
intensely life-affirming, rather than simply soul-destroying. 
In the chapter that follows I want to extend the critique of the existential approach 
developed here, an approach that has been overly entangled in that religious and 
individualistic perspective characteristic of Kirkegaard's faith. Instead, using Jean-
Paul Sartre and Erving Goffman, I begin to discuss the existential account of 
agoraphobic self-identity in terms of the individual's relations to others. That is, to the 
performance of a specifically 'social' space drawing once more on the agoraphobic 
narratives of my respondents. 
1 S0ren Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling: Dialectical Lyric was first published in 1843 under the 
pseudonym Johanes de Silentio. 
2 "That woman is more sensuous than man appears at once in her physical structure" (Kierkegaard 
1980: 65) l original emphasis.] The male is "more qualified as spirit" ( 1980: 65). 
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>Clum and Knowles ( 1991) report that typically 59% of panic disorder cases are female to 41 % male. 
See also Chambless and Mason (1986) . 
.t The example Kierkegaard gives is of wanting to be, or be greater than, Caesar ( 1989: 49). 
5 "[A] fire takes hold in something that cannot burn, or cannot be burned up - the self'' ( 1989: 49). 
6 This notion has currency in the field of market analysis, as evidenced by Solomon's Consumer 
Behaviour; "A consumer exhibits attachment to an object to the extent that it is used by that person to 
maintain self-concept. [sic] Objects can act as a sort of security blanket by reinforcing our identities, 
especially in unfamiliar situations. [ ... ]This coping process may protect the self from being diluted in a 
strange environment [ ... ]products are a sort of 'social crutch' to be leaned upon during a period of 
uncertainty" ( 1994: 29617, emphasis added). Solomon goes on to say "A consumer's products place 
him or her in a social role which helps answer the question 'who am I now?"' ( 1994: 296). 
7 Notwithstanding Gregson 's criticism of the current narrow focus on the mall by theorists of 
consumption, for many agoraphobics this particular site, rather than "the high street, speciality 
shopping complexes, discount warehouses, markets and mail order" (Gregson 1995: 136) does serve as 
the epitome of all others in terms of its ability to induce panic. It is for this reason that I take the mall as 
my focus. 
8 Mathews eta/. (1981: 4) report from a study which found 'joining a line in a store' to be the most 
commonly reported anxiety provoking situation amongst agoraphobics (96%). 
Chapter Five 
'Putting on a Face': 
Sartre, Goffman and Agoraphobic Anxiety in Social Space 
"Hell is - other people!" (Sartre) 
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At the beginning of this thesis I argued that we must remain sensitive to the fact that 
individuals experience agoraphobia in different ways and in different social 
circumstances; that agoraphobia is a 'syndrome' best understood in terms of 
Wittgenstein's notion of 'family resemblance' (see Introduction). This 
characterisation is supported by the comments of those attending agoraphobic self-
help groups who have spent many hours comparing and contrasting their experiences. 
As one agoraphobic argues; "everybody gets their own, eh, agoraphobia ... it's a 
different creature to each different person that has it" (Carron). Another adds "we' re 
different people, it affects us differently, we all deal with it differently" (Moyra). Yet, 
as the last chapter illustrated, despite the intensely personalised nature of each 
experience and the apparent lack of a single causative factor, it is possible to begin to 
tease out ce11ain threads that compose the matrix of this agoraphobic 'form of life'. 
One of these, I argued, was the foregrounding of a kind of existential angst, a 
generalized concern about threats to the very nature of one's 'being', which become 
crystallized in the overwhelming and sudden onslaught of a panic attack. As Carron 
states "it absolutely petrifies you ... you think you're going to DIE." The sufferer 
experiences feelings of derealization and depersonalization that seem to dissolve their 
identity. In Susan's words, "the first [panic attack] was, I was about 18 [ ... ]I was on 
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the bus [ ... ] and I got a' these weird feelings and I genuinely believed I was going to 
d. " 1e. 
The bus where Susan experienced her panic attack is, like the shops and malls 
discussed in the last chapter, an example of the kind of intensely social space that 
seems to precipitate panic attacks. These social spaces thereby come to be regarded as 
threatening to the sufferer's feeling of 'ontological security', defined by Giddens 
(1997: 36) as the "confidence or trust that the natural or social worlds are as they 
appear to be, including the basic existential parameters of the self and social 
identity"). Like many other fellow sufferers Susan, a recently married mother, 
responded to this threat by withdrawing into what she perceived as the sanctuary of 
her home in order to avoid the recurrence of such intense experiences. This contrast, 
between the anxieties associated with social spaces and the home as a place of relative 
safety, is another recurrent theme in agoraphobics' accounts: 
"[Y]ou're safe in your own home." (Ann) 
"When I was out. . .I would take a panic attack, my safe place was my own 
four walls ... ifyou know what I mean, my house ... a safe place[ ... ] I'd be 
alright as long as I was in here." (Maggi~) 
Often, agoraphobics speak of an urgency to get back home once a panic episode has 
begun outside, as Susan graphically illustrates 
"and here's another weird thing, you get nearer and nearer to your house, but 
your house appears to be moving further, and further, away from you. Like 
tunnel, sort of vision, and you get so freaked that you actually start physically 
running, I mean I've ran down that road before with my five year old 
practically scraping along the ground." (Susan) 
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The fact that the home provides agoraphobics with a place of refuge from potentially 
corrosive contacts with others is readily understood if, as chapter 4 suggested, we 
characterize agoraphobics' experiences of panic attacks as indicative of a 'boundary 
crisis', as the problematizing of sufferers' ability to maintain and reconstruct their 
self-identity in the face of de(con)structive social influences. From this point of view 
the protective boundaries of the home exclude, or at least attenuate, some of the worst 
effects of social space. Maggie's "own four walls" provide a relatively impermeable 
barrier that helps reinforce her psychocorporeal boundaries, a 'breathing space' within 
which she can recuperate. The home might be regarded as a kind of 'architectural' aid 
to re-constructing one's self-identity, an identity that is already more likely to be 
entangled within the fabric of the home for women than for men. In this sense the 
agoraphobic' s avoidance of social space might be viewed as a retreat into a 
normatively feminine space where gendered boundaries are protected and potentially 
reinforced. 
However, the agoraphobic's experience of home is often ambiguous; for some, home 
becomes so 'secure' that they are rendered incapable of leaving, they become, quite 
literally, housebound. Having lost their ability to neg~tiate their way in the world, and 
finding the locations in which they can move comfortably much reduced, sufferers 
may eventually be unable even to leave their homes without experiencing an 
incapacitating level of anxiety. The home is simultaneously experienced as both 
asylum and prison. As Maggie explains "I wouldn't go outside the door. I wouldn't 
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even go to the backdoor to empty the bin." Another respondent, Brenda, explains that 
if a neighbour passes the bottom of her garden: 
"she would shout up to me cause she would know that I couldnae go down. 
You know how you see women blethering over the fences? Well I could nae do 
that." 
As we might expect, the actual intensity and form of such experiences vary. As Terry, 
one of the two male respondents points out, not everyone is so severely affected, 
"everybody's no' the same, there's different degrees o' this ... agoraphobia". For 
example Ann explains, "I was never housebound, but I did find the world was getting 
smaller". Jane too states: 
"I always loved going out, and even now, for me to spend a whole day in the 
house would be, torture. Even if it's just into the garden, I've got to get out for 
a wee while." 
However, at the other end of the spectrum some find even their home provides little 
respite from anxiety and panic: 
"When it was at its worst, I'd be at one end of the room, and my daughter 
would be in a pram at the other end, and I couldn't even cross the room to lift 
my baby out of the pram." (Fiona) 
Some agoraphobics, such as Iris, who for a time was confined to her bedroom, 
experience panic in all but one small part of their home and others, such as Linda, will 
panic even there. 
The are a couple of points that need to be emphasised here. First, that even if the 
individual does panic at home, it will often still be perceived as the safest place, 
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because there, no-one else will see them panic (see below). Second, people clearly 
have differing abilities to cope with everyday aspects of social life and there is a 
continuum of experiences from the 'normal' (that is, 'appropriate' and manageable) to 
'abnormal' (inappropriate and unmanageable). Thus while some respondents retreat 
still further into their homes, those more fortunate are able to extend the boundaries of 
the home outwards. For example, some agoraphobics regard their car as capable of 
providing 'ontological security' in much the same way as the home does. One sufferer 
does in fact describe the car as being "like an extension of your home." (Nora) 
This use of the home or car to reinforce the boundaries of self-identity might be seen 
in terms of Arnaud Levy's concept of "subjective space": For Levy, subjective space 
"surrounds us like an envelope, like a second skin." (Levy 1977, cited in Burgin, 
1996: 213, emphasis added) The problem is, when the agoraphobic leaves home or 
gets out of her car, space ceases to be subjective. Once again she finds herself 
required to perform in front of those other people who create, determine and compose 
social space. (Kirby 1996: 99) As the last chapter argued, sufferers are, it seems, too 
highly sensitised to the ways in which others 'charge' space through their presence. 
Social space is thus experienced as corrosive, or, we might say, a~ject a term Julia 
Kristeva uses to denote that which we must "radically exclude" from ourselves, but 
which is always present, threatening to invade us and causing anxiety (Kristeva 1982; 
Sibley 1995). 
This chapter seeks to investigate further the nature of this problematic relation to 
social space and the difficulties agoraphobics find in its 'performance' (Freund 1998). 
In particular it questions why the routine activities that are hardly brought to 
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consciousness in 'normal' experiences of social space become problematized as a 
source of existential angst for agoraphobics. There are thus two apparently 
contradictory aspects of the experience of social space that a theoretical account must 
address. On the one hand there is the question of the almost thoughtless 'practice of 
(normal) everyday life', and on the other the 'pathology' of an agoraphobic anxiety 
that, in certain social conditions, can erupt into a full-blown crisis of identity. For this 
reason, I shall draw upon theoretical perspectives that can speak to both the 
'everyday' and the 'existential' aspects of social space, namely the sociological 
writings of Erving Goffman and the existentialist philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre. 
As anyone remotely familiar with the work of these figures will know, their 
perspectives are not straightforwardly compatible. However, both theorists do address 
what might be termed the social and spatial phenomenology of personal identity. 
While I do not intend to 'integrate' their theoretical perspectives, or play one off 
against the other, I will suggest that each has a different, though mutually beneficial 
role to play in the elucidation of agoraphobic life-worlds. I thus aim to use 
complimentary aspects of their work to put forward an account that has both 
explanatory and (as chapter 8 shows more fully) therapeutic potential. By bringing 
sociological and philosophical perspectives regarding the problematic nature of social 
existence in contemporary western society to bear on agoraphobia, we might gain new 
and thoroughly different insights into the disorder that lie beyond the reach of, for 
example, clinical and indeed, social psychology. (See, for example, Capps and Ochs 
( 1995) for a contrasting, though insightful, psychological account of agoraphobia.) 
161 
Building upon my account of Kierkegaard's existentialism in the last chapter I first 
outline what I take to be the relevant aspects of Sartre's philosophy for understanding 
the existential backdrop to agoraphobic life-worlds. In particular I will draw out 
Sartre's account of the role of 'the gaze' of others in constituting (and threatening) 
self-identity. Sartre's abstract philosophical account is then contextualized and 
exemplified through the words of agoraphobic interviewees. I claim that their own 
words bear testimony to the existential anxieties underlying their experiences of social 
space and provide concrete examples of sufferers' fears of others' visual attention. I 
then attempt to connect Sartre's philosophical account to Goffman 's empirically 
based work on individuals' use of strategies to protect themselves against the social 
intrusions of others. Again, drawing directly on agoraphobic narratives, I interpret 
their fearful and avoidant behaviour as a 'breakdown' in their ability to utilise the 
'everyday' coping mechanisms highlighted by Goffman. 
Finally I briefly address the potential therapeutic value of Sartre's and Goffman's 
insights. While Sartre demonstrates the need for awareness of and sensitivity to the 
profound and debilitating effects of social anxiety, Goffman discloses the practical 
means by which a degree of control can be reasserted over the subject's fragile social 
self. That is to say, by 'practising' the kind of coping mechanisms Goffman describes, 
the agoraphobic individual might gradually relearn to (at least partially) protect 
themselves from the perceived peril of the public eye. Taken together, then, the 
theories of Sartre and Goffman might thus help constitute a hermeneutics of 
agoraphobic experience, one that can provide practical insights into the problematic 




Sartre, the Look and BeingJor-others. 
The fear of fear, of the terror that erupts in the full-blown panic attack, rules the lives 
of severe agoraphobics. Such 'anxiety', 'anguish' or Angst, is (as we have seen) a 
unique and profoundly disturbing emotion yet it has, John Macquarrie writes, "a 
subtle and elusive character that thought can scarcely grasp". (Macquarrie 1971: 128) 
Anxiety comes and goes. When present it seems to pervade everything and yet 
because of this its source is impossible to pinpoint. It's fear - of what? "That which 
arouses anxiety is nothing, and it is nowhere. Yet [ ... ] it is so close as to be 
oppressive and stifling. It is not this or that particular thing, but rather the world, or 
being-in-the-world." (Macquarrie 1971: 130) 
For existential philosophers like Sartre (and Kierkegaard) nothingness is indeed the 
source of anxiety. It arises from the awareness that we exist but that we might cease to 
do so, that we might die. For Saitre, anxiety is "the apprehension of nothingness" 
(1993: 29), the nothingness that "lies coiled in the heart of being - like a worm." 
(1993: 56) For Heidegger too "that in the face of which one has anxiety is being-in-
the-world as such." ( 1988: 230, original emphasis). Anxiety both brings to the surface 
and problematises the existence of the self and its world, it is an expression of the 
fragile nature of our individual existence, a mood that threatens "something like a 
total disclosure of the human condition." (Macquarrie 1971: 130) 
In a strange way "[ a]nxiety individualises Dase in" 1 says Heidegger. Anxiety is, he 
argues, the Grundbefindlichkeit, the 'ground' on which one finds or becomes aware of 
oneself as being, and yet paradoxically "Angst likewise is the experience of 
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groundlessness, the absence of anything holding one in place and anchoring one's 
actions". (Cooper 1990: 130) Anxiety is that indefinite edginess, that vertigo inducing 
fear of the void that might at any time open beneath our feet. 2 With the onset of 
anxiety the familiar world recedes, its reality and concreteness are challenged and the 
subject is left feeling profoundly, inexplicably alone. "In anxiety one feels 'uncanny'. 
[unheimlich] Here the peculiar indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself 
alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to the expression 'the nothing of nowhere'. 
But here uncanniness also means 'not-being-at-home'." (Heidegger 1988: 189) 
Although neither Sa1tre nor Heidegger mentions agoraphobia, this description of the 
subject's realization of the fragile and strange nature of their existence fits perfectly 
with agoraphobics' own accounts of their anxieties and (as we have just seen) in their 
case 'not-being-at-home' can be taken quite literally. In what she terms her progress 
diary Carron frequently writes of a world which appears (in a way akin to the clinical 
'derealisation' discussed in chapters 1 and 4) "completely alien" and of an "unreality" 
that can even extend to her own house. 
"So I' 11 go out, I' 11 take that bus journey. I' 11 go down and I' 11 come back. I' 11 
walk in that door, and I' 11 be, it'll be like walking into a completely alien 
house, environment, the lot ... I' 11 know, that this is my house, that this is my 
suite, this is my, these, everything here is mine [ ... ] it was like this before I 
went out, but it'll - not - seem- real. And it's, it's like you're looking at 
things through water ... and it's the scariest thing in the world."3 
The particular ab-normality of agoraphobic experience might be regarded as an 
extreme expression of the ontological anxieties that underlie all human existence 
though the agoraphobic seems unusually exposed to and unprotected against the 
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sudden onrush of anxiety. Yet such anguish is clearly absent from most people's 
everyday lives. This, Sartre contends, is because individuals are ordinarily shielded 
from 'true' awareness of the abyssal nature of our existence by their blind pursuit of a 
life immersed in the crowd. We pass our days in perpetual proximity to and collusion 
with others submerging our individuality and thereby refusing to recognise and take 
responsibility for our own ephemeral existence. This blissful ignorance is a 'false' 
way of life that, for Sartre, exemplifies 'inauthenticity' and 'bad faith'. 
There is then a certain tension between the individual and the social nature of human 
life that can 'estrange' us from our potential as free, authentic, and independent 
individuals. "My being-for-others is a fall through absolute emptiness toward 
objectivity [ .... ] this fall is an alienation." (Sartre 1993: 274-5) We can be 'taken hold 
of by others, accept their views as our own, see ourselves as they do, and suppress 
our potential to be anything more. This, for existentialism, is life lived under the 
dictatorship of 'the they', as if our being-for-others, our public selves were all that 
mattered. We lose touch with our 'true' selves and become merely 'one of the crowd'. 
For Sartre, existentialism presents a challenge to this homogenisation of humanity, 
and provides the subject with the means to overcome their estrangement from their 
full human potential, to resist rather than succumb to the crowd. One of the ways in 
which we come to awareness of the inauthenticity of our being-for-others is precisely 
through the experience of Angst. "[l]n our everyday being-in-the-world and being-
with-others we are able to tranquillise ourselves and escape the radicalness of the 
human condition. But anxiety jerks us out of these pseudo-securities. We are made to 
feel 'uncanny' and 'not at home'." (Macquarrie 1971: 130) Sartre's point is that 
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anxiety is a necessary analogue of individuation. "What 'sinks away' in Angst is the 
world as interpreted by the 'they'. The usual meaning of things and actions fade as the 
everyday framework within which they have their slots becomes 'uncanny'." (Cooper 
1990: 131) Angst thus has the potential to bring one's estrangement from one's 'true 
self to an end, shocking and propelling us out from a comfortable conventionality to 
face a new, more questioning mode of existence. For Sartre, this 'true self from 
which we are 'alienated' does not already exist 'underneath', or hidden behind the 
false. Rather, it must be created, brought into being by independent action in the 
world, by increased awareness and realisation of our potential for total freedom. To 
live authentically is an on-going struggle for freedom, a perpetual resistance to the 
pull of the crowd. "Freedom that manifests itself through anguish, [angst] is 
characterised by a constantly renewed obligation to remake the Self that designates 
the free being". (Sartre 1993: 34-35.) 
Sartre, of course, wants the realization of 'authentic' existence to be philosophical 
rather than pathological, and agoraphobia should not be celebrated as a transcendence 
of 'bad faith'. The existentialist call to the individual is indeed to 'separate' herself 
from others, but while the agoraphobic subject may, in a sense, have taken 
responsibility for their social relations by trying to bring them to an end, this 'choice' 
does not stem from realization of personal freedom. In fact, an agoraphobic's avoidant 
behaviour might still be regarded as being ultimately determined by their relation to 
the crowd, though by their felt need to keep a distance from it. Thus, while such a life 
lacks the usual tranquilizing benefits that ensue from a sense of 'belonging' to (being 
one of), the crowd, Sartre might still ironically have judged such an existence 
'inauthentic'. 
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The agoraphobic subject certainly feels far from comfortable in or cosseted by 
crowds. It is, as chapter 4 showed, social scenarios that usually provoke agoraphobic 
anxiety. But how can this discomfort be reconciled with Sartre's claims? The answer 
lies in the inherent ambiguity of anxiety and of human existence itself. There can be 
no Self without the Other but neither can there be a Self if one is wholly subsumed 
within the Other. Put differently, one must experience some degree of alienation.from 
the crowd in order to overcome one's alienation from one's (authentic) self in the 
crowd. Ironically, it is our awareness of the 'objectifying' Look of others that proves 
the source of our anxious striving towards self-recognition. "I grasp the Other's look 
at the very centre of my act as the solidification and alienation of my own 
possibilities." (Sartre 1993: 263) Emotions surge through me as I am held by the look 
of others - anxiety, shame etc. - as I see myself as others must see me. "I am ashamed 
of myself as I appear to the Other. By the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in 
the position of passing judgement on myself as an object, for it is as an object that I 
appear to the Other." (Sartre 1993: 222) These emotions are the indefinable and 
unstable 'ground' of my being, the source of my individuality. "I now exist as myse(f 
for my unreflective consciousness. It is this irruption of the self which has been most 
often described: I see myse(f because somebody sees me - as it is usually expressed." 
(Sartre 1993: 260) "Behold now I am somebody!" (Sartre 1993: 263) 
So Sartre's claims about the anaesthetic effects of the crowd have to be put in their 
proper context. Taking responsibility for oneself requires a difficult balancing act in 
our relation with others. "Authentic being-with-others [ ... ] lets the human stand out as 
human in freedom and responsibility", while "inauthentic being-with-others[ ... ] 
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depersonalizes and dehumanizes [and ... ] imposes uniformity". (Maquarrrie 1971: 91) 
Although the look brings us awareness of our separate existence it also threatens to 
erode the very space within which we create ourselves. Without the look I am 
nothing, or at least not properly human, but with the look I become aware of the 
tenuous grounds of my own existence. The same look that solidifies and objectifies 
me also alienates, disturbs and threatens to discompose me. (For explicitly feminist 
interpretations of Sartre and the 'look', see Murphy 1989; 1999.) 
We are indebted to the Other for our sense of identity but, for this very reason, the 
presence of an-Other being has the capacity to destabilize our sense of ourselves and 
knock the ground out from under our feet. Sartre (1993: 255) explains that, when we 
are confronted with another person, "suddenly an object has appeared which has 
stolen the world from me. Everything is in place; everything still exists for me; but 
everything is traversed by an invisible flight and fixed in the direction of a new object. 
The appearance of the Other in the world corresponds therefore to a fixed sliding of 
the whole universe, to a decentralization of the world which undermines the 
centralization which I am simultaneously effecting". Their presence forces us to 
realize that there are 'other' ways in which the world can be constituted, 'other' 
configurations which we cannot control. By appearing before us, Danto explains, the 
Other initiates a "struggle for centrality and ownership of worlds" (1975: 116). "With 
the Other's look the 'situation' escapes me [ ... ] I am no longer master of the 
situation." (Sartre 1993: 265, original emphasis.) 
This realization can be truly frightening, weakening one's sense of 'ontological 
security'. Some individuals seem never to be troubled by such intangible concerns, 
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and it is clear from sufferers' accounts that there is no single factor that renders a 
particular individual sensitive and susceptible to the production of space by others. If 
Sartre is right there should however be a clear relation between the individuals' se/f-
consciousness and their susceptibility to the look of Others. Further, as Sartre ( 1993: 
29) infers, we might expect the (sensitized) subject to be disturbed by what she herself 
might (be seen to) do in the Other's presence. "[M]y being provokes anguish [Angst] 
to the extent that I distrust myself and my own reactions." One might extrapolate from 
Sartre's assertion that "[ v ]ertigo is anguish to the extent that I am afraid not of falling 
over the precipice, but of throwing myself over", that agoraphobia is 'anguish' to the 
extent that I am afraid not of people themselves, but of what I might do in their 
presence. 
Both of these predictions seem amply born out by interviewees' accounts. Without 
exception all those interviewed emphasized that it was the presence of other people 
that provoked anxiety. Thus Nora repudiates the common misconception of 
agoraphobia as fear of open spaces: 
"I'm not frightened when I'm out, I'm never happier than when I'm tramping 
about the countryside, but.., I think what they really mean is, if you're out with 
people, and maybe, you know, trapped by people." 
It is important to emphasize that her anxiety does not stem from an inability to 
socialize but from a wariness of becoming the object of others' attentions. In common 
with many respondents Nora describes herself as "very out-going in some ways [ ... ] 
if you speak to anybody who knows me, they'd say oh yes Nora she's great fun 
[laughs]". She continues, however, 
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"inwardly ..... its all an act, inwardly I'm really, I don't ever want to be the 
centre of attention [ ... ] I'm the sort, if I had a heart attack in the middle of 
Princes Street [Edinburgh city-centre] I'd have to crawl into a back alley and 
die, rather than say to somebody could you get me help, because I would hate 
the attention." 
Iris too expresses comparable concerns about the proximity of other people when I 
ask her to expand on her claim that 'shopping' is an especially difficult activity. She 
explains that, "its em, the other people around. And the sort of noise, the noise levels, 
and lots of other people. "4 While Iris' emphasis on the noise created by other people 
suggests that it may be necessary to expand Sartre's account of the gaze to account for 
other forms of 'sensory intrusion' the real point she is making here is one of loss of 
self-control in the crowd. This emphasis is reinforced later in the same interview; 
"when I was home I felt I could control what was happening to me whereas ifl went 
out, there were other people ... " Iris breaks off here, and hesitates, before going on to 
tell the disturbing tale of having a panic attack in a crowded supermarket. Although 
her statement is left unfinished, it implies that, by their mere presence, others rob her 
of some degree of control over her world - that is,. her self and her environs - in a 
manner reminiscent of Sartre's account. 
Although some sufferers find it difficult to articulate exactly why other people are so 
disturbing, Brenda is unequivocal when asked if she can offer any explanation: 
"Aye. It's them looking at me. I'm scared if they look at me too much and 
guess how I'm feeling I'm gonnae burst into tears, cause I'd be totally 
embarrassed if that happened." 
Brenda provides further insights when she describes how she became aware of the 
role of people per se in her agoraphobia. She states, 
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"I was okay going out at ten o'clock at night when it was dark and there was 
nobody there, take [the dog] a walk and it wouldnae bother me. That's when I 
realised it was people I was scared of as well." 
Whereas being alone in a place traditionally thought of as 'public' when it is dark 
would itself be a source of anxiety for many women, (da Costa Meyer 1996) Brenda's 
particular concerns for her personal safety are clearly of a different, one might say, 
existential, nature. It is the anxiety provoking look of others she wishes to avoid, and 
darkness can, in this respect, be seen to constitute a barrier to their gaze (Bankey 
200 I). Even if there are others around, Brenda will not be so readily exposed to their 
scrutiny; she is protected by the cover of darkness. Fran, an elderly Stress Watch 
founder who became agoraphobic over fifty years ago, echoes this sentiment when 
she states that, while going out anywhere is difficult, "it's easier to go to the pictures, 
because of the darkness, and you know no-one can see you". 
Brenda continues her account of the difficulties posed for her by a watch~! public, 
describing her feelings about various swimming pools - clearly social places, but of a 
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kind she can enter into under certain circumstances. She is relatively unconcerned by 
the attentions of those others in the pool itself, perhaps because she is almost entirely 
underwater and so largely hidden from their looks. What we find, however, is that her 
fears do incorporate the possibility of being subject to the Other's gaze (ie, not one of 
the swimming 'crowd') from a distance. Brenda explains that it is thus impo1tant to 
find a pool where "there's nobody staring in at you, and I don't need to worry about 
anybody looking in." She illustrates by saying, 
"I can go into [pool 'A'], I cannae go into [pool 'B ']just because it's a more 
open swimming pool. [Pool 'A's] closed in, you don't see so much outside, 
but [pool 'B's] got glass windows, you look through and people are sitting 
there looking, big glass windows looking into it, I cannae go in, I have tried". 
Brenda's account repeatedly highlights her desire not to be subjected to another's 
look. An earlier comment revealed that this is at least partly due to a feeling of 
embarrassment, and a fearful preoccupation that she might do something 
embarrassing when the other is looking. This in fact is a concern she shares with other 
interviewees. Fran, for example, states; "I got so as I wouldn't go out in case I did 
something embarrassing in company". Jane, whose agoraphobia stemmed from an 
initial specific phobia of frost and snow, also alludes to such awkward concerns when 
asked why social spaces are so difficult; 
"if it's a busy restaurant... for instance going out for a Christmas dinner, and it 
is busy, beginning to feel, I want out of here, not wanting to embarrass 
yourself, or anybody else, and trying to figure a way of getting out of there 
..... its, it's the same with other social things, and I know when I'm 
approaching that kind of feeling, and I leave". 
In response to a similar question about difficulties with social space, Nora says; 
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"I suppose that you feel that you' re just going to completely lose control [ ... ] 
and you're terrified you're going to fall over, or.., I suppose make a fool of 
yourself really[ ... ] I suppose you just think that people will be watching." 
Maintenance of composure can thus be seen to be significantly more difficult when 
the subject perceives that they are under the watchful eye of others, or as Brenda puts 
it (in a group interview) when "all eyes are on you." 
There is then, a clear sense in which agoraphobic individuals are deeply disconcerted 
by the presence, and especially the look, of others. Drawing on Sartre's account, one 
might hypothesise that this anxious discomfort stems from a sense of objectification 
caused by that look. One simply cannot dictate how one's subjectivity is reconstituted 
in the other's eyes. A mere bodily air of civil indifference is either unmanageable or 
insufficient, and further strategies will be required, perhaps as simple in some cases as 
making the best of existing geographical features. Moyra says of any social space, but 
in particular relation to her church - Moyra's attends regularly, despite her 
difficulties. Christianity is clearly an important part of her life, and she stresses that 
her faith helps her cope with her disorder - "I've got to sit at the back. I don't like 
thinking there' re people behind me watching me fidgeting. I'm very self conscious." 
By sitting with her back to the wall, Moyra can minimise the potential for others to 
look at her, and thus also the discomfort that thought of this generates. She is firmly 
guarded, from one direction at least, and need not be tormented by the potentially 
menacing content of the spatiality at her rear. 
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The other's look can seem to rob the individual of vital aspects of their identity, 
reducing their sense of embodied selfhood to that of an object over which they have 
only limited control. Sartre's account can help articulate the disturbing sense of 
alienation from one's environment that often accompanies the agoraphobic's 
experience of social space. On this view, as we have seen, the other effectively steals 
the world from the subject. Their simple presence alters the constitution of one's 
world, which no longer emanates only from one's self. These unsettling phenomena, 
of depersonalisation and derealisation respectively, can be among the most 
frightening aspects of agoraphobia for many sufferers. The perceived discrepancy 
between one's own subjective sense of reality at such times, and what one imagines to 
be the shared reality of others, can be deeply alarming, leading to horrendous feelings 
of abnormality and lack of control over self and world. Sufferers' interviews and 
diaries provide numerous examples of just how immediately this abnormality is felt. 
In addition to strange bodily sensations, distances are collapsed or expanded, and 
space becomes impossibly 'alien and strange'. 
I want to turn now to explore Goffman's theorisation of 'face-work' and 'front 
management', and question whether they can be understood as coping mechanisms 
for dealing with the spatially mediated social anxieties outlined by Sartre, and 
suffered to extremes by agoraphobics. I want to suggest that Goffman highlights these 
'managing' behaviours, of which non-phobics are mostly unaware, but which, 
because they are both necessary and unattainable, loom large in many agoraphobic 
lives. 
Gofjinan and se(fmanagement 
If Sartre is right then there is a terrible weight of responsibility attached to our 
freedom; it is the freedom to take risks, make mistakes, to do wrong and to fail, to 
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lose control and be judged for our actions. It is in this sense that Sartre believes we are 
'condemned' to be free, doomed to make continual choices. Authentic human 
existence might then be seen as a perpetual process of 'crisis management'. 
As is well known much of Goffman's work constitutes a detailed study of interactions 
between strangers, in an attempt to uncover the means by which we manage ourselves 
in our relations with others. His analysis reveals a number of unspoken and largely 
taken for granted conventions, codes of conduct that govern our behaviour in the 
social realm and make it possible to remain comfortable in relatively close proximity 
with others. In Goffman's own words, "[w]hen in the presence of others, the 
individual is guided by a special set of rules [ ... ] called situational proprieties." (1963: 
243) These conventions are intended to "allow others their space", (Tseelon 1995: 38) 
to allow the illusion that one moves in a private, protective sphere, even when firmly 
entrenched in the social world of strangers. Conventions of social behaviour can then 
be seen to dictate respectfulness towards boundaries of personal space, a 
respectfulness of the right "not to be stared at or examined", that must be reciprocal if 
social relations are to be unproblematic. This allows individuals to maintain some 
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control or "mastery" over their immediate environs, and limit the extent of alienation 
that the other's presence can inflict. 
Perhaps foremost among those strategies Goffman's analysis highlights is that of 
'civil inattention'. This entails "giv[ing] to another enough visual notice to 
demonstrate that one appreciates that the other is present (and that one admits openly 
to having seen him), while at the next moment withdrawing one's attention from him 
so as to express that he does not constitute a target of special curiosity or design". 
( 1963: 84) Civil inattention is the means by which we steer clear of the form of 
"invasion" that is the direct gaze, (Tseelon 1995: 67) and maintain the pretence of 
indifference to the appearance and concerns of others. 
However, to be 'one of the crowd', to not stand out and thus be subject to intense 
scrutiny, one needs to behave appropriately, according to ce11ain situational rules. 
"Paradoxically," writes Goffman (1963: 35), "the way in which he [sic] can give the 
least amount of inform_ation about himself [ ... ] is to fit in and act as persons of his 
kind are expected to act". Of course, one needn't be aware of and intent on following 
explicit rules associated with particular situations. Rather, these often implicit 
behavioural standards and techniques of self-management are intemalised so that we 
come to manage our behaviour, monitor movements and responses etc., in accordance 
with a tacit 'feel for the game', rather than by enacting formulaic codes. 
The key to playing one's role in this 'drama' convincingly, and negotiating one's way 
around social space in a non-threatening and relatively inconspicuous manner is a 
"disciplined management of personal appearance or 'personal front"' (1963: 24) and 
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an ability to display "sufficient harnessing of the self' ( 1963: 27). One's face must be 
composed into an "inscrutable mask", indeed, we require a repertoire of faces, or 
masks, for a variety of situations, to maintain a comfortable degree of privacy. This 
principle of privacy might be defined as our ability to control the amount of 
information about ourselves that we display to others. (Tseelon 1995: 74 ). 'Putting on 
a face' can be seen as one aspect of what Bauman (1993: 153) refers to as "the art of 
mis meeting", a skill which must be mastered if one is to live among strangers. 
Bauman ( 1993: 155) explains the necessity of this strategy thus; "The overall effect of 
deploying the art of mismeeting is 'desocializing' the potentially social space around, 
or preventing the physical space in which one moves from turning into a social one." 
Goffman claims, via his empirical observations, to have uncovered other specifiable 
tactics and devices that subjects employ to limit their involvement in social space and 
their exposure to its inherent dangers. The extent to which they use these 
'involvement shields' (Goffman 1963: 40), and 'stalls' (Goffman 1971: 56) may 
depend, amongst other factors, on their level of social anxiety but they are by no 
means merely the preserve of 'extreme' or 'abnormally' sensitive subjects. For many, 
such strategies are in fact a familiar part of everyday social life. Perhaps one of the 
most obvious everyday examples of the 'involvement shield' would be that of the 
newspaper used by commuters in a manner that precludes social exchanges with 
others. Similarly, 'stalls' protect and indeed create private space, by "provid[ing] 
external, easily visible, defendable boundaries for a spatial claim" ( 1971: 57). The 
following example is provided; "at beaches devices such as large towels and mats can 
be carried along with the claimant and unrolled when convenient, thus providing a 
portable stall" ( 1963: 56). In this manner, the individual can partially stabilise and 
control the "ever shifting dimensions" of personal space ( 1963: 58). 
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Alternatively, subjects can territorialise space by attempting to highlight their need to 
use it for paiticular purposes. 'Use space', according to Goffman (1963: 58) is "the 
territory immediately around or in front of an individual, his [sic] claim to which is 
respected because of apparent instrumental needs." For example, giving "sports 
[people ... ] the amount of elbow room they require in order to manipulate their 
equipment." Clearly, however, while some strategies may successfully assert 
legitimacy over a given spatial domain, they will not necessarily prevent the intrusive 
look of the Other. Goffman' s example of 'use space' might in fact invite and 
encourage audience involvement. 
It seems then that the social world is rife with danger, and coping with it requires trust 
that others are practising civil inattention, that one is not constantly being stared at 
and invaded, and thus robbed of the protective barriers of personal space. What, 
though, would happen, were one to lose that trust in others, or could not trust oneself 
to maintain a face or behave in a manner that invites unwelcome attention? Such a 
failure to manage social space has profound implications for the individual concerned. 
"Failure or success at maintaining such norms has a very direct effect on the 
psychological integrity of the individual. At the same time, mere desire to abide by 
the norm - mere good will - is not enough, for in many cases the individual has no 
immediate control over his [sic] level of sustaining the norm. It is a question of the 
individual's condition, not his will; it is a question of conformance, not compliance." 
(Goffman 1990: 152-3) In terms ofGoffman's (1969) dramaturgical analogy 
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agoraphobics might be regarded as suffering from a kind of 'stage-fright'~ they shun 
'public performances' where possible and strive to reduce their need to engage in 
'. . ' . . s 1mpress1on management to a mm1mum: 
Goffman's description of how one can be 'thrown out of step' with social norms does 
in fact capture something of agoraphobic accounts of panic, in particular, experiences 
of depersonalisation. "When an incident occurs and spontaneous involvement is 
threatened, then reality is threatened[ ... ] and the pa1ticipants will feel unruled, unreal 
and anomic." (1967: 135) This threat of breakdown is, according to both Sartre and 
Goffman, more acute in the presence of others. "The 'strangeness' of strangers means 
precisely our feeling of being lost, of not knowing how to act and what to expect. [ ... ] 
Avoidance of contact is the sole salvation, but even a complete avoidance, were it 
possible, would not save us from a degree of anxiety and uneasiness caused by a 
situation always pregnant with the danger of false steps and costly blunders." 
(Bauman 1993: 149) Each and every agoraphobic sufferer has learned from painful 
experience that "[t]he surest way for a person to prevent threats to his [sic] face is to 
avoid contacts in which these threats are likely to occur." (Goffman 1967: 15) 
However, complete avoidance of contacts is not always possible for the "[d]efence of 
social space is never foolproof. Boundaries cannot be hermetically sealed. There is no 
really infallible cure against strangers, let alone against the dread they arouse." 
(Bauman 1993: 157) One might be required (for example by pain, or a strong sense of 
duty) to enter into social space for reasons as diverse as a trip to the dentist or, in the 
case of more than one respondent, a daughter's wedding. Failure to maintain one's 
'composure' in these socially charged situations can lead to the individual having to 
struggle with what Goffman (1990) refers to as the "stigma" of a "spoiled identity". 
Moyra explains, 
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"I tell as few people as possible, mainly because people don't understand it. 
And some people who I have told, nice enough people by the way [laughs] but 
you just dinnae see them afterwards, you know what I mean?" 
While the onset of agoraphobia typically entails a cessation, or at the very least, 
radical curtailment of the subject's involvement in social space, the necessity of a 
'face saving' front will continue even within their newly constricted life-worlds. 
Contact with the 'outside world' may extend no further than relations with close 
friends and family members, but many make massive efforts to conceal their 
agoraphobia even here. Brenda says of her grandchildren, for example, "I had to 
watch what I was doing so as I didnae frighten them as well [ ... ] I didnae want any of 
them to ever know how I was feeling." One individual I spoke with was attempting to 
conceal the extent of her current difficulties in what one would imagine to be the 
reassuring environment of the self-help group, although for palpably different reasons. 
She says, 
"I don't like to talk to them [other members of her group] about it being this 
bad again, so I go to them, and I put on the face, I put on this other, 'oh yeah 
I'm fine', face. And I don't know why, I think its because[ ... ] I don't want to 
frighten anybody into thinking they're going to get this way again." 
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Once the process of putting on a face becomes a consciously felt need, then simply 
trying to fit in, to appear 'normal' in social space involves a substantial effort of will. 
Regardless of its purpose, maintaining a pretence of this kind is exhausting, and 
impossible to keep up indefinitely. A place to repose, and recompose, must be found, 
and though this often takes the shape of the subject's home, some may find temporary 
solace in other environments. Fiona, divorced from an unsupportive husband, and 
currently coping well enough to work part time as a care assistant, explains that, 
"even when I couldn't talk to anyone else, and when I'd be in the waiting 
room, keeping a smile on my face, as soon as I got into his [the G.P's] surgery 
I could really drop my guard, it was the one place where I could." 
Many sufferers find that they need some kind of assistance to keep up their 'guard', 
and their (metaphorical and/or material) distance from others. A number of writers on 
agoraphobia have noted that sufferers tend to derive comfort from the use of dark 
glasses. Such items can be understood to function, in Goffman' s terms, as portable 
'involvement shields'. Though obviously less effective than a brick wall, glasses can 
provide an invaluable sensation of 'cover', both in the sense of protection, and of 
disguise. Commenting on their usefulness, Moyra explains that, 
"its partly cause it gives you a wee feeling of security. Its partly cause you 
think, well you know they can see you, but they cannae see your eyes. You 
know how sometimes if you're troubled it shows in your eyes?" 
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The covering of one's eyes can partially obscure one's feelings, but it can also make it 
more difficult for others to intrude on, or 'trap' the subject, by attempting to engage 
her in conversation or some other form of exchange. As Goffman ( 1963: 95) points 
out, "eye contact opens one up for face-engagement", and so dark glasses shield one 
from involvement by literally blocking the potential for eyes to 'meet'. 
The pushing of an object such as a pram can also assist ease of movement through 
social space, an enabling tactic that is mentioned by several respohdents. Moyra has 
said that "I know I found it difficult when I stopped pushing the buggy, when my 
youngest son didnae need it anymore, I didnae know what to do with myself'. In 
Goffman' s terms, we can understand this strategy by imagining that the buggy 
effectively creates an area of 'use space' around the subject. It signals to others the 
need to keep their distance, at the same time as conferring legitimacy on the subject's 
presence in social space. Perhaps the presence of children themselves can have 
something of a similar effect, blocking, or at least distracting attention from the 
anxious subject. Nora says of the time when her children were little, that "really for 
many years, I thought that was my .... I hid behind them a bit". 
The need to hide, in one way or another, is powerfully illustrated by Brenda when she 
describes how she used the 'geography closest in' to this end. On her account, one's 
own body can be manipulated to constitute a form of corporeal defence against the 
other's look, though this is done with limited success. 
"At one point I thought that's why I was, like I had let myself get quite big 
[ ... ] cause I was eating and eating and eating, and it was to stop folk fae 
staring at me. But then it was the opposite [laughs], like I felt then folk were 
staring at me cause I was so, big." 
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Brenda's bodily boundaries were thus felt to exceed expectations of normality, and to 
attract additional unwanted attention as a result. As Goffman emphasises, the best 
defence against scrutiny is to not stand out. 
The structure and production of space in sufferers' homes can also reveal much about 
the experience of this debilitating disorder. In Goffman' s ( 1960) terms the walls of the 
home demarcate (like the face) a "front region" from a backstage haven from social 
pressures. Sufferers homes are frequently organised to minimise the fear of the look. 
For example, Brenda's discourse on these issues followed a short (and barely 
articulate) question about the construction of safe space in and around her home -
"d' you feel as if you sort of do anything to build up so11 of barriers or make it more 
like your home?" In response, Brenda immediately embarks on an in-depth account of 
the socio-spatiality of her home-life; 
"Right, see the sheds at the bottom of the garden, they were right out there 
[points to adjacent patio] so that people couldnae see me. That wasnae open 
like that, these sheds were up here". 
In an effort to protect herself, Brenda arranged for two garden sheds to be positioned 
immediately outside her patio doors, thus completely blocking the view (both ways) 
out over her garden, towards the back fence and beyond. "It felt too open for me 
[so ... ] that's where the sheds were sitting, so that I didnae need to see, and I didnae 
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think folk were, staring in at me." Brenda's condition has improved since this time, 
but although her fear of being looked at has abated sufficiently to allow relocation of 
the garden sheds, she still makes use of more p011able involvement shields in order to 
step outside. "I can go out there and sit on the patio, put the patio-set out, and sit, but 
I've got the brolly on top of me [hand gestures over head] so, I'm sort of sheltered by 
the brolly". 
Brenda uses another 'visual aid' to screen herself from council gardeners who store 
equipment in a garage intrusively close to her front window. 
"That's why I got these blinds was so I could do that[ ... ] cause I get, nervous. 
Well I don't know who the men are[ ... ] its just, .. they're in my, bit [makes 
'guarding' hand gestures], and they shouldnae be there [laughs]." 
The tenor of Brenda's description suggests that her displeasure relates to their close 
proximity in itself, and not simply with their propensity to look, thus connecting with 
my next point. Steps were also taken to alter the geography immediately outside the 
front door, which opens directly onto the street. Brenda explains, 
"that wall wasnae always there, and that got built so I could sit outside, and 
still feel I was inside the house. [The wall runs parallel to the front of her 
house, at a distance of several feet, and stands less than that in height.] The 
sun at night time comes up there [and so her husband said] come on out and 
sit, I says I cannae, that's fine he says, we'll soon so11 that out [laughs], and he 
got that wall built [so ... ] that's worked, I can go and sit, I can even go out 
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there now and wash my windows, because I'm still in my own ... , I'm still in 
my own bit, I'm no' in ..... there's nobody in my space ... in my air or 
anything, basically there's nobody in my space." 
Brenda almost caricatures her own voice here, and uses her hands to symbolise 
grasping or possessiveness, as if self-mocking of a 'greed' for space, which she 
clearly perceives as 'irrational'. Her account makes plain that her sense of spatiality is 
fragile, and needs to be asserted and defended more explicitly than would 'normally' 
be the case. 
I would suggest that Brenda's experience is a peculiarly gendered one, given that, in 
many contemporary Western societies at least, women are frequently more likely than 
men to be subjected to an intrusive and objectifying stare. This gendered phenomenon 
has been the focus of much feminist research, and theorists have explored visual 
objectification of women from many angles (Bordo 1993; Tseelon 1995). One might 
surmise that the greater propensity for women to be stared at requires that they be 
adept at protective front management, that women tend to have a greater need to 
protect themselves from the Look than do men. For half of the population at least, 
'doing gender' most likely involves an (ultra) awareness of the power of the Other's 
look, and this may go some way towards an explanation of the predominance of 
agoraphobia, as a spatially and socially mediated disorder, among women. After all, 
women are, in Goffman's ( 1977: 329) words, "somewhat vulnerable in a chronic way 
to being hassled". (See chapter 7.) 
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Conclusion 
Although Sartre and Goffman approach the question of subjectivity in social space 
from different perspectives, both recognise its precarious nature. According to Sartre, 
the objectifying look of others is a defining moment in our becoming self-conscious; 
it is in their eyes that we see ourselves as somehow different, discontinuous from the 
crowd. But this discontinuity threatens to open a gulf beneath our feet; we face the 
abyss, the unfathomable anxiety of our own fragile existence. One response can be the 
bad faith of burying our heads in the sand, or more accurately, busying ourselves in 
the crowd. But even this supposes a certain immunity from the gaze, an ability to 
engage in what Goffman terms impression management, to 'put on a face' for others. 
If instead, for one of innumerable reasons, we become hypersensitive to a gaze that 
only continues to heighten our 'self-consciousness', then social space threatens to 
become corrosive rather than constitutive of our identities. In this case, where the 
coping mechanisms of 'front management', 'stalls' and 'involvement shields' become 
incapable of suppressing the anxieties of everyday existence, then the agoraphobic 
takes refuge in the asylum of their home. And, like any asylum, as I have previously 
stated, its walls may come to demarcate both a place of safety and a prison. 
Sartre celebrates the revelatory possibilities of an anxiety through which one finds 
oneself. However, Goffman adds a necessary corrective to this existential emphasis 
on authenticity by uncovering the workings of those more or less taken-for-granted 
mechanisms by which the individual maintains a sense of identity in the face of, and 
in spite of, the other's look. Were social spaces to become constant battlegrounds 
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between competing compositions then even the strongest will could not sustain itself 
for long. There is a need to deflect, to reflect the look, and to protect oneself with the 
shield of civil indifference. When this shield fails, the subject experiences their very 
se(f as unmasked and naked, exposed to social space to a degree that makes their 
continued involvement intolerable. 
It is in this context, once we have discovered just how and why social existence can 
be so unnerving, that sociological observation could be invaluable for the 
agoraphobic. Goffman' s account, in particular, discloses those ordinarily taken-for-
granted protective tactics that, I would suggest, sufferers must re-learn to enable 
(relatively) safe social engagement. This chapter has thus shown that, taken together, 
the aspects of Sartre's and Goffman's work that I have highlighted contribute to a 
hermeneutics of agoraphobic experience. It presents an account that is both 'abstract', 
in its recognition of existential anxieties, yet very much 'down to earth', identifying 
as it does the practical minutiae of psychological survival in the contemporary social 
world. I will return to the therapeutic potential of these findings in the final chapter 
and conclusion of this thesis. 
I now want to turn from Sartre towards the related but more phenomenologically 
inclined and embodied philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. As indicated in the introduction, 
Merleau-Ponty expands Sartre's account of the gaze into a more general sensory 
phenomenology of the embodied individual, one that also recognises the importance 
of the social (as opposed to merely individual) construction of lived space. In this 
sense chapter 6 continues the movement from an existentialism based on 
philosophical abstraction (Kierkegaard) towards an account grounded in everyday life 
and simultaneously helps prepare the way for the therapeutic considerations of later 
chapters. 
1 Dasein, literally 'there-being' is Heidegger's term for the human existant. 
2 Vertigo has provided a favourite metaphor in existential accounts of Angst. 
3 That Carron experiences discomfort even here, though clearly as a response to her venture outside, 
suggests that she clearly only finds the home a place of only relative safety . 
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.i The presence of others is clearly the predominant factor for this sufferer, but what Iris goes on to say 
lends support to the findings of this thesis concerning the disturbing and unheimlich architecture of 
consumer spaces. "I think that, like being enclosed .... its not so bad in a street, but you almost feel as if 
you're in a bubble, it's a totally unreal environment. ... Its alien, and strange." 
5 Goffman ( 1969: 170) defines 'stage confidence' as "the capacity to withstand the dangers and 
opportunities of appearing before large audiences without becoming abashed, embarrassed, self-
conscious, or panicky." 
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Chapter Six 
A Phenomenology of Fear: 
Merleau-Ponty and Agoraphobic Life-Worlds 
Introduction 
I hope by now that I have demonstrated the relevance of existentialism as a framework 
for thinking about agoraphobia. Kierkegaard's and Sartre's works allow us to develop an 
interpretation of the phenomenology of the initial panic attack with its associated 
experiences of dizziness, derealisation and depersonalisation and offer profound insights 
into the intimate connection between subjectivity and social space that can help us 
understand its fearful potentialities. As the last chapter argued, these existential 
perspectives can be combined with other narratives, like those of Goffman, which also 
seek to elucidate the relationship between self and other in terms of the (usually 
unconscious) maintenance and control of boundaries. 
However, as the previous chapters have intimated, there are still certain issues with 
Kierkegaard's and Sartre's thought that need to be addressed in order to ground their 
theoretical perspectives fully in everyday life. First, both philosophers often seem to 
regard the mind as something different from and somehow unrestricted by the fact of its 
embodiment. Despite their differences in outlook, both Kierkegaard (the Christian) and 
Sartre (the atheist) stress the mind's ability to transcend its current circumstances, 
whatever they might be, and make free choices. But while we may indeed be 'condemned 
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to be free' in an abstract sense, the experiences of agoraphobics seems to challenge the 
idea that a refusal to face up to this freedom is "aJl in the mind". One of the most obvious 
aspects of sufferers' accounts is the manner in which agoraphobia manifests itself 
'physically', in the body's suddenly increasing heartbeat, in sweating, palpitations, or 
legs that turn to jelly. Second, in his discussion of the influence of others Sa11re 
concentrates on 'the look' almost to the exclusion of other sensory contacts. Again this 
seems consistent with a derogation of the import of bodily contact and embodied 
subjectivity. 1 
This chapter seeks to address the issue of embodiment by excavating and criticizing the 
Cartesian origins of this separation and privileging of the mental over the physical and by 
reevaluating the role of other, non-visual sensations, in contributing to our performance 
of social space. It does this by drawing on the (existential) philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, 
which explicitly seeks to elucidate the interrelations between embodied selves and others 
in terms of a phenomenology of social space. I first set out my interpretation of Merleau-
Ponty' s approach, before attempting to demonstrate its particular power and relevance of 
in relation to a case study, that is, a detailed account of the particular narrative of one 
individual agoraphobic, Linda. 
As previous chapters have argued, there is no essential agoraphobic experience so 
choosing to emphasize Linda's account should not be taken as an attempt to 'reify' the 
narrative of one 'typical' subject over and above those of others. Rather, as chapters 2 
and 3 suggested, the study of agoraphobia can benefit from the application of different 
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methods at different times and this processual approach is mirrored in the form and 
content of the thesis itself. Since the purpose of this chapter is to draw together and 
ground existential accounts in every-day life I have chosen to focus in detail on one 
respondent's account of their agoraphobic experiences. This allows me to present a more 
rounded account of agoraphobia, one which can integrate the various stages of the 
syndrome's development, from panic attack, to anxious incarceration in the home, to the 
mechanisms employed for coping with a seemingly hostile world in the narrative of a 
particular embodied individual. 
While Linda's account certainly differs in detail from those of other respondents, the 
manner in which her own agoraphobia developed and impinges on her life adds a singular 
depth to the multiple voices heard so far. The danger with drawing on many accounts is 
that in using these voices to illustrate and 'flesh out' philosophical points one can 
sometimes seem to be abstract them from their particular life-contexts; they too can thus 
come to seem almost disembodied. There is thus both an ethical and a methodological 
rationale for concretizing at least one voice within the context of a particular life-history. 
In this way the reader is offered both an anchor and a point of contrast, a d(fferent 
approach that opens up, rather than closes down, the analytic and conceptual potential of 
the thesis as a whole. 
The narrative of any of my agoraphobic respondents could have been represented here to 
fulfill this chapter's aims. That I chose Linda perhaps comes down to no more than her 
evidently (as we shall see) artistically inclined perceptual articulacy. This is especially 
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relevant and informative in a chapter designed to high-light in phenomenological terms 
the mediating role of the sensations in acquiring and maintaining a sense of identity. 
Linda's discursive attention to her perception of colour and sound seemed to render her 
narrative extremely suitable for illustrating and concentrating the conceptual power of 
Merleau-Ponty's approach to understanding our place in the world. It is hoped that (this 
phenomenological reading of) Linda's story will thereby provide some contextualizing 
material with which fragments of others' stories and theories might be read and threaded 
together. 
Merleau-Ponty, Space and the Horizons of Identity 
"Every sensation carries within it the germ of a dream or depersonalisation [ ... ] this 
activity takes place on the periphery of my being." (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 215. Hereafter 
referenced as PP.) 
Since, as Merleau-Ponty points out, our own births and deaths are "prepersonal horizons" 
that cannot be experienced by us, all that remains of our existence is our apprehension of 
ourselves as "already born" and "still alive". (PP 216) But, although there are defining 
moments at our beginning and at our ending, the nature of our existence in between these 
points is less easily circumscribed. Modernity and modern philosophy, in keeping with 
Newton's solid mechanics and the possessive individualism of an emergent capitalism, 
have sought to impose hard and fast lines around us; to make of the individual an atom, a 
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being-for-itself, autonomous, self-interested and introspective. (See Irigaray 1985 and 
MacPherson 1979.) For Descartes, the first modern philosopher, the cogito provided the 
acid test of our continued existence - I am thinking, therefore I am ("still in existence"). 
In this way existence was intellectualized, equated with the activity of thinking, of 
bringing our being before the court of self-consciousness. 
Ironically, for a materialist age, where tangibility is regarded as the sine qua non of the 
external world's existence, the Caitesian solution redefines the self in terms of a life of 
the mind. Subjects are thinking things (res cogito) who are not of this world, souls 
without material substance (res extensa). In this way our identity is protected only at the 
cost of completely separating self and world, internal and external, the subjective from 
the objective. We are ghosts in the body's machine, disconnected observers watching the 
world pass us by. 
But, Merleau-Ponty argues that this cannot be. We are not a pure pre-given consciousness 
since consciousness is first and foremost 'intentional', it is always consciousness of 
some-thing. 2 What is more, this intentionality is not intellectually discovered but is 
something we become aware of through our lived experiences. Contra Descartes, 
consciousness is not something set apart from the world, but is itself a part of the world, 
it is "a project of the world, meant for a world which it neither embraces or possesses, but 
toward which it is perpetually directed." (PP xvii) This involvement of the thinking 
subject in a project is paramount. For Merleau-Ponty consciousness is "in the first place 
not a matter of 'I think' but of 'I can'." (PP 137) This dissolution of the absolute 
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Cartesian boundary between self and world has a number of important implications. First 
it re-emphasizes the body as integral to any understanding of the human situation. "I am 
conscious of the world through the medium of my body[ ... ] I am conscious of my body 
via the world" (PP 82). The "subject that I am, when taken concretely, is inseparable 
from this body and this world." (PP 40) We are incarnate, our access to the world is by 
way of our bodies. Second, this obviously means that, unlike res cogito, we do have 
extension, we take up/occupy space. Indeed the experience of space is fundamental to our 
individuality, since our identity is no longer conceived of as a pre-given essence, a soul, 
but as a product and projection of our unique situation within the world. Third, thinking 
can no longer inoculate us against the world's intrusion since identity and thought are 
relational rather than absolute. "I am not, therefore, in Hegel's phrase, 'a hole in being' 
but a hollow, a fold, which has been made and can be unmade." (PP 215) 
Philosophy, for Merleau-Ponty thus becomes an investigation into the fragility of our 
existence, into the complex inter-relations between body, space and self, into what it feels 
like, and what it means to be alive. Where Descartes sought understanding through the 
application of a philosophical method, an intellectual program for pure thought, Merleau-
Ponty directs his attention to the phenomenology of existence. It is not thinking but 
perception that is paradigmatic of our lived but never fully conscious experience. Rather 
than taking self (perceiver) or world (perceived) as givens, we must begin with 
perceptions themselves, i.e. with phenomena. Perceptions are fundamental intentional 
states-of being, "the background from which all acts stand out" (PP x/xi) and which the 
ability to act presupposes. This 'bracketing off, or suspension of judgement about the 
ontology of self and world so as to focus on 'experiences' is referred to as the 
'phenomenological reduction' or epoche. 
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While Descartes sought to introspectively establish the existence of an inner self through 
a thorough going skepticism about sensations, Merleau-Ponty regards these self-same 
sensations as the only access we have to our selves and our world. This is because 
sensations seem to occupy a liminal position. On the one hand sensations are the means 
by which I tentatively "grasp, on the fringe of my own personal life and acts, a life of 
given consciousness." (PP 216) They are the very ground from which my self-
consciousness emerges to posit itself over and against the world. But, on the other hand, 
sensations remain ultimately intangible, I can never experience them as mine since they 
seemingly come and go without my calling them. Sensation "runs through me without my 
being the cause of it." (PP 216) I never possess sensations and in some strange way they 
seem to concern "another self which has already sided with the world." (PP 216) In a 
way sensations too are a kind of pre-personal horizon. Just as "I cannot know my own 
birth and death. Each sensation, being strictly speaking, the first, the last and only one of 
its kind, is a birth and death." (PP 216) 
Given the modern presupposition of an identity based upon the Cartesian self I 'naturally' 
assume ownership of my conscious thoughts since they seem to be constitutive of my 
identity. But if this identity is actually predicated on the ambiguous im-personal status of 
sensations then it is to sensations we must look if we are to understand who and what we 
are. "Truth does not inhabit only 'the inner man' [sic], or more accurately there is no 
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inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself." (PP xi) 
Things are perceived before they can be thought and such perceptions evidence the 
complex intertwining of self and world. Phenomenology thus explores the essentially 
perceptual nature of our being-in-the-world, countering the post-Cartesian abstraction of 
mind from matter by concentrating on our most basic experiences, those sensations which 
seem to span the gap between internal and external. According to Merleau-Ponty all the 
efforts of phenomenology "are concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and primitive 
contact with the world, and endowing that contact with a philosophical status." (PP vii) 
It is for these reasons that Merleau-Ponty is concerned to "offer an account of space, time 
and the world as we 'live' them." (PP vii) rather than as abstract entities. Indeed he 
introduces a crucial distinction between 'objective' and 'lived' space. The former is "the 
space of rulers and tape measures", also described as physical, clear, geometrical or 
Euclidean space. The latter is the projection of our own spatial orientation on to the 
world, also referred to as subjective, existential, anthropological or phenomenal space. 3 
For Merleau-Ponty, the structure of lived space emerges from a relationship to our 
environs that is both perceived and produced through the activities we engage in. Lived 
space is "cut up and patterned in terms of my projects." (Bannan 1967: 37) In terms of 
our earlier account, lived space is a performance. Our movement "superimposes upon 
physical space a potential or human space [ ... ]. The normal function which makes 
abstract movement possible is one of 'projection' whereby the subject of movement 
keeps in front of him an area of free space in which what does not naturally exist may 
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take on a semblance of existing." (PP 111) Unlike geometrical space, lived space cannot 
be measured in meters or miles. Its distances are not fixed, but change according to our 
modes of existence, our moods, and environmental factors beyond our control e.g. 
whether it is night or day. 
4 
"Our reading of the world" depends on the "season of the 
year, and the season of being." (Evernden 1985: 131) Our sense of being-in-the the-world 
entails a kind of qualitative 'measurement' of lived space, a 'lived distance', which 
"binds me to the things which count and exist for me, and links them to each other. This 
distance measures the scope of my life at every moment." (PP 286) 
As one would expect, Merleau-Ponty argues that lived space is mediated through the 
body. "The body is the vehicle of being in the world, and having a body is, for a living 
creature, to be intervolved in a definite environment, to identify oneself with certain 
projects and be continually committed to them." (PP 82.) To act we need a kind of bodily 
sense of where we are, that is, a proprioceptive awareness of our physical deployment in 
and through space that usually operates below the level of consciousness. This 
unconscious awareness of our lived space comes through perception's 'operative 
intentionality', that intending toward the world, which "evaluates the potentialities of my 
whole environment, so that objects appear as graspable or out of reach, inviting or 
threatening, as obstacles or aids." (PP 440) We perceive and live this world through our 
various senses, seeing, hearing, touching etc. each of which have their own characteristic 
spatiality. Because "[e]ach sense implicates the entire body, is intrinsically intersensory", 
(Zaner 1964: 181) these individual sense perceptions do, ordinarily, correspond and 
cohere, such that "there is a unification of these spaces in one lived spatiality" (PP 260). 
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This sense of unification - of the senses, of spatiality, of existence as a whole - can, for 
Merleau-Ponty, largely be attributed to the workings of our intentional arc. He writes, 
"the life of consciousness[ ... ] is subtended by an 'intentional arc' which projects round 
about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and moral 
situation, or rather which results in our being situated in all these respects. It is this 
intentional arc which brings about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility 
and motility. And it is this which 'goes limp' in illness." (PP 136) 
Lived Space and Perceptual Problems 
Lived space is then distinct, though related, to the pre-existing and independent space of 
the 'objective' world. In Merleau-Ponty's own words "[c]lear space, that impartial space 
in which all objects are equally important and enjoy the same right to existence, is not 
only surrounded, but also thoroughly permeated by another spatiality." (PP 286) While 
objective space is 'always already there', we are involved and connected with it only by 
means of lived space, and this connection must be managed and maintained, "ceaselessly 
composed by our own way of projecting the world." (PP 287) 
The 'synthesis' of space by the subject is "a task that always has to be performed afresh" 
(PP 140) a (usually unconscious) project of mediation that can never be completed once 
and for all. Only by means of this 'composure' of space do we come to distinguish 
ourselves. "Space is the correlate to, but also negation of, subjectivity," and so our 
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understanding and awareness of what we are, and are not, is necessarily spatially 
mediated. It is drawn out of our perceptual involvement with the 'phenomenal field', 
from the "dialogue or dialectic between organism and its environment, in which each 
patterns the other." (Spurling 1977: 11) Lived space is formed by, but also actively 
forms, our sense of self in the world though a "pre-thematic 'patterning' of the world that 
is difficult to catch at work." (Spurling 1977: 18) 
From a phenomenological perspective "[w]e have the experience of an/, not in the sense 
of an absolute subjectivity, but as one indivisibly demolished and remade over the course 
of time. The unity of either the subject or the object is not a real unity, but a presumptive 
unity on the horizon of experience." (PP 219) Since our being-in-the-world must be 
continually negotiated, the effective construction and reconstruction of lived space 
requires a certain amount of 'perceptual faith' on the part of the subject. Our coherent 
sense of ourselves is by no means continuous or guaranteed and if we lose perceptual 
faith, our 'habitual' sense of ourselves in our milieu can become confused and senseless. 
Our praktagnosia, (PP 140) that practical bodily (rather than symbolically mediated) 
'understanding' through which our body has access to its world can be damaged or even 
lost. In the event, we can no longer trust that self and space will maintain normal, 
predictable relations, and we no longer know what to expect from the world - we might 
say that we have 'lost our grip' on it. 
In other words, lived space is ordinarily 'taken-for-granted', produced below or beyond 
the level of conscious awareness and reveals itself only as a result of dysfunction, when it 
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is "thrown into relief by morbid deviations from the normal." (PP 286/ So long as lived 
space is successfully maintained, we have a sense of freedom to move as we please 
(within the limitations of our physicality6), an easy relation with an environment that 
invites and encourages our involvement. But, if our sense of space breaks down we may 
find ourselves facing a repellant, unwieldy environment that restricts our freedom of 
movement, and threatens our sense of wellbeing. 
This conception of being at home in space has clear affiliations with Heidegger's notion 
of 'dwelling'. To dwell "is the basic character of Being in keeping with which mortals 
exist." (Heidegger 1993: 362) Wohnen (dwelling) "means to reside or stay, to dwell at 
peace, to be content". (Krell 1993: 345) Dwelling might be summarized as a form of 
'sustainable personal development', of growing within and cultivating a sustaining 
relationship with one's environs. "[O]nly because mortals pervade, persist through, 
spaces by their very essence are they able to go through spaces. But in going through 
spaces we do not give up our standing in them. Rather, we always go through spaces in 
such a way that we already sustain them by staying constantly with near and remote 
things." (Heidegger 1993: 359) Heidegger too suggests that moods and mental states 
might affect our ability to negotiate space, e.g. that depression might engender a "loss of 
rapport with things". (Heidegger 1993: 359) Merleau-Ponty goes much further, arguing 
that "[ w ]hat protects the sane man [sic] against delirium or hallucination, is not his 
critical powers, but the structure of his space." (PP 291, emphasis added.) 
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For this reason Merleau-Ponty suggests that the best way to investigate lived space is 
through applying "a new mode of analysis - existential analysis" (PP 136) to the 
spatialities of 'deviant' modes of existence such as that associated with schizophrenia. 
Explaining the logic of this approach, Hammond et al ( 1991: 181) write that, "[t]he 
pathological case operates as a heuristic device that shocks one into an awareness of what 
is taken for granted. It is a means of gaining distance from the familiar, so that one is 
better able to explicate it. "7 Within this context, Merleau-Ponty presents the reader with 
descriptions of disturbing scenes from schizophrenic life-worlds (drawn from the work of 
Binswanger and Minkowski) which his conceptual analysis aims to render 
comprehensible. "A schizophrenic patient, in the mountains, stops before a landscape. 
After a short time he feels a threat hanging over him[ ... ] Suddenly the landscape is 
snatched away from him by some alien force. It is as if a second sky, black and 
boundless, were penetrating the blue sky of evening. This new sky is empty, 'subtle, 
invisible and terrifying'." (PP 287) The schizophrenic experiences a suddenly 
unmanageable transition within their lived space. The world becomes unheimlich as he 
seems to lose touch with the space of the objective world, and to be left alone in a now 
threatening and baffling subjective space. 
For the schizophrenic, the world can suddenly change its physiognomy (or its 'living 
significance') and appear to be menacing and sinister. "In the street, a kind of murmur 
completely envelops him; similarly he feels deprived of his freedom as if there were 
always people present round about him; at the cafe there seems to be something nebulous 
around him and he feels to be trembling [sic]; and when the voices are particularly 
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frequent and numerous, the atmosphere round him is saturated with a kind of fire, and 
this produces a sort of oppression inside the heart and lungs and something in the nature 
of a mist round about his head." (Minkowski, quoted in PP 286, emphasis in original.) 
Here, the subject's own lived space limits, rather than 'makes space for' his existence. It 
encloses and threatens to smother him, all the while separating him off from involvement 
with the shared space of others. In such cases of psychosis, the subject appears to have 
lost their sense of connection with objective space, and feels (with)drawn into their own 
fragmented and frightening spatiality. The ability to synthesize a tolerable compound of 
lived and objective space has been lost. We might say he has lost the ability to maintain 
the necessary balance or 'communion' (Rabil 1967: 32) between lived and objective 
space that allows for a comfortable, unthinking rappo11 with the world. This communion 
is, of course, necessary because "I never wholly live in varieties of human space, but am 
always ultimately rooted in a natural and non-human space." (PP 293)8 
Merleau-Ponty argues that the ability to construct a 'homely' lived space is vital for one's 
mental health. If we are to feel that we belong, and have a place in the world, then we 
must be able to compose a suitable space. If we cannot 'situate' ourselves comfortably in 
relation to other people or things, we feel, quite literally, 'misfits'. This feeling can vary 
according to circumstances that are never entirely within our control. "Sometimes 
between myself and the events there is a certain amount of play (Spielraum), which 
ensures that my freedom is preserved while the events do not cease to concern me. 
Sometimes, on the other hand, the lived distance is both too small and too great; the 
majority of the events cease to count for me, while the nearest ones obsess me. They 
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enshroud me like the night and rob me of my individuality and freedom. I can literally no 
longer breathe; I am possessed." (PP 286) 
This spatial understanding of mental health seems to have wider application. Consider, 
for example, the following instance of 'neurotic' experience. "I felt as if I didn't fit into 
the world ... When I saw the snow, I felt I couldn't cope. One day it wasn't there and the 
next it was. I saw it and it upset me and I went to pieces ... I felt I did not want to be alive 
because I was not related to anything. I just seemed totally out of everything and I started 
to cry. I couldn't cope with the hurt and the pain. I felt I would never feel part of 
anything." (Sims 1983: 116) To keep our feet on the ground we need to be at ease with the 
space around us, to be on familiar and perhaps even intimate terms with our environs 
without suffering anxious "feelings and fears of loss of self." (Sims 1983: 114)9 
The Experience of Agoraphobia: Linda's Story 
Merleau-Ponty's explication of the phenomenology of spatial distortions suffered in 
psychotic disorders (e.g. schizophrenia) and 'extreme states of consciousness' (e.g. 
neurological disorders and mescaline consumption) seems ideally suited for examining a 
spatially mediated disorder like agoraphobia. Sufferers' accounts of spatial distortions 
associated with agoraphobic attacks (see below), would also seem to make them perfect 
exemplars of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological problematic thereby placing us in a 
better position to judge his theory's philosophical merits. Much more importantly, if 
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Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the relations between space, sensations and self-
identity helps conceptualize agoraphobics' experiences and explain their symptoms then 
it may be of some use in suggesting therapeutic or coping strategies for sufferers. 
The best way to facilitate this mutual dialogue is by letting sufferers speak for 
themselves. In what follows I therefore focus on one particular sufferer's (Linda's) 
narrative in some detail. I do this for the reasons specified above and also because 
presenting a single case study might be regarded as the theoretical equivalent of an in-
depth 'existential analysis' of the kind favoured by Merleau-Ponty, an analysis that 
would be less meaningful at a greater level of generality. As a painter and a musician 
Linda is also, as I argued above, especially well placed to articulate her sensory 
perceptions of an agoraphobic life-world. Her experiential account will, I hope, help to 
paint a sophisticated phenomenological picture of agoraphobia that foregrounds the 
relevance of 'lived space' in understanding agoraphobic and non-agoraphobic 
experiences. 
I met 'Linda' through my ethnographic involvement with WASP, the self-help group she 
attended at that time. Linda is thirty-nine years old, single, and lives in a Scottish village 
with her two school age children and an asso1tment of cats. She paints full-time, 
primarily to earn a living, but she also derives a great deal of pleasure from her work. 
Linda says that she has recently managed to strike a balance between painting that she 
actually enjoys, and that people are willing to buy; 
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"for years and years I painted flowers, and things that I.. .och, that were very 
pretty, but they just weren't me. But, I think I've maybe cracked it with the 
balance, and it is land, its just landscapes [laughs] and it is so ironic, cause I, I've 
got an exhibition, in this place, [ ... ] the theme of the exhibition is travelling, 
[laughs ... ] the irony of it just makes me smile, you know really, that here's an 
agoraphobic woman, producing these paintings of, you know ... far distant 
places." 
As a child, Linda's parents had moved home frequently within Scotland. She recalls often 
feeling uprooted, and unsettled in a new town. Linda begins her narrative by describing 
these aspects of her childhood, and the fact that she does so suggests that the lack of a 
secure and stable base in her early years continues to hold a place of importance in her 
personal history. She explains that when she was seventeen, she planned to leave an area 
where she had recently moved and had few friends to work abroad as a nanny. It was at 
this stage in her life when she experienced her first panic attack; 
"I can remember it quite vividly, it was the night before I left home." When asked 
if she could describe it, she says, "I was lying on my bedroom floor with 
headphones on, really really loud music, and em its strange, hard to describe [ ... ] 
it was just utter terror, you know, you might ... you might experience if somebody 
had a knife at your throat, you know, that level of fear." 
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Linda later comes to identify this as the beginning of her agoraphobia, and says "I think, 
ever since then I've always been pretty miserable actually". In Linda's mind, the original 
experience of panic is linked with her anxieties about leaving home. Although 'desperate' 
to leave, she was unsure and anxious about what departure from this place of perceived 
safety might entail. This ambivalence was a source of confusion, perhaps rooted in a 
sense of not really belonging anywhere. While the 'homely', non-social location of 
Linda's first panic attack is in itself unusual (illustrating the difficulty of positing 
'essential' aspects of agoraphobia), the subsequent development of Linda's agoraphobic 
avoidance followed the fairly 'typical' route of gradually increased avoidance of places 
where she might be seen to panic (Bankey 2001 ). 
The job abroad didn't work out, and Linda soon came back to live in various locations in 
England, reluctant to return to her parents' home. She continued to experience a fairly 
high, but variable level of background anxiety, and to develop agoraphobic avoidance of 
certain, mostly crowded places. 
"I always had to live out in the country, I couldn't live in town, so its, I couldn't 
walk through ... I mean I lived in Exeter, for five, six years, and I never once 
walked right across, right through the main street." 
Although she did consult a doctor about her difficulties with negotiating social space, "it 
was just a case of pull yourself together", and years passed before she came to understand 
what was wrong. "I never came up with the word agoraphobia in all those years, I never 
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knew what it meant, I just knew that I couldn't go, I couldn't get too far away from 
home." When she did eventually come across the term agoraphobia, it was through her 
own reading; "I know so much about it now, as much as any shrink probably, but then .. .I 
just didn't know what the hell was happening." 
Despite an inability to stray far from the security of her home, she maintained a pretence 
of 'normality' for some years. In the midst of much discomfort and confusion Linda 
managed to complete a course at art college, clearly a difficult experience. She tried not 
to admit that she was struggling, and often adopted strategies, invented excuses, to 
disguise her difficulties. 
"It gradually, it kinna got worse, and I was pretty miserable at ait college. I hated 
it [ ... ] I was like the 'awkward' student, because, you know if they went on trips 
for instance, to France, or London, to galleries, I always said I couldn't afford it." 
At the end of this period, she says, "I'd had enough of England, and I wanted to come 
home". We might interpret this 'home-sickness' as a need for stability in her life, perhaps 
a desire to 'put down roots', and in a sense this is what she proceeded to do. 
Having returned north to Scotland, Linda says, (my emphasis) 
"I think I was quite happy for a while, quite content, I had a job, and I met this 
chap, and eh, my life was much more structured I think [ ... ]you get, you know, 
really se(f' contained when you have children and a partner, but then[ ... ] after 
seven years, we split up, and that's really, when I went down hill again, my 
foundations were shaken." 
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Describing the early stages of the period following her return to Scotland, Linda 
emphasizes the positive aspects of social space, how the presence of others can in fact be 
experienced as helpful and consolidating. However, things clearly took a sudden turn for 
the worse with the break up of her relationship. A traumatic event such as this can subject 
almost anyone to a period of vulnerability and insecurity. Linda herself was deeply 
distressed by the experience, and she uses a powerful and spatial metaphorics to relate 
this part of her story. Her usage of the concepts of structure, foundations, containment, 
and downwards motion relative to her environment, can be interpreted in relation to 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological framework of identity, as a description of increased 
stability, then sudden erosion of her 'intentional arc' in response to changes in her 
emotional landscape. She had suddenly become very vulnerable indeed, destitute and 
dispossessed of self worth. 
Shortly after her marriage break up, Linda had a major panic attack when she was 
driving, again listening to very loud music, and "just collapsed really. It was like a 
snowball effect, an accumulation of all those years of[ ... ] not addressing things that were 
happening in my head." She said she had been doing too much, and thinking 
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"keep going, I can do it, I can do it, but actually, you know, inside, you're 
crumbling ... and all of a sudden, your body, mind and body and soul just, just 
exploding, and saying STOP, cause you're gonnae die, or you, something ... you're 
gonnae completely, crack, if you don't, address this." 
The terms I've highlighted here emphasize the confusion Linda experiences in the 
boundaries of her phenomenal body, an intolerable and unsustainable confusion of 
internal and external space. She clearly loses the ability to project a protective boundary 
around herself, and as a result, is both assaulted by external space, crumbling inwardly 
under its pressure, and unable to prevent internal space from exploding outwards. Both 
sensations indicate a lack of containment, the crack that permits dispersion of self into its 
surroundings. Her account highlights the fact that personal "integration is always 
precarious, since what can be patterned or structured can also be broken up as new 
patterns come into existence." (Spurling 1977: 39) While Linda experienced this attack, 
and indeed her first severe episode of panic, in an ostensibly 'private', non-social 
location, one might speculate that the loud music rendered her surrounding space 
virtually, if not actually social. By this I mean that, even though the nature and presence 
of the 'noise' was of her own choosing, her emotional 'response' to the music was 
ampl(fied beyond her control. At her most sensitive and vulnerable, even a virtual social 
presence was perceived as intrusive and frightening. Noise is, in any case, often closely 
associated with most forms of sociality (emphasized by Iris in chapter 5) - gatherings of 
people are rarely silent - and other respondents in this project refer to the distressing 
volume of the situation when describing the excessive multi-sensory stimulation social 
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space seems to entail. (A phobic participant in a self-help video also repo1ts "the noise of 
the traffic" as disturbing, and that it "seems to get louder and louder" during a panic 
episode - see chapter 8.) 
So at this stage, when things had come to a head, Linda received psychiatric help, in the 
form of counselling and medication. Although appreciative of the attention to her 
problems, and relieved, to a degree, to have them out in the open, the treatment does little 
to alter the agoraphobic lifestyle she has maintained more or less consistently since the 
age of seventeen. When asked about the form of treatment she would liked to have 
received at this stage, she says 
"to be honest, in some ways, if I'd been taken into a hospital, put in a bed, and 
cuddled by the nurses, I mean that would have been great actually [laughs] to 
have a month or something out of the turmoil that my life was in." 
Feeling, as she does, phenomenally insecure, Linda craves the tactility of human contact, 
cuddles that would soothe her enervated senses, and affirm her diminished sense of self. 
Placed in a consolatory environment, it seems she could find the time and space to re-
cover, to strengthen her phenomenal bodily boundaries, and restore her weakened 
intentional arc. 
For Linda, there are good reasons for accepting the debilitating nature of her illness. To 
do so means easing up on the constant battle against it, 'making the best of a bad lot' 
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rather than trying to fight something she feels can't be beaten. 10 In this way, it is possible 
to avert the pain of panic attacks by completely avoiding situations that would provoke 
them; 
"but the trouble with that is your world shrinks, till it is just the one room or your 
bed or whatever." Linda goes on to say; "the thing about agoraphobia, or maybe 
people with similar problems, is that they just jog along. There's a lady in the 
village, here where I live, hasn't come out her house in twenty years." 
One can then, in a sense, 'choose' just to live within one's own 'particular radius', but 
this inevitably results in an extraordinarily restricted life-style in a constricted life-world. 
Linda shares the view expressed by other sufferers that it is essential to practice going 
outside your home regularly if you are to avoid becoming house-bound for extended 
periods of time. This is expressed in a statement also reminiscent of my earlier usage of 
the quotation from Evernden , about the phenomenal, physiognomic relevance of 
'seasons of the year', and 'seasons of being'; 
"another relevant thing is the season. You know the winter. .. I don't get much 
practice ... of you know going out cause the weather's crap, or whatever, you don't 
go for day trips or, you know, sort of hibernate. But in the summer, you know, the 
spirits lift, what have you, things become a lot easier, I become happier". 
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At different times, Linda stresses the fact that it becomes more difficult to function 
outside your home, or even to imagine doing so, if you 'get out the habit'. Confidence is 
easily lost, and painful to regain, so "practice is really important [ ... ] I feel that I don't do 
enough, to be honest, but then, at the same time, I'm wary of not pushing myself too 
much." There's a delicate balance to be struck in order to keep the physiognomy of your 
life-world relatively constant and familiar, to keep your involvement with it on anything 
like an even keel. Adopting Merleau-Ponty's terms, operative intentionality has to be 
exercised, you have to practice projecting and patterning lived space, with its potential 
for freedom of movement, to prevent its becoming hopelessly and debilitatingly 
contracted. 
Linda recognizes that what she does for a living may not be all that conducive to 
developing and maintaining the skills necessary for coping in difficult spaces, which tend 
to be those populated with other people. 
"Working at home[ ... ] its not that healthy really, its very isolating. And I think if 
you 're out in an office environment, or a shop, or, you know that sort of thing, 
you know you're mixing with people just by the very nature of the job, you're 
getting practice every day". 
The view Linda expresses here corresponds with some sufferers' theories about the 
development and exacerbation of their agoraphobic symptoms. Women have said that 
being 'stuck at home', for example, during the late stages of pregnancy, looking after 
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young children, or in one case, because of a back injury, can, in a sense, cause you to 
'forget', or lose the habitual bodily sense (praktagnosia), of what's involved in going out. 
In a sense, you forget how to project your own lived space, necessary for freedom of 
movement, over and against those of other people. In such social circumstances, one's 
own lived space may need to be asserted more strongly, and defended against the 
seemingly corrosive presence of the lived spaces of others. There is then much effort, 
skill, confidence and (perceptual) faith required to convert space into something like a 
dwelling or 'homely' environment. 
However, despite these perceived disadvantages of extended periods behind closed doors, 
the home clearly is often experienced as a place of sanctuary, an asylum rather than a 
prison (but see Valentine 1998). As we have seen, it is understandably tempting just to 
stay there, and avoid risking one's stability and security in the attempt to construct and 
explore a non-home based life-world. Most agoraphobics know, to their cost, the dangers 
of over-exposure to space outside the home. The world can become very frightening very 
quickly, and display an overwhelming physiognomy of horror. You have to tread lightly, 
and warily to avoid coming face to face with the terrible reality of full-blown panic, a 
breakdown in relations between lived and objective space that causes one's surroundings 
to become threatening and awful. The subject of panic feels that the space they occupy is 
somehow qualitatively different from that of other people around them, they do not 
belong there, and their only option is to run, usually homewards. Having 'lost the place' 
in this way, home often seems to be the only imaginable space in which to rebuild your 
defences, away from the prying eyes and presence of others. 
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When asked if she can explain why the home is the most comfortable place to be, Linda 
thinks carefully about her answer. What she eventually articulates so clearly is in fact 
fairly typical of sufferers' views. 
"When I look around here, kids aside [ ... ] its like, almost like an extension ... of 
me .. . you know its, it feels safe because ... its, it's a shield, it's a, protective thing, 
you know, obviously there's walls, and a roof em, but I would feel just as safe in 
my garden." 
Her statement reveals that it would be simplistic to assume that the protection is derived 
from the physical enclosure of the bricks and mortar alone. While sufferers do, to an 
extent, incorporate these walls into their sense of self, to strengthen their phenomenal 
bodily boundaries, there is a deeper issue at stake here, relating to the structure and 
spatiality of our very existence. Merleau-Ponty's existential analysis reveals that home is 
often the centre of our lived space. It constitutes the heart of many of our life-worlds and 
provides a relatively stable base for us to orient ourselves in relation to. Agoraphobics, 
who spend so much of their time anxiously floating free from their moorings, are 
especially needy of this stability. At home, the subject can attempt to flex her operative 
intentionality, imagining lived distances opening out before her and 'gearing' herself 
towards them. These spaces can be physiognomically perceived as anything from an 
abyss that threatens to engulf, to an expanse that invites participation. The home provides 
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relatively stable foundations from which sufferers can make judgments about their ability 
to cope, and to assess the prospective reliability of their intentional arc. 
However, even here, as Linda discovered, there are times when the foundations turn out 
to be less than solid, and this realization can be truly terrifying. To lose the protective 
carapace of your sense of lived space here, to be invaded by unheimlich anxiety in your 
own home, is devastating to your sense of self. When 
"you 're in a state of permanent anxiety, chronic, its really quite disabling, there's 
nowhere ... , whether its your home .. , this is the scariest thing that I discovered, 
when I was really ill, it was, my home wasn't enough, my bed, my pillow, my 
mother staying here for months ['she was my rock'], wasn't enough[ ... ] nothing 
is, and, that's when you just lose it completely, you, there's just nothing there at 
all, you know, this fear". 
What Linda seems to be expressing here is at the very heart of existential anxiety; the fear 
that at the root of everything is nothing, and that there is no place where you are safe 
from the threat to your existence, the loss of self, that hovers at the bounds of being. 
Linda survived this experience, though the level of anxiety seems to have persisted 
beyond what most sufferers of agoraphobia would have to endure. 11 
215 
For agoraphobics then, anxieties are generally associated with attempts to project 
themselves beyond the home, which is ordinarily the safe centre from which their lived 
space radiates outwards. Linda notes; 
"I think everybody's got their own, radius, perimeter [laughs], mine is, I can go to 
[nearby town], it's a bit iffy ifl can walk along the main street, an' stuff like, a 
Saturday [when its busier] that's really pushing it". 
Bannan can be seen to echo Linda's point about the home's importance (thus suggesting 
this is not a uniquely agoraphobic experience) when he says that "the centre of my space 
is usually my home or dwelling, in terms of which I orient myself in the lived world." 
(Bannan 1967: 37) 
One of the tactics Linda uses to extend the perimeter of her life-world beyond her home 
is to project a comparable sense of security onto her car, which she says she uses "too 
much. Like when I park my car in the town, em I have to, be near the car[ ... ] there's 
always got to be this place, this sanctuary, where I can go and feel safe". Linda is able to 
leave the house, and the radius of her life-world, her safety zone, extends far enough to 
include many of the things that are important for a 'full life'. "The only thing that is 
missing in my life is this, ability to, to go, to say I'll go up north, for a holiday, and you 
know, what the hell, go to London and see an exhibition". When she takes herself 'out of 
her element' and into unpredictable social situations, she is in a sense laying herself open 
to intrusion from the spatial compositions of others. 
Linda has a high degree of perceptual sensitivity, and while this is clearly a source of 
pleasure, it is also disabling, in that she cannot always keep stimuli at a safe distance 
from herself. She often feels invaded by sounds; 
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"maybe its being a musician I don't know, I can't read music, everything that I 
learn is just by ear, I've got one of these really intense, sort of listening, skills that 
I've got, it's a bit mind blowing at times[ ... ] if I'm in somewhere like Princes 
Street, where its just all, the noise, the buzz, the general. .. , I think that definitely 
effects my brain, my mind, and it makes you very uneasy." 
As a painter, Linda is also highly attuned, and sensitive to, visual stimuli, but she says "I 
wish I wasn't". She feels unable to protect herself from their influence, or even assault; 
"All my flipping senses are too, acute, for their own good[ ... ] everything about me's just 
really acute." Linda is decidedly not 'thick-skinned', she emphasizes the close 
relationship between her acute sensitivity to sights and sounds and her inability to project 
a protective spatiality, or boundary. Uncalled for sensations seem to 'flood in' despite all 
she might do to try to shield her self from unwelcome stimuli. This is especially so in 
intense (social) spaces where these sensations emanate from and are produced by others 
yet seem to enter her very being in a manner completely beyond her control. 12 Here the 
boundaries of identity become confused and such sensations might even seem to belong 
to "another self which has already sided with the world." (PP 216) 
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Conclusion 
Bryan Turner (1987: 218) has claimed that phenomenology has limited potential for the 
study of health and illness, as it can describe, but never explain the condition in question. 
However, Linda's account has shown that Merleau-Ponty's existential analysis provides 
much more than mere description. His focus on the continual construction of, and 
variable relations between lived and objective space paves the way for a more sensitive 
reading of 'disordered' encounters between individuals and their life-worlds. 
Merleau-Ponty offers a philosophical problematic that provides both a framework for 
understanding and a nuanced vocabulary capable of expressing the existential trauma and 
spatially mediated experiences of the agoraphobic. He also draws our attention to the 
vital point that those 'boundary' problems experienced by sufferers are neither so unique, 
nor so bizarre, if we choose to understand them in terms of a pathology of every-day life 
and existence. We are not Cartesian subjects. There are no fixed and immutable 
boundaries between self and world. The self is a project that needs to be constantly 
renegotiated and the senses provide the medium of this dialectic and of our orientation in 
social space. The experience of panic can arrive 'out of the blue' precisely because 
"[e]very sensation carries within it the germ of a dream or depersonalisation [ ... that] 
takes place on the periphery of my being." (PP: 215) 
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What is more, Merleau-Ponty also reminds us that we are not 'ghosts in a machine' but 
embodied entities. This suggests that any therapy that concerns itself merely with the 
mind (res cogito) fails to give due weight to the bodily and sensory aspects of the 
condition, to our 'extended' selves. What Linda wanted most was to be 'cuddled', to have 
her boundaries recognized and reinforced. Many other sufferers too find that they can 
gain a degree of security by hanging onto someone or something, as we saw in the 
previous chapter. 
Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the sociality of space also explains why we are all subject 
to the effusion of others' spatial compositions and how agoraphobics' characteristic and 
extreme discomfort in certain kinds of places - those commonly described as 'public' -
can be indirectly derived from other people. (As outlined in chapter I, I choose to 
describe characteristically 'difficult' space as 'social' rather than 'public', given the 
latter's problematic association with yet distinction from the 'private' sphere.) The 
presence of others and their projections can, for the agoraphobic at least, throw the 
stability of spatial situation into question. She can lose the essential sense that her bodily 
location is "not one among many but the center in relation to every location." (Bannan 
1967: 74) People 'perform' space, literally populate it with their own presence and 
constructions, causing it to become charged with their noisy, odiferous, colourful and 
tactile spatiality. The sensory phenomena that others make manifest has to be 'handled' 
by those who share their surroundings, and the 'performance' of this task is ordinarily 
taken for granted. The sufferer from agoraphobia, however, lacks the ability to assert 
their own subjective spatiality in the face of the spaces of others. When subjected to high 
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degrees of sensory stimulation, sufferers feel 'trapped'. The contesting lived spaces of 
others jar their senses, and they can become overwhelmed and anxious to the extent that 
they suffer a full-blown panic attack. This chapter has shown that Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenological framework is capable of expressing and assisting such frightening 
aspects of agoraphobic existence. 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy has been described as "an attitude of wonder in the face of 
the world, a constant questioning and desire for understanding [ ... ] in the hope of 
attaining some kind of directedness or orientation. The goal of [his] philosophy is to 
enable each of us to rediscover his [sic] situation in the world." (Spurling 1977: 5) As I 
hope to have demonstrated, Merleau-Ponty can be read as initiating at least a partial 
'explanation' of agoraphobia which builds upon the existential traditions represented by 
Kiekegaard and Sartre, and his quest for orientation may have an important part to play in 
wider geographies of mental health. 
In the following chapter, I continue the exploration of embodied experience of social 
space and the subject's relations to others in terms of the rather extreme boundary 
changes experienced during pregnancy. What, after all, could challenge one's subjective 
boundaries more than having another individual develop within the limits of one's own 
body? Pregnancy also problematizes women's relations to social space in other ways, for 
example, in terms of their decreased mobility, a radical alteration of their body shape that 
often seems to make them a focus of public attention, and in terms of the altered 
responses of surrounding people. It goes without saying that pregnancy is a gender issue. 
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However the heavily gendered nature of agoraphobia together with the fact that all of the 
women in my study groups had been pregnant (and that some of them actually associated 
their initial agoraphobic episodes with issues surrounding pregnancy) makes pregnancy 
of obvious import. Chapter 7 thus seeks to develop the discussion of Merleau-Ponty 
further by advancing a feminist interpretation of the possible synergies between the 
gendered experiences of pregnancy and agoraphobia. 
1 This is certainly not to say that Sartre ignores the issue of our embodiment (he does not) but simply to 
point out that his interests are primarily psychological and that for him our mental existence always 
precedes our essence. "Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself." (Sartre 1957, 28) The kind 
of (mental) freedom Sartre is interested in extolling is therefore somewhat different from the freedom 
desired by the housebound agoraphobic. 
2Intentionality, from the Latin i11te11tio, was a medieval term reintroduced by Franz Bretana in the 
nineteenth century who argued that all states of mind were directed towards, or about some-thing. It does 
not necessarily imply conscious intent on the part of the thinker. (See Searle 1988: 3.) 
3 'Lived space', appears first, and most frequently, in his Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty 
was not in fact the first theorist to use the concept of 'lived space', it was introduced by the psychologist 
Minkowski, in 1933, and incorporated some years later into the Phe110111e11ological Psychology of Erwin 
Straus. 
-1 Since "spatiality is characteristic of our being in the world, there should be a variety of types of space 
according to the various modes of that commitment" (Bannan 1967: 99) 
5 In this sense, lived space can be conceptualized along similar lines to Leder's ( 1990) notion of the 'dys-
appearing body', i.e. the body re-appears to conscious awareness as a result of some dys-function. (See also 
Csordas 1994; Williams and Bendelow I 998a and I 998b (esp. ch.8).) 
6 See Dyck 1995, Dorn 1998 and Park et al 1998 for discussion of 'disabled' experiences of space. 
7Edie makes a similar point when he says that one should study extreme states of consciousness as "it is 
sometimes easier to see in certain extreme cases what the normal or ordinary implies but hides." (Edie 
1987: I 04) 
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8 It is vital to reemphasize that phenomenology's emphasis on sensations is in no way indicative of 
idealism. Merleau-Ponty never contests the existence of a real material world. Indeed, he writes that 
"phenomenology is a philosophy for which the world is always 'already there' before reflection begins - as 
an inalienable presence" (PP vii). 
9 The experience of vertigo can also be understood in terms of a loss of balance between lived and 
objective space. (See Kirby 1996, Yardley 1994 and Quinodoz 1997 for accounts of 'vertiginous' 
experience of the world.) 
10 Many sufferers share the view that agoraphobia is something you never recover from, but merely have to 
learn to live with;"/ don't care what anybody says, you 're never cured from agoraphobia." (Carron) 
11 Ordinarily, a panic attack will usually last somewhere between a few minutes and a couple of hours, 
though the intensity of the experience obviously makes it feel like much longer. (Gournay 1989) 
12 One might speculate that the contrast between the depersonalisation Linda occasionally experienced in 
listening to and being 'possessed' by recorded music and her ability to play music even in public places 
might be connected with the degree to which she regards herself as responsible for (and the source of) the 
sensations she experiences. 
Chapter Seven 
Pregnant Pauses: 
Agoraphobic Embodiment and the Limits of (lm)pregnability 
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"The integrity of my body is undermined in pregnancy [ ... ] by the fact that the 
boundaries of my body are themselves in flux. In pregnancy I literally do not 
have a firm sense of where my body ends and the world begins." (Young, 
1990: 163) 
Introduction 
In recent years, feminist geographer Robyn Longhurst has published a number of 
articles exploring the embodied experience of pregnant women, particularly in 
relation to 'public' space. (See Longhurst 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000a; 2000b.) By 
bringing the perspectives of feminist theorists such as Iris Marion Young and 
Elizabeth Grosz to bear on her own empirical research, Longhurst has demonstrated 
that women in contemporary western society experience an increased fluidity in the 
boundaries of their embodied selves during pregnancy. Further, she posits connections 
between these boundary phenomena and the increased discomfort and public censure 
experienced by pregnant women in the social sphere. One consequence of such 
'politics of pregnability' that Longhurst explores is the occurrence of an, albeit 
temporary, 'shrinkage' in women's life-worlds. 
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In this chapter, I want to take up the project initiated by Longhurst in relation to some 
of the agoraphobic boundary issues raised in previous chapters. Agoraphobia is a 
disorder which, as I argue throughout this thesis, radically problematises the subject's 
bodily boundaries. That is to say, it effectively disrupts the ordinarily stable, and 
largely taken-for-granted boundary between inside and outside, person and place. 
Certain environments are felt to be threatening and invasive, so much so that subjects 
increasingly withdraw from social space, describing their worlds as "getting smaller" 
as their condition 'progresses'. 
And so, according to Longhurst's account of pregnancy, and my own theorisation of 
agoraphobia, both embodied 'conditions' apparently involve elements of boundary 
disruption and spatial restriction. Insofar as pregnancy also entails a retreat 
homewards in the manner outlined by Longhurst, away from the vagaries and 
demands of public life, it highlights some of those stereotypical aspects of femininity 
- domesticity, dependence etc. (Moi 1999) also expressed in agoraphobia. It is also 
interesting that, while the individual histories of those women who took pmt in my 
research on agoraphobia differed markedly from each other in numerous ways, they 
all had personal experience of pregnancy and motherhood that figured more or less 
prominently in their personal narratives of agoraphobia. I thus intend to open an 
investigation into the possible significance for sufferers from agoraphobia of these 
descriptive, and perhaps experiential, similarities, and will question whether socio-
spatial, psycho-corporeal experience of pregnancy and agoraphobia might have wider 
implications for feminist geographies. 
224 
However, I wish to emphasise at the outset that, although I tentatively suggest that 
there is some evidence of a synergistic relation between pregnancy and agoraphobia, I 
am in no way claiming that there is a straightforwardly causal connection between the 
two conditions. Rather I seek to elucidate and interpret the meaning of commonalties 
in pregnant and agoraphobic experiences, through a phenomenology of women's 
relations to social space. The overwhelmingly gendered nature of agoraphobia 
suggests that there must be something about the cultural experience of being a woman 
in contemporary western society that contributes to its development. There must be 
aspects of 'doing gender' (Butler 1990; 1993), that for some women helps weave 
diverse webs of experience, yet binds them together in such a way that amounts to an 
agoraphobic syndrome. I aim to investigate pregnancy as one aspect - but neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition - of an identifiably woman-centred phenomenology 
that might shed some light on the general complexion of women's experience that 
involves increased susceptibility to agoraphobia. 
The ( lm)pregnability of the Self 
Previous chapters have described the distressing and boundary disruptive symptoms 
of agoraphobia in some detail, but for the purposes of this chapter, it is important to 
re-emphasise certain aspects of the phenomenology of the panic attack and sufferers' 
subsequent agoraphobic anxiety. Not only are the descriptions they provide indicative 
of an existential threat to the usually taken-for-granted boundedness of the self, but 
typically, the sufferer clearly expresses their experience in a language that freely 
mixes bodily and mental metaphors. In accordance with the phenomenological 
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approach introduced in chapter 1, and detailed in chapter 6, the self in question is 
indubitably an embodied self. What is more, these experiences are elicited within the 
specific context of socially charged spaces, the agoraphobic 'comes out' in a cold 
sweat in the presence of, or in anticipation of the presence of, others. 
If subjectivity and corporeality are inextricably intertwined then it seems obvious that 
changes in the latter will necessarily have some bearing on the former. This is, of 
course, the same insight that underlies attempts to theorise the experience of 
pregnancy. That is to say, the embodied experience of pregnancy will not leave the 
shape of a self unaltered; one cannot be the selfsame individual postpartum. Women 
themselves may be aware and wary of such change, as Young ( 1990: 168) in fact 
points out. "Especially if this is her first child she experiences the birth as a transition 
to a new self that she may both desire and fear. She fears a loss of identity, as though 
on the other side of the birth she herself became a transformed person, such that she 
would 'never be the same again'." 
Pregnancy can, it seems, be a phenomenally intense and transformative experience, 
affecting, even 'refracting' one's identity in previously unimagined ways. In the 
words of Lucy Bailey ( 1999: 338/9); "[l]ike a beam of white light which is shone 
through a prism and emerges as a rainbow, a number of bright and colourful aspects 
of [respondents'] characters were arrayed as a result of the pregnancy." Bailey reveals 
that while some women felt ambivalent about their pregnancies, others obtained great 
satisfaction from discovering new aspects of their personalities, and described 
feelings of 'fulfilment' and increased self-worth. A number (albeit a minority) of the 
women taking part in Longhurst's research enjoyed the corporeal experience of 
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pregnancy, and it was found to liberating by some of the group interviewed by Rose 
Wiles ( 1994: 33/4 ). Wiles reported at the outset of her paper that "[t]he limited 
research literature indicates that pregnancy may be a time when women could 
experience their weight in a less negative way due to a greater social acceptability of 
fatness during pregnancy", though she concludes that this applies only to those she 
terms 'fat', not those of 'average-weight', who become pregnant. Wiles' research thus 
emphasises that different women experience pregnancy very differently and ensuing 
changes are not necessarily positive. 
Young's account of her own experience of spatial and bodily changes that take place 
during pregnancy are enlightening (for the uninitiated like myself at least), and lend 
some clues as to the emergence of embodied-identity issues for the pregnant subject. 
She states, for example; "my belly swells into a pear[ ... ] this round, hard middle 
replacing the doughy belly with which I still identify" ( 1990: 162), revealing an 
emerging need to rethink one's habituated bodily image and attendant patterns of 
action. "My automatic body habits become dislodged; the continuity between my 
customary body and my body at this moment is broken." (1990: 163) As a result of 
her changing body shape, the subject's previously taken-for-granted sense of her 
boundaries becomes increasingly unreliable. She undergoes a subtle metamorphosis 
that, though largely predictable, necessitates an increased awareness and attention to 
her materiality and movement. 
Gradually, Young explains, she becomes aware of the movements of the foetus, 
within, but somehow separate from her-self, an experience that unsettles her sense of 
individuality and coherence. "Pregnancy challenges the integration of my body 
227 
experience by rendering fluid the boundary between what is within, myself, and what 
is outside, separate. I experience my insides as the space of another, yet my own 
body." (1990: 163) The pregnant woman undergoes what is surely a unique 
experience, to have an-other fully within her own body, "inside and of me, yet 
becoming hourly and daily more separate" (Rich 1976: 47). She is no longer simply 
and unquestionably 'one'. How could such inherent ambiguity fail to perplex? 
In addition to this sense of interior difference, Young describes significant alterations 
to her sense of being in place. She feels differently about her environment, and this is 
at least partly because she believes pregnancy entails that one's sense of the 
phenomenological location of the 'I' partially shifts from the region of the eyes to the 
region of the trunk. "In this orientation that Straus calls 'pathic' we experience 
ourselves in greater sensory continuity with the surroundings [ ... ] Pregnancy roots me 
to the earth." ( 1990: 163) Clearly, this too can be characterised in terms of boundary 
alteration. Young feels less separate from what were previously her 'surrounds', and 
describes 'proprioceptive' disruptions, alterations to the sense of one's "being in a 
body and orientated in space" (Csordas 1994: 5) that radically problematise one's 
conception and experience of being a particular situated self. Bailey ( 1999: 340) 
similarly found that her research subjects perceived a "dissolution of the edges of 
their bodies." She infers that "[f]or a pregnant woman, the edges of the self become 
blurred as the body no longer seems to operate as a physical marker of individuality." 
To repeat Young's (1990: 163) compelling description, "[i]n pregnancy I literally do 
not have a firm sense of where my body ends and the world begins." 
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So far, we have begun to get a sense of what pregnancy might entail for the identity of 
the subject in question, both in terms of direct personal experience, and in the more 
general, philosophically abstract sense of challenging traditional conceptions of 
selfhood. Longhurst is among those who argue that a non-dualistic understanding of 
pregnant embodiment undermines and disrupts restrictive (masculinist) notions of 
subjectivity. She writes (2000a: 55), "[p]regnant women undergo a bodily process that 
transgresses the boundary between inside and outside, self and other, one and two, 
subject and object." In order to warrant these assertions, Longhurst presents an 
account of pregnancy that is less philosophically removed from everyday life than that 
presented so far. She, like Young, deals with bodily boundaries in some detail, but for 
Longhurst, these boundaries are a substantially more material and messy affair. 
It is central to Longhurst's thesis regarding pregnant women's withdrawal from public 
space that the mere presence of their bodies - bodies that "threaten to break their 
boundaries, to spill, to leak, to seep" - endangers "rational public order". Pregnant 
women, writes Longhurst, "can be seen to occupy a borderline state as they disturb 
identity, system and order by not respecting borders, positions and rules. Their bodies 
are often considered to constantly threaten to expel matter from inside - to seep and 
leak - they may vomit (morning sickness), cry (pregnant women tend to be 
constructed as 'overly' emotional [ ... ]), need to urinate more frequently, produce 
colustrum which may leak from their breasts, have a 'show' appear, have their 'waters 
break', and sweat with the effort of carrying the extra weight of their body'." 
(Longhurst 2000: 15) 
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This is an account of pregnancy that takes body boundaries and bodily fluids 
seriously. Drawing on Elizabeth Grosz, Mary Douglas and Julia Kristeva, Longhurst 
(2000a: 45) thus argues that pregnant bodies are discursively constructed as 
potentially 'leaky', inscribed as 'modes of seepage' and, as such, cannot be trusted to 
occupy public space. "The pregnant woman who enters the public realm risks 
'soiling' herself and perhaps even others with matter produced by her body. Her body 
threatens to contaminate and to pollute." A number of Longhurst's research subjects 
thus describe their fear and disgust at the prospect of having to behave in such 
socially inappropriate ways when out in public as, for example, being sick in the 
gutter, or having their waters break in a shopping centre, events that would be 
'revolting' or 'embarrassing'. Pregnant women do not want to be seen as 'out of 
control' in the presence of others, and their anxieties in this respect are reminiscent of 
those of agoraphobic women, who feel their boundaries cannot be relied upon to keep 
them under control and separate from the outside world. Indeed, pregnancy does seem 
to entail an analogous 'shrinkage' of the subject's life world as they withdraw from 
public places, and experience a paitial 'confinement' in the private realm of their 
homes. 
While it is certainly the case that pregnant women are fearful of what they themselves 
might (be seen to) do in public, there is also an awareness and apprehension of others' 
curiosity, their possible thoughts and behaviour in response to the subject's 
'expectant' state. Pregnant women describe feeling subjected to the censorious and 
proprietorial behaviour of others, responses apparently most notable in social spaces 
such as bars, where subject's feel judged to be behaving in a morally inappropriate 
manner just by being there (presumably in the presence of alcohol and cigarette 
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smoke~ Longhurst 1999). This sense of public interest in, even 'policing' of, pregnant 
women's behaviour, can though be found to a lesser extent throughout social space, 
and is, arguably, simply an extension of the type of censure directed at women in 
general in a masculinist civic sphere. For many contemporary women, varying 
degrees of intervention and intrusion is an unwelcome reality of their day-to-day 
lives. 
As I highlighted in chapter 5, it is the frequent fate of many women in contemporary 
western society to be subjected to and objectified by an intrusive male gaze (see 
Tseelon 1995). Young ( 1990: 166) stresses the positive aspects of the experience of 
the pregnant woman arguing that "[t]he culture's separation of pregnancy and 
sexuality can liberate her from the sexually objectifying gaze that alienates and 
instrumentalizes her when in her nonpregnant state." However, this tells only one side 
of the story. The kind of look directed at pregnant women is, admittedly, likely to be 
different, yet it could arguably intensify individuals' sense of being objectified, 
alienated, and instrumentalised by the other's gaze. While the pregnant woman is not, 
perhaps, as likely to be considered a sexual object, she is still the object of a different 
kind of look, certainly not fully a 'subject' in her own right. One could argue that she 
is attributed merely instrumental value, as the 'vessel' for her unborn child, and is 
thus, as Kristeva ( 1980: 237) contends, "simply the site of her proceedings." Insofar 
as women are thus objectified, they may be more likely feel alienated than liberated 
by (some) others' attitudes to their embodied selves. The nature and intensity of the 
gaze directed at pregnant women may prove to be a source of disturbing self-
consciousness, as they find themselves subjected to intrusions more unnerving than 
ever before. 
231 
It appears then that pregnant women are somehow 'answerable' to public concerns 
about their appearance and behaviour. They are expected to conform to normative 
standards of 'decency' to an even greater extent than non-pregnant women, who are 
clearly not exempt from public moral condemnation of their looks and behaviour. The 
female subject's usual sense of accountability is intensified as she is reduced to her 
role as expectant mother. This places added limitations upon her (already socially 
restricted) behaviour, dress etc. There are appropriate ways to look and behave during 
pregnancy, and apparently, the more modest and demure the better. While this 
situation is certainly changing, with clothing retailers increasingly responding to the 
demands of contemporary working, and otherwise active pregnant 'consumers', it is 
still the case that women who stray too far from certain (dated) feminine ideals may 
be subject to severe social criticism. Pregnant women know that they are likely to 
'provoke' strong reaction should they decide, for example, to 'parade themselves' in 
public in a bikini. As Longhurst (2000b: 11) repo1ts, a front page newspaper 
photograph of women doing just that was followed by the publication of a number of 
'disgusted' letters to the editor. (In one choice excerpt, the letter writer asks if these 
women were aware that "they make special frocks for pregnant women to wear in 
public". So distressed was s/he by their oversight, and keen to put things right, that 
s/he "drew frocks on all of them".) 
The women in Longhurst's study 'often claimed that they were uncomfortable with 
the idea of people looking at them [and this] in part stemmed from the feeling that 
their bodies were less attractive during pregnancy' (2000b: 6). The sense of exposure 
experienced by pregnant women can be aggravated by (what Kim Chemin (1981) 
232 
identified as) our cultural 'tyranny of slenderness' (but compare Wiles 1994). At a 
time when they are more likely to attract attention, it seems many women have to 
contend with their own and what they perceive to be others' increasingly negative 
feelings about their enlarged bodies. Longhurst relates a number of instances where 
pregnant women express self-consciousness about their breasts and stomachs, or try to 
hide them from view, wearing baggy clothing to avoid attracting attention. One might 
also interpret this behaviour as an attempt to 'normalise' the appearance of boundaries 
experienced not only as 'bulging' (and 'therefore' unattractive) but also ambiguous 
and untrustwo1thy in that, as outlined above, they threaten to break down. 
During pregnancy, women can be subjected to more than just the look of others. One 
of Longhurst' s interviewees states that "sometimes I feel as though being pregnant 
automatically deprives me of my individual identity and personal space. People seem 
to have a fascination with pregnant women's stomachs and want to pat them[ ... ] 
because I've got a bump it seems that I've become public prope1ty." ( 1998: 28) In a 
strikingly similar vein, Bailey repo1ts that "[a] number of the women observed that 
their bodies had become 'public prope1ty', to be conunented upon, patted and 
prodded, sometimes by people they knew very little or even complete strangers. They 
described their bodies as being 'invaded', both by these other people and by the baby 
inside them." ( 1999: 340) That social restrictions on 'handling' others are apparently 
lifted during pregnancy means that visibly pregnant women forfeit part of their right 
to privacy, to keep strangers at a respectful distance, and that their sense of 
independence diminishes at the hands of others, sometimes quite literally. Pregnant 
women's 'condition' ostensibly confers rights on 'the public' to take an active and 
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open interest in their bodies, not only by looking, but also by commenting on and 
even touching, behaviour that would not, ordinarily, be socially sanctioned. 
Pregnancy and Agoraphobia: Commonalties and Potential Synergies 
Given my characterisation of both agoraphobia and pregnancy as posing a 
fundamental challenge to one's sense of self-identity via the problematising of the 
selfs previously taken-for-granted boundaries perhaps we might be justified in 
looking for other links between these conditions. 
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It certainly seems from the work of Longhurst and others that many pregnant women 
find their increased exposure to public attention and potential censure problematic. 
The fact that pregnant subjects seem suddenly to lose others' respect for their personal 
space also seems to be of more than passing relevance for agoraphobic women (for 
whom privacy is a matter of psychological survival). Being the focus of others' 
concern is a critical fear and source of concern for agoraphobics, who want always to 
blend in, never stand out for social scrutiny. 
An aversion to public attention means that, like agoraphobic women, many pregnant 
women also seem to withdraw into the confinement and relative security of their 
homes. There are of course some simply pragmatic or largely physiological reasons 
behind this partial withdrawal from public space. Pregnant women may feel tired 
more often, and encounter more barriers to social space arising directly from the built 
environment. Especially in the later stages of pregnancy, insufficient elevators, public 
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toilets etc. may hinder women's movements, and the home may simply be the easiest 
and most comfortable place to be. Friends and family are likely to support this course 
of (in)action, helping to minimise the need for activity outside the home, by, for 
example, taking care of shopping, and so on. 
Longhurst suggests that being pregnant may permit women to withdraw from public 
space in a manner that they may even find empowering. Clearly, as with agoraphobic 
withdrawal, retreat to one's home need not be an entirely negative experience. 
Apparently, though, it is very easy to quickly get out of the habit of negotiating social 
space. Presenting oneself appropriately in public is an activity that, while often taken 
for granted by non-phobic individuals, does need to be practised (Butler 1990; 1993); 
it takes discipline and control to blend in, and to feel comfortable with others. Perhaps 
for this reason some find that their difficulties extend beyond pregnancy when the 
initial reason for withdrawal is, literally, removed. In some circumstances the period 
of confinement seems to reduce subjects' confidence in their ability to manage 
themselves in the public realm. As one agoraphobic interviewee, Brenda explains, "it 
wasnae until I went to do it [leave home] that I realised, oh what's happened?" 
Given this, it might seem tempting to link pregnancy more directly with agoraphobia. 
ls it really accidental that, despite their vastly different life-histories, all of the 
agoraphobic women I interviewed had experienced pregnancy? Certainly other 
studies have found that pregnancy is frequently associated with heightened anxiety. 
Capps and Ochs ( 1995, p. 32) recount the case of Meg who now regards these 
anxieties as a precursor of her agoraphobia. "At the time I had anxieties but I hadn't 
become agoraphobic yet. I had, you know, the glimmerings of what was to come, but 
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it wasn't full blown yet [ ... ] When I think about pregnancy now I have a lot more 
anxieties. Pregnancy itself is a form of confinement. You' re in it for the long-haul 
once you start. It's irrevocable." (Original emphasis.) 
The majority of my own respondents also associated pregnancy with difficulties of an 
agoraphobic nature and, like Meg, some made direct links between their experiences 
of pregnancy and the onset of agoraphobic symptoms. Perhaps the clearest case of this 
was Susan who said that "pregnancies definitely have made a mega difference to my 
life anxiety wise, it's increased the anxiety." Susan explicitly identifies her 
agoraphobic symptoms as starting "after the birth of my first child." Since this time, 
she has experienced intermittent episodes of severe agoraphobia, linked, by her, to 
pregnancy. For example, 
"I was fine for a good couple of years, and then I had my son, and I took post-
natal depression again, and it just brought everything back all over again, and 
then it was pretty much an uphill struggle for the next ... five years." 
I have met with and interviewed Susan on several occasions, covering the period 
before, during, and after her latest (and easiest) pregnancy, and we discussed the 
effect of this experience on her agoraphobia at some length. Although leaving home 
for Susan is never an effort- or thought-less endeavour, she explains that she is even 
less likely go out when pregnant. This is partly, it seems, due to increased concern 
about others' perceptions and judgements of her size and appearance - not normally a 
major source of concern for Susan, who usually appears comfortable in tight-fitting 




"getting like the side of a house [laughs]. It's no' the most attractive ... [ ... ] 
I'm no' a person that enjoys being pregnant, I'm no' into the clothing that you 
wear when you're pregnant [laughs] you know just silly wee vain things like 
that." 
The kind of flowing and 'feminine' clothes usually deemed suitable for maternity 
wear are 'not quite me' for Susan, who is used to presenting herself in a more hard 
edged fashion. Although, there is a sense in which she dismisses this aspect of her 
heightened sense of self-consciousness as simple 'vanity', there is surely more at 
stake here. Susan demonstrates that awareness of others' readiness to judge her will at 
the very least make it more difficult, if not impossible, to leave home. She seems 
hesitant about being cast as 'mum-to-be', a role she finds as ill-fitting as the 
associated outfits. 
Susan also exemplifies the importance of practising the negotiation of social space, 
explaining that during her most recent pregnancy, she was in fact able to attend 
hospital, as opposed to the home visits she required previously. She suggests that her 
experience was so different because she felt much 'stronger' at the outset of this 
period of potential confinement, having made concerted efforts to 'exercise' her 
ability to leave home. As she explains; "before I fell pregnant I'd done a lot of hard 
work", but even so, still "had a few setbacks during the pregnancy". Other recovering 
agoraphobic women frequently comment that it is essential to expose yourself to the 
outside world on a regular basis. Not to do so for any reason, whether fear of panic, 
physical impairment, or simply bad weather, can only have a detrimental effect on 
their confidence in their ability to handle themselves in public. 
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However, despite these testimonies, it would be extremely unwise to jump to the 
conclusion that pregnancy causes agoraphobia. For one thing, there are many other 
issues at stake surrounding the transition to being a parent and the experience of early 
motherhood in itself, which ought to be taken into account. It is often not pregnancy 
itself but its aftermath that is cited by respondents as a crucial period in the onset of 
their agoraphobic symptoms. When I first interview Lizzy, for example, (an original 
member and regular attendee of WLMI) and ask how and when she became 
agoraphobic, she states: 
"It was actually really, when I had my children ... that it came. I think it did. 
[ ... ]When I came out of hospital, and a' the anxieties of having your first 
child, I just, I just felt ... very anxious about him, thought he was going to stop 
breathing ... But nobody was there to reassure me, you were on your own, and 
that was it. And ever since then I was always very wary about taking him out 
on my own, travelling on the bus." 
When I asked Fiona to elaborate on the increased agoraphobic difficulties she 
explicitly associated with pregnancy, it emerges that for her too it was rather the 
experience of early motherhood that posed the greatest problems. She states that, on 
top of everything else, having a 
l 
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"baby to cope with just toppled me. When it was at its worst, I'd be at one end 
of the room, and my daughter would be in a pram at the other end, and I 
couldn't even cross the room to lift my baby out of the pram." 
In the following exchange (which took place at a later date) Fiona raises issues that 
potentially complicate understandings of her near paralysing panic. 
Joyce - you know we talked about pregnancy before ... ? 
Fiona - yes, that's when it got bad, but I don't think it was the actual 
pregnancy ... 
Joyce - Right. It just sort of happened around that time, you wouldn't say 
there was anything to do with, about being pregnant? 
Fiona - No I don't. Although having said that, maybe the way I handled it 
was ... because your hormone levels and everything are all, you know ... But I 
think it was ... it wasn't pregnancy itself ... [ ... ] em, it got so bad at that time, it 
really got so bad when I had the baby, em, I mean I couldn't go out. You know 
you used to have those vans, shop vans that come round? I couldn't go out to 
that. 
Fiona is clearly reluctant to 'blame' pregnancy for her difficulties. But, despite her 
seeming willingness to take personal responsibility for her agoraphobia, she strives to 
articulate her understanding of the relation between 'the way [she] handled' 
pregnancy, and hormonal fluctuations associated with the experience she presumably 
could not help. One can imagine that popular discourses constructing pregnant, and 
indeed all women as at the mercy of raging hormones may complicate and undermine 
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Fiona's, and other subjects' attempts to understand and manage their complex 
emotional worlds during any difficult time. Pregnant women, perhaps especially those 
who are already emotionally vulnerable, may be hindered in their attempts to 'handle' 
their situation by repeated suggestions that they are probably 'going nuts' (Longhurst 
1997). 
Fiona, who, like the majority of agoraphobic respondents, has had to contend with 
debilitating fears about 'losing it' or 'cracking up' - especially in the early days of her 
disorder - is by no means alone in attaching significance to hormonal fluctuations. 
Moyra, for example, states that 
"obviously with a female it depends on the time of the month as well, you 
know sometimes if you 're having a bad spell? It can be that time of the month, 
and it can be weird if you' re pregnant as well." 
Mary, too, raises the issue of hormones, but then in seeming contradiction to Moyra's 
position, states, 
"I was fine when I was having at least one of my children[ ... so] it can't all be 
hormonal. You get men that come along [to the group] as well. It can't just be 
the female hormone [laughs]." 
The discussion soon turns to pregnancy with Brenda, too, when, during an interview 
in her own home, her daughter Jane arrives on a visit with her own two-month-old 
baby. In the lengthy conversation and humorous exchanges that follow, Jane describes 
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her experience of 'going do-lally' - a term she readily applies to her mother - during 
her own pregnancy. She in fact experienced a panic attack for the first time when she 
was pregnant, and could now, she claimed, understand from personal experience why 
her mother would 'run round like a headless chicken'. As an aside, intended to 
illustrate her daughter's unflattering metaphorical account of panic, Brenda describes 
how, during a 'nightmare' attempt at a shopping trip two years previously, she 
"knocked a pregnant woman flying in the middle, crossing a street in 
Glasgow, and I turned round to apologise and I done it again [ ... ] that's what 
she means by going round like a headless chicken. I just didnae know where I 
was to go, where I was gonnae feel safe." 
As we can see, since her own pregnancy Jane now has some insight into her mother's 
confused and disjointed ( over)reaction to 'unsafe' social situations. Perhaps her own 
(necessarily limited) background knowledge of what panic entails helped Jane to 
prepare, to manage her experience and prevent it getting 'out of hand'. Jane may now 
associate the strange spatial experience of panic with pregnancy, and thus with 
aspects of her female 'situation'. She knows, however, that she was not really 'going 
nuts'. Benefiting precisely from the experience of women who have gone before, Jane 
knew that life, and relative stability, goes on. 
The idea that there might be a straightforward causal link between pregnancy and 
agoraphobia is further undermined by the very diversity of causal narratives offered 
by sufferers themselves. It is surely understandable that agoraphobia sufferers want to 




agoraphobia, and that they are willing to devote considerable time and energy to the 
attempt. However, despite their best efforts, few eventually find themselves in 
Susan's situation, able to specify a particular reason for their disorder. Rather, 
sufferers are likely to point to a number of potentially stressful factors that existed or 
occurred prior to the onset of their condition, and to speculate that their agoraphobic 
symptoms manifested themselves as a result of some combination of these factors. 
Each individual has a different story to tell, and many continue to speculate and re-
work their narratives to the present day. 
While pregnancy was a theme that frequently surfaced during discussions relating to 
the issue of possible causes it was far from being the only one. Among those diverse 
events respondents put forward as causative or contributory factors of their own 
agoraphobia, one respondent, for example, refers to the sudden and distressing 
appearance in her neighbourhood of a man resembling the perpetrator of earlier abuse. 
Another (Carron) described the stress of being detained behind Checkpoint Charlie 
for several hours, in addition to maintaining an extremely demoralising relationship 
with her mother-in-law. A third respondent (Fiona) struggles to identify any possible 
cause, and tentatively suggests that she may have suffered some underlying trauma 
from witnessing bombing raids as a child. These accounts are not 'typical' and, if 
anything, agoraphobic causal narratives are similar only insofar as they don't knmv 
exactly why they became agoraphobic, there tends to be something of a consensus 
that "you can't put your finger on any one thing" (Fiona). 
In their attempts to understand their situation more fully, and hoping to gain insights 
that might aid recovery from agoraphobia, many subjects have turned to a variety of 
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clinical literature and self-help resources (discussed further in chapter 8), only to find 
that they shed little more light on the subject of causes. In line with respondents' 
accounts, such sources often acknowledge that stressful events - such as a family 
bereavement, period of illness, change of home/job, or pregnancy - may be considered 
a significant or precipitating factor (Marks 1987; Gournay 1989). Carron states; "I've 
read a lot of books on it, an' they do say its an emotional reaction to something, it's a 
reaction to something really emotional." On the other hand, it is also acknowledged 
that panic may seem to have appeared entirely 'out of the blue'. If, though, we 
consider the nature of some of those stressful events highlighted more closely, we 
might speculate that they often involve lack of control over one's situation, and seem 
to call one's place in the world into question. 
We can speculate similarly about the phenomenal impact of other significant life 
events, that they involve the subject in facing substantial change, to one's relations 
with people and places, and perhaps also to one's prior role. In the face of 
bereavement, for example, one feels utterly impotent. The profound experience of loss 
can seem to alter the shape of one's family relations and life-world, forcing the 
subject to negotiate new spaces, or gaps in their lives where previously, there were 
none. Certain other events outlined by sufferers may seem to do so only temporarily, 
even 'trivially', as in the case of short term physical disability such as that caused by a 
back injury (suffered by Jane). However, even despite apparent recovery, this 
experience might have lasting impact on the way the individual conceives of herself, 
for example, in terms of her physical capabilities and independence. It may make her 
feel powerless, shake or undermine her self-confidence and ontological security, in a 
deep-rooted and enduring way. 
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What then are we to make of these accounts? One could argue that such situations, 
including pregnancy and maternity, insofar as they entail a radical rethink of one's 
life-world in potentially disorientating ways, could fall within Karl Jaspers' 
phenomenological conception of 'boundary situations'. Such boundary phenomena, 
for Jaspers, can be defined as "situations I cannot get out of, situations I cannot see 
through as a whole." (Jaspers, quoted in Young-Bruehl 1981: 21 ), and which, as such, 
threaten one's 'orientation' in the world'. Boundary situations challenge our 'space 
for freedom' (Young-Bruehl 1981: xi). They cause us to sit up and take note of our 
bearings, to question ourselves and (our place in) the world and perhaps wonder how 
to go on. According to Alfons Grieder ( 1999: 186), boundary situations are thought to 
arise, for example, "through serious accident, conflict with others, illness, having to 
face one's death, or the death of somebody very close". While pregnancy is often 
strongly desired, and thus not an 'adverse' event of the kind most often associated 
with Jaspers' conceptualisation, experiential accounts reveal that it can indeed present 
a challenge to the subject's 'space for freedom'. 
Such 'space' is, as feminist geographers recognise, and Young famously demonstrates 
in Th rmving Like a Girl (1990), already far more restrictive for women than for men. 
I would thus argue that 'boundary situations', pregnancy included, heighten women's 
awareness of existent, intensely limiting aspects of a masculinist social world, 
bringing home (sometimes literally) the socio-spatial ramifications of women's 
culturally situated, gendered embodiment. A women's identity, perhaps especially her 
identity as a pregnant woman, is already decided, or at least only minimally 
negotiable, and experiencing such limited choice about how to re-present oneself 
socially is bound to be unnerving - i.e., to stimulate 'nerves' about 'public 
appearances'. 
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The commonalties between pregnancy and agoraphobia and the apparently synergistic 
relationship between them in certain cases might then be better understood as 
phenomena that are, quite literally, engendered by women's experiences of 
subjectivity in contemporary society. The social pressures experienced by women, 
whereby they are expected to be especially sensitive and responsive to the needs and 
gaze of others, especially in terms of their orientation toward their family, children 
etc. might all contribute to the difficulty of maintaining a stable sense of self. This is 
nowhere more the case than in pregnancy and childcare. It obviously takes a degree of 
se(f-confidence in relation to the social world to trust one's capability in relation to 
another being. In the absence of a solid and reassuring suppo11 network, the pregnant 
or newly parental subject can easily feel isolated and incompetent, and perceive their 
behaviour to be policed to a greater extent. Two of the respondents in this project, for 
example, described concerns about being, and being judged to be, 'unfit' mothers 
(one, Mary, worries that her children 'brought themselves up') and independently 
described periods of particularly intense anxiety in anticipation of the arrival of health 
visitors in their homes. In fact, as each subsequently became less and less likely to 
leave home - more housebound - they became increasingly house-proud, keeping their 
own domestic territory as near perfect as possible. These subjects describe real 
concerns about 'doing' mother-, and house-work badly, and failing to perform 
stereotypical aspects of their gender role to culturally expected and internalised (high) 
standards. 
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I would however like to close with the following, somewhat tentative, suggestion. If 
we can continue to develop and strengthen feminist understandings of embodied 
subjectivity that take women's 'other' socio-spatial experience seriously, we would 
perhaps be less likely, as a culture, to pathologize boundary difference and disruptions 
of the kind undergone by pregnant, 'insecure', and otherwise 'excluded' subjects. 
That is to say, a model of subjectivity that is not based on masculinist conceptions of 
bounded autonomy may allow (especially female) subjects to experience boundary 
changes as something other than crises. One could then feel ambiguous or uncertain 
about one's new and shifting place in the world, without feeling intolerably exposed 
or unstable. 
Conclusion 
This chapter initiated an inquiry into conceptual and socio-spatial links between the 
experience of two conditions overwhelmingly considered 'women's troubles', and 
aspects of the peculiarly gendered treatment of women in contemporary western 
society. Drawing on theoretical accounts and empirical research with women who are 
pregnant, women who are agoraphobic, and women who have experience of both 
conditions, the chapter suggested that each presents an intensification of and is 
synergistically linked with the meaning and doing of gender. 
It was shown that agoraphobia, like pregnancy, demonstrably troubles the subject's 
sense of being a discrete individual, reliably separate from the 'outside' world. In both 
conditions, women experience their boundaries as more fluid, less protective, and 
untrustwo11hy; they fear they might 'break down'. Additionally, they may feel (and 
indeed, be encouraged to feel) less rational and emotionally stable. Both states also 
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involve heightened awareness of the censorious and objectifying gaze of others that is 
associated with reluctance to present oneself in public. Moreover, the chapter has 
argued that pregnancy and agoraphobia serve to magnify pre-existent socio-spatial 
difficulties of womanhood, chiefly, that of maintaining a bounded and secure sense of 
identity, in addition to a 'space for freedom', in limited and limiting social 
circumstances. 
Feminist theorists (eg. Battersby 1998; Borda 1995) have convincingly argued that 
women generally are subjected to ideological imperatives to look and act according to 
certain gendered norms, behavioural standards that still lean towards domesticity and 
servility as opposed to authority and sociality. They have further shown that women 
tend to be represented as having more fluid boundaries than men, and as such, they 
are less suited to, even threaten the stability of, the rational order of the masculine 
public realm. Women's 'volatile bodies' (Grosz 1993) thus require a degree of 
'confinement' within the domestic sphere. In pregnancy and agoraphobia, this 
feminine boundary situation apparently reaches something of a crisis point, as the 
need for confinement intensifies. That is to say, in both conditions, women are treated 
to 'more of the same', rather than differently, and it is, I argue, the socio-cultural 
situation of women in general that 'produces' agoraphobia. 
At the outset of this chapter, I suggested that there must be something about the 
existential realities and meanings of being a woman that entails susceptibility to 
agoraphobia. I aimed to show that it is a 'condition' - perhaps (following Bardo on 
anorexia) an 'overdetermined symptom' - of the cultural situation of women. Bardo 
has written, "I take the psychopathologies that develop within a culture, far from 
being anomalies or aberrations, to be characteristic expressions of that culture; to be, 
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indeed, the crystallisation of much that is wrong with it." (1995: 141) Aside from 
being a powerful argument for the need to study such psychopathologies - they hold 
"keys to cultural self-diagnosis and self-scrutiny" - Bordo' s basic contention is that 
disorders such as agoraphobia are potentially understandable in the light of wider 
social circumstances. Agoraphobia is a cultural condition, coalescent from the 
treatment and experience of women, and must be explored by, amongst other 
approaches, a phenomenology of femaleness and femininity. By focusing on one 
aspect of some women's experience, this chapter has gone some way towards 
extending feminist explorations of pregnability initiated by Young, Longhurst et al, to 
probe affinities with agoraphobia. It has thus begun to forge experiential and 
conceptual links between some aspects of 'doing' and experiencing gender 
(particularly those highlighted by pregnancy), and the gendered distribution of 
ago rap ho bia in contemporary western society. 
In the following chapter, I want to explore the issue of treatment for and possible 
recovery from agoraphobia touched on above, in chapter 5. Specifically, chapter 8 
will offer an experientially grounded critique of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
(CBT), a method of treatment commonly advocated by widely used and increasingly 
available forms of self-help resources. This final substantive chapter is motivated by a 
desire to reveal the ways in which CBT apparently employs a peculiarly gendered and 
restrictive, rather than liberating, model of the self, one that relies on the kind of 
Cartesian dualisms that I have worked to undermine throughout this thesis. The 
chapter aims to look beyond such potentially debilitating views of selfhood, and 
gesture towards a more spatialised notion of subjectivity that could be appropriate, 
comfortable and comforting for the respondents re-presented by this study. Such a 
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potentially enabling conception might, I suggest, help integrate the fractured spaces 




'All in the Mind .. ?': 
Analysing the Subject of 'Self-Help' 
"I think they try to fob us off, I don't think, em, they really take us, very 
seriously. I think they think probably because its mostly women that go to 
them with these problems that they think we're, a bit neurotic, maybe just a bit 
weak, an ... don't want to cope with, maybe everyday life." (Kathy, 
agoraphobia sufferer and contributor to self-help video 'A'.) 
Introduction 
It has been clear from the outset of this thesis that it is 'peopled', rather than 'open' 
spaces that agoraphobics fear and avoid, though this clearly runs contrary to both 
popular opinion and dictionary definitions of the disorder. As we have seen, the lack 
of understanding surrounding agoraphobia can combine with sufferers' own 
reclusiveness to make their condition extraordinarily isolating, both physically and 
emotionally. Sufferers may be reluctant to discuss or even admit to having difficulties 
they themselves don't understand, even with close friends and family. Recall Moyra's 
poignant observation, quoted in chapter 5, that many "nice enough people" with 
whom she had confided responded by keeping their distance - "you just dinnae see 
them afterwards, you know what I mean?" Should sufferers eventually decide to seek 
help from health-care professionals, it is, as Kathy makes plain in the above quotation, 
by no means guaranteed that help or even understanding will be forth-coming. In 
circumstances such as these, self-help resources may seem to be the only source of 
information and support available, and it is therefore important to understand their 
character and role. 
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'Self-help' resources in general are, as Robin Allwood remarks (1996: 19) "aimed 
primarily at women", being mostly concerned with what are (stereo)typically 
considered to be 'women's problems', those related to depression, weight and anxiety. 
(For feminist perspectives on therapy for women see Brown 1995, Brown and Root 
1996 and McLeod 1994; on feminist psychology see Burman 1998 and Unger 1998.) 
Such texts would therefore seem to be an important focus for feminist researchers' 
attention, and I want to consider what a feminist interpretation of self-help resources 
aimed at agoraphobic women might reveal. Perhaps the most immediately obvious 
focus for such an analysis relates to the ambiguity inherent in the very name of the 
genre. The term 'self-help' can either be read in the ('common'-) sense of 'help 
yourself, or in the alternative, more complex sense of 'help for the self. The 
difference here lies between what is straightforwardly 'self-service', and what is a 
kind of therapy for the treatment of selves. Both senses clearly harbour implicit 
definitions, but the latter in particular begs specific questions regarding the nature of 
assumptions underlying this definition. Namely, given that there are contested notions 
of what a self is or can be, whose idea of self is being invoked here? To exactly what 
kind of self is help is being offered? 
Previous chapters have specifically criticised the hegemony of what I referred to as a 
Cartesian model of the self, one that separates mind (res cogitans) from body (res 
extensa) and consciousness from the world. I have argued that such a separation is 
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both untenable and incapable of understanding the nature of the boundary crises that 
agoraphobics experience. A key part of this thesis has been to develop a different 
understanding of the self and of self-consciousness as embodied, intentional and as a 
'performance' in social space. As chapter I pointed out, there is a consensus among 
contemporary feminist theorists that subjectivity and our sense of self is thoroughly 
embodied, that the body and not just the mind is "a medium of culture" (Bordo 1993: 
65). (See also Battersby 1998, Butler 1990; 1993, Irigaray 1985.) Further, as chapter 6 
argued, the existential phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and others entails a critique 
of the pure consciousness of Cartesian philosophy positing instead an 'intentional' 
consciousness that is not something set apart from the world, but is part of the world. 
Thus, in Merleau-Ponty's words, our conscious being is "a project of the world, meant 
for a world which it neither embraces or possesses, but toward which it is perpetually 
directed." (PP xvii) The agoraphobic's difficulty lies, I have argued, in the dangers 
inherent in maintaining the 'semi-permeable' boundaries of the self in the face of a 
(social) world that sometimes appears as if it threatens to possess their very being, to 
embrace them so tightly as to squeeze them out of existence. 
We have then two quite distinct models of the self and yet, ironically, self-help 
materials currently available to agoraphobics tend to elide any attempt to bring the 
predominantly Cartesian model into question. As we shall see, they tend to discuss 
issues about self-identity and self-control in entirely physical or mental terms - as 
dependent upon either a 'strong constitution' or a 'weak will' rather than, as previous 
chapters have argued, an inextricably complex combination of both. The 
representation of agoraphobic selves on offer in self-help materials is set against, 
while dependent upon, a myth of 'normal' (Cartesian) identity. 
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The audience of the self-help videos I discuss below are shown to be subjected to the 
pervasive notion that there is a particular version of self, a form of 'normality', to 
which they should aspire. This mythical model is, I will argue, inextricably bound up 
with an interlocking set of masculinist discourses, and is overly, if not overtly, reliant 
on an individualist, yet dualistic, liberal humanist model of the self. Maintaining the 
hegemony of this Cartesian conceptualisation involves the denigration and 
suppression of alternative discourses, those associated with the wrong (read feminine) 
side of a familiar set of hierarchic dichotomies: of the body (as opposed to mind); of 
nature (held against culture); and emotion (as always subservient to reason). (See for 
example Bondi 1992, and Plumwood 1993. 1) I argue that these dualistic discourses 
are instrumental in positioning the subject(s) of agoraphobia, and have an intrinsically 
normative role and rationale. 
My ultimate aim here will be to show that this limited and limiting 'ideal' cannot 
contain or account for, and thus excludes, the embodied experiences of agoraphobic 
women. One need not, however, necessarily respond to this situation by positioning 
the agoraphobic as pathological, by representing her in terms of an aberration of an 
assumed normal self, and one that requires re-moulding within Cartesian terms. One 
might rather question the validity and adequacy of the Cartesian model itself. I would 
in fact suggest that sympathetic analysis of sufferers' relations with their environment 
might offer a challenge, a possibility for subverting a model incapable of recognising 
this alternative (and largely gender specific) experience, elements of which, I contend, 
are common to non-phobic women as well. 
One outcome of pursuing this line of thinking will be the suggestion that self-help 
resources drawing on dualistic discourses are of limited effectiveness for sufferers 
from agoraphobia. This conclusion begs the question of what self-help of a more 
inclusive hue (perhaps informed by feminist critiques of singular notions of self) 
might look like. I thus intend to close this thesis, but obviously not the debate, by 
gesturing toward possible alternatives. 
Approaching the subject of se(f-help 
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Chapter 2 set out the background rationale (in terms of my processual methodology) 
for choosing to focus on group discussions of self-help videos. To reiterate briefly; 
although I had not originally envisaged this aspect of the project it became clear that 
video material could provide a 'text' ideally suited to a shared and participatory 
'reading'. The debates that followed the screenings helped to gauge the participants' 
responses to the videos' portrayal of agoraphobia in terms of my developing 
conception of the agoraphobic self and also provided some insights into the 
importance of self-help group dynamics (see chapter 3). The presence of familiar 
faces also offered a source of mutual support should any of the scenes representing 
panic attacks prove potentially distressing. 
The two videos discussed were Not all in the Mind, an 'amateur' production 
collaboratively made by eight previous members of WASP (video A) and Fight or 
Flight (video P), professionally produced in Australia. One of the most interesting 
contrasts between these videos is the degree to which they rely on 'expert' opinion. 
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While video A gives largely first hand accounts of agoraphobia from sufferers 
themselves, video P constantly intersperses such accounts with a running commentary 
from mental-health professionals. 
2 
What is important from the point of view of this 
chapter is the degree to which, despite their differences in terms of location, 
production and approach, both videos can be seen to call upon a discourse of self-help 
heavily indebted to the Cartesian model of the self outlined above. 3 
The question thus arises as to how exactly one should attempt to investigate and 
analyse the underlying presumptions about the nature of self in any given text(s)? As 
chapter 2 indicated the approach developed by Norman Fairclough ( 1992, 1995) 
seemed particularly apposite. Fairclough situates 'text' within the realm of 'discourse 
practice' (text production and consumption), which is in turn situated within the realm 
of 'sociocultural practice'. His depiction of the relations between these elements is 
intended to convey their interdependency, and suggests that we must look wider afield 
than the environment immediately surrounding the text if we are to appreciate the 
complexities of its role, and uncover its unacknowledged relations with wider socio-
cultural and political factors. 
When we consider self-help texts, we must acknowledge that they are curiously 
situated, occupying an unstable position between 'lay' and 'professional' territory, in 
terms both of their production and consumption. In relation to the former, although 
they tend to be produced largely by those from a medical background, and 'thus' with 
the professional authority to present information and advice that entails, self-help 
texts often incorporate experiential accounts from sufferers, who are positioned as 
'experts' of a different kind because of their personal knowledge. As for their 
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consumption, self-help resources may be used in the training of health-care 
professionals, as well as by sufferers, and by interested friends and family members. 
The 'discourse practice' surrounding the text, to use Fairclough' s terminology, is then 
diversely constituted, and its heterogeneity provides a variety of interesting 
connections with the wider realm of 'socio-cultural practice'. The complex 
positioning of the self-help text suggests that it is constituted by, and constitutive of, 
an unusually large and diverse range of discourses. One might then expect 
representations of agoraphobic and non-phobic selves to reflect this diversity, and that 
the texts could thus have a mediatory role, filtering information between distant 
subject positions. However, I will argue that what we do in fact find is a singular 
version of self that is presumed very strongly indeed. The self in question will be 
shown to be atomistic and autonomous, rational and self-knowing. It is a firmly 
bounded individual, defined in terms of its separation from others, and yet essentially, 
internally dualistic. It is precisely this Cartesian self whom the viewer-subject is 
encouraged, and helped to be. 
Re-presenting Panic 
I want now to open the discussion of the self-help texts by examining their portrayals 
of the experience of panic. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the account of spaces of 
consumption in chapter 4, 'shopping scenes' form a key aspect of both videos 
portrayal of agoraphobic's experience. We are already familiar with the significance 
of the agora, or market place, and social spaces of this particular kind often present 
sufferers with the greatest difficulties. The opening scene of video A (the 'amateur' 
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production) is Prince's Street in Edinburgh, among the largest and better known 
shopping sites in the city centre. This text begins by positioning the viewer around the 
halfway point of this street, looking down a stretch of pavement along which crowds 
of people move, at various speeds, in both directions. In the centre of our view, a 
woman walks towards us, clutching her bag tightly in front of her. Her eyes dart 
around nervously, then she stops, and stands with her hands pressed to the sides of her 
head, covering her ears; she appears desperately uncomfortable. A steady, rhythmic, 
pulsing sound can be heard, increasingly loudly, in the background, and seems to 
simulate ultra-awareness of a rapidly beating heart. During these opening seconds, 
the following three accounts of panic are overlaid. 
"I feel faint, sick and dizzy, and I come out in a cold sweat." 
"My heart staits hammering, my chest feels tight, I can't breathe, and I feel as 
if I'm having a heart attack. The noise of the traffic seems to get louder and 
louder, and I feel more and more frantic." 
"I begin to feel absolutely rooted to the spot, and I just can't move at all. I feel 
as if there's an iron band tightening round my head." 
The scene then changes to an aisle in a supermarket. It is brightly lit, even gaudy, and 
the light pulses in time with the repetitive beating sound. As we move forward, slowly 
and unsteadily, the aisle appears increasingly tunnel like, and never quite comes into 
focus. Objects on the shelves become closer, then move away, but their outlines 
remain blurred. Our perspective then alters, unexpectedly and quickly, as the camera 
pans upward, towards the light, then lurches down. The ground beneath us glares, 
blindingly, and our view slowly and shakily lifts to eye level. The effect is one of 
disorientation, and this is clearly the intent. We hear Sheila's voice; 
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"Going to the supermarket is an everyday experience for most people, but to 
an agoraphobic, it is a real trauma. The stimulus is just too much for the eyes 
to cope with, and the fluorescent lighting, bouncing off the already tiled floor, 
causes a feeling of anxiety, if not extreme panic." 
The shopping scene in video P (the 'professional' production) opens with 'Sharon', 
seated outdoors, amongst greenery, in what is presumably her garden. Her account 
begins; 
"And then I was in a shopping centre, with my sister, the one day, and I think 
that's when I really got a full-blown, out-of-control, panic attack, where I was 
standing in the shop with her, and just, all of a sudden, my world just.., the 
world started spinning, and I just thought I was going totally out of control. 
[The scene changes to the inside of a shopping mall. The camera is out of 
focus, and moves with a rapid freeze frame action in a circular motion. 
Sharon's voice continues throughout;] My legs started going weak, um, I 
couldn't focus on anything, um, I really started shaking, almost.. .hot and cold 
chills going down me, um, rapid heart beat, and I just actually thought I was 
going to collapse right there. Terrible nausea, and em, I remember my sister 
looking at me and saying, you know, you are absolutely white as a ghost!" 
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This scene is accompanied by dissonant, drawn out notes played, perhaps, on an 
organ. It begins erratically, then alternately ascends and descends an atonal scale, 
which is obtusely reminiscent of an alarm, or siren. The sound connotes confusion, 
disorientation, and the irregular interval between each note is suggestive of 
strangeness, unfamiliarity. What we actually see is an excess of bright lights and 
reflective surfaces, a predominance of glimmering whiteness that is decidedly not 
easy on the eye. The camera moves in on signs, perhaps advertisements, which shift 
in and out of focus and are impossible to read. People, too, move in and out of focus, 
and the scene appears disjointed, unpredictable. The viewer's perspective appears 
odd, and changes without warning; side to side movement creates a sense of being off 
balance, and there is a jerky quality to the camera movement, suggesting a lack of 
continuity. The place looks thoroughly menacing, and the viewer has no control over 
the way visual information is gathered and presented. 
Perhaps the first thing one would note about the shopping scenes would be the 
striking similarities between the visual portrayals of panic by both videos. Although it 
is apparent, and predictable, that there is greater technical expertise available to the 
producers of video P, clearly both are aiming to produce similar effects. Both intend 
to create a sense of disorientation, confusion, lack of focus, and of the overwhelming 
fear that would accompanies the loss of control over one's senses, one's relations with 
the environment and ultimately, of one's self.4 This element of 'loss of control' can be 
seen to constitute the central theme of both portrayals; all aspects of these scenes, 
visual, verbal, and otherwise, are primarily geared toward communicating this state of 
being to the audience. Panic, the viewer learns, entails loss of control to a terrifying 
degree, not only over oneself, but crucially, also in relation to the environment. 
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It is my contention that this portrayal supports the interpretation of agoraphobic 
anxiety advanced by this thesis as a boundary crisis - a term also used by Kirby 
(1996) in her partially autobiographical account of 'post-traumatic vertigo'. The loss 
of se(f-control relates to a breakdown in the normally taken-for-granted relation 
between, not mind and body, but self and space, a subjective experience for which the 
Cartesian worldview does not allow. To warrant this interpretation, first consider the 
images in isolation. The presentation of visual information in both shopping scenes is 
strongly suggestive of lack of agency on the part of the protagonist. Think of the 
scene in video A where the supermarket aisle closes in on the subject, or where the 
ground lurches upwards. In video P objects are shown to move rapidly closer or to 
become unexpectedly bright. One could interpret these images as suggesting that the 
balance of power in the relation between person and place has shifted from the former 
to the latter. This is to say that, for the agoraphobic, the environment itself takes on a 
kind of agency. It loses its static, predictable 'thingness', and this lack of assumed 
continuity renders it threatening and dangerous. How can you feel secure in a place 
where the visual information it presents you with virtually assaults your sense of 
sight, and thus, your sense of self? 
The notion that the self is under threat is supported by the linguistic accounts that 
accompany these images, as is the earlier suggestion that we can identify a central 
theme. In video P, Sharon characterises her first panic attack as "full blown, out of 
control", and describes her environs thus; "my world just, the world started 
spinning". The effect of this sensation? "I just thought I was going totally out of 
control." Sharon moves between descriptions of apparently 'internal' and 'external' 
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happenings with manifest ease. It is 'the world' that spins, but she herself that is 'out 
of control', and I take this to be indicative of ambiguity, fluidity, in the boundary 
between the two. Her characterisation suggests that her sense of herself is inseparable 
from her sense of her environment, and is thus in tune with the relational construction 
of subjectivity put forward by feminist and post-structuralist theorists such as Judith 
Butler ( 1990: 1993).
5 
What Sharon goes on to say, however, seems to focus entirely 
on internal bodily sensations, implying more stability of boundaries, more autonomy, 
than my interpretation suggests. By her own account, these things are happening to, 
rather than around her. 
If, however, we take post-structuralist feminist approaches seriously, the sensations 
Sharon describes need not be understood so exclusively, as definitively within or 
without, the limits of the flesh, as an attribute either of subject or object. Theorists 
who are critical of dualistic conceptions of subjectivity, rather than those with a 
Cartesian perspective, can thus help articulate the experience of agoraphobic panic, 
which exceeds bodily limitations, and corrodes the security one's boundaries afford. 
Consider, for example, the embodied experience of shakiness, nausea, 'hot and cold 
chills': these phenomena are symptomatic of a perceived disruption in the barrier 
between internal and external space. They are the subjective sensations of corporeal 
breaches, immediate signs of permeability that are anathema to the stable subject of 
modernity. 
In video A, participants present experiential accounts that are similarly suggestive of a 
confusion in self/space relations. While some of the sensations described are 
apparently internal - "my heart starts hammering", some apparently external - "the 
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noise of the traffic seems to get louder and louder", others are concerned with the 
interactions between internal and external realms. To be "rooted to the spot", for 
example, and to "have an iron band tight round my head", is to make use of 
metaphors arising from person/place relations. Other seemingly straightforward 
descriptions also turn out to be more ambiguous on closer inspection. The statement, 
"/come out in a cold sweat", clearly implies a breach of the internal/external barrier, 
and Kathy's choice of words suggests that she herself is exposed in the process. 
Similarly, to be "faint, sick and dizzy" are all symptoms that disrupt the felt 
boundaries of the self. Lucy Yardley has paid particularly close attention to 
experiential accounts similar to these in developing her 'ecological-constructionist' 
analysis of disorientation and dizziness. Yardley's analysis is, arguably, also 
applicable to agoraphobic anxiety. Here, the subject also experiences disorientating 
phenomena, and doubts their ability to respond appropriately to their environment 
(Yardley 1997: 117), to maintain self-control. 
The importance of Yardley's account for agoraphobia lies mainly with its focus on 
boundaries, and its refusal to work within reductionist frameworks dominant in 
contemporary discourses of health and illness. 6 In her own words, "the ecological 
account characterises disorientation as arising at the interface between the individual 
and their environment [ ... it places] the emphasis on dynamic relations rather than 
essential causes [ ... ] This is no simple pyscho-somatic or somato-psychic 
relationship, but a profound and intricate interactive bond between the material and 
discursive aspects of disorientation, which creates and reproduces the condition and 
preconditions, meaning and implications of disorientation." (Yardley 1994: 118/9) 
The ecological-constructionist view presents us with a means of understanding the 
subject in context. And, as the shopping scenes clearly demonstrate, context is 
intrinsic to understanding the nature of agoraphobic experience. 
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The women with whom I watched these scenes were clearly impressed by the 
faithfulness of their representations. The following exchange came immediately after 
the shopping scene in video P, which we viewed first. 
Betty - "That's what it feels like to me, that is what it feels like ... but it feels 
like that to me out in the street as well." 
Jane - "Like things go out of focus." 
Joyce - "So d'you think that would be quite a useful thing, if I was to show 
that to people, and say that's what a panic attack's like ... is that fair?" 
Ruth - "Oh aye, that is what a panic attack's like." 
Their response to the scene in video A is similarly enthusiastic, with comments like 
"that's what a panic attack's like, like a switch getting turned on" (Jane), and "that's 
the truth, that's how it really happens." (Ruth) It is reasonable to claim that for these 
sufferers at least, the shopping scenes managed to capture, and communicate 
something of their experience. Inevitably the portrayals are particular and partial, in 
that they try to give visual sense to sufferers' (as opposed to medical practitioners') 
descriptions of anxious experience. It is perhaps for this reason that the representation 
is felt to be 'authentic', that it is somehow faithful to the spirit of panic, whose picture 
it attempts to paint. There is, as of yet, no attempt in the texts to explain, or draw 
conclusions about these phenomena, and the face of panic remains recognisable to 
those who suffer its presence in their lives. 
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So far, I have argued that there is a dominant theme shaping both of these shopping 
scenes, namely, the severe loss of control suffered by the agoraphobic subject. I have 
further suggested that this loss of control can be most constructively understood in 
(non-dualistic) terms of a breakdown in the relations between person and place. I now 
want to consider the format of the texts as a whole, in order to place these portrayals 
of agoraphobic selves in relation to the Cartesian, masculine ideal of normality 
against which they are set. 
(Ab )normal Narratives 
The remainder of video A consists largely of eight narrative accounts of agoraphobia 
that are presented by the sufferers in their own homes. All are introduced by first 
names, and all but one are women. The pieces are edited from interviews/discussions 
with Sheila, who is herself a sufferer, and was the organiser of the self-help group at 
the time the video was made. Sheila narrates throughout, occasionally commenting on 
sufferers' accounts, or asking encouraging questions. It is Sheila who introduces the 
sole non-phobic respondent, whose contribution will be assessed below. 
Video P begins with a male voice describing a first panic attack, and his subsequent 
fear of driving. The scene switches between 'Wayne' in his living room, and footage 
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of a night driving scene, while he describes how panic would "take over", and how he 
thought he "might die". Enough information is given by this sufferer for us to deduce 
that he was employed as a driver, though his first name is the only written text to 
appear on the screen. Wayne's piece lasts for around 90 seconds, and is followed by 
the 40 second piece involving Sharon which is described above. Immediately 
afterwards the scene changes to the office of Dr. Lisa Lampe, who, the caption 
informs us, is a consultant psychiatrist. Lampe proceeds to reorganise and reiterate 
much of what Sharon has said, listing the symptoms of panic in an orderly manner. 
Professor Ron Rapee takes a similar role when he appears on screen around 30 
seconds later. Rapee, a 'professor of psychology', offers another dispassionate 
account of panic episodes, and concludes definitively, "if a person staits to associate 
those panic attacks with certain areas, and because of that they stait to avoid doing 
certain things, or going to certain places, then we would call that agoraphobia." 
The four characters involved in video P have then all been introduced within the first 
few minutes of the video. As we will see, the layout of their introductory pieces sets 
the tone for the rest of the video. Sharon and Wayne alternately describe their 
experience, and the professionals interject to retell their stories in an authoritative 
fashion, supplementing them with additional, technical language and information. In 
'translating' individual accounts in this way, Lampe and Rapee could be said to 
undermine the phobic contributors' authority. They also move beyond the 
particularity of the personal narrative, toward a more generalised account, arguably a 
meta-narrative, of agoraphobia. 
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The authoritative identities of Lampe and Rapee are maintained throughout the text in 
a number of ways. First, both are introduced with their full professional titles, which 
has the effect of fore-grounding their institutional, rather than personal roles from the 
outset. This effect is perpetuated by presenting both as entirely static throughout the 
video. That they remain seated in what are presumably their own offices creates the 
impression of professional consultation in an institutional context. Additionally, both 
are presented in formal dress; Lampe and Rapee are seen in smart office-wear, as 
opposed to Wayne's T-shirt, jeans and overalls, and Sharon's loose, patterned dresses. 
The manner and style of their delivery is also contributive. Both use calm, measured 
tones, and their use of language tends to be authoritative. The use of medical and 
semi-technical terms serves to enhance the impression of expertise, as does the 
occasional use of statistics - "as many as thirty five or more, per cent of the 
population will have a panic attack, at some point in their lives". The style of the 
professionals' delivery is then largely pedagogical. 
In these various ways, the impression is created that Lampe and Rapee are providing 
unbiased information for the enlightenment of their audience. This information is 
never presented as opinion, and we are given little encouragement to doubt the 
veracity of their accounts. Neither Sharon nor Wayne questions the authority of any 
statement, and so an impression of consensus is created. Lampe and Rapee are also 
clearly at a distance from the subject(s) they are discussing (quite literally -
'professionals' and 'sufferers' never appear on screen at the same time). They are 
never at pains to communicate the reality of the disorder, so their contributions are 
less emphatic, less intense, even incompatible with those of Sharon and Wayne. There 
is none of the immediacy that often characterises sufferers' accounts; rather, the 
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professionals' approach to agoraphobia is 'objective' and 'rational', directed toward 
bringing an unruly body under discursive control. This approach privileges and re-
emphasises the dominant (masculine) side of the hierarchic dichotomies referred to 
above. 
For the producers of the amateur, as well as the professional production, there is a 
specifiable, physical, reason and explanation for agoraphobics' 'abnormal' loss of 
control. Not all in the Mind posits a balance dysfunction as the root-cause of 
sufferers' disorientation and anxiety. Their inability to maintain a 'normal' level of 
self-control is, consequently, not their fault. This physical, rather than mental, 
attribution of the problem is an important point since, as Yardley emphasises, there 
are 'moral implications' to this far from neutral issue. "[D]eviations from normal 
behaviour for which no somatic explanation is provided inevitably carry a social 
penalty, since psychological problems are considered less 'real' and more 
blameworthy than physical defects." (1994: 115) It is then, very much in the 
sufferers' interests to demonstrate that their 'abnormal' behaviour is a reasonable 
response to a physical problem. While adopting this viewpoint, the manner of 
sufferers' representation of rational (masculine), biologistic medical discourse 
arguably demonstrates resistance to its hegemony. 
In video A Dr. David Weeks is presented in a manner that foregrounds his 
institutional identity, using largely similar methods to those of video P. However, the 
surrounding contributions from non-professional participants serve to contextualise 
his expertise. He is introduced as someone who is conducting research on sufferers' 
behalf, and is called upon to present findings that concur with the group's view of 
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agoraphobia's links with problems with balance. Weeks is being used to verify, give 
the stamp of authority to, what the sufferers' themselves already knew. He begins; 
"we discovered that agoraphobic balance problems are genuine and real[ ... ] 
this condition is not purely psychological, there's a heavy, physical, 
biological, neurological component to it, that has been only marginally 
suspected in the past, but never actually proven. Now its been proven." 
This contribution is clearly intended to be authoritative, but we can see that the 
agoraphobic women in control of this text have opted to include the professional' s 
account in order to add credence to their own theories about their disorder. They have 
put themselves in the position of being able to choose who to include and who to 
exclude, in order to construct their own version of agoraphobia, perhaps realising that 
"discourse is the power which is to seized" (Foucault 1984: 110). 
I have already suggested that the privileging of the masculine constitutes a 
recognisable theme in self-help discourses. In the following section I want to explore 
the (implicit and explicit) depictions of gender in more detail, focusing particularly on 
the implied association between masculinity and endurance, femininity and fear. 
Framing fear as.feminine 
"If it happens to you first of all when you're in your teens and you go to see 
the doctor, the doctor will say, 'its your age, its adolescence. When you' re a 
267 
bit older, you'll get over that problem'. When you 're in your twenties, they 
say 'once you're married, and have children, and have plenty to do, you'll 
forget all about that silly business'. And then, you get to the menopause, and 
they say 'once the menopause is over, you' 11 be much better'. What happens 
then? What do you wait for then, 'til you die, will you be better then?" 
(Sheila) 
This quotation, which brings video A to a close, suggests that some sufferers are more 
than familiar with the practice of attributing their fearful condition to their sex and/or 
expected gender role behaviour. For many, agoraphobia is a woman's problem, or 
even a "housewife's disease" (da Costa Meyer 1996: 150) - and (thus?) an irrational 
and thoroughly 'silly' affair. 
The women with whom I watched this video responded with much hilarity to these 
closing remarks, although their cognisant laughter was perhaps tinged with the 
bitterness of remembrance. They too had experience of this kind of dismissal and a 
refusal to take their 'trivial', womanly problems seriously. 
The assumption that agoraphobia is a feminine affair is often largely unspoken. It is 
Bill, the sole male agoraphobic contributor to video A, who comments explicitly on 
this gendered aspect of the disorder. He states: 
"Quite frankly, in 25 years of suffering from agoraphobia, I have never met 
another male who has said that he is agoraphobic, and yet, I am told, that there 
are a number of men, who do suffer, and em, I feel that most. .. that probably 
says a lot. Men have to think about their image, the macho image [so its 
difficult] to admit to suffering from something which a lot of people simply 
see as being a weakness." 
268 
Bill suggests that men are more likely to resist the agoraphobic appellation then 
women, but not that they are less likely to have the same anxious experiences. While 
his claim is clearly contentious, that a sufferer perceives this to be the case is in itself 
significant. 
7 
Bill highlights the notion that agoraphobia is widely perceived to be a 
peculiarly feminine weakness. Given the male-stream western tendency to belittle all 
that is not-masculine, men may well be reluctant to associate themselves with this 
denigrated state of being-in-the-world. Bill's comments on his solitary experience as a 
male agoraphobic reveal what he sees as identifiable, understandable reasons why 
men will refuse this particular subject positioning. 
Wayne, commenting on his own disorder in video P, points to personal difficulties he 
encountered in admitting he was agoraphobic, difficulties we can perhaps relate to 
Bill's notion of the male 'macho image'~ "at first, my pride wouldn't let me do 
it .... I'm not in that basket, if you know what I mean [laughs], that's not what's wrong 
with me at all." (although Sharon expressed similar hesitancy, suggesting it is not 
only men who would wish to distance themselves from 'feminine' characteristics.) 
Overall, however, video P creates an entirely different impression of the gendered 
distribution of agoraphobia from video A. The inclusion of one male and one female 
sufferer suggests a gender balance, and there is no mention that this is not in fact 
representative of the actual gendered distribution of agoraphobia. One might then 
wonder if the producers were concerned not to represent agoraphobia and panic 
attacks as 'women's problems', perhaps even to disrupt conceptions of fear as 
stereotypically feminine. 
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This notion can be suppo1ted by the fact that the text's po1trayal of Wayne is often 
framed in terms of traditional constructions of masculinity. For example, his role is 
often active, and he is repeatedly seen performing tasks associated with paid 
employment outside the home. Wayne works on an outdoor pool, files papers and 
answers the telephone in his office, and attends to the mechanics of his racing car in 
his garage. These performances are markedly different from those of Sharon, who 
behaves 'similarly' only to the extent that she too conforms to her gender-role 
stereotype. 
Sharon is shown standing over a kitchen sink, looking out of the window, or peering 
through a door that she is holding slightly ajar, while her voice-over describes her 
inability to leave home. When we do see Sharon out of doors, she is driving her car to 
collect her children from school, standing in a queue in a post office, and entering a 
shopping centre, all activities associated in some way with domesticity. It is thus 
Sharon's role as a housewife that is fore-grounded by this text, and this clearly has 
implications for the way her contribution will be received by different audiences. 
The visual representations of gender in video P might then be seen to challenge 
assumptions about the feminine nature of fear, by associating it with displays of 
masculine, even macho, imagery (racing car mechanics, DIY, etc.) and not simply 
with (feminine coded) domestic chores. However, the potential power of this 
association is undermined by the text's consistent refusal to trouble gendered 
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dichotomies in any other way, a tactic which effectively amounts to complicity in 
their hegemony. A greater degree of authority and credibility will thus continue to be 
associated with a male, rather than female voice. 
In video P, it is in fact Wayne's voice that opens and closes the text, and it is Wayne 
who is given the task, along with the professionals, of conveying information about 
new self-help techniques, and demonstrating how they are to be carried out. These 
factors strengthen the sense of authority created by his 'manly' activities, adding the 
weight of cultural capital to his masterly, masculine presence. Although it is Sharon 
who is experientially best placed to speak to agoraphobia sufferers, her contribution is 
denigrated, designated less than that of the male by framing it in terms of culturally 
undervalued domestic work. Whether deliberate or not, the gendered selves 
represented by this text are echoes of those masculinist stereotypes predominant in 
media discourse and the wider socio-cultural realm of text production. The portrayal 
of gender is always the Same, and agoraphobic fear is still largely a 'feminine' affair. 
Even if there are occasional aberrant males displaying similar symptoms, they must 
have the self-same ideal. In line with the privileging of masculinity we find 
throughout the texts, the advocated response to 'aberration' is aspiration - striving to 
be yet more-of-the-Same; more manly, more in control, and above all, more rational. 8 
From emotional woman to rational man 
At various stages throughout the texts, sufferers are advised to 'rationalise their 
thoughts', and to practice 'rational thinking'. Agoraphobic fears are, on this account, 
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physical in origin, and nothing that a good dose of rationality won't cure. They arise 
when subjects respond irrationally to physical symptoms, and can be brought within 
their conscious control. 9 
"What happens with people with panic attacks is they get these feelings, these 
physical feelings, that, that begin their anxious feeling. They then start to think 
of these feelings as being something terrible. They've learnt across their lives 
that these physical feelings are bad, 'I shouldn't have them', so they 
immediately start to be anxious [ ... ]The important thing for people with panic 
attacks to learn is that these are two separate things. There' re physical 
feelings, and then there's your interpretation, your emotional response to those 
things." [Rapee advocates mentally separating these sensations, in order to] 
"see them much more objectively". 
It is important to be clear about the content of this statement. It contains the definition 
of panic, and is presented as an entirely factual account. And yet this account is 
contentious, to say the least. Rapee effectively states that fear is a response to 
adrenaline, by no means an obvious or 'common sense' conclusion, and one that 
many sufferers would dispute (see below). What we have here is an account that 
constructs the agoraphobic as exhibiting an irrational loss of control in the face of an 
unruly body. There is an assumption that nothing can be done to prevent the physical 
occurrences, that the body is beyond hope or restraint. However, one can learn, be 
taught, to control one's responses to its behaviour, thereby re-establishing the body in 
its proper place in the mind's dominion. 
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Given that this dualistic model informs the professional view of the agoraphobic 
subject, we can begin to see the origin of what I term the 'bureaucratic' approach to 
her treatment, one that is quite literally a case of mind over matter. Lampe and Rapee 
effectively advocate the development of a good management strategy, to enact their 
positivistic and quantitative approach to 'treatment'. First and foremost, the subject 
must accept their designation, and be fully interpellated into the agoraphobic subject 
position. Wayne himself makes this point clear; "until such time ... as you are 
diagnosed, and you accept, that that's what's wrong with you .. . you won't stait getting 
better" (emphasis added). He then adds, in terms one ~1ight describe as 'macho', that 
it is also necessary to "have the fight or the will to beat it". Having satisfied these 
conditions, the subject can embark on a programme of 'cognitive restructuring', in 
which 'self monitoring' plays a crucial role. This process, the monitoring of the self, 
is aided by the provision of specially designed forms that are to be carried about the 
person at all times. This tactic enables panic symptoms to be recorded accurately and 
efficiently, and thus be objectified, "as soon as they've finished having an attack" 
(Rapee). In the appropriate boxes, sufferers should note details such as the time and 
the duration of the panic, as well as the intensity, "on a 0-8 scale". Gathering 
"evidence" about, and quantifying symptoms is intended to encourage the 
development of less "extreme", more "realistic" thoughts. In addition, sufferers 
should "learn the right rate" for breathing, which is held to be "three seconds in, three 
seconds out", though appropriate adjustments can be made (with the aid of a second 
hand on a watch or alarm,) if this is not found satisfactory. 
Until now, I have clearly chosen to focus on vocabulary that emphasises the 
scientistic nature of the regulatory discourse. However, much of this terminology is 
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actually couched in more 'ordinary', colloquial phrases, and delivered in a 
conversational style. For example, Rapee describes the self-monitoring form as "very 
nice as it comes as a little pocket sized [form], so that people can always carry a 
bunch" with them. The effect of this 'conversationalization' is, as Fairclough ( 1995, 
10) has argued, to naturalise the content of the speech, to suggest that these are run-
of-the-mill, common sense notions shared by all of 'us'. In fact, Rapee is often more 
explicit in his attempts to normalise his normative views; he describes the treatments 
he advocates as "practical common sense ones". He further attempts to naturalise 
biologistic aspects of his model of the self. For example, Rapee suggests that when a 
panic episode begins, the sufferer should try thinking 
"that's a good thing that my heart's pumping blood round my body, and helps 
me get ready to fight. It's something very natural and normal, its simply 
happening at the wrong time". 
One should, then, accept that the body is behaving 'naturally', but only insofar as we 
can use this information to enculturate our volatility (knowledge is power after all. .. ). 
Our bodies can be civilised by the reach of the mind, and rational, realistic thinking 
should be practised until it becomes, ironically, "almost second nature" (Wayne). 
Sharon too advocates the power of mind over body, reason over emotion; "I still, to 
this day, have to do um, rational thinking, and I' II probably have to do it maybe for 
the rest of my life." 
The women with whom I watched video P were not always convinced by its 'common 
sense' characterisation of agoraphobia. I ought to admit that they could have picked 
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up on the fact that I personally was more favourably disposed toward the amateur 
production. Besides this however, it is difficult to foster a sense of sharing a life-
world with the characters involved, not least, because of the strangeness of their 
surroundings. On a winter's day in a Scottish housing estate, its difficult to empathise 
with someone basking in the Australian sunshine by the side of their outdoor pool. 
There may well be other mitigating factors, but it remains significant that members of 
this audience were critical of some of the assumptions underlying this version of 
agoraphobia, and that they drew on their own experience to validate these criticisms. 
Iris, for example, commented on the nature of panic thus; 
"I think sometimes the physical feelings are the result, that its the other way 
round ... the emotional feelings that you have leads to the physical things". 
Jane tentatively agrees, then states, "I mean ... the effect's there, the whole 
thing, before I start thinking, my fingers are tingling, or my heart's staiting to 
beat a bit fast, or I feel dizzy. Its .... the whole lot comes ... phwoooh [this is 
accompanied by hand gestures, to simulate something rushing toward her 
face], without any reason". 
Sufferers' accounts suggest that they simply do not experience this distinction 
between physical and mental symptoms in the way the above examples from 
professional discourse suggest. Their vocabulary and metaphors of panic point rather 
to a concern with the relationship between themselves (as deeply embodied) and their 
surroundings; that is to say, with their immediate psycho-corporeal geographies. As 
one would expect, Cartesian conceptualisations of subjectivity are not adequate to the 
task of articulating the experience of dynamically constituted subjects. "The reduction 
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of disorientation [or agoraphobic anxiety] to purely physical or wholly psychological 
factors presents many individuals with an artificial forced choice between the somatic 
and psychic models, with the result that important aspects of their experience remain 
unexplained and untreated." (Yardley 1997, 114, emphasis added) Moreover, 
sufferers' difficulties are compounded by this impossibility of fully articulating their 
experience. "[T]hey are forced to resort to the unsatisfactory discourses available to 
them in order to (mis)represent their problem to themselves and others." (Yardley 
1997, 115) This does not, however, mean that the therapies reliant on such 
'unsatisfactory discourses' are completely without merit. 
Clearly, it must be acknowledged that the cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) being 
advocated here does in fact 'work' for some agoraphobia sufferers, in the crucial 
sense of giving them a hold on their disorder, and thus making their everyday lives 
more tolerable, less infused with panic. Despite my obviously critical analysis of the 
ideological underpinnings of CBT, such apparently academic matters need not 
necessarily be a concern for the subject of self-help whose anxiety can be partially 
soothed and steadied, slowed down by counting, controlling measures. 
However, I want now to draw attention to potentially substantial problems associated 
with an over reliance on this particular model of the self, one largely divorced from 
the all-important social context. I have suggested that the supposed 'universality' of 
the self represented in these texts is challenged by the embodied experience of 
agoraphobic women, thus revealing a gap between (at least) two contesting 
conceptions of self. However, despite the texts' representation of agoraphobic women 
as problematizing the Cartesian view of the self, the professionals' response to their 
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experience is to continue to privilege and re-emphasise this Same (masculine) notion 
of self. The superiority of this model is uncritically assumed, and sufferers are left in 
no doubt that they ought to (com)press themselves into an ill-fitting Cartesian mould, 
a restrictive mould which, I would tentatively suggest, may be partially responsible 
for their dreadful difficulties in the first place. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has advanced a feminist interpretation of self-help texts for agoraphobia 
sufferers, stressing the impo1tance of rendering underlying assumptions about the 
nature of selves explicit. I have argued that it is a Cartesian notion of self that is 
uncritically assumed by the texts in question, and that this has important implications 
for the treatment of agoraphobic women. The point to be emphasised is that therapies 
constructed around notions of self to which agoraphobic women cannot easily relate 
will have limited effectiveness. Sufferers most likely do not feel, may never have felt, 
autonomous, rational or firmly bounded as subjects, surrounded by yet separate from 
a world of isolable objects. Within dualistic discourse, however, there is little room 
for alternatives, and the agoraphobic woman can be seen only as somehow lacking 
and inadequate~ like, but less than, the rational (male) ideal. As Rose points out, 
"[d]ualisms maintain order by offering only two positions, both of which are 
constituted around a single term - the masculine Same." (Rose 1993: 82) There is as 
of yet no conceptual position to comfortably house the excessive experience, the (to 
borrow from Irigaray [ 1985: 112]) ex-orbitant bodies and voices of agoraphobic 
women. 
277 
My intention is not, however, to argue that we should or even could ever entirely 
reject this Cartesian model or the dualisms at its heart. Dualistic thinking is obviously 
firmly entrenched within our language and world-views, utterly pervasive throughout 
all aspects of society. That it can operate to stabilise troubled identities, more or less 
temporarily, is not in doubt. And in fact, rather than celebrating their 'difference', the 
person who is 'ill' will most likely want nothing more than to 'fit in', to conform with 
their society's expectations of normality and rationality. Yet this is not to say that 
dualisms should not be problematized, that we should not question exactly what kind 
of society, what kind of selves, they are helping to produce and maintain. 
This discussion has shown that unquestioning and uncritical approaches to 
subjectivities are severely limited, incapable of conceptualising or containing the full 
extent of agoraphobic being-in-the-world, and that in fact, the results are always the 
Same. I want to suggest that by analytically probing predominant conceptions of 
normality we might create potential spaces for alternative models of self to arise, 
models that allow difference in terms other than deviation, and to which 'ill-defined' 
women could more comfortably relate. 10 
I am not suggesting that such strategies could somehow alter the phenomenology of 
fear, that the actual lived experience of panic and anxiety could be rendered more 
tolerable. Rather, that the troubled identities of agoraphobic women are not so far 
removed from an acceptable (feminist) 'ideal' of normality that they should be 
beyond representation. Indeed, respondents' inspired use of metaphor, and the 
imaginative visual portrayals of panic in self-help videos are indicative of the kind of 
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communicative work that must be done. We initially require a 'vocabulary' with 
which to articulate such experience, and this must be the practical goal of a strategy to 
make discursive space for integrated corporeo-conceptual involvement with the 
world. This strategy would also be Utopian, however, in that it reaches out toward the 
no-place beyond dualistic thinking, speaking and writing. 
It has long been the contention of many feminists that language matters, and one's 
ability to mobilise discourse to communicate with others is of fundamental 
importance for innumerable aspects of our lives, not least, for our mental health. The 
personal narratives composed by agoraphobic women draw on metaphoric language 
in particular ways, to communicate how their experience consumes and confuses their 
senses (see above, esp. p. 8/9). 11 They are 'drowned' or 'suffocated', 'shaken' and 
'shocked', 'frozen' in both time and space. Their experience is deeply embodied, but 
in a way that blasts through dualist borders. 
I want to suggest that the language used by these women to express their experience is 
at times an attempt to transcend the dualisms implied by, and inherent to, our specular 
symbolic order (lrigaray 1985). Consequently, it may not always be helpful 
therapeutically to (op )press this experience back into dualistic discourse, to interpret it 
strictly, for example, in terms either of mind or of body. 12 
Perhaps then, feminist theorists and therapists should acknowledge and encourage the 
use of spatial and other metaphors to ground such boundless and fearful exposure, to 
create a platform of sorts on which it can be articulated and, therefore, granted 
legitimate existence. We might constructively develop existing elements of our 
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vocabulary that do not insist on the mind/body split, and which therefore resist 
complicity with masculinist dualistic thought. Boundary breaking speech acts can be 
literally transgressive. By developing feminist and therapeutic language games 13 with 
a more integrated, holistic approach to selves and space, we may be more adequately 
equipped to faithfully represent agoraphobic, and perhaps Other, experiences, to 
provide alternative-self help. Perhaps now, with this re-weaving of feminist, 
phenomenological and agoraphobic narratives we might begin to see different patterns 
emerging from the tangled threads of women's lives. 
1 Val Plumwood characterises dualistic thinking and its place in western philosophy in terms of a 'logic 
of colonisation', describing the concept of dualism as "the construction of a devalued and sharply 
demarcated sphere of otherness [which] results from a certain kind of denied dependency on a 
subordinated other". ( 1993: 41, emphasis added.) 
2 Video A lasts for twenty minutes, of which only two minutes is given over to 'expert' opinion, video 
P, by Monkey See productions, lasts for forty eight minutes. 
3 As chapter 2 indicated, I selected the video Pon the basis of its recommendation by the No Panic 
newsletter and video A because it provided a local Scottish context familiar to members of the group. 
4 Although see Yardley ( 1997: 123) for a discussion of cultural or drug induced alternatives, where 
'loss of control' is positively welcomed. She writes that "there are clearly important differences 
bet ween disorientation which is deliberately self-induced, whether by dance, drugs or dazzling 
displays, and sudden attacks of vertigo and dizziness which were neither anticipated nor desired." 
5 See also, for example, Lorraine's ( 1999) exploration of lrigaray and Deleuze on subjectivity, and 
Battersby ( 1998). 
6 See Lupton ( 1994 ). and Jones and Porter ( 1998), especially contributions by Armstrong, Osborne and 
Rose. 
7 Dianne Chambless has presented research findings that may be taken to support Bill's claim, 
suggesting that agoraphobia in men may often be masked by substance abuse. She writes, "[g]iven the 
prevalence of alcohol in Western society, it may be expected, then, that large numbers of male 
agoraphobics are to be found, not in phobia societies and psychiatric clinics for phobia treatment, but in 
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bars, Alcoholics Anonymous, and alcoholism treatment centers." (Chambless 1982: 5) However, her 
findings have yet to be replicated, and the vast majority of research on agoraphobia continues to point 
to a significant sex difference in distribution (for example Marks 1997, Mathews et al. 1981, McNally 
1994). 
8 Gillian Rose ( 1993: 75) provides a useful account of the phallocentric nature of dualistic thought. In 
her words, the two sides of dualisms "are not two discrete alternatives, because the feminized side is 
defined in relation to the masculine. The two sides are not oppositions between two unrelated terms 
[ ... lRather, this is a field of knowledge divided between two related terms. Woman is described in 
terms of Man, as the Other of the Same." This 'field of the Same' "cannot admit radical difference 
from itself." According to this masculine symbolic order, women are both partially Other and the 
Same, butfully neither. They are thus always already unstable. 
9 For discussion of feminist critiques of rationality, see Hekman ( 1992). 
10 For alternative criticism of 'normal' conceptions of embodiment, see Dyck ( 1995) and Park et al. 
( 1998). 
11 See Kearns ( 1997) for discussion of narrative and metaphor in relation to health and illness. 
12 Where such dualistic splits are desirable and helpful, we need, at the very least, to explicitly 
recognise that they are being employed for strategic purposes, and acknowledge that the split may not 
seem to accord with individuals' embodied experience of the world. It is not a naturally occurring 
boundary, but rather a particular way of conceptualising identity, and one that will have both pos.itive 
and negative effects. There are other possibilities. 
13 For a feminist interpretation of the Wittgensteinian concept of language games, see Davidson and 
Smith ( 1998). 
281 
Conclusions 
In bringing this thesis to a close, I aim to draw its diverse experiential and theoretical 
threads together, and to underline its various insights into the experience and 
meanings of agoraphobia. I claim that the thesis' findings are not only of potential 
significance for the disorder's sufferers, but that they constitute a significant 
contribution to socio-geographical understandings of the mutually constitutive nature 
of selves and spaces. Before outlining the form and content of this contribution, I will 
present a brief reminder of the project's background and beginnings, and the process 
of its development towards this final form. 
From the outset of this work, I aimed to be clear about the emotional, intellectual and 
political roots from which it grew. Its substantially feminist and phenomenological 
approach was shown to have evolved in response to a perceived predominance of bio-
medical and psychological interpretations and explanations of what is evidently .felt 
by its mainly female sufferers to be a socially and spatially mediated disorder. In an 
attempt to address some of the gaps revealed by this initial (and on-going) review of 
relevant literature, an emphasis was placed on the individual (and later, collective) 
voices and narratives of its mostly women sufferers. By placing such first-hand 
experiential accounts of the disorder centre stage, I hoped to make space for the 
largely neglected stories of agoraphobic women to be told and heard. Such a strategy 
was thus meant to prioritise the views and concerns of sufferers themselves, and to 
allow the project to develop in a responsive manner. Further, by presenting in-depth 
inquiries into individual situations - and so situated selves - it aimed to emphasise the 
impo1tance for understandings of agoraphobia of recognising its immediate 
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(embodied) and wider social and spatial contexts. In these ways, it was hoped that a 
new, more sympathetic and inclusive account of agoraphobia would be allowed to 
emerge. 
Assembling the methodological means to realise these aims was, however, a 
surprisingly complex and ongoing process. In chapter 2, I outlined precisely how I 
intended to address the project's concerns, explaining the explicitly feminist methods 
by which data was to be generated, managed and analysed. This task of 'research 
design', imagined in advance to constitute a discrete part of the overall project, did 
however prove profoundly resistant to closure. Instead, it remained a live and kicking 
'work in process' long after the project protocol itself was composed and 'confirmed', 
a feature of the research that was highlighted in chapter 3. This chapter also outlined 
the importance of self-help groups, explaining how they came to occupy a more 
central place in the research to mirror their centrality in sufferers' lives. 
The changing and increasingly intricate nature of my involvement with self-help 
groups was in fact to provide much food for thought. Admittedly contrary to my 
expectations I preconceptions, I quickly learned that self-help groups members were 
often willing and more than able to 'manage' my role within their group. The manner 
of my participation was thus often shaped in response to members' more or less 
explicit attempts to position me in certain ways. With one group in particular, this 
positioning and enactment of a 'communicative distance' between us was 'measured' 
and articulated via the medium of humour. Group members' expressions of humour 
not only emphasised the extent to which they shared certain embodied knowledge and 
experience - and so, I argued, a 'form of life' - it also accentuated the extent to which 
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they saw me (and at first, endeavoured to keep me) in the role of 'outsider'. Humour 
can clearly be used to maintain, shift, or break down boundaries between individuals 
and groups. And in fact, as chapter 3 demonstrates, the communicative ('humorous') 
distance between myself and the self-help group was open to question, and decreased 
over time as the women became willing to 'let me in on' their jokes. Respondents' 
jokes were thus shown to have an important, indeed revolutionary role in the 
negotiated process of research. 
Beyond this first section of the thesis, intended to establish exactly how and why the 
work underlying it took place, I set out a series of five substantive and inter-linked 
chapters. In chapter 4, I explored the obviously significant and recurring experiential 
themes of panic and consumption, in relation to the early existentialist theorising of 
Kierkegaard. This exploration illuminated the connections between these strands in 
terms of a certain closeness between the nature of agoraphobic panic (often 
experienced in and/or related to consumer spaces) and existential Angst. This latter 
form of unnerving emotion is conceptualised by Kierkegaard as the sense of a 
fundamental threat to our very Being, an awareness of the abyss or nothingness that 
necessarily underlies our existence in the world. In the (rather gloomy) light of this 
existentialist world-view, the overwhelming attack of agoraphobic panic can, I 
argued, be seen as a sudden crystallisation of Angst, experienced as the near 
dissolution of one's sense of self. That is to say, panic questions the very grounds of 
one's existence and identity, the basic sense that one is something, rather than 
nothing. 
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Following this chapter, the focus initially shifts to consider what could be described as 
the experiential and conceptual opposite of consumer spaces for the agoraphobic; that 
is, the soothing and (mostly) panic free, safe space of the home. Here, behind closed 
doors, one is generally free from the objectifying 'look' of others, and the constitution 
and maintenance of self-identity is an almost effortless 'performance', executed on 
one's own territory and terms. In stark contrast, the antithetical pathoscapes of social 
space (epitomised by the mall discussed in chapter 4) present a deeply disturbing 
challenge to the agoraphobic's ability to project an acceptable (read 'normal) 'public' 
image. Social space is perceived as a highly pressured and pressurising environment, 
one that intrudes on the boundaries of fragile selves and renders the task of putting on 
an appropriate, protective 'face' in order to 'blend in' virtually impossible. 
Clearly, unless the agoraphobic subject can establish some way of managing these 
social anxieties, very little progress beyond their home and associated safe space is 
likely to be made. This chapter suggests that, in response to the insights Sartre 
provides into this socio-spatial problematic, via his account of the objectifying 'look', 
we might turn to Goffman' s analysis in search of potential means for resolution. 
Goffman' s perceptive account of the practical and largely unnoticed minutiae of 
psychological survival in social spaces could, I argued, prove invaluable for 
agoraphobic therapies. The issue of therapy was taken up in more depth in the final 
chapter, where I argued that whatever form or course is devised for individual 
agoraphobics, it must take account of the power of others to influence the shape and 
texture of social space. In consequence, it must be able to offer some means of self-
protection to the subject threatened by the emotional projections, spatial 
constructions, and the 'look' of others. Chapter S's appropriation of Sartre is thus 
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more socially grounded and 'down to ea1th' than its rather esoteric predecessor, but 
still lies some way short of the fully empathetic, feminist and phenomenological 
account which the thesis aimed to develop. 
In evident contrast with what has gone before, chapter 6 turned to explore the 
situation and experience of just one respondent in particular, phenomenological depth. 
Merleau-Ponty's approach was used here to highlight the peculiar and inescapable 
embodiment of agoraphobia, and to bring a live, panicked dimension to the rather 
bloodless and distant approaches of early existentialist theorists. It thus shifted the 
focus from the nature of 'Being' or existence as an abstract concept, to the fleshy 
realities of being-involved with the mundane practices, and so also anxieties, of 
everyday life. Perception is obviously key to Merleau-Ponty's world-view, and his 
approach emphasises the importance of our complex sensory involvement with our 
environs for understandings and experience of agoraphobia. One's sense of self-
identity is shown to be mediated by multiple (i.e. not only visual) sensations, and 
significantly, to be mediated in a manner that transcends dualistic distinctions 
between one's mind and one's body. Merleau-Ponty's approach thus moves away 
from the Cartesian subject to enable a focus on mutually constitutive relations and 
fluid boundaries between (embodied) selves and 'surrounding' spaces. 
The question(ing) of boundaries is an ever present theme in this thesis, and one that 
increasingly comes to prominence as the phenomenological discussion proceeds 
through chapter 7. Here we explore possible links or 'synergies' between 
contemporary experience of (insecurely bounded) womanhood, its exaggerated 
expression in pregnancy, and the embodiment of agoraphobia. This penultimate 
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chapter once again underlined the importance of treating agoraphobia (in the 
theoretical as well as conventional sense of the term) in its embodied, socio-spatial 
contexts. It drew earlier Sartrean insights regarding objectification, towards a 
specifically gendered experience of bodily boundaries combined with a 
phenomenological reading of how these boundaries are troubled and transformed. 
This chapter concluded that the contemporary socio-cultural climate in which western 
women live works to undermine the stability of our embodied senses of self, via 
judgmental and degrading practices of emotionalisation, objectification, exclusion and 
infantilisation. The chapter argued that agoraphobia might be thought of as a 
boundary crisis arising from these masculinist cultural conditions. 
Such boundary explorations lead us on to issues of treatment and thus back, in the 
final chapter, to the self-help groups with which we began. We returned here to look 
in critical detail at some therapeutic options currently available to the subject in 
(boundary) crisis, and to their own assessment of the potential value of these 
resources. This chapter emphasised the impo1tance of listening to sufferers' own 
descriptions of their embodied experience, given the phenomenal distance between 
the version of panic they themselves present, and that predicated of the Cartesian 
(masculine) subject who frequently seems to star in self-help resources. Chapter 8 
suggested that agoraphobic subjects may well benefit from the usage of therapies 
based on feminist models of selves, models that allow for differently felt and 
disparately constituted boundaries. 
It has hopefully, then, become increasingly clear as this thesis advanced that its 
intentions were to explore and open up, never 'fix', define or delimit, the experience 
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and meanings of agoraphobia for the selves, and also societies, who are affected by its 
presence. As we moved through the 'minor theories' (Katz 1996) and stories of each 
chapter, the thesis attempted to reveal an increasingly nuanced, individualised and 
therapeutically inclined analysis of the potentially problematic, socially and spatially 
constituted nature of subjectivity. The insights brought to light are thus multi-
perspectival but I hope that the particular 'take' on agoraphobic experience presented 
here has yielded valuable clues into the nature and roots of our inherently anxious 
(because always precarious) existence. Such philosophical inquiries into the nature of 
Being are not, I have argued, as esoteric and removed from everyday life as the 
terminology might suggest. Being is always already embodied and placed; to be is to 
be situated, and the context of day-to-day living is absolutely key. The increasingly 
intimate and intricate reading of the data generated by this project thus particularises 
questions of women's existence, and does so in specific relation to embodiment in and 
by contemporary culture. This fully grounded approach involved analysis of the social 
construction - and crucially, resistance and disruption - of the spaces and places in 
which women move and are moved. As this statement implies, the relational impact 
between people and places is never simply unidirectional, and appreciation of the 
complex interplays between has implications for feminist treatment (again, 
theoretically and conventionally) of situated selves. 
With regard to the emotional influence and 'power' of place, the thesis clearly 
demonstrates that we can be moved by, for example shopping malls, to feel fear, 
frustration and panic. However, respondents have shown that these self-same places 
can also move us to feel anger, determination, and sometimes, even hope. Thus, such 
emotional states are not always 'steady' or predictable, and can (be made to?) change 
288 
over time. Emotions such as anxiety are interactive, rather than simply responsive. 
They come into being at the shifting interface between people and their environments, 
a dynamic and mutually constitutive relation that means we can at least partially 
influence the nature of social space, and in turn, the nature of its influence on our 
selves. This conclusion leads me to argue that a particular embodiment of feminism -
of feminist (emotional) ideas and (bodily) attitudes - could inform and help petform 
particular kinds of space (Rose 1999), and thus enable more comfortable and even, 
almost unthinkably, enjoyable spatial engagements. Here, one might learn from Susan 
Bardo' s personal account of the shift from feeling 'substanceless' in social space to 
having a sense of 'definition' - metaphors strongly evocative of the absence and 
presence of boundaries - and experiencing an exciting rather than incapacitating 
'charge' at the thought of leaving home (in Bardo et al 1998~ see also chapter 4 ). 
Negative and panicky 'reactions' are not set in stone, and feminist insights into their 
incipient existence at the boundaries of our lives can help us work towards their 
transformation. 
I thus want to close this thesis by suggesting that we can usefully draw on Bordo's 
and other feminist accounts of re-formed self/space relations, and put such embodied 
musings into practice for the benefit of phobic and other uncomfortably bounded 
women. Feminist theory and therapy, I have argued, can help us deal with our 
embodiment in and objectification by contemporary masculinist society. Such large-
scale problems inevitably have to be handled at the smaller scale of the 'geography 
closest in'. Feminism works at multiple levels, and can be brought to work 
immediately through the bodies and boundaries of the individual, helping to 
strengthen her resistance to subversions of her self. As we have seen (chapter 5), 
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exposure to the look of others - an objectifying, and clearly gendered phenomenon -
heightens awareness of the precarious nature of Being, and of being next to Nothing. 
It powerfully evokes the frightening closeness of the substanceless abyss and in our 
defence, boundaries must be brought into Being. They must be made to lie between 
us, and this is a project that ought to be undertaken inter-subjectively. Given that 
boundaries are negotiated in relation, the individual alone need not be held 
responsible for their production and maintenance. In this context, feminist approaches 
to boundary 'therapy' could usefully consider the role and value of women's self-
help, or more appropriately, 'mutual support' groups. There is, I would argue, much 
potentially valuable research to be conducted in this area, given the possible benefits 
for emotional health of exchanges between women with similar but shifting embodied 
experience of boundaries. It is perhaps in this supportive context that the possibilities 
for and effects of the social and spatial performance of 'boldness', (Koskela 1997), 
among other assertions of feminist self-hood and spatiality, could most productively 
be explored. 
Finally, to recap, having identified and theorised the nature of agoraphobic, and by 
implication 'other' socio-spatial anxieties, in the phenomenological terms of boundary 
crises, this thesis offers a critique of an existing and predominant treatment model, 
and points towards possible alternatives and directions for future research. I have 
argued that, despite what may be deeply held and long-term, even in-grained anxieties 
in the face of social space, feminist informed therapeutic intervention might enable a 
degree of re-negotiation, and substantiation, of our felt sense of the bodily boundaries 
that distinguish between yet inter-connect selves with 'surrounding' spaces. As we 
have seen (particularly in chapters 6 and 7) the projection of boundaries is a bodily 
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habit and attitude towards the world that needs to be practised and regularly 
exercised. Perhaps, then, by initially doing so in a supportive therapeutic environment 
we can (re-?) learn to intensify and strengthen our (perception of our) boundaries, and 
to thus fabricate a 'space for freedom' around our selves (Jaspers in Young-Bruehl 
1981: xi). With an embodied sense of such peripheral protection we would be better 
placed to mediate our involvement with social space and better protected against the 
projections and potential intrusions of its others. 
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'Joking apart .. .': a 'processual' approach to 
researching self-help groups 
Joyce Davidson 
The Institute for Health Research, Lancaster University, Alexandra Square, 
Lancaster LAI 4YT, UK 
It is well known that 'feminist research 111ethodologies' reject the traditional ,md positiuistic 
i11siste11ce 011 detached objectiuity, fa11ouri11g instead a situated and empathic respo11siue11ess 
to /iarticular research co11texts. In practice, howeuer, i11terviewees ofte11 haue a justifiable 
i11terest in 111ai11taining a communicative distance betwee11 researcher and researched, 
thereby retai11i11g a degree of co11trol ouer the research process. Although the nature and 
f1111ctio11 of this co111111unicati11e distancing change over time it may (initially at least) 
em/Jhasize the boundaries between the res/Jondents' 'insider' and the researcher's 'outsider' 
status. This /Jhenomenon seems especially pertinent where those researched comprise a 
tightly knit group with shared i11terests mid experiences such as self-help groups for those 
sttf fering from s/Jecific disabilities. This paper reflects on my own experiences interuiewing 
agoraphobic women members of two such groups in Central Scotla11d and disrnsses the 
manner in which lmmour acted as an indicator a11d facilitator 0f these changing commu-
nicatiue distances. It concludes that a processual methodology is required in cirrnmsta11ces 
where managing the research process is often as much a matter of coping with as directing 
change. 
Key words: humour, self-help, processual methodology, feminism, agoraphobia, commu-
nicative distance. 
Every joke is a tiny revolution. (Orwell 1968) 
Feminist methodologies in theory and 
practice 
In the course of studying the meanings of ago-
raphobia for those women whose lives are 
(de)limited by its presence, I have been in-
volved to varying degrees with a number of 
sufferers' self-help groups based in Central 
Scotland. In truth, my initial involvement was 
intended merely to establish contact with group 
members willing to be interviewed on an indi-
vidual basis. I had not, at this stage, anticipated 
quite how significant a place these groups occu-
pied in some sufferers' lives, or imagined that 
'a big part of [my] thesis should be a bout 
groups'. It was partially in response to this 
exhortation from Carron, one of those women 
whose words (and actions) have informed this 
research, 1 that I came to realize that the nature 
and role of self-help groups were an important 
ISSN 1464-9_365 prim ISSN 1470-1197 onlinc10V020163-21 © 2001 Taylor & Francis Ltd 
DOI: 10.1080 14649360120047797 
• • ... ~-- -- - .• -. - • ~ - -..... ~ •.. ~ ..... ·~··:..."'-"' " .......... • - -· ... --_.,Po ......... --;; 
164 Joyce Diluidson 
topic in their own right. It was also an indi-
cation that, however definite my ideas might 
have been about the project's direction, such 
plans would inevitably be disrupted, resisted 
and forced to evolve in different ways by the 
agoraphobic subjects themselves. 
Prior to embarking on the empirical compo-
nent of this project, my research design could 
reasonably be characterized as an almost 'text-
book' approach. My prior experience as a fem-
inist researcher was purely theoretical, and so I 
was reliant on the experience and advice of 
others concerning the translation of feminist 
theory into feminist practice. Fortunately, re-
cently there has been an increase in social 
science debates on such methodological issues, 
and this trend has been well represented in 
feminist geography, notably in symposia such 
as 'Women in the Field' (in The Professional 
Geographer 1994) and 'Focus: Feminism as 
Method' (in The Canadian Geographer 1993). 
The contributors to these debates draw on their 
own research experience in ways that illustrate 
flaws in 'traditional' methods, with their em-
phasis on objectivity and distance, developing 
alternative approaches based around principles 
of intersubjectivity, reflexivity and positionality 
(see, e.g., McDowell 1992: 406). The methodol-
ogy I devised for this project in advance of 
conducting the fieldwork was then based on my 
interpretation of such attempts to negotiate 
ethical relations between researcher and re-
searched. 
As a feminist researcher I was also aware of 
the need for a 'critical and reflexive questioning 
of what the research/researcher hopes to ac-
complish, why a particular area was chosen, 
and for whom we are working' (Nast 1994: 58). 
I had chosen to study agoraphobia-deemed it 
'significant for inquiry' (Christopherson 1989, 
cited in Rose 1993: 57)-because it is a wide-
spread and debilitating condition that over-
whelmingly affects women (Clum and Knowles 
1991). The gendered nature of agoraphobia 
mirrors that of anorexia nervosa (Bordo 1995). 
But where this latter disorder has been exten-
sively explored by the social sciences and ex-
posed in the mass media, agoraphobia remains 
an under-researched and largely 'hidden' con-
dition (Bordo 1988, 1993). The attention given 
by the popular press to eating disorders is 
doubtless in part due to the celebrity status of 
many of its sufferers. In contrast, any media 
figure that became agoraphobic-that is, fear-
ful of public/social space-would be likely, 
almost by definition, to lose rapidly their 
celebrity status as anything other than a 
recluse.2 My initial aims were simply to explore 
the meanings of agoraphobia for its sufferers, 
and in so doing, allow them to voice their own 
concerns and perhaps also raise public aware-
ness about their condition. I must also admit 
that there were additional personal reasons for 
my choice of research interest since for a lim-
ited time I had previously experienced some of 
the symptoms associated with agoraphobia. 
Following Maynard's (1994: 17) contention 
that the legitimacy of women's own under-
standing of their experiences is one of the 
hallmarks of feminism, I resolved that the data 
collected for this project should largely consist 
of contributions from women with personal 
(embodied) knowledge of agoraphobia, rather 
than, for example, the (secondary) testimony of 
non-phobic health care professionals or other 
(merely) interested parties. In formulating a 
method for data generation, I followed the 
suggestion that 'ethnographic methods, includ-
ing participant observation and in-depth inter-
viewing, are powerful in allowing us to both 
describe women's actions and reveal the mean-
ing of these actions for them' (Dyck 1993: 53, 
emphasis added; see also McDowell 1992). I 
felt that one-to-one interviews would allow for 
sensitive exploration of difficult issues, and that 
these should be open-ended and largely un-
structured, to allow part1c1pants to construct 
their narratives in the manner, depth and at the 
length of their own choosing. I wanted to avoid 
specifying themes, or making assumptions 
about subjects' life-worlds in advance (May-
nard 1994: 13). Consequently, my interview 
schedule was loosely constructed around broad 
opening questions (e.g. how long ago did you 
become agoraphobic?) and prompts to encour-
age but not compel subjects to provide more 
detail (e.g. could you tell me a bit about what 
happened at that time?). 
Before the research commenced I struggled at 
length with thoughts of a co111111u11icative ideal, 
the possibility of conducting the interviews in a 
non-hierarchical and non-exploitative way, per-
haps even in a manner that would be beneficial 
or enjoyable, rather than stressful or embar-
rassing for the women who took part. Encour-
agingly, I found that some feminist research 
had suggested that it was at least possible for 
interviews to be a rewarding experience for 
respondents. For example, Maynard (1994: 17) 
claimed that subjects could be personally em-
powered by their participation in a research 
project via 'their contribution to making visible 
a social issue, the therapeutic effect of being 
able to reflect on and re-evaluate their experi-
ence as part of the process of being inter-
viewed, and the generally subversive outcome 
that these first two consequences may gener-
ate'. 
When recruiting interviewees I had also 
drawn extensively on previous research in the 
attempt to construct a suitable and ethical 
method of bringing agoraphobic women's sto-
ries to light. There are clearly many methodo-
logical pitfalls to avoid in feminist research 
(England 1994) and much about interviews in 
particular that can be emotionally dangerous 
for respondents. The give and take of these 
exchanges can each all too easily become unidi-
rectional, leaving one party enriched, the other 
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exposed and vulnerable (Katz 1994; Kobayashi 
1994). Consequently, I felt that as the material 
I accessed could be of a deeply personal and 
highly sensitive nature, there was a risk I might 
initiate or exacerbate distress by negotiating 
difficult moments inappropriately. I was also 
concerned that respondents might be led to 
experience anxieties after I had left the scene, 
and therefore considered it essential to ensure 
that the subjects I recruited had access to an 
adequate support network to help them man-
age any traumatic issues that might arise. Thus 
the most obvious place for the search for inter-
viewees to begin was with agoraphobic 'sup-
port' or 'self-help' groups. By approaching 
local and physically situated groups, rather 
than mail- or telephone-based organizations 
such as (the England-based) No Panic, I aimed 
to make as sure as possible that each individual 
subject would be immediately involved with an 
established and solid source of support and in 
no sense isolated. 
In summary then, my initial reason for con-
tacting members of self-help groups had noth-
ing to do with trying to understand the role 
and dynamics of these groups themselves. Such 
groups simply seemed to be an appropriate 
medium for contacting people who would 
otherwise be difficult to identify and approach. 
They also offered the additional advantage of 
limiting any distress caused during and after 
interviewing. What I failed to take into ac-
count, and what subsequently required a sub-
stantial shift 111 my research focus and 
methodology, was the fact that respondents' 
identification with such groups might actually 
problematize my initial presuppositions about 
the manner and degree of attaining a commu-
nicative ideal. 
By this I mean that, theoretically speaking, I 
had understood feminist research methodolo-
gies to presuppose the researcher's ability to 
organize their activities in such a way that they 
purposefully narrow rht: commun1carivt: dis-
rance berween rht:mst:h·es and rhcir rt:spon-
denrs. Bur, in order ro achie\'t: rht:se resulrs 
somerhing approaching a rrusring and comforr-
ablc rdarionship musr cxisr (or be broughr ro 
exisrence) berween inrerviewt:r and inrerviewee 
(Skeggs 1994). Feminisr researchers have, of 
course, long recognized rhar communicarive 
comparibiliry is for from guaranreed simply 
because researcher and respondenr are of rhe 
same sex. Despire rhe focr rhar I knew my 
respondenrs would almosr cerrainly all be 
women I did nor necessarily expecr much in rhe 
way of experienrial or emorional 'closeness' 
arising from gender idenriry alone (Dyck 1993: 
54), and in facr our experiences as women were 
inevirably revealed ro be very differenr. I, for 
example, was rhe only woman involved in rhis 
projecr who did nor have children (see also 
Gilberr 1994). Where rhere was some sense of 
connecrion, rhis 'common ground' ofren 
seemed ro depend as much on orher facrors, for 
example, sharing a Scorrish working-class 
background wirh members of one group, rarher 
rhan gender alone. Indeed, as rapes subse-
quenrly revealed, my inclinarion ro srress simi-
lariries berween us was such rhar on occasion I 
(unwirringly) srressed my accenr. 
Inreresringly, and imporranrly, I had seri-
ously under-esrimared rhe degree ro which 
membership of rhe self-help group irself could 
become an imporranr facror in mediaring rhe 
women's sense of self and group idenriry. As I 
rry ro show below, rhe self-help group can offer 
irs members a collecrive idenriry based on rhe 
murual recognirion of a shared experienrial 
experrise. In rhis way rhe group acrs as an 
alrernarive locus of discursive power rhar can, 
in cerrain circumsrances, operare in an exclu-
sionary fashion ro rhose deemed 'oursiders'. In 
parricular, ir resisrs any conscious or subcon-
scious presumprion of conrrol on rhe parr of 
incoming researchers. This means rhar any ar-
rcmpr ro narrow rhc communicarive disrance 
bcrwecn researcher and researched has ro rake 
place on rhe group's own rerms, rerms rhar can 
differ markedly according ro rhar group's own 
inrernal dynamics. I wanr firsr ro illusrrare rhe 
manner in which rhe communicarive disrance 
berween researcher and researched is brokered 
rhrough groups' dynamics, using rhe example 
of humour as a key elemenr of rhe discursive 
process. I will rhen rum ro rhe merhodological 
implicarions of rhis srudy as rhey mighr impacr 
on feminisr research in general and work wirh 
self-help groups in parricular. 
Sharing the agoraphobic experience 
In rhe winrer of 1997 /98, I began rhe arrempr ro 
conracr self-help groups in my rarger area, Cen-
rral Scorland. Having firsr pursued a few dead-
end avenues of inquiry, I conracred a Disrricr 
Council 'Mobiliry Iniriarive' lisred on rhe 
Healrh Educarion Board for Scorland (HEBS) 
compurer darabase. In a relephone conversarion 
wirh irs direcror, I found rhar rhe organizarion 
had been esrablished five years previously wirh 
rhe inrenrion of providing 'rravel rraining for 
various people who have difficulry using public 
rransporr'. Rena wenr on ro explain rhar her 
organizarion offered 'a person cenrred, srep-by-
srep approach, designed ro suir rhe needs of rhe 
individual, wherher rhey're shorr-sighred, or 
have learning difficulries, or wharever'. In facr, 
whar Rena found was rhar many of rhe individ-
uals coming forward wirh mobiliry difficulries 
were suffering from agoraphobia: 'Due ro lack 
of sraff, and because [rrearing agoraphobia suf-
ferers] proved ro be very rime-consuming, we 
decided ro ser up a murual-supporr group 
['group A', and ro] provide rransporr for rhose 
who can cope wirh coming ro rhe group'. Rena 
agreed ro speak ro group members abour my 
research, and larer confirmed rhar rhree women 
had ;igreed to bt: int1.:n·ie\v1.:d in an adjoining 
room ~lt the next group session. (Only one man 
attended these meetings, and he agreed to a 
brief interview at a latc:r d;itc:.) A second group 
[group B] was later contacted through an ad-
dress listed with other support organizations in 
a district library. 
It is important to understand just why agora-
phobics experience difficulties in using pL1blic 
transport. Agoraphobia is not, as it is popu-
larly defined, a fear of 'open spaces'. Rather it 
originates in the sufferer's experience of one or 
more severe panic attacks in a p11/Jlic place such 
as a crowded bus or shopping centre (Gelder, 
Gath, Mayou and Cowen 1996: 173). Recipi-
ents of panic attacks describe disruption to 
their breathing, heart rate, and their sense of 
physical and/or mental stability, along with a 
number of other disturbing effects, often asso-
ciated with disruption to bodily boundaries and 
an overall 'loss of control' (Bankey in press; 
Davidson 2000a, 2000b, 2001; Marks 1987). 
Subjects worry, for example, about suddenly 
screaming, passing out, or losing control of 
bowel and bladder function. Although panic 
attacks are not exclusive to agoraphobia, being 
a feature of other psychiatric conditions such as 
generalized anxiety disorder and panic disorder 
without agoraphobia (American Psychiatric As-
sociation 1994), some of those who experience 
them go on to develop the fearful avoidance of 
public places characteristic of agoraphobia. In-
terestingly, this agoraphobic syndrome rends to 
develop in women in their early or middle 
twenties; only about 15 per cent of diagnosed 
sufferers are men (Clum and Knowles 1991).' 
The experience is so frightening that subjects 
deliberately and desperately avoid social situa-
tions perceived provocative of panic, or from 
which escape to safety and privacy might be 
difficult should p;inic occur (Gournay 1989: 7). 
The memory and fear of the panic attack re-
mains so painfully vivid that it shapes the 
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courst: ;111d content of their day-to-day lives. 
O\'er rime, they find themselves avoiding more 
and more situations. For some, this evasion 
escalates until they becomc: socially and spa-
tially paralysed, utterly unable to leave their 
homes. One respondent, Carron speculates 
that, 
the ones that fall into this ... extreme, this depth 
of ... no· bein~ able to do anything., incapacity I 
suppose, arc the ones that havenac been able to 
shrug it off. It's no' just been one panic attack, its 
been, I mean my first three came within an hour and 
a half ... that was back in 1961 and I can remember 
them like it was an hour ag.o. They're no' easy to 
forg.et."1 
All of the women who participated in this 
research arc long-term, diagnosed agoraphobics 
'coping' with their disorder well enough to be 
able to attend self-help group sessions on a 
regular basis. Clearly, none are currently 
house-bound, although most had been at some 
stage prior to joining the group. Susan states 
that 'for two and a half years I never went over 
the door', and, because it was the only place 
she felt safe, Iris stayed in her bedroom for six 
months. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for 
sufferers in this stare to have no idea why they 
are unable to leave home. Even if they do seek 
medical help, correct early diagnosis is nor 
always forthcoming. In Carron 's case, for in-
stance, it took fifteen years of tranquillizer 
addiction, and persistent visits to various GPs, 
before she was told that she was suffering from 
agoraphobia. 
While diagnosis 1s 111 no sense equivalent to 
a cure, feelings of immense relief, of recogni-
tion and legitimacy are common among newly 
diagnosed agoraphobics. When I asked Carron 
if her own diagnosis was helpful, she replied: 
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Oh aye! Well what do you think? You're getting all 
these weird feelings, nobody's telling you what's 
wrong with you, you think you're going mental. If 
somebody says you've got, puts a name to it, uh uh, 
you feel, you feel bloody good [laughs] but it 
doesnae make it better. 
Having something nameable gives subjects 
something to work on, a new linguistic cate-
gory with which to organize their experience, 
and offers new hope that it is also treatable. To 
such ameliorative ends, many newly diagnosed 
subjects are given the opportunity to access 
support from self-help organizations and 
groups. Such information is not always pro-
vided immediately, at the primary health care 
level, bur there are many ways in which suffer-
ers can, sooner or later, discover the existence 
of support networks.5 For the respondents in 
this study at least, finding a group to attend has 
been an overwhelmingly positive experience. 
(Though it must be borne in mind that my 
strategy of recruiting respondents through self-
help groups effectively screens our the negative 
responses of those dissatisfied subjects who no 
longer attend.) 
Self-help groups perform a number of im-
portant services for their members, including 
the provision of practical help and advice about 
managing day-co-day tasks. As Fiona explains, 
'once you get into a group, and everybody 
knew what, exactly what you were talking 
about, you know. Everybody knew, and they 
were giving me wee [little] ideas ... "why don't 
you try this or try that?", you know, and it's 
been great'. 
Among the services and benefits of the 
group, perhaps the most obviously valuable is 
quite simply the understanding of others who 
have personal experience of agoraphobia, and 
who thus know exactly what its like. 'The 
biggest thing about self-help groups' according 
to Carron, 'is they've all been there, they all 
know what you're talking about ... They're no' 
gonnae ridicule you, they're no' gonnae look at 
you funny, they're no' gonnae think you're an 
oddity, cause they all know'. 
Despite the otherwise diverse membership of 
the groups, their accounts repeatedly reveal a 
high degree of commonality and mutual recog-
nition among individual subjects of self-help 
groups, so much so that it seems agoraphobia 
shapes and permeates most aspects of sufferers' 
lives, in very similar ways. The disorder can 
then be said co constitute a shared and substan-
tive background against which sufferers' lives 
are lived. Although numerous and significant 
differences remain between individual sufferers, 
this agoraphobic background could be charac-
terized, in Wittgensteinian terms, as being con-
stitutive of a common 'form of life'. This idea 
of a 'form of life' was developed by Wittgen-
stein co designate in non-essentialist terms 
'what it is about a community that makes 
possible meaning' (Baker 1984: 288). Its precise 
meaning is difficult co specify precisely because 
it does not defi~e any essential features that are 
identical in all cases, bur rather points to the 
myriad ways in which a shared life-world is 
called upon and given expression in a common 
language. 
Agoraphobia, I would suggest, constitutes an 
experiential background that means one will 
tend co conceptualize and respond co situations 
in certain ways rather than others. According 
to Baker (1984: 278) 'forms of life rest finally 
on no more than the fact that we agree, find 
ourselves agreeing, in the ways that we size up 
and respond co what we encounter'. If one 
suffers from agoraphobia, an invitation to a 
wedding, for example, will be greeted with 
dread, never pleasure, and even lunch at a local 
cafe with one or two close friends can be felt a 
particular kind of torture. Such commonalities 
of experience enable participants to take a 
certain amount of mutual understanding for 
granted in their conversational exchanges. That 
is to say, they may draw (implicitly or ex-
plicitly) on particular and shared (mi-
cro)cultural references, and need not 
continually explain themselves, or 'spell out' 
their emotions and reactions to the situation 
being discussed. Precisely because of significant 
overlaps among their experiences of the world, 
fellow sufferers will often simply understand 
what is being said in a way that might leave 
non-sufferers entirely mystified. 
That subjects do have shared concerns, de-
spite significant experiential differences, is felt 
very strongly. Susan says of her own group 
membership, 
it's very mixed as well, social backgrounds, religious 
backgrounds, it's such a broad spectrum of people. 
And I mean it's interesting as well, 'cause we've all 
had such different lives, but we've all got this one 
thing in common. 
This commonality of agoraphobic experience is 
strongly felt, but not easily communicable to 
'outsiders', whose non-phobic form(s) of life 
render them partially deaf, or indifferent, to 
agoraphobic discursive accounts. Despite suf-
ferers' best efforts, it can feel as though the 
linguistic means of bridging the experiential 
gap are non-existent. In one sufferer's phrase, 
describing agoraphobia to a non-phobic is 'like 
trying to explain red to a blind person' 
(Moyra). For this reason, many sufferers would 
agree with Carron's conclusion (in an individ-
ual interview). She states, 
you tend no' to talk to-unless they're really inter-
ested [laughs, nods toward interviewer]-you tend 
no' to talk to people about agoraphobia. What's the 
point? They don't understand it so what's the point? 
That group members partially share an outlook 
on the world is evidenced by their ability to 
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share jokes based around their agoraphobic 
experience, jokes whose meaning would be lost 
on a non-phobic 'outsider' (as I myself was to 
discover). Indeed jokes can act as a perfect 
indicator of belonging to, or being excluded 
from, a shared community of meaning. If a 
joke is to work, if it is to be humorous, then we 
need to be able to 'get it', to understand what 
it means, to what it refers. Even if you were the 
kind of person who appreciated surreal hu-
mour it would be difficult to find anything 
funny about an allusion to a Monty Python [a 
British comedy group] sketch if you had not 
already seen one. In our everyday lives, 
whether at work, within the family or through 
watching television, we become party to, or 
excluded from, jokes that others share around 
us. Humour often entails a form of dramatic 
irony, it is a case of 'being in on it' or 'in the 
know' (knowledge) about something someone 
else might not yet be aware of. There are 
private jokes that might, for example, entail the 
repetition of a particular phrase that have some 
special meaning only because of previously 
shared experiences. Those who have not lived 
through these experiences, or have not had 
them recounted to them, will inevitably fail to 
find them funny, indeed they may not even 
recognize them as a joke at all. 
Jokes make reference to particular contexts, 
often an everyday context, but one that is 
approached from an unusual angle, or one 
revealed, through a sudden change in circum-
stances or perspective to have alternative mean-
ings. The delivery of the punch line is often a 
matter of revealing just what this alternative 
perspective entails or how it came about-the 
shock of this revelation is the cue for laughter. 
Not getting the joke is a matter of failing to 
contextualize it, to see the difference between 
the everyday and the way the everyday has 
been transformed through this recontextualiza-
tion. To take a trite example, I once repeated 
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the following joke in the context of a feminist 
discussion group: 
Q: How many feminises does it cake co change a 
light bulb? 
A: That's not funny! 
It has to be said, there was not much laughter, 
which some might consider ironic in the ex-
treme. However, I would prefer to think that 
this was not because, as the joke suggests, 
feminists lack a sense of humour (especially 
about ourselves), but because our collective 
experience of feminism was anything bur hu-
mourless. 
The ways in which we react to jokes are very 
complex, precisely because the joke, like lan-
guage itself, can call upon many different as-
pects of a form of life in many different ways. 
A joke has the character of 'depth' precisely 
because it can be likened to a 'misinterpret-
ation' of normal linguistic usage. Such misin-
terpretations call upon and reveal 'deep 
disquietirudes; their roots are as deep in us as 
the forms of our language and their significance 
is as great as the importance of our language' 
(Wittgenstein 1988: 11). By this I certainly de 
not mean that we should, like Freud (1976), 
necessarily understand jokes as a form of 
cathexis, as being associated with the retention 
and subsequent discharge of pent up psychic 
forces concentrated upon a disturbing object 
(in this case the subject's agoraphobia). No one 
denies that telling a joke can relieve the tension 
or that being able to laugh about something 
can be therapeutic in certain circumstances. 
(There may well be a kind of 'joke-work' 
analogous to 'dream-work' to use Freudian 
terminology. 6) But the 'light bulb' example also 
points to another frequently experienced el-
ement of jokes, namely the fact that they can 
also be discomforting. I do not simply mean 
that some jokes can be judged as being in bad 
caste, but rather that one is sometimes unsure 
whether or not it is appropriate to laugh. This 
is especially true when someone seems to be 
making a joke at their own expense and/or 
when that joke relics upon drawing attention to 
some aspect of their lives in which we appar-
ently do not or cannot share. Here the 'mean-
ing' of the joke is ambiguous because it seems 
to express a set of circumstances that are not 
our own and may not normally be regarded as 
a suitable subject for humour. Our flustered 
reaction is not a matter of failing to get the 
joke bur of being unsure how to react. We are 
unsure precisely what message is being commu-
nicated to us. To what degree and how should 
we respond to the serious subtext contained 
within and transmitted by the joke? To simply 
read the joke at face value is to risk laughing at 
and not with others and thereby risk further 
distancing ourselves from them communica-
tively. In this sense then, I wish to emphasize 
the 'social' rather than the 'psychoanalytic' as-
pects of the respondents' employment of hu-
mour. 
People are, of course, well aware that hu-
mour can induce such discomfort and in certain 
circumstances can deliberately employ this am-
biguity to indicate difference or demarcate a 
boundary between ingroups and ourgroups. On 
my first day of empirical research, the first 
person who entered the ante-room of the sup-
port group to be interviewed was Carron, who 
immediately states, 'they [the other group 
members] sent me in first cause they said I'd 
scare you [laughs]'. Carron then goes on to 
suggest that I reposition my chair and my 
tape-recorder. 'If you turn it round this way 
and bring your chair over a bit it'll be able to 
hear both of us'. Later, having spent around 
thirty minutes recounting her tale of agorapho-
bia with much passion and eloquence, Carron 
is apparently satisfied with her contribution, at 
least for the time being. She is also concerned 
to make way for the next subject who has 
volunteered to rake part, and so brings the 
'interview' to a close. 'Thar's just about all I 
can tell you ... You '11 get a lot fae [from] the 
other ones too because everybody has a differ-
ent perception of it'. And on this note, she 
requests that I keep her abreast of the project, 
and departs. 
From the outset, Carron 's tactics enable her 
to rake a degree of control over the situation. 
Before having met me, she and the other group 
members had (as I learnt later) collectively 
decided that I was most likely of a kind \vho 
needed to be 'put in their place', perhaps intim-
idated a little and so 'brought down to size'. 
Her opening statement, revealing that Carron 
could, or even should scare me, is said light-
heartedly, and is clearly, explicitly, intended as 
a joke-that it is encompassed by laughter 
makes this plain. However, there is perhaps 
implicitly a suggestion of another meaning, a 
serious matter underlying the humorous facade. 
Carron is thus-to use an old bur pithy Scots' 
phrase-'half joking, hale [whole] earnest'. 
And, at the time of her utterance, I did indeed 
feel that there was more jibe than jest, and 
understood Carron's joke (as intended?) to 
show that group members were calling (at least 
some of) the shots. Indeed, Carron 's 'perform-
ance' as respondent in this interview is charac-
terized by assertiveness throughout, and it 
appears Carron is not about to let herself be 
victimized, belittled or exploited by my re-
search. 
The assertive tone is initially set by the bold 
manner of her entrance, and the intention to 
(re)position us both-quite literally-in par-
ticular ways. I did indeed feel soundly put in 
my place, slightly on edge, and any preconcep-
tions I might have had about timid phobic 
personalities were already being thoroughly un-
dermined. Carron 's entrance did in fact remind 
me of the only joke I can recall concerning 
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agoraphobia, which occurred in an episode of 
the British television sir-com, Father Ted. Spec-
ulating as to the reasoning behind the half-
crazed Father Jack's prolonged retreat to a 
cardboard box, nice-bur-dim Dougal suggests, 
'maybe he's agro-phobic'. 'No way!' says Ted, 
'I've never known Father Jack to run away 
from a fight'. And so, in a matter of seconds, 
Carron had successfully challenged the antici-
pated hierarchical relationship between re-
searcher and researched, and she continued to 
maintain a degree of control throughout the 
interview.- For example, when I suggest that 
the interview should be shaped by those issues 
Carron herself considers important, she re-
sponds: 
Thar's good ... It's much better to come in wi' no 
questions, like, you cake it foe [from l the person char 
knows cause you'll learn much more char way. 
In this way, I am shown that Carron is assess-
ing my approach for its appropriateness; 
clearly, she and other group members are will-
ing and able to comment when they see room 
for improvement in the nature or direction of 
the project. I am firmly positioned as learning 
at their hands; it is they who are knowledge-
able, and who should be respected as such. 
It struck me as significant in this first meeting 
that, while I had been concerned not to high-
light differences between researcher and re-
searched, that is, not to stress my outsider 
status, it seemed that this was precisely what 
Carron intended to do. Her comment ('they 
sent me in to scare you') introduced a gap 
between us, and served to emphasize her close-
ness with, as opposed to my distance from, the 
group. This issue recurred in the interviews 
with the other two members, who repeatedly 
emphasized their sense of belonging within the 
group, pointing out similarities between them-
selves and fellow sufferers. It seemed clear (at 
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least with hindsight) that they felt a shared 
identity that I was very much apart from, 
outside of, and was repeatedly told I could not 
possibly comprehend. (To provide one more 
illustrative example: 'with the best will in the 
world, unless you've been there yourself, 
there's no way you'll understand'.) It was 
strongly felt and voiced that one has to have 
personal experience of agoraphobia in order to 
appreciate what the disorder means, and sub-
jects could only expect this embodied compre-
hension from other group members. 
Following some reflection on these initial 
individual interviews, I became convinced it 
would be remiss not to alter my data gener-
ation strategy to incorporate groups into my 
research. This position was strengthened by 
Maria Mies' contention that 
the emphasis on interviews of individuals at a given 
rime must be shifted towards group discus-
sions ... This collectivization of women's experi-
ences is nor only a means of getting more and more 
diversified information, bur it also helps women to 
overcome their structural isolation in their families 
and to understand that their individual sufferings 
have social causes. (1983: 73) 
I clearly had to respond to the way in which 
the women constantly demonstrated through 
their words and actions that their agoraphobic 
identities should be seen in the context of the 
group as a whole. The best way to achieve this 
now seemed to require ethnographic involve-
ment with group sessions since this appeared 
to offer an appropriate and potentially 
valuable way to open the research to an 
inside (if not insider's) view of agoraphobia. In 
this way the project's processual methodology, 
its need to respond to circumstances and 
change rack at different points, was born of 
necessity. 
The dynamics of self-help groups and com-
municative distance 
In the spring of 1998, I began attending the 
sessions of the group (A) 8 to which Carron 
belongs, and additionally began to visit a se-
cond group (B). When I first attended group 
A's meetings, members extended a manifestly 
generous and genuine welcome. But, it was 
clear I should not mistake my physical presence 
within the space of the group with what it 
means to be a 'true' insider. Often, it was 
members' use of humour that functioned as a 
reminder of this fact. 'In-jokes' worked as 
markers of group members' shared experience, 
and as resistance to the imposition of my 
influence on the group. 
In an early meeting with group A, a passing 
mention by Ruth of the fact (previously known 
to all but me) that she had a heart attack 
during a 'therapeutic' trip to Lourdes some 
years ago caused much hilarity among all 
group members. To be entirely honest, I was 
more than a little taken aback by what I per-
ceived to be a very black humorous episode 
(and, with hindsight, wondered if this indeed 
might have been at least part of the point}. I 
was unsure how to respond, but felt that laugh-
ter on my part might be overstepping the line 
of acceptable behaviour from a relative 
stranger. There was clearly a level of intimacy 
between these women that I was not privy to, 
a closeness that was emphasized by their ability 
to share laughter about a dreadful experience 
without being seen as unsympathetic. For a 
mere acquaintance to have 'made light' of such 
tragic circumstances would surely have risked 
causing offence, and this was not the only 
'humorous' episode to occur during my first 
few meetings when I was unsure how (I was 
expected) to react. I felt that such ambiguous 
positionality in relation to 'shared' jokes illumi-
n:Hed my status as neither fully inside nor 
outside the group (Katz 1994: 72). 
During these meetings, and also later, when 
listening to tape recordings of this group, I 
have been struck again and again by the pre-
dominance of laughter, despite (or perhaps be-
cause of?) the fact that the substantial content 
of group discussion is often of an ostensibly 
distressing nature. For the 'outsider', it can 
come as a surprise that subjects frequently 
discuss difficult issues with a remarkably light 
touch. The following extract, for example, is 
taken from Ruth's account of a trying period in 
her marriage: 
I got that angry I put my coat on and I said 'right 
that's it, I'm outa here and I'm not coming back'. He 
says, 'rhhaar's awwright'. He says tac [to] [their 
daughter] 'don't worry hen, she'll be back in before 
ye know it'. [pause] I only got to the end of the 
building. 
All of the women laugh at this point (no doubt 
Ruth's contribution is funny because they un-
derstand what she means) and Carron states [to 
me] 
that's the other thing Joyce, you cannae threaten rae 
leave your man because he knows you're no' gonnae 
get very far [laughs]. 
Such humorous exchanges are associated with 
those occasions, relatively rare in day-to-day 
life outside the group, when agoraphobia suf-
ferers can take pleasure from their difference 
from others, and commonality with each other. 
Their 'abnormality' is not usually the stuff of 
laughter and there is a tangible sense of cathar-
tic release in the group's atmosphere at such 
rimes. The very 'irrationality' of their fears 
becomes a source of amusement in itself. Car-
ron's effort to let me in on this joke also 
indicated that she, and perhaps the others, were 
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becoming more accustomed to and comfortable 
with my presence. It suggests an expectation 
that I will understand rather than judge, sym-
pathize with rather than dismiss accounts of 
their 'disordered' experiences, views and be-
haviours. As protective barriers are gradually 
lowered, it becomes increasingly likely that one 
of the women will help me to share the senti-
ments of jokes I appear not to 'get'. 
One aspect of their lives that was frequently 
referred to by group members was the in/abil-
ity to dispose of rubbish outside the home. This 
was used as a measure of the severity of agora-
phobia on numerous occasions, and was itself 
often considered 'laughable'. One respondent 
states, 'I couldn't even step outside the door to 
empty the bucket'; another, 'the dustbin had to 
be right at the back door', and a third, 'I 
couldnae empty the rubbish'. Given the fre-
quency with which this seemingly trivial ac-
tivity-disposing of household waste--was 
discussed in individual and group interviews, I 
was brought to reflect on its possible 
significance. One can speculate that, for some 
agoraphobic subjects, the space within their 
home is perceived to be the only area over 
which they have almost total control. In stark 
contrast, almost all space beyond the threshold 
of their home seems unmanageably complex 
and unpredictable. Under circumstances such 
as these, the ability to expel the detritus and 
disorder of daily life from the space of the 
home is perhaps attributed with heightened 
importance. Agoraphobic narratives in fact re-
veal that the characteristic desire to manage the 
space of the home is at times taken to some-
thing of an extreme, and sufferers' 
(over)concern with domestic matters can result 
in an exaggerated expression of a stereotypical, 
'housewifely' version of femininity.'' Humour is 
then used to linguistically manage what suffer-
ers themselves perceive to be an 'abnormal' 
state of affairs. Iris, for example (shaking her 
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head as if to acknowledge the pointlessness), 
describes obsessively combing out the fringes of 
a particular rug before she could be content 
that her living room was sufficiently tidy, 
whereas Brenda jokes about hovering around 
visitors with dust-pan and brush and continu-
ally exchanging used with clean ashtrays. Iris 
and Brenda are not alone in their intolerance of 
perceived disarray, or 'chaos'. 
As I became a more regular attendee at these 
meetings my relation to the group shifted and 
the women's attitude towards me also seemed 
to change. On a later occasion, for instance, 
group members discussed their experience of a 
local screening programme for breast cancer. 
The mammogram constitutes an instance of 
intolerable entrapment for agoraphobics, char-
acterized by Brenda as being 'anchored'. By 
this, she means 'pinned down' (in this instance 
almost literally) and unable to escape. 
Brenda: I mean when you're getting a mammogram 
you're stuck ... 
Ruch [co inrerviewer]: They've gor your chisr [chesr] 
berween a machine [laughs, and uses hands co illus-
rrare clamping acrion on breasr]. 
Carron: So, you gee a panic rhen, you cannae gee our 
rhe damned rhing, whar do you do? 
Ruch: [laughs] See rheir faces, you're running abour 
wi' your chisr hanging our! 
While it was clearly felt that I still required 
some explanation concerning the source of 
their shared humour, it was the experience of 
the mammogram rather than panic they saw fit 
to elaborate. Knowing I had not undergone the 
former ordeal they offered additional descrip-
tions and information, clarification they felt 
was no longer required with regard to the 
latter. I was, to an increasing extent, expected 
to apprehend parts of their phobic experience, 
even if I could not comprehend all of it fully. 
The women's recognition of, and expectations 
regarding my growing awareness and under-
standing had, I felt, shifted my status some-
what closer to that of 'ii1sider'. Consequently, 
less contextualizing information, and explana-
tions of jokes were thought to be necessary. 
The fact that I did get the jokes, that I began 
to think certain things funny in much the same 
way as the group members also illustrates how 
humour can operate as an indicator of commu-
nicative distance. Sharing jokes entails an abil-
ity to call upon a tacit understanding of a 
shared 'form of life'. A regular target for pho-
bic humour concerns the tactics some women 
have adopted for coping with the outside 
world, tactics that they themselves perceive to 
be 'irrational' and therefore laughable. For ex-
ample, it is fairly common for sufferers to 
'shield' themselves with, and hide behind, sun-
glasses or umbrellas, which help them feel less 
exposed to scrutiny and intrusion by others. 
More unusually, however, Ruth feels intolera-
bly vulnerable without her hat, and conse-
quently wears it for protection at all times: 
l wear ir co keep my head on [laughs]. l know irs 
laughable ... [bur] l couldnae go co rhe bin 
wirhour ir. 
Ruth offers no explanation for this statement, 
but all of the women present, including myself, 
find it funny and join in her laughter. We do 
not need to have the joke explained to us, we 
just find it funny, and in a way that perhaps 
defies rational explanation. Intriguingly, and 
appositely, Freud (1976: 102) observes that 
when we laugh at a joke 'we do not know what 
we are laughing at'. 
Clearly, it is a rare and supportive space in 
which one can describe such unusual sartorial 
habits and receive knowing, never mocking 
laughter in response. Ordinarily, even thinking 
about the prospect of having a panic attack, 
losing control and making a spectacle of one-
self could drive an agoraphobic to anxious 
discracrion. Herc, however, the women clearly 
enjoy their conversations, and it is difficult 
to convey the pleasure and sense of sharing 
they appear to experience. One of the main 
benefits of group attendance is clearly derived 
from a sense of shared experience, and being 
able to discuss difficulties with others who 
understand. Much in the way of background 
knowledge can be assumed in conversation 
with 'fellow sufferers', as opposed to the nu-
merous experiential gaps that have to be filled 
in when recounting tales of panic to the unini-
tiated. 
There was, however, a contrast between my 
experience of group A and that of group B. 
Here, attendance was again negotiated through 
the group organizer, Mary, but as it turned our, 
the dynamics and demands of individual mem-
bers meant that my methodological approach 
evolved differently. Group B was by far the 
more formally organized. Members gathered in 
a church hall, where sessions were actively 
structured, largely by Mary, who would direct 
questions to individuals regarding their experi-
ence or 'progress', and facilitate any discussion 
that subsequently arose. In such circumstances, 
it seemed appropriate to rake a metaphorical 
back sear, and cause as little disruption to 
ordinary group proceedings as possible. I 
tended to see my role here fairly straightfor-
wardly, as that of a 'participant observer', 
attending meetings with a prominently placed 
note-book to remind others of my status as 
researcher, bur otherwise keeping a relatively 
low profile. 10 I tried always to be responsive to 
signals from individuals that they wanted to 
know more about my research, my own experi-
ence of panic, or to talk about themselves or 
their problems. This would usually happen be-
fore meetings began, or during coffee breaks 
rather than in the course of the sessions them-
selves. During this rime, I tended to speak only 
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when spoken to, or on the odd occasion when 
it seemed appropriate. 
Before every meeting· we had agreed that 
Mary would explain my presence. She was also 
asked to remind those present that they could 
ask me to leave at any rime. I had also agreed 
to leave the meeting ten minutes before the 
others to enable and encourage discussion 
about my involvement 'in private'. This could 
then, if desired, be relayed back to me anony-
mously via Mary. In practice, to avoid disrupt-
ing things, I usually rook advantage of natural 
breaks in the proceedings to make my exit. 
Here and in many other instances one had to 
a void employing hard and fast rules. I had to 
remain alert and sensitive to the significance of, 
or changes in, group dynamics or individuals' 
moods, and to be willing to react accordingly. 
Given the formal nature of group B meetings, 
these aims were relatively easy to achieve. I felt 
there was a requirement, perhaps an expec-
tation, that I perform 'professionally', and keep 
some 'distance' between myself and group 
members. There was never any real challenge 
to the boundary between (their) insider and 
(my) outsider status, from either side of the 
fence. In fact, my attempt to follow respon-
dents' lead throughout the procession of group 
B meetings meant our relations evolved m a 
way that, if anything, strengthened the divi-
sions between us. 
Having said this it seemed that group B was 
itself somewhat lacking the strong sense of 
internal coherence that characterized group A. 
This may have been for a number of reasons. 
Perhaps the more formal organization and the 
centralized role of the facilitator occasionally 
restricted horizontal channels for communi-
cation between members. People may also have 
had less in common. Individual membership 
and attendance also seemed to exhibit a greater 
degree of variation from session to session and, 
being centrally located in a major city, this 
group also drew on people from a wider variety 
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of backgrounds. (Group A had been predomi-
nantly working class.) Bur perhaps more im-
porcantly rhan all chese rhings was che face char 
rhe group was nor encircly composed of agora-
phobics. During discussions cercain members 
somerimes spoke abour personal circumsrances 
in ways char were quire discincc from che con-
cerns of agoraphobic members and seemed co 
have been indicarive of ocher, quire differenc, 
psychological problems. This of course meanc 
char rhey were nor always calling upon a shared 
'form of life' and did nor comprise such a righc 
communicy of shared meanings. 
As one mighr expecr chis meanc char humour 
did nor fearure prominencly in che group. When 
jokes were made I found char ic usually seemed 
appropriare co simply smile racher rhan laugh 
our loud. This conformed co rhe behaviour of 
mosr ochers in che group and co che srereorype 
of professional derachmenc expecred of me. 
This is nor co say char no one ever made jokes 
wich agoraphobic associarions. Some jokes re-
vealed exacrly rhe same concerns and be-
havioural parrerns exhibired by members of 
group A, such as rhe cendency co be excessively 
house-proud. For example, screwing up her 
face in apparenc disgusc, Susan scares, 'I don'c 
like mess. I have a real problem wich mess, dire, 
uncidiness, mess'. She chen goes on co relare her 
anxieries abour visirors 'disrupcing' her home, 
one of whom recenrly 'made crumbs. Honestly, 
I had co pracrically sir on my hands co srop 
myself bringing rhe Hoover [vacuum cleaner] 
in'. However, che response co such jokes was 
more resrrained and chey were few and far 
becween. This was partly no doubr because ic 
rook a grear deal of confidence in chis sercing co 
councer rhe group's formal srrucrure and 'hold 
che floor' bur also because of a need co explain 
and racionalize che joke co ochers in terms that 
a non-agoraphobic might understand. Susan 
could nor rely on che unspoken complicicy and 
racir knowledge so characceriscic of group A. 
She scares, 'I was smvmg co be chis perfecr 
wife, perfecr morher, perfecc lirtle home-maker, 
perfecc chis, perfccr char ... I was so, so anx-
ious, righr? Scriving for chis perfeccion, all rhe 
rime'. Speculacing herself as co rhe reasons for 
her behaviour, Susan rums co rhe group, 'bur 
rhar's years of being in che house isn'c ic? 
You've gor norhing else co do 'cause you're so 
frighcened of going ourside. My way of dis-
rracring myself from panicking is cleaning, 
shampooing carpers, anyrhing'. 
Ac rhe rime (and also wich hindsighc), I 
recognized char che subjecrs of group A were 
challenging and resiscing my mencally re-
hearsed performance of sensicive, feminise re-
search in a very differenc way from group B. 
Whereas my posicioning in relarion co rhe larcer 
cended co be more passive rhan I ancicipared (as 
a somewhar peripheral, 'foreign' body), mem-
bers of group A demanded more accive, direcr 
involvemenc in rheir meerings. This may seem 
paradoxical bur ir is indicarive of rhe way in 
which group A's close-knir communicy oper-
aced co empower chem and enable chem co 
incervene directly in rhe research process. On 
rhe firsc occasion of my meecing group A, 
Brenda sec che inirial (assercive) cone for rhe 
meecing, gercing che discussion off rhe ground 
by quesrioning me abour my arricude cowards 
her disorder. I had mer Brenda jusc minures 
before, and had spenc a few momencs, follow-
ing incroduccions, explaining co rhe group as a 
whole (chere were six women presenc on chis 
day) char I wanred co disrupr rheir usual pro-
ceedings as lirrle as possible, co simply 'sir in 
on' cheir meecing. Brenda's firsr response co my 
conrriburion was as follows: 
Brenda: Can I ask you what your opinion is o' [of] 
people that have got agoraphobia? 
Joyce: My opinion? 
Brenda: Aye. What you think. D'you think we're off 
wur heids [our heads, implying mentally unstable]? 
So much for just sitting in! In this way, Brenda 
explicitly and effectively positions me in rela-
tion to herself and the rest of the group, high-
lighting my separateness from herself and then 
making an explicit demand upon me. Her state-
ment; 'what do you think of us', draws atten-
tion to my outsider position, and feels in no 
sense like a deferral to my supposed authority 
as an academic or researcher (see Longhurst 
1997: 37). Brenda clearly feels that, as an out-
sider, assumptions cannot reliably be made 
about my views, nor can my sympathy/empa-
thy be taken for granted. I have entere9 into, in 
a sense intruded on, her group, disrupting its 
safe, predictable and manageable space, and 
Brenda quite reasonably wants my views 
brought out into the open. In this way my 
research is made answerable to group A's 
members. This positioning is maintained here-
after by, for example, explicit assessment of my 
contributions by group members. By respond-
ing, for example, 'that's an interesting ques-
tion, but ... ', subjects are able to reshape my 
contributions, and refocus discussion according 
to their own interests and priorities rather than 
my own. While such evaluations are never, in 
the event, entirely negative, they do function as 
a reminder that my continued presence is en-
tirely due to group members' tolerance. In fact, 
as one subject pointed out, the women are not 
taking part in the project 'for completely altru-
istic reasons. People like you can help publicize 
the thing'. 
In effect then, once again my methodological 
expectations had been confounded and I had 
been forced to adopt quite different research 
strategies with each group to achieve the de-
sired ends. This even affected the way in which 
I chose to collect material for my project. The 
absence of a leader to actively shape conversa-
tions in group A meant that the women present 
tended to be equally involved in their discourse. 
Each could direct questions to the others, my-
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self included, so there was no sense in which I 
could take a back seat and 'observe' the pro-
ceedings. It thus seemed less appropriate to use 
a notebook in sessions with group A, but mem-
bers consented to have sessions tape-recorded, 
explaining that 'we're no' a secret society'. 
While the subjects would at times carry on 
discussions seemingly regardless of my pres-
ence, they could also channel their discussion 
towards me explicitly, and expect substantial 
responses and involvement. The situation was 
therefore far less 'controlled', from my point of 
view, than my largely predictable meetings 
with group B; in effect, I could be called to 
account at any time. 
Conclusions: a processual approach to 
spaces of self-help 
This paper has described the ways in which a 
methodological approach has evolved from its 
initial textbook character through the need to 
engage in a more responsive way with the 
subjects of my research. Engaging with the 
priorities of respondents led to a move away 
from a focus on individual interviews towards 
ethnographic involvement with two agorapho-
bic self-help groups, each of differing form and 
content. While I performed the relatively pass-
ive role of participant observer in one formally 
organized group (B), my manner of involve-
ment in the other's less formal sessions was far 
more active, and would change from week to 
week. In response to such variable circum-
stances, I have suggested that one should be 
willing, at times, to follow respondents' lead. 
The researcher cannot anticipate and plan for 
every possible eventuality in the interview situ-
ation. At some stage, it seems, you-the re-
searcher-might have to fall back on 'common 
sense', and hope that you have enough in the 
way of sensitivity and basic social skills to get 
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both you and your subject through the inter-
view relatively harm-free (Parr 1998). My own 
experience reveals that, no matter how care-
fully such issues have been thought out in 
advance, the subjects of our research may have 
ideas and plans chat do not coincide with, and 
effectively thwart, our own. Such circum-
stances demand that we enact what Skeggs 
(1994: 88) terms a 'counter-hegemonic ap-
proach to research', recognizing a need to re-
spond to subjects' (often unpredictable) 
requirements rather than cleaving to a pre-for-
mulated design, regardless of how carefully it 
was planned or how suitable it may have 
seemed in advance. 
Throughout the course of chis project, my 
methodology increasingly came to be seen, in 
this light, not as a pre-existing framework, but 
as a 'work in progress', or rather, process. That 
is, my method was neither firmly established 
and fixed, nor 'progressing' in one direction 
toward a particular end. Rather, it evolved as a 
continually shifting set of methods chat had to 
respond to changes in my understanding of 
agoraphobia, my recognition of subjects' rela-
tion to their groups and the dynamics of those 
groups themselves. As Kim England (1994: 82) 
observes, 'research is a process not just a prod-
uct. Part of this process involves reflecting on, 
and learning from past research experiences, 
being able to re-evaluate our research criti-
cally'. One of the things I hope that chis paper 
has done is outline and defend the suitability of 
what I would term chis 'processual' methodol-
ogy, particularly for working with groups. 
A second important methodological point to 
make about chis research is to highlight the 
very important differences in researching what 
might be termed 'natural' groups from 
':ucificially' constructed groups like focus 
groups (Longhurst 1996). This point is made in 
a different context by Holbrook (1996: 141), 
who argues chat 'groups with people who al-
ready know each other and share a sense of 
common social identity have different strengths 
and weaknesses from research with groups of 
comparative strangers'. Rather than being 
brought together for research purposes, the 
participants in my research had themselves ac-
tively chosen to belong to support groups to 
help chem make sense of and manage their 
disordered lives. A self-help group like group 
A, where all of its members might be said to 
share a form of life chat secs chem apart from 
ochers and who all occupy a (quite literally) 
meaning-full community poses particular 
methodological problems. It requires us to re-
assess the degree to which the researcher is 
actually in control of the research environment 
and, in particular, reveals how negotiating the 
communicative distance between researcher 
and researched is a two-way and uneven pro-
cess. Where the agenda of the focus group is set 
prior to the meeting by a researcher who re-
garded themselves as facilitating and directing 
discussion, the dynamics of the self-help group 
are radically different. Not only do the discus-
sions tend to be more diffuse and the issues 
addressed less predictable but the members of 
the group themselves actively direct the conver-
sations and regulate (through the use of hu-
mour amongst other things) the relations 
between researcher and researched. 
Self-help groups thus problematize in a 
rather different way the 'communicative ideal' 
chat is often thought co underlie feminist re-
search methodologies. Many feminists have 
pointed out chat the relationship between re-
searcher and researched can never be equal. As 
McDowell (1992: 409) makes plain, we must 
recognise and rake account of our own position, as 
well as that of our research participants, and write 
this into our research practice rather than continue 
to hanker after some idealized equality between us. 
However, my previous reading had led me to 
expect that it would necessarily be the re-
searcher who occupied the privileged position. 
As Mies (1983: 67) points our, researchers 
should realize that while as 'women, they are 
effected by sexist oppression together with 
other women ... as scholars they share the priv-
ileges of the (male) academic elite'. Skeggs 
(1994) too has noted the researcher usually has 
an affiliation with a powerful and largely mid-
dle-class institution. 
I was thus prepared, as Kobayashi (1994: 73) 
suggests, to try to demystify the university-
based research process as far as possible, in the 
attempt to 'deconstruct the barrier between the 
academy and the lives of the people it professes 
to represent'. I expected to be able to simply 
reject the positivist model of a standoffish ob-
jectivity and employ a 'conscious partiality' 
(Mies 1983: 68) in order to break down com-
municative barriers. But in the case of group B 
I found the formal structure and dynamics 
made this almost impossible. In the case of 
group A I simply had not bargained for the 
extent to which membership of a self-help 
group could change the balance of power in the 
research process. Its members (at least initially) 
were largely in control of regulating the com-
municative distance between us, and of decid-
ing when and how to construct and deconstruct 
barriers. 11 I was, then, largely unprepared for 
the possibility that my interviewees might not 
enter the situation in the 'submissive' spirit I 
had anticipated, that they might rather actively 
resist my positioning, obstruct (albeit 'wittily') 
any move toward insider status, and recon-
struct the interview situation in particular and 
unpredictable ways. 
This brings us to the final issue raised in this 
paper, that of humour. Humour, here as else-
\vhere, serves a number of ends. First, as is 
widely recognized, it is a form of coping mech-
anism, a way of 'making light' of difficulties, 
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and therefore rendering them more manage-
able. Second, it is a way of affirming shared 
expericncc--the women understand each other 
and jokes emphasize this. Indeed, as psychol-
ogist Jerry Palmer (1994: 58) notes, humour is 
'a form of ethological integration [that] aids 
social bonding [and] the creation and preser-
vation of group identity'. Third, and perhaps 
most relevant to my methodological concerns, 
jokes serve as a kind of resistance against my 
'authority'. Members' performance of humour 
articulates and protects agoraphobic subjectivi-
ties from outside(r) influence and intrusion. 
I have argued that the manner in which 
humour is employed in all these ways can act 
as an indicator of the communicative distance 
between researcher and researched and of the 
group dynamics itself. This is because, in order 
to work, humour has to call upon a basis for 
shared meanings. The degree to which the joke 
strikes a chord with those within the group is 
thus an indication of the depth of these shared 
meanings. Whether the joke's meaning has to 
be made explicit or can remain entirely implicit 
is also indicative of the degree of communality 
within the group and of changes in the re-
searcher's relation to that group. It is in this 
sense that each joke can represent a 'tiny revol-
ution' in the research process. Thus humour 
should be recognized as playing a potentially 
significant part in such processual exploration. 
We as researchers should rake care to respond 
sensitively to jokes as expressions of something 
of worth rather than dismissing them as mere 
humorous 'asides' to the more serious stuff 
of research. Otherwise, the joke could well be 
on us. 
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Notes 
Carron (all names arc pseudonyms) is just one of those 
I spoke with who believes that the importance of 
self-help groups is too frequently overlooked, that they 
arc undervalued, and hence under-funded. Carron is 
one of seventeen long-term members of self-help groups 
in Central Scotland who has taken part in a series (in 
her case, three) in-depth individual intcn•icws since 
1998. All interviews have been audio-taped and tran-
scribed verbatim with participant's permission. Inter-
views revealed that participants have divergent social 
backgrounds and economic status, though all were 
white, had children, and all but two (one divorced, one 
widowed) were currently married. Ages of participants 
ranged between 33 and 79 at the time of interview. 
Only two men took part, neither of whom regularly 
attended the groups which form the focus of this paper. 
2 There has, however, been some recent interest in the 
topic of panic attacks (characteristically associated with 
the onset of agoraphobia) with several famous sufferers 
proving willing to discuss their experiences. 
3 For speculation about why this might be so sec David-
son (2000a). 
4 I have opted to try and transcribe these recordings in a 
way that remains faithful to the women's own voices 
and manner of expression. Marjorie Devault (1990: 
107) refers to other approaches that 'translate slang and 
vernacular into standard English in order to highlight 
the content rather than style of respondents' speech'. 
The justification for this practice is often that readers 
might be 'prejudiced, or simply distracted, by speech 
that reveals lack of education or a particular or regional 
class background'. However, such prejudice is rarely 
challenged or subverted by standardizing practices that 
'smooth out' difference, practices that may also be a 
way of distorting women's words, of 'discounting and 
ignoring those parts of women's experience that arc not 
easily expressed'. 
5 Should the individual's GP be unaware of agoraphobic 
support groups, the recommendation may come further 
down the line of treatment via a community psychiatric 
nurse (CPN), clinical psychologist, counsellor or thera-
pist. Alternatively, sufferers might sec a group adver-
tisement in their local newspaper, a poster in the town 
library, or news may be passed by word of mouth (a 
friend of a friend etc.). Television talk shows and radio 
phone-ins occasionally feature discussion of agorapho-
bia, and provide telephone numbers for national orga-
nizations such as The National Phobics Society, No 
Panic, Pax, and StrcssWatch, or the Scottish Associ-
ation for Mental Health, who each pass on details of 
local points of contact. These information sources arc 
clearly not comprehensive or fail-safe, and there is no 
way of knowing how many individuals slip through this 
supportive net. (For more information on self-help 
resources, sec the essays collected in Gartner and Reiss-
man (1984; sec especially Katz) and Smith (1980)). 
6 In the context of the group meeting, humour can clearly 
serve a number of positive ends. Recent psychological 
and psycho-therapeutic literature has suggested that 
humour has the capacity to reduce anxiety (Palmer 
1994: 58), even that it is the 'opposite' of stress (Martin 
1997). 
7 Humour can thus operate as a strategy of resista11ce 
towards victimization or exploitation by the research 
process, insofar as it emphasizes group solidarity and 
creates a distance between researcher and researched. In 
the conclusion to her article on researching male refuse 
collectors, Jane Tooke (2000: 223) writes that 'humour 
was used by me to connect with the men, and by the 
men to distance me'. 
8 At this stage, when I began to attend group A sessions, 
they were meeting on a less formal basis than previ-
ously, without a facilitator in a housing estate-based 
community centre equally (if not easily) accessible to all 
members. (These changes were entirely due to a much-
rcsistcd withdrawal of public funding.) 
9 There is a sense, I would suggest, in which agoraphobic 
women involved in this project compensate for their 
inability to manage some (outdoor) aspects of 'doing 
gender' (Butler 1990, 1993)-for example shopping, 
family outings ctc.-by doing other (indoor) aspects to 
extremes, and thus performing an exaggerated stereo-
type of the Western 'housewife' (Tseelon 1995). It 
seems that for some home-oriented women such as 
these, the 'private' space of their very own domestic 
sphere comes co equal che 'public' (appraisahle) face of 
their femininity. Home, for che agoraphobic, can he 
experienced as an expression and even extension of 
their self (Davidson 2000a), and negative judgement by 
(non-phobic) ochers is chus considered co be no laugh-
ing maccer. 
10 In addition co my records of che meetings I also fol-
lowed Beverley Skeggs' ( 1994: 87) advice and kept a 
research diary from the oucsec of chis project. This 
enabled rnncinual evaluation of che extent and effec-
tiveness, or limicacions, of my accempcs ac 'reflexivity' 
and ethical ethnography and pro,·ed invaluable for 
comparison and subsequent reformulation of che man-
ner of my involvement wich each group. 
11 Though of course ocher factors may have played a pan 
in chis, including che face chac I was considerably 
younger chan the majority of members of group A and 
chat I had a rclacively low academic scacus as a posc-
graduace scudenc. 
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Abstract translations 
«farce ,i part»: role d1t procede dans /es recherches 
s1tr /es gro1tpes d'entraide 
Comme on le sait les 'mcthodes de recherches fcmi-
nistes' rejettent la tendance traditionnelle et posi-
riviste vers une 'objectivirc' dctachce, favorisant 
plur6t une rcceprivire siruce et empharique dans 
divers contextes de recherche. T ourefois, en pra-
tique, Jes rcpondants Ont SOUVCnt till interct justifie a 
maintenir une distance de communication entre 
chercheur(se) et sujer de recherche au cours d 'une 
entrevue; cc faisant, ces personnes retiennent un 
certain contr6le sur le processus de recherche. Bien 
que la nature et fonction de cette distance de com-
munication change avec le temps, cer ecart peur (du 
moins au debut) faire ressortir Jes frontieres separant 
Jc Statut 'interne' du repondant Ct celui 'externe' du 
chercheur(se). Ce phenomene semble encore plus 
pertinent lorsque les sujers de recherche forment un 
groupe intime partageant des intcrets et experiences 
communes comme Jes groupes d'entraide pour per-
sonnes handicapees. Cet article se veut une reflexion 
sur mes propres experiences de recherche avec des 
femmes agoraphobes membres de deux groupes 
d'entraide en Ecosse Centrale. II examine aussi com-
ment l'humour agit en rant qu'indicateur et agent de 
facilitation des distances de communications. La 
conclusion soutient qu'une approche sensible au pro-
cede est necessaire la ou le processus de recherche 
implique non seulement la resolution de problcmes 
associes aux changements de distance de communi-
cation mais aussi une abilite a diriger ces 
fluctuations. 
Mots clefs: humour, autonomic, methodologie sen-
sible au procede, feminisme, agoraphobic, distance 
de communication. 
'Bro mas a pa rte .. .': "" enfoque 'proces1tal' a la i11-
uestigaci611 de grupos de apoyo 1111tf1to 
Es bien sabido que las'merodologias de investigacion 
feministas' rechazan la insistencia tradicional y posi-
tivistica en una objetividad imparcial y, en su lugar, 
favorecen una receprividad situada y empatica a 
especificos contexros de investigaci6n. Sin embargo, 
en la practica los entrevistados a menudo rienen un 
interes justificable en mantener una disrancia comu-
nicariva entre el investigador y lo invesrigado y asi 
retienen un cierto grado de control sobre el proceso 
de investigaci(rn. Aunquc la narnraleza y la funcion 
de esra disrancia comunicariva cambian con cl 
ricmpo pucdc quc (por lo mcnos al inicio) rccalqucn 
las frontcras enrre cl csrarus de 'socio' <lei cncucs-
rado y cl de 'persona de fucra' dcl invcstigador. Esre 
fcnomeno parccc scr cspccialmcnrc pcrrincntc 
cuando aqucllos quc forman cl foco de la investiga-
cion comprenden un grupo muy unido con intcrcses 
y cxpcricncias comparridos coma, por cjcmplo, los 
grupos de apoyo muruo para las quc sufren de 
problcmas especificos. Esre papel hace referencia a 
mis propias expcriencias de entrevistar a mujeres 
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agorafobicas, micmbros de dos grupos de apoyo 
muruo en Escocia Central, y habla de la manera en 
que cl humor servia como indicador y facilirador de 
csras cambiantcs disrancias comunicarivas. Concluye 
por sugerir que se requiere una merodologia procc-
sual en circunsrancias en las que dirigir cl proceso de 
investigaci6n es muchas veces canto una cucsri6n de 
cnfrentarse a, coma dirigir, cambios. 
Palabras claves: apoyo muruo, merodologia proce-
sual, feminismo, agorafobia, disrancia comunicariva. 
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Summary Drawing on individual and group interviews with agoraphobic women, this 
paper explores sufferers' accounts of agoraphobia as entailing apparent dysfunctions in 
spatial awareness. In particular, it examines the effects of agoraphobic anxiety on the lived 
boundaries of body and self and relates this to agoraphobics' contrasting experiences of the 
relative 'security' of the home and the unheimlich and disturbing architecture of the 
shopping mall. 
Introduction 
Robin Kearns has described one role of the geogra-
pher as a 'teller of tales' ( 1997, 269). I aim to take up 
this position in order to communicate something of 
the stories told by agoraphobic women about their 
changing 'life-worlds' (Dyck 1995). Although there is 
great diversity amongst the narratives, I attempt to 
draw particular threads together, demonstrating that 
sufferers' accounts tend to be constructed around 
particular themes. I thus offer a discourse of agora-
phobic experience, a partial articulation of particular 
worldviews focused around body-, home- and 
consumer-spaces. 
I will begin by outlining the nature of agoraphobia, 
using, as far as possible, sufferers' own words, and 
introducing a theme that is interwoven throughout 
this paper: the contention that agoraphobia can be 
characterized as a disorder that problematizes suffer-
ers' experiences of bodily boundaries. The sufferers' 
descriptions of agoraphobia are very much embod-
ied accounts; the disorder disturbs taken-for-granted 
understandings of self as securely, straightforwardly 
bounded; issues of embodiment and identity 
(re)construction are thus central to the women's 
stories. 
Accounts of embodiment by feminist geographers 
have emphasized that nobody can ever be consid-
ered in isolation (Johnston 1998a; 1998b; Longhurst 
1994; 1995; 1998; see also Grosz 1994). In this 
paper, I will suggest that the agoraphobic body is 
most dramatically (re)constituted in relation to the 
home and the shopping mall. Sufferers' largely posi-
tive experience of the former will be contrasted with 
their pathological experience of the latter, character-
ized here as a 'pllthoscape' that is deeply damaging 
to the agoraphobic sense of self. 
It is hoped that by exploring these places through 
the bodies of agoraphobic women (Nast and Pile 
1998), a unique perspective will be provided that 
contributes to ongoing geographical research on 
health, place, embodiment and gender. I hope also 
to open a window onto a hidden and frightening 
landscape that has been little explored outside bio-
medical contexts (but see Bordo et al 1998; Capps 
and Ochs 1995). 
This research employs qualitative methods to 
explore what are often highly sensitive and personal 
issues. Data consists primarily of transcripts from a 
series of tape-recorded self-help group discussions, 
and individual interviews conducted with ten agora-
phobic women who attend self-help groups in 
Scotland. These long-term sufferers 'self-selected' 
after initial contact was negotiated via group organ-
izers. 1 I supplement these experiential accounts with 
clinical literature aimed at healthcare professionals 
and resource material aimed at sufferers themselves. 
There have recently been extensive debates in 
human geography concerning the centrality of meth-
odological issues to qualitative research. My own 
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approach has been influenced by debates in feminist 
theory that have developed in response to method-
ologies advocating detachment and distance 
between 'researcher' and 'researched', which have 
thus been described as 'objectifying' (see, for 
example, Mies 1983 ). In contrast, feminists have 
stressed the political and ethical importance of 
research that is for women, not simply 'of' or 'about' 
them (Smith 1987). There must be give as well as 
take in the course of our research, and I see the 
notion of 'intersubjectivity' (discussed in McDowell 
1992) as being crucial to this approach. 
lntersubjectivity serves to reconceptualize the 
exchange between interviewer and interviewee(s) in 
terms of dynamic relations between two (or more) 
subjects. It involves a recognition that data is not 
simply collected-there can be no 'object' of dispas-
sionate study-but rather constituted as a result of 
the interaction between researcher and research 
subject. The interviewer is enjoined to be 'critical and 
reflexive' about this relationship (Nast 1994), and 
must be sensitive to contextual factors in each 
individual case if s/he is to produce quality research. 
As Maynard and Purvis ( 1994, 3) point out, effec-
tive and ethical techniques for interviewing and 
analysis clearly require one to translate theoretical 
concepts into research practice. In the case of my 
own work, 'intersubjectivity' and 'critical reflexivity' 
actively shaped the course of my everyday fieldwork, 
which I chose not to conduct as a discrete and 
limited block to be analysed at a later date. Rather, 
each interview was followed by verbatim transcrip-
tion and in-depth reflection on (and discussion of) 
the issues raised. As a result, subsequent interviews 
were conducted in a more informed, sensitive and 
constructive manner. Additionally, interviewees were 
able to respond to my own thoughts regarding 
previous interviews, and data was thus reconstituted 
and enriched over time. This methodological 
approach enables a more faithful representation of 
respondents' contributions during subsequent dis-
course analysis of the transcripts, one that 'fits the 
reality of the respondents' lives' (Bailey et al 1999, 
175).2 It initiates a speaking for the agoraphobic 
women involved in my research. 
The importance of feminist methods for this 
project is underlined by the gender distribution of 
agoraphobia. Whilst much remains to be learned 
about the 'causes' of the disorder, of the few predic-
tive factors that have been identified, the most 
reliable of these by far is sex. Clinical research has 
consistently demonstrated that at least two-thirds of 
sufferers are women, and studies often suggest that 
this figure is in reality. much higher.3 
Agoraphobic boundaries: a definition 
The term 'agoraphobia' is commonly thought to 
denote a fear of 'open spaces', but the disorder is in 
fact far more complex. Those diagnosed as agora-
phobic may well be adversely affected by a variety of 
other situations. For example, the spaces of restau-
rants, cinemas, shopping centres, trains/buses and 
elevators have all been considered out of bounds by 
some agoraphobic individuals (American Psychiatric 
Association 1994; Marks 1987; Tian et al 1990). 
The variety of objects and situations that stimu-
lates agoraphobic anxiety has prompted questions 
about its existence as a coherent condition. How-
ever, healthcare professionals tend to agree that 
there is a fairly consistent 'core cluster' of symptoms 
relating to phobias that 'run a fluctuating course 
together through episodic exacerbations and partial 
remissions' (Marks 1987, 324). The symptoms tend 
to focus around a fear of public spaces. Westphal, 
the German psychiatrist who introduced the term in 
1871, chose the Greek agora to denote public places 
of assembly, and the marketplace in particular, char-
acterizing the agoraphobic condition as 'the impos-
sibility of walking through certain streets or squares, 
or the possibility of doing so only with resultant 
dread of anxiety' (cited in Marks 1987, 323; see also 
Chambless 1982; Vines 1987). 
Agoraphobics themselves often stress the fact that 
their disorder involves a mixture of phobias that have 
more to do with crowded places than with open 
spaces and, ironically, often involve claustrophobia. 
As the following interviewee pointed out: 
it takes in a lot of different phobias. Sort of encompasses 
. . . just about everything . . . I mean you can get 
claustrophobic ... social phobic, and ... I never agreed 
with the definition of agoraphobia anyway. I'm fine in 
an open space. As long as there's no ' a whole lot o' 
people there I'm fine. (Carron) 
Similarly, Jane states, 'I'd probably be fine even in 
Prince's Street [a notoriously busy part of the 
Scottish capital!, if it was empty!' (group interview, 
original emphasis). The question of what causes 
certain spaces to be felt in a threatening way is 
highly complex. Kathleen Kirby offers a suggestion 
compatible with these sufferers' descriptions. She 
writes, 
the problem with space isn't just space; it is the fact that 
there are other people in it-other people who are 
creating it, determining it, composing it ... is it surpris-
ing then, that space could seem a bit hostile? ( 1996, 99) 
Her statement implies that space is somehow 
charged, populated with the constructions of others. 
Most of the time, most individuals are quite literally 
impervious to these unwholesome attributes of 
space. Space, as Elspeth Probyn ( 1995, 83) points 
out, 'presses upon bodies differently', a contention 
shared and developed by feminist geographers 
(Longhurst 1996; 1997; Rose 1993 ). Why, then, do 
some bodies respond more sensitively to public 
space than others? 
What in the world causes agoraphobia? 
The development of agoraphobia will typically begin 
with the individual experiencing an anxiety attack in 
a public place. This may be the result of a signifi-
cantly disturbing scene, such as an accident of some 
sort, or it may seem to come completely 'out of the 
blue'. Whatever the cause, as anyone who has 
experienced an anxiety attack will know, it is a 
deeply distressing event. Large numbers of first-time 
sufferers fear imminent death from heart attack 
or brain haemorrhage, or even outright insanity 
(Mathews et al 1981 ). Ordinarily capable people 
will feel overwhelmed by panic in a way for which 
nothing could possibly prepare them; as Carron says, 
'it absolutely petrifies you ... you think you're going 
to die.' In another respondent's words, 
your heart starts thumping, you feel you're choking in 
your throat, you can't swallow and you feel all dizzy and 
giddy, and, like, if it's in a shop, or the church or what, 
you just feel you want to run. (Maggie) 
Law (1975, 53) communicates something of the 
intensity of a panic attack: 
Suddenly, sensations stronger and stranger than any I 
had previously known charged through my body ... I 
turned and twisted and tried to remove the devilish 
feelings that possessed me ... this evil thing threatened 
to rob me of my identity . . . Everything seemed to 
disintegrate. 
This sufferer felt that reality was 'tearing in on him', as 
if he were receding into an abyss, with a mighty hand 
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trying to 'squeeze the breath, and every particle of 
self identity from lhiml' (law 1975, 72). 
These descriptions suggest that the boundaries of 
the agoraphobic self afford inadequate protection 
from the outside world, a phenomenon also familiar 
to Ruth: 
When I take a serious ... eh, panic attack, I feel as 
though there's no ... no top of my head. I feel as 
though it's all opened up, and it's air. It's a terrible 
terrible sensation ... as if there's wind or something. 
(group discussion) 
Employing a term used by Anthony Giddens, we 
might say that the subject has lost her 'ontological 
security';4 her sense of self is so deeply threatened 
by the panic attack that she will have an understand-
able fear of experiencing another. Many will take 
steps to reduce the risk of repetition by avoiding 
locations similar in nature to the site of the initial 
attack. As a result of their wariness, they may 
develop heightened sensitivity to bodily sensations 
reminiscent of anxiety, such as sweating and 
increased heart rate, which may, ironically, have a 
hand in precipitating the dreaded event. 
A second attack will increase general anxiety, 
damage self-confidence that has already been 
dented, and may further restrict the types and num-
bers of locations where the subject feels safe. Having 
lost their ability to negotiate a way in the world, and 
experiencing a reduction in the locations in which 
they can move comfortably (or at all) sufferers may 
eventually be unable to leave their homes without 
experiencing an incapacitating level of anxiety. As 
Ann explains, 'I was never housebound, but I did 
find the world was getting smaller'. Another sufferer, 
who is perhaps more typical, says, 'I wouldn't go 
outside the door. I wouldn't even go to the backdoor 
to empty the bin' (Maggie).5 
Sufferers may also experience feelings of being 
unreal or far away, paralysing weakness of the limbs 
and a sensation of faintness or falling. The following 
quotation (taken from a self-help book) describes 
some of the latter symptoms and puts a disturbing 
twist on our understanding of what it means to feel 
'faint': 
suddenly everything around me seemed unfamiliar, as it 
would in a dream. I felt panic rising inside me ... I felt 
totally unreal ... Two people came along and I almost 
stopped them to ask if they could see me-was I really 
there. (Melville 1979, 13) 
This description characterizes the phenomena exper-
ienced by some agoraphobics, which have been 
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described as derealization and/or depersonalization. 
According to Marks, these involve strange and dis-
turbing feelings relating to both inner and outer 
reality: 'During depersonalization one feels tempor-
arily strange, unreal, disembodied, cut off or far away 
from immediate surroundings' {Marks 1987, 342, 
emphasis added). Marks suggests that a mild form of 
such phenomena may be similar in nature to many 
more common anxiety symptoms, such as dizziness 
or feelings of floating, but of far greater intensity; the 
felt boundary of the body has broken down.6 
Carron frequently devotes substantial passages of 
her progress diary to describing such experiences, 
which she calls 'unreality'. At times, she writes, 'the 
whole world looks alien', at others, 'it's like you're 
seeing everything through water'. Such 'delusional 
geographies' {Parr 1998) are clearly disturbing, 
and create considerable hazards for the subject 
attempting to negotiate public space. 
Maintaining control over difficult space 
Agoraphobics employ certain strategies to help them 
stay in control, to 'keep a hold' of themselves and 
maintain that crucial sense of mental and bodily 
integrity. They may develop a certain resourcefulness 
in their use of space, venturing beyond the bound-
aries of home only when it is absolutely necessary, 
and at times when the streets are less likely to be 
crowded. Jane says she 'like[s] to be out when 
there's nobody else out' {group discussion). 
Sufferers have reported feeling less discomfort in 
difficult spaces when it is raining, foggy or dark, so 
may be uncommonly glad of the stormy conditions 
that render space less threatening. One can imagine 
that this is because the view of surrounding space is 
disrupted, visually divided into more manageable, 
less threatening portions, helping the subject to 
'divide and conquer' difficult space. 
A feeling of security or greater control can also be 
achieved simply by pushing a bicycle, trolley or 
pushchair: 'I felt safer when I was pushing one of the 
prams or the buggy' {Susan). Some will carry or 
clutch a favoured object, which seems to act as an 
anchor, helping the sufferer to remain grounded. 
Wielding an umbrella can not only operate as a 
psychological crutch, or distraction from one's fears, 
but also stand between the subject and the 
encroaching space, restricting their view and literally 
extending a protective boundary over the vulnerable 
body. It might not actually stop the sky from falling 
on the subject's head, but it does afford some 
temporary relief: 'you can hide behind it, put it in 
front of you' {Lizzy, group discussion). Some suffer-
ers find that a car can function as a protective 
bubble, which serves to replace the carapace of 
which their disorder has deprived them. Carron 
explains, 'I still cannae go down the street, I cannae 
walk along to the shops on my own', yet she can 
drive a car. When asked if she can explain why, she 
says, 'I think its the fact that if anything was to 
happen, if I get a panic, I can stop the car, and I'm 
enclosed in the car' {she then shapes her hands 
around her head to communicate this feeling of 
enclosure). 
The car is capable of providing ontological secur-
ity, in much the same way as the home does {see 
below). One sufferer does in fact describe the car as 
being 'like an extension of your home' {Nora, group 
discussion). In this context, we might usefully employ 
Arnaud Levy's concept of 'subjective space'. For 
Levy, subjective space 'surrounds us like an enve-
lope, like a second skin' {levy 1977, cited in Burgin 
1996, 213, emphasis added). But when the agora-
phobic leaves home, space ceases to be subjective. 
Sufferers are too highly sensitized to the ways in 
which space is charged by others; it thus becomes 
corrosive or, we might say, abject, a term Julia 
Kristeva uses to denote that which we must 'radically 
exclude' from ourselves, but which is always present, 
threatening to invade us and causing anxiety 
{Kristeva 1994; Sibley 1995). 
The need to touch, to have physical contact with 
and apply oneself to some object or other that 
reaffirms the subject's existence is a common feature 
of agoraphobia: 
I was crossing the road, and, when I got to the middle 
part, with nothing around me, I suddenly panicked. I 
was aware of all the space around me, nothing I could 
touch. I went sort of clammy and nervous, I could feel 
my heart beating, and I had to run to the other side and 
hold on to a lamp-post. (cited in Hallam 1992, 88) 
One could argue that the contact with the lamp-post 
effectively emphasized the boundaries of the body, 
thereby proving to the sufferer that she did exist as a 
bounded subject. Ruth will under no circumstances 
leave home without her hat, which provides partial 
protection from exposure of her inner-self during a 
panic-attack {group discussion, see above). Carron 
devised a different, and very particular, coping mech-
anism, involving the strategy of application in both 
senses of physical contact and distraction: 
I used to use an elastic band !she demonstrates how by 
circling her fingers round her wrist] ... And when I went 
out I could feel, 'cause you can ieel the panic corning, I 
used to twang this elastic band against the inside of rny 
wrist. And it was amazing that pain ... replaced the 
panic. I was black and blue !laughter]. I was black and 
blue, but it helped. 
This strategy served as an immediate, if painful, 
reminder of the reality of her embodiment, and 
dam(n)ed the wave of panic with a wall of pain. 
Similarly, Susan says, 'I used to take my keys in my 
hand, and if I felt a bit weird, I'd dig the keys into my 
hand. You know, a wee bit of short sharp shock 
treatment.' It is preferable to experience one's 
boundaries through pain than not to experience 
them at all. Pain helps to avoid the feeling of 
disintegration of everything that outright panic 
entails. 
So far, I have argued that a striking, perhaps 
primary feature of agoraphobia is its impact on 
the boundaries of the embodied self. The disorder 
disturbs space both internal and external to the 
subject, even confusing the border between the two. 
The agoraphobic loses her 'taken-for-granted-
boundedness', and suffers the confused agonies of 
raw exposure of the dislocated self. 
Being (house)bound 
When I was out ... I would take a panic attack, my safe 
place was my own four walls ... if you know what I 
mean, my house ... a safe place ... I'd be alright as long 
as I was in here. (Maggie) 
you're safe in your own home. (Ann) 
It's so horrible when you go outside, it really does 
genuinely put you off going outside. (Susan) 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the subject who is 
faced with a boundary crisis on the scale suffered by 
the agoraphobic should eventually become more or 
less temporarily housebound. Her boundless vulner-
ability means she may have no choice but to remain 
exclusively within the home. The agoraphobic 
assumes the protective boundaries of the home as 
reinforcement and extension of the psychocorporeal 
boundaries of the self, incorporating her 'own four 
walls' as an essential element of 'ontological secur-
ity'. The association of this sense of security with the 
home is clearly not a universal experience, but, for 
some at least, the home is 'a truly safe place, the 
container and springboard for integrated living ... 
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the foundation of an ontologically secure existence' 
(Marilyn K Silverman, cited in Bordo et al 1998, 90; 
compare Valentine 1998). 
Often, there is an urgency to get back home, once 
a panic episode has begun outside, as Susan graphi-
cally illustrates: 
and here's another weird thing, you get nearer and 
nearer to your house, but your house appears to be 
moving further and further away from you. Like tunnel, 
sort of, vision, and you get so freaked that you actually 
start physically running, I mean, I've ran down that road 
before with my five year old practically scraping along 
the ground. 
These accounts suggest a powerful contrast between 
meanings attached to home spaces and the world 
beyond. Feminists have explored this in relation to 
distinctions between 'private' and 'public' spaces, 
arguing that the contours of this binary formation are 
as much a product as a reflection of binary construc-
tions of gender (Bondi and Domosh 1 998; Dowling 
1998; Duncan 1996). Despite the achievements of 
feminism in expanding women's horizons, the gen-
dered identities of women in general are still more 
likely to be enmeshed with the fabric of the home 
than those of men. In this context, agoraphobic 
women's experience of home as a place of safety, of 
refuge, might be viewed as a retreat into a norma-
tively feminine space where gendered boundaries 
are protected and potentially reinforced. 
However, the agoraphobic's experience of home 
is often ambiguous: for some, home becomes so 
'secure' that they are rendered incapable of leaving, 
and it can thus simultaneously be experienced as 
prison and asylum; 
When it was at its worst, I'd be at one end of the room, 
and my daughter would be in a pram at the other end, 
and I couldn't even cross the room to lift my baby out 
of the pram. (Fiona) 
I always loved going out, and even now, for me to 
spend a whole day in the house would be torture. Even 
if it's just into the garden, I've got to get out for a wee 
while. (Jane, group discussion) 
Even when the home does not provide a panic-free 
zone, it is still preferable; at least inside, no one can 
see you panic: 
If you're on your own, and you're freaking, it's okay 
cause no one else is there to see you. Whereas if it 
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happens in the middle of a busy shop, or cinema, or 
anything like that, it's embarrassing. (Susan) 
Despite the ambivalence of feelings about the home, 
it is often the safest space available. This contrasts 
strongly with interviewees' accounts of their experi-
ences in public spaces of consumption, such as the 
shopping mall. 
Women and shopping 
In late twentieth-century Western cultures, shopping 
has become one of the organizing principles of our 
lives. In Jon Goss's (1993, 18) words, 
planned retail space is colonizing other privately owned 
public spaces such as hotels, railway stations, airports, 
office buildings and hospitals, as shopping has become 
the dominant mode of contemporary public life. 
The lack of attention paid to shopping is puzzling; 
until, that is, we consider the extent to which the 
activity is seen as gendered (Miller 1997). As feminist 
theorists have forcefully demonstrated, when an 
activity is feminized, it is also trivialized, denigrated 
and relegated to the 'private sphere' (Bondi 1992). 
That shopping is still largely seen as a 'feminine' 
pastime is beyond a doubt, as recent empirical 
research has demonstrated (Falk and Campbell 
1997). Colin Campbell claims that children are 
socialized to believe that 'shopping is basically part 
and parcel of the activities which help to define the 
female role, and especially of that distinctive sub-role 
of housewife' (1997, 167). This stereotype has some 
basis in reality, in that, as Nicky Gregson writes, 'it is 
still overwhelmingly women who shop ... just as 
much as it is women who form the majority of retail 
sales workers' (Gregson 1995, 137; see also Lowe 
and Crewe 1991; Moore 1991 ). Given the centrality 
of shopping to the feminine sex-role stereotype, 
indeed to women's gendered identities, we can 
imagine extra difficulties for the agoraphobic woman 
in her exclusion from this symbolically private (but 
physically public) realm. The agoraphobic can 
neither 'do' the shopping (for necessities) nor 'go' 
shopping (for pleasure, or contact with friends), and 
the inability to perform these basic tasks can be very 
demoralizing, depriving women of the opportunity 
to reconstruct their identities in crucial ways. As the 
following quotations illustrate, they feel deprived of 
the chance to lead 'normal' lives, in a society where 
predominant ideologies dictate that to be normal is 
to be a consumer (but see Dyck 1995 and Park et al 
1998 for critiques of such ableist assumptions): 
Your family are suffering. You're doing nothing that a 
woman I pause I a mother and a wife should do. (Carron) 
You feel like, you know, a bad parent, because you 
couldn't do all the things that the other parents were 
doing ... I just felt that I wasn't doing my so-called job 
properly. (Susan) 
I'd love to just meet my daughter on a Saturday 
afternoon, and just have lunch and go shopping. I can't 
do it. (Nora, group discussion) 
Women sufferers characteristically structure their 
narratives around the theme of shopping, using the 
contrast with the home to illustrate every aspect of 
their disorder. The (in)ability to shop is used as a 
measure of the severity of their condition at any 
given time, from describing the onset of the disorder 
('you go into a shop, and there's a queue in the shop, 
and you think, I must get out of here, I just can't 
stand in this queue, and everything escalates from 
that' [Anni) to describing its effect on day-to-day life 
('At the worst stage I wasn't going out at all, and I 
couldn't even go to the shop, the kids had to go to 
the wee shop across the road' [Lynn]) and types of 
treatment ('he would take me round the shops, and 
put me into shops for as long as I could bear it, and 
then out again. You know, gradually getting me used 
to that' [Maggie]). 
For women with agoraphobia, feelings about 
shopping are laden with a complexity of meanings, 
and have considerable implications for aspects of 
their self-identities. I want to suggest that the particu-
lar difficulties shopping sites pose for agoraphobics 
are not due to the mere fact of the intolerable 
visibility and proximity to others, but rather a deeper 
aspect, related to the ways in which these spaces of 
consumption are actually constructed. 
From market stalls to mega-malls, shopping sites 
are deliberately organized to encourage us to buy, to 
weaken any resolve we have to abstain. A great deal 
of energy, not to mention finance, is expended in 
attempts to pinpoint vulnerabilities to be exploited, 
and ways to elicit particular consumer responses. 
This kind of manipulation is indubitably more intense 
in larger shopping centres and malls where socia-
bility takes second place to sales. Whilst every agora 
has characteristic sights, smells, sounds, tastes and 
objects to be picked up and handled, the mall is 
arguably more single-minded in its orientation 
toward consumption (see Goss 1992; 1993; 
Hopkins 1990; Kowinski 1985; Shields 1989). 
In one discussion group, sufferers had an enthusi-
astic, if inconclusive, conversation about the puz-
zling nature of their extreme and shared difficulties 
with 'the Gyle' (an Edinburgh mall they had all 
attempted to negotiate): 
Ruth: I was only in ten minutes 
Jane: If I go into the Gyle, even if I go in with someone 
with me, I start getting this ... I want to go home. 
Lizzy: How do we all get it in the Gyle? 
They go on to discuss various possibilities, including 
lack of exits, shape and layout, and the effect of 
different lighting. Yet they cannot put their finger on 
exactly why it horrifies them so much, and struggle 
to articulate the nature of their anxieties. I would 
argue that the apparent intangibility of their shared 
experiences can only be explained by taking into 
account the ambience and effects of the 'mall experi-
ence' as a whole. This must include considering the 
manner in which the mall is intentionally con-
structed, so as to precipitate the breakdown of 
consumer resistance and undermine the boundaries 
of the self. 7 
The malady of the mall 
The attempt to draw connections between spaces of 
consumption and the deconstruction and recon-
struction of self-identities has a pedigree that goes 
back at least as far as Walter Benjamin's 'Paris 
arcades' project. Victor Burgin explains how, accord-
ing to Benjamin, the arcades represent an image of 
space latent in all of us, 
the pre-Oedipal, maternal, space ... In this space it is 
not simply that the boundaries are 'porous', but that the 
subject itself is soluble. This space is the source of bliss 
and of terror, of the 'oceanic' feeling, and of the feeling 
of coming apart; just as it is at the origin of feelings of 
being invaded, overwhelmed, suffocated. (Burgin 1996, 
155) 
Shopping in the mall can thus be said to be contra-
dictory: 'it is an experience that yields both pleasure 
and anxiety, a delightful experience that can quickly 
become a nightmare' (Falk and Campbell 1997, 12). 
Recent sociological approaches concur with 
Burgin's psychoanalytic reading in recognizing the 
impact of spaces of consumption upon self-identity. 
For example, Zygmunt Bauman describes the subject 
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of consumption as someone who is engaged in 'self 
construction by a process of acquiring commodities 
of distinction and difference' ( 1988, 808), that is to 
say, buying an identity. We interact with consumer 
products, as part of what has been called the reflex-
ive project of the self, asking questions of ourselves 
such as, 'Am I like that?; Could that be (part of) me?' 
(Falk and Campbell 1997, 4). For these reasons, the 
mall is, I would argue, the site of boundary crises par 
excellence, as we try to build a secure identity in an 
environment that continually erodes it. 
The mall can be regarded as both symptom and 
cause of the loss of stable social anchorings. Not 
only does the 'mall-based allocation of goods and 
dreams, gratifications and identities, [provide! no 
more than intermittent palliatives for underlying anxi-
ety and appropriation of, if annihilation of subjectiv-
ity' (Langman 1992, 67), but it is actually complicit in 
developing an architecture of abjection. In the space 
of the mall, one is subject to more than mere 
'sensory stimulation'; there is rather a continual 
perceptual bombardment that, bizarrely, is intended 
simultaneously to stimulate and sedate. Margaret 
Crawford claims that this can bring on an attack of 
ma/ de mall, a 'perceptual paradox' characterized by 
'disorientation, anxiety and apathy' ( 1994, 14). The 
mall is a place where 'confusion proliferates at 
every level' ( 1994, 4); the consuming subject is 
channelled in a certain direction, passing a bizarre 
mix of design features that have been disassociated 
from any historical or geographical context. For 
Goss, the mall is 'effectively a pseudoplace which 
works through spatial strategies of dissemblance and 
duplicity' ( 1993, 19). Its contradictions and juxta-
positions render the space incomparably intense, 
and, one could argue, are meant to problematize our 
boundaries; its space is so thoroughly charged as to 
be incomparably corrosive to the secure, as well 
as the agoraphobic, sense of self. As Jane notes, 
'it's very stressful for anyone ... no' just people that 
have ... agoraphobia'. 
The spatial and symbolic architecture of the mall is 
conducive to the production of agoraphobic anxie-
ties precisely because it is an extreme exemplar of 
that 'amusement society' that, as Langman writes, 
both 'fosters panic and provides commodified 
means for its alleviation in ever more consumption' 
( 1994, 68). The mall simultaneously breaks down 
boundaries and offers a way of refashioning them, 
namely by buying the consumer goods with which 
we identify, and which stamp a transitory identity on 
us. 8 Given the close relations I have outlined 
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between agoraphobia and conceptions of bounded 
identity, it is not surprising that agoraphobics 
should be especially susceptible to the shopping 
experience. 
Conclusion 
This paper initiates an inquiry into the complex, 
changing and deeply embodied lifeworlds of agora-
phobic women, and demonstrates how individual 
senses of self are constituted in relation to one's 
immediate environment. By drawing particular 
threads of sufferers' narratives together, the paper 
broadens our understanding of two kinds of 
places-the home and the mall-that are peculiarly 
significant for participants in this research. Further, it 
outlines the advantages of developing a spatial 
account of agoraphobia, an anxiety disorder that is 
paradigmatically experienced and discursively repre-
sented by its sufferers in terms of the problematiza-
tion of boundaries between inner and outer lived 
space. 
By understanding agoraphobia as a gender-
specific expression of a boundary problem, the links 
between its aetiology and the significance of certain 
environments for sufferers are clarified (in particular, 
the ontological security frequently associated with 
the home and the unheimlich pathology of spaces of 
consumption). This approach emphasizes the spatial 
constitution of identity, and links the incidence of 
agoraphobia with the social settings of late modern-
ity. By highlighting the implication of home and mall 
spaces for the shape and health of social identities, it 
allows a more inclusive story to be told. 
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Notes 
All but one of the women interviewed individually was 
born in Scotland, the other having moved from England 
many years ago. All had been married and had children, 
and all were white. There was, however, great variation 
in age, class background and current social status, to the 
extent that some considered their phobia to be the only 
thing they had in common. Unless otherwise stated, 
the quotations are from individual interviews. All partici-
pants have been given pseudonyms to protect their 
anonymity. 
2 For detailed discussion of the issues raised here, see the 
focus on 'Feminism as method' in Canadian Geographer 
(Moss er a/ 1993). On the importance of sensitivity to 
women's usage of language, see Devault ( 1990) and 
Davidson and Smith ( 1999). See Parr ( 1998) for a 
discussion of suitable methodologies for 'post-medical 
geography'. 
3 Reviewing the findings of twelve relatively recent agora-
phobia studies, Clum and Knowles ( 1991) have found 
the average proportion of female sufferers to be 89 per 
cent. This gendered difference is all the more remarkable 
when compared with the percentage of women suffering 
from pure, or 'simple', panic disorder (American Psychi-
atric Association 1994). Clum and Knowles' study found 
that women account for only 59 per cent of panic 
disorder patients. On the basis of this study, it appears 
that, although men are almost as likely to suffer from 
panic attacks and to develop panic disorder, they are 
significantly less likely to go on to develop agoraphobia. 
For discussions of sex difference in agoraphobia, see 
Bordo (1995, especially 170), Brehony (1983), Fodor 
(1974) and Tian (1990). 
4 Giddens defines ontological security as the 'confidence 
or trust that the natural or social worlds are as 
they appear to be, including the basic existential par-
ameters of the self and social identity' (Giddens 1997, 
36). 
5 Agoraphobia is usually a chronic condition. Among the 
women interviewed, many had suffered for more than 
the average duration of eleven years before being diag-
nosed, and, even having undergone various courses of 
treatment, there was a common feeling that you never 
recover from agoraphobia, you merely learn, more or 
less successfully, how to accommodate it: 'you have to 
make the best of it' (Fran) and 'learn to live with it' 
(Susan). 
6 Kirby writes similarly of another spatial phobia (vertigo), 
that it involves: 
a rift between subject and reality, the mobilization of 
the internal processes of the subject, and a new 
fluidity of the external realm ... [In vertigo) the 
internal/external relation breaks down, resulting in a 
degeneration of interior organization, and finally-one 
could imagine, in advanced stages-in a confusion of 
the external order too. (Kirby 1996, l 02) 
7 Notwithstanding Gregson's criticism of the current nar-
row focus on the mall by theorists of consumption, for 
many agoraphobics this particular site, rather than 'the 
high street, speciality shopping complexes, discount 
warehouses, markets and mail order' (Gregson 1995, 
136) serves as the epitome of all others in terms of its 
ability to induce panic. It is for this reason that I take the 
mall as my focus. 
8 This notion has currency in the field of market analysis, as 
evidenced by Solomon's Consumer behaviour. 
A consumer exhibits attachment to an object to the 
extent that it is used by that person to maintain 
self-concept [sic]. Objects can act as a sort of security 
blanket by reinforcing our identities, especially in 
unfamiliar situations ... This coping process may pro-
tect the self from being diluted in a strange environ-
ment ... products are a sort of 'social crutch' to be 
leaned upon during a period of uncertainty. ( 1994, 
296-7, emphasis added) 
Solomon goes on to say, 'A consumer's products place 
him or her in a social role which helps answer the 
question who am I now?' (1994, 296). 
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Abstract This paper explores the nature of agoraphobic sufferers' fears of 
social spaces drawing on Merleau-Ponty's dual conceptions of 
'lived' and 'objective' space. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological 
approach highlights both the mediating role of sensations in 
acquiring a sense of identity and the importance of recognising 
the social (as opposed to the merely individual) construction of 
lived space. I argue that an approach capable of theorising 
agoraphobic 'being-in-the-world' requires just such recognition 
of the effect that other people have on the space that they 
occupy. The potential relevance of this approach for sufferers 
from agoraphobia is explored through a case study. 
Keywords: agoraphobia, Merleau-Ponty, body-boundaries, lived space, self-
identity 
Agoraphobia: an introduction 
Both received popular wisdom and dictionary definitions typically 
characterise agoraphobia as being an experience of 'dread in, and of, open 
spaces' 1• However, while the experience of agoraphobia is evidently spatially 
mediated (as is apparent in other names for the condition such as platzangst 
in German, and peur des espaces, in French) this common definition is 
actually quite misleading (Marks 1987). As the term itself, coined by 
Westphal in 1871, suggests, it seems to be social spaces, those 'public places 
of assembly' epitomised by the agora (the ancient Greek marketplace), 
rather than open spaces that typically induce agoraphobic avoidance2• To 
paraphrase Sartre, hell, for the agoraphobic, is in fact 'other people'. 
Despite sharing some features with, and often seeming to encompass 
social phobia, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM IV) classifies agoraphobia as an identifiably separate anxiety disorder 
f; Blackwell Publishers Ltd/Editorial Board 2000. Published by Blackwell Publishers, I 08 Cowley Road, 
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from both ·social' and 'Simple' phobias. (American Psychiatric Association 
1994). Although the APA is consistent in characterising agoraphobia in 
terms of the subjects' fears about being away from home and/or in social 
situations from which they cannot easily withdraw. the precise diagnostic 
criteria have altered with each edition of DSM 3. Since 1980 (DSM III) 
agoraphobia has been closely associated with the new diagnostic category 
of 'Panic disorder', hence the current definitions of 'Panic disorder with 
agoraphobia' and the less common, and more contentious, 'Agoraphobia 
without a history of panic disorder'4 . The occurrence of panic attacks is 
not only of crucial diagnostic importance, it is also a primary concern 
of sufferers themselves. (In my own research all those I have interviewed 
have, without exception, experienced panic attacks5.) Typically. the onset 
of agoraphobic avoidance occurs in women - around 89 per cent of 
agoraphobics are female (Clum and Knowles 1991)6 - following a panic 
attack in a public place, whether in response to stressful circumstances, or 
seemingly 'out of the blue'. Sufferers then begin to avoid places of a similar 
nature for fear they might experience another attack. 
What is clear is that both the agoraphobic's difficulties in traversing social 
space and any accompanying panic attacks seem to entail a destabilisation, 
if not complete breakdown of the boundary between 'inner' self and 'outer' 
world (Davidson 2000). In the words of one interviewee, 'When I take a 
serious ... panic attack, I feel as though there's no ... no top of my head. 
I feel as though it's all opened up, and it's air· 7• In extreme cases this 
is experienced as a threat to the sufferer's sense of identity, as a form of 
derealisation or depersonalisation8. In this situation, Marks writes, 'one 
feels temporarily strange, unreal, disembodied, cut off or far away from 
immediate surroundings, and one's voice sounds strange and distant' (Marks 
1987: 342). The sufferer cannot connect with her surroundings and feels 'out 
of place' in a disconcertingly alien world. 
Such experiences are difficult to conceptualise, but I shall argue that the 
philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, which seeks to elucidate the interrelations 
between self and others in terms of phenomenology of social space can 
provide valuable insights into agoraphobia. 
Merleau-Ponty, space and the horizons of identity 
Every sensation carries within it the germ of a dream or depersonalisation 
[ ... ] this activity takes place on the periphery of my being (Merleau-Ponty 
1962: 215. Hereafter referenced as PP.). 
Since, as Merleau-Ponty points out, our own births and deaths are 
'prepersonal horizons' that cannot be experienced by us, all that remains 
of our existence is our apprehension of ourselves as 'already born' and 'still 
alive'. (PP: 216) But, although there are defining moments at our beginning 
(t' Blackwell Publishers LtdiEditorial Board 2000 
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and at our ending, the nature of our existence in between these points is less 
easily circumscribed. Modernity and modern philosophy, in keeping with 
Newton's solid mechanics and the possessive individualism of an emergent 
capitalism, have sought to impose hard and fast lines around us; to make of 
the individual an atom, a being-for-itself, autonomous, self-interested and 
introspective9 . For Descartes, the first modern philosopher, the cogito 
provided the acid test of our continued existence - I am thinking, therefore 
I am ('still in existence'). In this way existence was intellectualised, equated 
with the activity of thinking, of bringing our being before the court of self-
consciousness. 
Ironically, for a materialist age, where tangibility is regarded as the sine 
qua non of the external world's existence, the Cartesian solution redefines 
the self in terms of a life of the mind. Subjects are thinking things (res cogito) 
who are not of this u·orld, souls without material substance (res extensa). In 
this way our identity is protected only at the cost of completely separating 
self and world, internal and external, the subjective from the objective. We 
are ghosts in the body's machine, disconnected observers watching the 
world pass us by. 
But, Merleau-Ponty argues that this cannot be. We are not a pure pre-
given consciousness since consciousness is first and foremost 'intentional', it 
is always consciousness of some-thing 10. What is more, this intentionality is 
not intellectually discovered but is something we become aware of through 
our lived experiences. Contra Descartes, consciousness is not something set 
apart from the world, but is itself a part of the world, it is 'a project of the 
world, meant for a world which it neither embraces or possesses, but toward 
which it is perpetually directed' (PP: xvii) 11 • This dissolution of the absolute 
Cartesian boundary between self and world has a number of important 
implications. First, it re-emphasises the body as integral to any under-
standing of the human situation. 'I am conscious of the world through the 
medium of my body[ ... ] I am conscious of my body via the world' (PP: 82). 
The 'subject that I am, when taken concretely, is inseparable from this body 
and this world' (PP: 40). We are incarnate, our access to the world is by way 
of our bodies. Second, this obviously means that, unlike res cogito, we do 
have extension, we take up/occupy space. Indeed, the experience of space is 
fundamental to our individuality, since our identity is no longer conceived 
of as a pre-given essence, a soul, but as a product and projection of our 
unique situation within the world. Third, thinking can no longer inoculate us 
against the world's intrusion since identity and thought are relational rather 
than absolute. 'I am not, therefore, in Hegel's phrase, "a hole in being" but 
a hollow, a fold, which has been made and can be unmade' (PP: 215). 
Philosophy, for Merleau-Ponty thus becomes an investigation into the 
fragility of our existence, into the complex inter-relations between body, 
space and self, into what it feels like, and what it means to be alive. Where 
Descartes sought understanding through the application of a philosophical 
method, an intellectual programme for pure thought, Merleau-Ponty directs 
c Blackwell Publishers Ltd1Editorial Board 2000 
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his attention to the phenomenology of existence. It is not thinking but 
perception that is paradigmatic of our lived but never fully conscious 
experience. Rather than taking self (perceiver) or world (perceived) as given, 
we must begin with perceptions themselves, i.e. with phenomena. Percep-
tions are fundamental intentional states-of-being, 'the background from 
which all acts stand out' (PP: x/xi) and which the ability to act presupposes. 
This 'bracketing off', or suspension of judgement about the ontology of self 
and world so as to focus on 'experiences' is referred to as the 'phenomeno-
logical reduction' or epoch. 
While Descartes sought introspectively to establish the existence of an 
inner self through a thorough-going scepticism about sensations, Merleau-
Ponty regards these self-same sensations as the only access we have to our 
selves and our world. This is because sensations seem to occupy a liminal 
position. On the one hand, sensations are the means by which I tentatively 
'grasp, on the fringe of my own personal life and acts, a life of given 
consciousness' (PP: 216). They are the very ground from which my self-
consciousness emerges to posit itself over and against the world. But, on the 
other hand, sensations remain ultimately intangible, I can never experience 
them as mine since they seemingly come and go without my calling them. 
Sensation 'runs through me without my being the cause of it' (PP: 216). 
I never possess sensations and in some strange way they seem to concern 
'another self which has already sided with the world' (PP: 216). In a way, 
sensations too are a kind of pre-personal horizon. Just as 'I cannot know my 
own birth and death. Each sensation, being strictly speaking, the first, the 
last and only one of its kind, is a birth and death' (PP: 216). 
Given the modern presupposition of an identity based upon the Cartesian 
self I 'naturally' assume ownership of my conscious thoughts since they seem 
to be constitutive of my identity. But if this identity is actually predicated on 
the ambiguous im-personal status of sensations then it is to sensations we 
must look if we are to understand who and what we are. Truth does not 
inhabit only "the inner man" [sic], or more accurately there is no inner man, 
man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself' (PP: xi). 
Things are perceived before they can be thought and such perceptions 
evidence the complex intertwining of self and world. Phenomenology thus 
explores the essentially perceptual nature of our being-in-the-world, counter-
ing the post-Cartesian abstraction of mind from matter by concentrating on 
our most basic experiences, those sensations which seem to span the gap 
between internal and external. According to Merleau-Ponty all the efforts of 
phenomenology 'are concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and primitive 
contact with the world, and endowing that contact with a philosophical 
status' (PP: vii). 
It is for these reasons that Merleau-Ponty is concerned to 'offer an 
account of space, time and the world as we "live" them' (PP: vii), rather 
than as abstract entities. Indeed, he introduces a crucial distinction between 
'objective' and 'lived' space. The former is 'the space of rulers and tape 
r' Blackwell Publishers Ltd/Editorial Board 2000 
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measures', also described as physical. clear, geometrical or Euclidean space. 
The latter is the projection of our own spatial orientation on to the world, 
also referred to as subjective, existential, anthropological or phenomenal 
space 12. 
For Merleau-Ponty, the structure of lived space emerges from a relation-
ship to our environs that is both perceived and produced through the 
activities we engage in. Lived space is 'cut up and patterned in terms of my 
projects' (Bannan 1967: 37). Our movement ·superimposes upon physical 
space a potential or human space [ ... ]. The normal function which makes 
abstract movement possible is one of ·'projection" whereby the subject of 
movement keeps in front of him an area of free space in which what does not 
naturally exist may take on a semblance of existing' (PP: 111 ). Unlike 
geometrical space, lived space cannot be measured in metres or miles. Its 
distances are not fixed, but change according to our modes of existence, our 
moods, and environmental factors beyond our control, e.g. whether it is 
night or day 13 . 'Our reading of the world' depends on the 'season of the 
year, and the season of being' (Evernden 1985: 131 ). Our sense of being-in-
the-world entails a kind of qualitative 'measurement' of lived space, a 'lived 
distance', which 'binds me to the things which count and exist for me, and 
links them to each other. This distance measures the scope of my life at every 
moment' (PP: 286). 
As one would expect, Merleau-Ponty argues that lived space is mediated 
through the body. 'The body is the vehicle of being in the world and having 
a body is, for a living creature, to be intervolved in a definite environment, 
to identify oneself with certain projects and be continually committed to 
them' (PP: 82). To act we need a kind of bodily sense of where we are, i.e. a 
proprioceptive awareness of our physical deployment in and through space 
that usually operates below the level of consciousness. This unconscious 
awareness of our lived space comes through perception's 'operative inten-
tionality', that intending toward the world, which "evaluates the potentialities 
of my whole environment, so that objects appear as graspable or out of 
reach, inviting or threatening, as obstacles or aids' (PP: 440). We perceive 
and live this world through our various senses, seeing, hearing, touching etc. 
each of which have their own characteristic spatiality. Because '[e]ach sense 
implicates the entire body, is intrinsically intersensory' (Zaner 1964: 181), 
these individual sense perceptions do, ordinarily, correspond and cohere, 
such that 'there is a unification of these spaces in one lived spatiality' (PP: 
260). This sense of unification - of the senses, of spatiality, of existence as a 
whole - can, for Merleau-Ponty, largely be attributed to the workings of our 
intentional arc. He writes: 'the life of consciousness [ ... ] is subtended by an 
"intentional arc" which projects round about us our past, our future, our 
human setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation, or rather 
which results in our being situated in all these respects. It is this intentional 
arc which brings about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility 
and motility. And it is this which ''goes limp" in illness' (PP: 136). 
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Lived space and perceptual problems 
Lived space is then distinct from, though related to, the pre-existing and 
independent space of the 'objective' world. In Merleau-Ponty's own words, 
'[c]lear space, that impartial space in which all objects are equally important 
and enjoy the same right to existence, is not only surrounded, but also 
thoroughly permeated by another spatiality' (PP: 286). While objective 
space is 'always already there', we are involved and connected with it only 
by means of lived space, and this connection must be managed and main-
tained, 'ceaselessly composed by our own way of projecting the world' (PP: 
287). 
The 'synthesis' of space by the subject is 'a task that always has to be 
performed afresh' (PP: 140), a (usually unconscious) project of mediation 
that can never be completed once and for all. Only by means of this 'com-
posure' of space do we come to distinguish ourselves. 'Space is the correlate 
to, but also negation of, subjectivity', and so our understanding and aware-
ness of what we are, and are not, is necessarily spatially mediated. It is drawn 
out of our perceptual involvement with the 'phenomenal field', from the 
'dialogue or dialectic between organism and its environment, in which each 
patterns the other' (Spurling 1977: 11 ). Lived space is formed by, but also 
actively forms, our sense of self in the world though a 'pre-thematic "pat-
terning" of the world that is difficult to catch at work' (Spurling 1977: 18). 
From a phenomenological perspective '[w]e have the experience of an /, 
not in the sense of an absolute subjectivity, but as one indivisibly demolished 
and remade over the course of time. The unity of either the subject or the 
object is not a real unity, but a presumptive unity on the horizon of 
experience' (PP: 219). Since our being-in-the-world must be continually 
negotiated, the effective construction and reconstruction of lived space 
requires a certain amount of 'perceptual faith' on the part of the subject. 
Our coherent sense of ourselves is by no means continuous or guaranteed 
and if we lose perceptual faith, our 'habitual' sense of ourselves in our milieu 
can become confused and senseless. Our praktagnosia (PP: 140), that prac-
tical bodily (rather than symbolically mediated) 'understanding', through 
which our body has access to its world, can be damaged or even lost. In the 
event, we can no longer trust that self and space will maintain normal, 
predictable relations, and we no longer know what to expect from the world 
- we might say that we have 'lost our grip' on it. 
In other words, lived space is ordinarily 'taken-for-granted', produced 
below or beyond the level of conscious awareness, and reveals itself only as a 
result of dysfunction, when it is 'thrown into relief by morbid deviations 
from the normal' (PP: 286) 14• So long as lived space is successfully 
maintained, we have a sense of freedom to move as we please (within the 
limitations of our physicality 15), an easy relation with an environment that 
invites and encourages our involvement. But, if our sense of space breaks 
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down we may find ourselves facing a repellent, unwieldy environment that 
restricts our freedom of movement, and threatens our sense of wellbeing. 
This conception of being at home in space has clear affiliations with 
Heidegger's notion of 'dwelling'. To dwell ·is the basic character of Being in 
keeping with which mortals exist' (Heidegger 1993: 362). Wohnen (dwelling) 
'means to reside or stay, to dwell at peace, to be content' (Krell 1993: 345). 
Dwelling might be summarised as a form of 'sustainable personal develop-
ment', of growing within and cultivating a sustaining relationship with one's 
environs. '[O]nly because mortals pervade, persist through, spaces by their 
very essence are they able to go through spaces. But in going through spaces 
we do not give up our standing in them. Rather, we always go through 
spaces in such a way that we already sustain them by staying constantly with 
near and remote things' (Heidegger 1993: 359). Heidegger too suggests that 
moods and mental states might affect our ability to negotiate space, e.g. that 
depression might engender a 'loss of rapport with things' (Heidegger 1993: 
359). Merleau-Ponty goes much further, arguing that '[w]hat protects the 
sane man [sic] against delirium or hallucination, is not his critical powers, 
but the structure of his space' (PP: 291, emphasis added). 
For this reason, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the best way to investigate 
lived space is through applying 'a new mode of analysis - existential 
analysis' (PP: 136) to the spatialities of 'deviant' modes of existence such as 
that associated with schizophrenia. Explaining the logic of this approach, 
Hammond et al. (1991: 181) write that, '[t]he pathological case operates as a 
heuristic device that shocks one into an awareness of what is taken for 
granted. It is a means of gaining distance from the familiar, so that one is 
better able to explicate it 16. Within this context, Merleau-Ponty presents the 
reader with descriptions of disturbing scenes from schizophrenic life-worlds 
(drawn from the work of Binswanger and Minkowski) which his conceptual 
analysis aims to render comprehensible. 'A schizophrenic patient, in the 
mountains, stops before a landscape. After a short time he feels a threat 
hanging over him [ ... ] Suddenly the landscape is snatched away from him 
by some alien force. It is as if a second sky, black and boundless, were 
penetrating the blue sky of evening. This new sky is empty, ''subtle, invisible 
and terrifying"' (PP: 287). The schizophrenic experiences a suddenly 
unmanageable transition within their lived space. The world becomes 
unheimlich as he seems to lose touch with the space of the objective world, 
and to be left alone in a now threatening and baffling subjective space. 
For the schizophrenic, the world can suddenly change its physiognomy 
(or its 'living significance') and appear to be menacing and sinister. 'In the 
street, a kind of murmur completely envelops him; similarly he feels deprived 
of his freedom as if there were always people present round about him; at the 
cafe there seems to be something nebulous around him and he feels to be 
trembling [sic]; and when the voices are particularly frequent and numerous, 
the atmosphere round him is saturated with a kind of fire, and this produces 
a sort of oppression inside the heart and lungs and something in the nature 
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of a mist round about his head' (Minkowski, quoted in PP: 286, emphasis 
in original). Here, the subject's own lived space limits, rather than 'makes 
space for' his existence. It encloses and threatens to smother him, all the 
while separating him off from involvement with the shared space of others. 
In such cases of psychosis, the subject appears to have lost their sense of 
connection with objective space, and feels (with)drawn into their own 
fragmented and frightening spatiality. The ability to synthesise a tolerable 
compound of lived and objective space has been lost. We might says/he has 
lost the ability to maintain the necessary balance or 'communion' (Rabil 
1967: 32) between lived and objective space that allows for a comfortable, 
unthinking rapport with the world. This communion is, of course, necessary 
because 'I never wholly live in varieties of human space, but am always 
ultimately rooted in a natural and non-human space' (PP: 293) 17• 
Merleau-Ponty argues that the ability to construct a 'homely' lived space 
is vital for one's mental health. If we are to feel that we belong, and have a 
place in the world, then we must be able to compose a suitable space. If we 
cannot 'situate' ourselves comfortably in relation to other people or things, 
we feel, quite literally, 'misfits'. This feeling can vary according to circum-
stances that are never entirely within our control. 'Sometimes between 
myself and the events there is a certain amount of play (Spielraum), which 
ensures that my freedom is preserved while the events do not cease to 
concern me. Sometimes, on the other hand, the lived distance is both too 
small and too great; the majority of the events cease to count for me, while 
the nearest ones obsess me. They enshroud me like the night and rob me 
of my individuality and freedom. I can literally no longer breathe; I am 
possessed' (PP: 286). 
This spatial understanding of mental health seems to have wider applica-
tion. Consider, for example, the following instance of 'neurotic' experience: 
I felt as if I didn't fit into the world ... When I saw the snow, I felt 
I couldn't cope. One day it wasn't there and the next it was. I saw it and 
it upset me and I went to pieces ... I felt I did not want to be alive 
because I was not related to anything. I just seemed totally out of 
everything and I started to cry. I couldn't cope with the hurt and the 
pain. I felt I would never feel part of anything (Sims 1983: 116). 
To keep our feet on the ground we need to be at ease with the space around us, 
to be on familiar and perhaps even intimate terms with our environs without 
suffering anxious 'feelings and fears of loss of self' (Sims 1983: 114) 18• 
The experience of agoraphobia: Linda's story 
Merleau-Ponty's explication of the phenomenology of spatial distortions 
suffered in psychotic disorders (e.g. schizophrenia) and 'extreme states of 
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consciousness' (e.g. neurological disorders and mescaline consumption) 
seems ideally suited for examining a spatially mediated disorder like agora-
phobia. Sufferers' accounts of spatial distortions associated with agora-
phobic attacks (see below), would also seem to make them perfect exemplars 
of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological problematic thereby placing us in a 
better position to judge his theory's philosophical merits. Much more 
importantly, if Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the relations between 
space, sensations and self-identity helps to conceptualise agoraphobics' 
experiences and explain their symptoms then it may be of some use in 
suggesting therapeutic or coping strategies for sufferers. 
The best way to facilitate this mutual dialogue is by letting sufferers speak 
for themselves. In what follows I therefore focus on one particular sufferer's 
narrative in some detail, though this respondent's account is fully supported 
by extensive interviews with other sufferers. (See note 5 above) My intention 
in presenting a single case study is to generate the theoretical equivalent of 
an in-depth 'existential analysis', one that might be less meaningful at a level 
of greater generality. 
I met 'Linda' through my ethnographic involvement with the self-help 
group she attended at that time. Linda is a painter and a musician, and 
I shall suggest that she is thus especially well placed to articulate her sensory 
perceptions of an agoraphobic life-world. Her experiential account will, 
I hope, help to paint a sophisticated phenomenological picture of agora-
phobia that foregrounds the relevance of 'lived space' in understanding 
agoraphobic and non-agoraphobic experiences. 
Linda is 39 years old, single, and lives in a Scottish village with her two 
school age children and an assortment of cats. She paints full time, primarily 
to earn a living, but she also derives a great deal of pleasure from her work. 
Linda says that she has recently managed to strike a balance between 
painting that she actually enjoys and that people are willing to buy: 
for years and years I painted flowers, and things that I ... och, that were 
very pretty, but they just weren't me. But, I think I've maybe cracked it 
with the balance, and it is land, it's just landscapes (laughs] and it is so 
ironic, 'cause I, I've got an exhibition, in this place, [ ... ] the theme of the 
exhibition is travelling, [laughs ... ] the irony of it just makes me smile, 
you know really, that here's an agoraphobic woman, producing these 
paintings of, you know ... far distant places. 
As a part-time musician, Linda often appears on stage in local venues, 
playing a melody instrument in a dance band. 
As a child, Linda's parents had moved home frequently within Scotland. 
She recalls often feeling uprooted and unsettled in a new town. Linda begins 
her narrative by describing these aspects of her childhood, and the fact that 
she does so suggests that the lack of a secure and stable base in her early 
years continues to hold a place of importance in her personal history. She 
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explains that when she was 17 she planned to leave an area to which she had 
recently moved, and had few friends, to work abroad as a nanny. It was at 
this stage in her life that she experienced her first panic attack; 'I can 
remember it quite vividly, it was the night before I left home'. When asked if 
she could describe it, she says: 
I was lying on my bedroom floor with headphones on, really, really loud 
music, and em it's strange, hard to describe [ ... ] it was just utter terror, 
you know, you might ... you might experience if somebody had a knife at 
your throat, you know, that level of fear. 
Linda later comes to identify this as the beginning of her agoraphobia and 
says 'I think, ever since then I've always been pretty miserable actually'. In 
Linda's mind, the original experience of panic is linked with her anxieties 
about leaving home. Although 'desperate' to leave, she was unsure and 
anxious about what this departure might entail. This ambivalence was a 
source of confusion, perhaps rooted in a sense of not really belonging 
anywhere. 
The job abroad didn't work out, and Linda soon came back to live 
in various locations in England, reluctant to return to her parents' home. 
She continued to experience a fairly high, but variable level of background 
anxiety, and to develop agoraphobic avoidance of certain, mostly crowded 
places. 'I always had to live out in the country, I couldn't live in town, so its, 
I couldn't walk through ... I mean I lived in Exeter, for five, six years, and 
I never once walked right across, right through the main street'. Although 
she did consult a doctor about her difficulties with negotiating social space, 
'it was just a case of pull yourself together', and years passed before she 
came to understand what was wrong. 'I never came up with the word 
agoraphobia in all those years, I never knew what it meant, I just knew that 
I couldn't go, I couldn't get too far away from home'. When she did 
eventually come across the term agoraphobia, it was through her own 
reading: 'I know so much about it now, as much as any shrink probably, but 
then ... I just didn't know what the hell was happening'. 
Despite an inability to stray far from the security of her home, she 
maintained a pretence of 'normality' for some years. In the midst of much 
discomfort and confusion Linda managed to complete a course at art 
college, clearly a difficult experience. She tried not to admit that she was 
struggling and often adopted strategies, invented excuses, to disguise her 
difficulties: 
It gradually, it kinna got worse, and I was pretty miserable at art college. 
I hated it [ ... ] I was like the 'awkward' student, because, you know if 
they went on trips for instance, to France, or London, to galleries, 
I always said I couldn't afford it. 
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At the end of this period, she says, "I'd had enough of England and I wanted 
to come home'. We might interpret this 'home-sickness' as a need for 
stability in her life, perhaps a desire to 'put down roots', and in a sense this 
is what she proceeded to do. 
Having returned north to Scotland, Linda says, (my emphasis): 
I think I was quite happy for a while, quite content, I had a job, and I met 
this chap, and eh, my life was much more structured, I think [ ... ]you get, 
you know, really self contained when you have children and a partner, but 
then [ ... ] after seven years, we split up, and that's really, when I went 
dmrnhill again, my foundations were shaken. 
Describing the early stages of the period following her return to Scotland, 
Linda emphasises the positive aspects of social space, how the presence of 
others can in fact be experienced as helpful and consolidating. However, 
things clearly take a sudden turn for the worse with the break up of her 
relationship. A traumatic event such as this can subject almost anyone to a 
period of vulnerability and insecurity. Linda herself was deeply distressed by 
the experience, and she uses a powerful and seemingly spatial metaphorics to 
relate this part of her story. Her usage of the concepts of structure, 
foundations, containment, and downwards motion relative to her environ-
ment, can be interpreted in relation to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological 
framework of identity, as a description of increased stability, then sudden 
erosion of her 'intentional arc' in response to changes in her emotional 
landscape. She had suddenly become very vulnerable indeed, destitute and 
dispossessed of self-worth. 
Shortly after Linda's break up, she had a major panic attack when she 
was driving, again listening to very loud music, and 'just collapsed really'. 'It 
was like a snowball effect, an accumulation of all those years of [ ... ] not 
addressing things that were happening in my head'. She said she had been 
doing too much, and thinking 'keep going, I can do it, I can do it, but 
actually, you know, inside, you're crumbling ... and all of a sudden, your 
body, mind and body and soul just, just exploding, and saying STOP, 'cause 
you're gonnae die, or you, something ... you're gonnae completely, crack, 
if you don't address this'. The terms I have italicised here emphasise the 
confusion Linda experiences in the boundaries of her phenomenal body, an 
intolerable and unsustainable confusion of internal and external space. She 
clearly loses the ability to project a protective boundary around herself, and 
as a result, is both assaulted by external space, crumbling inwardly under 
its pressure, and unable to prevent internal space from exploding outwards. 
Both sensations indicate a lack of containment, the crack that permits 
dispersion of self into its surroundings. Her account highlights the fact that 
personal 'integration is always precarious, since what can be patterned or 
structured can also be broken up as new patterns come into existence' 
(Spurling 1977: 39). 
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So at this stage, when things had come to a head, Linda received 
psychiatric help, in the form of counselling and medication. Although 
appreciative of the attention to her problems, and relieved, to a degree, to 
have them out in the open, the treatment does little to alter the agoraphobic 
lifestyle she has maintained more or less consistently since the age of 17. 
When asked about the form of treatment she would liked to have received at 
this stage, she says: 
to be honest, in some ways, if I'd been taken into a hospital, put in a bed, 
and cuddled by the nurses, I mean that would have been great actually 
[laughs] to have a month or something out of the turmoil that my life 
was in. 
Feeling, as she does, phenomenally insecure, Linda craves the tactility of 
human contact, cuddles that would soothe her enervated senses and affirm 
her diminished sense of self. Placed in a consolatory environment, it seems 
she could find the time and space to re-cover, to strengthen her phenomenal 
bodily boundaries and restore her weakened intentional arc. 
For Linda, there are good reasons for accepting the debilitating nature of 
her illness. To do so means easing up on the constant battle against it, 
'making the best of a bad lot' rather than trying to fight something she feels 
can't be beaten 19• In this way, it is possible to avert the pain of panic attacks 
by completely avoiding situations that would provoke them; 'but the trouble 
with that is your world shrinks, till it is just the one room or your bed or 
whatever'. Linda goes on to say; 'the thing about agoraphobia, or maybe 
people with similar problems, is that they just jog along. There's a lady in 
the village, here where I live, hasn't come out her house in 20 years'. One can 
then, in a sense, 'choose' just to live within one's own 'particular radius', but 
this inevitably results in an extraordinarily restricted lifestyle in a constricted 
life-world. 
Linda shares the view expressed by other sufferers that it is essential to 
practise going outside your home regularly if you are to avoid becoming 
house-bound for extended periods of time. This is expressed in a statement 
also reminiscent of Evernden's earlier point, about the phenomenal, 
physiognomic relevance of 'seasons of the year', and 'seasons of being': 
another relevant thing is the season. You know the winter ... I don't get 
much practice ... of, you know, going out 'cause the weather's crap, or 
whatever, you don't go for day trips or, you know, sort of hibernate. But 
in the summer, you know, the spirits lift, what have you, things become a 
lot easier, I become happier. 
At different times, Linda stresses the fact that it becomes more difficult to 
function outside your home, or even to imagine doing so, if you 'get out the 
habit'. Confidence is easily lost, and painful to regain, so 'practice is really 
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important [ ... ] I feel that I don't do enough, to be honest, but then, at the 
same time, I'm wary of not pushing myself too much'. There's a delicate 
balance to be struck in order to keep the physiognomy of your life-world 
relatively constant and familiar, to keep your involvement with it on 
anything like an even keel. Adopting Merleau-Ponty's terms, operative 
intentionality has to be exercised, you have to practise projecting and 
patterning lived space, with its potential for freedom of movement, to 
prevent its becoming hopelessly and debilitatingly contracted. 
Linda recognises that what she does for a living may not be all that 
conducive to developing and maintaining the skills necessary for coping in 
difficult spaces, which tend to be those populated with other people: 
Working at home ( ... ]it's not that healthy really, it's very isolating. And 
I think if you're out in an office environment, or a shop, or, you know, 
that sort of thing, you know you're mixing with people just by the very 
nature of the job, you're getting practice every day. 
The view Linda expresses here corresponds with some sufferers' theories 
about the development and exacerbation of their agoraphobic symptoms. 
Women have said that being 'stuck at home', for example, during the late 
stages of pregnancy, looking after young children, or in one case because of 
a back injury, can, in a sense, cause you to 'forget', or lose the habitual 
bodily sense (praktagnosia), of what's involved in going out. In a sense, you 
forget how to project your own lived space, necessary for freedom of 
movement, over and against those of other people. In such social circum-
stances, one's own lived space may need to be asserted more strongly, and 
defended against the seemingly corrosive presence of the lived spaces of 
others. There is then much effort, skill, confidence and (perceptual) faith 
required to convert space into something like a dwelling or 'homely' 
environment. 
However, despite these perceived disadvantages of extended periods 
behind closed doors, the home clearly is often experienced as a place of 
sanctuary, an asylum rather than a prison (but see Valentine 1998). As we 
have seen, it is understandably tempting just to stay there, and avoid risking 
one's stability and security in the attempt to construct and explore a non-
home-based life-world. Most agoraphobics know, to their cost, the dangers 
of over-exposure to space outside the home. The world can become very 
frightening very quickly and display an overwhelming physiognomy of 
horror. You have to tread lightly and warily to avoid coming face to face 
with the terrible reality of full-blown panic, a breakdown in relations 
between lived and objective space that causes one's surroundings to become 
threatening and awful. The subject of panic feels that the space they occupy 
is somehow qualitatively different from that of other people around them, 
they do not belong there and their only option is to run, usually homewards. 
Having 'lost the place' in this way, home often seems to be the only 
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imaginable space in which to rebuild your defences, away from the prying 
eyes and presence of others. 
When asked if she can explain why the home is the most comfortable 
place to be, Linda thinks carefully about her answer. What she eventually 
articulates so clearly is in fact fairly typical of sufferers' views: 
When I look around here, kids aside [ ... ] it's like, almost like an 
extension ... of me ... you know it's, it feels safe because ... it's, it's a 
shield, it's a, protective thing, you know, obviously there's walls, and 
a roof em, but I would feel just as safe in my garden. 
Her statement reveals that it would be simplistic to assume that the 
protection is derived from the physical enclosure of the bricks and mortar 
alone. While sufferers do, to an extent, incorporate these walls into their 
sense of self, to strengthen their phenomenal bodily boundaries, there is a 
deeper issue at stake here, relating to the structure and spatiality of our very 
existence. Merleau-Ponty's existential analysis reveals that home is often the 
centre of our lived space. It constitutes the heart of many of our life-worlds 
and provides a relatively stable base for us to orient ourselves in relation to. 
Agoraphobics, who spend so much of their time anxiously floating free from 
their moorings, are especially in need of this stability. At home, the subject 
can attempt to flex her operative intentionality, imagining lived distances 
opening out before her and 'gearing' herself towards them. These spaces 
can be physiognomically perceived as anything from an abyss that threatens 
to engulf, to an expanse that invites participation. The home provides 
relatively stable foundations from which sufferers can make judgements 
about their ability to cope, and to assess the prospective reliability of their 
intentional arc. 
However, even here, as Linda discovered, there are times when the 
foundations turn out to be less than solid, and this realisation can be truly 
terrifying. To lose the protective carapace of your sense of lived space here, 
to be invaded by unheimlich anxiety in your own home, is devastating to 
your sense of self: 
[When] you're in a state of permanent anxiety, chronic, it's really quite 
disabling, there's nowhere ... , whether it's your home ... , this is the 
scariest thing that I discovered, when I was really ill, it was, my home 
wasn't enough, my bed, my pillow, my mother staying here for months 
[she was my rock], wasn't enough [ ... ] nothing is, and, that's when you 
just lose it completely, you, there's just nothing there at all, you know, this 
fear. 
What Linda seems to be expressing here is at the very heart of existential 
anxiety; the fear that at the root of everything is nothing, and that there is no 
place where you are safe from the threat to your existence, the loss of self, 
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that hovers at the bounds of being. Linda survived this experience, though 
the level of anxiety seems to have persisted beyond what most sufferers of 
agoraphobia would have to endure20 . 
For agoraphobics then, anxieties are generally associated with attempts to 
project themselves beyond the home, which is ordinarily the safe centre from 
which their lived space radiates outwards. Linda notes: ·1 think everybody's 
got their own. radius, perimeter [laughs], mine is, I can go to [nearby town], 
it's a bit iffy if I can walk along the main street, an' stuff like, a Saturday 
[when it's busier] that's really pushing it'. Bannan can be seen to echo 
Linda's point about the home's importance (thus suggesting this is not a 
uniquely agoraphobic experience) when he says that 'the centre of my space 
is usually my home or dwelling, in terms of which I orient myself in the lived 
world' (Bannan 1967: 37). 
One of the tactics Linda uses to extend the perimeter of her life-world 
beyond her home is to project a comparable sense of security onto her car, 
which she says she uses 'too much. Like when I park my car in the town, em 
I have to, be near the car [ ... ] there's always got to be this place, this 
sanctuary, where I can go and feel safe'. Linda is able to leave the house, and 
the radius of her life-world, her safety zone, extends far enough to include 
many of the things that are important for a 'full life'. 'The only thing that 
is missing in my life is this, ability to, to go, to say I'll go up north, for a 
holiday and, you know, what the hell, go to London and see an exhibition'. 
When she takes herself 'out of her element' and into unpredictable social 
situations, she is in a sense laying herself open to intrusion from the spatial 
compositions of others. 
Linda has a high degree of perceptual sensitivity and, while this is clearly 
a source of pleasure, it is also disabling, in that she cannot always keep 
stimuli at a safe distance from herself She often feels invaded by sounds: 
maybe it's being a musician, I don't know, I can't read music, everything 
that I learn is just by ear, I've got one of these really intense, sort of 
listening, skills that I've got, it's a bit mind blowing at times [ ... ] if I'm in 
somewhere like Princes Street, where it's just all, the noise, the buzz, the 
general ... , I think that definitely affects my brain, my mind, and it makes 
you very uneasy. 
As a painter, Linda is also highly attuned, and sensitive to, visual stimuli, 
but she says 'I wish I wasn't'. She feels unable to protect herself from their 
influence, or even assault: 'All my flipping senses are too acute for their 
own good [ ... ] everything about me's just really acute'. Linda is decidedly 
not 'thick-skinned', she emphasises the close relationship between her acute 
sensitivity to sights and sounds and her inability to project a protective 
spatiality, or boundary. Uncalled-for sensations seem to 'flood in' despite 
all she might do to try to shield herself from unwelcome stimuli. This is 
especially so in intense (social) spaces where these sensations emanate from 
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and are produced by others, yet seem to enter her very being in a manner 
completely beyond her control21 • Here the boundaries of identity become 
confused and such sensations might even seem to belong to ·another self 
which has already sided with the world' (PP: 216). 
Conclusion 
Bryan Turner ( 1987: 218) has claimed that phenomenology has limited 
potential for the study of health and illness, as it can describe, but never 
explain the condition in question. However, Linda's account has shown that 
Merleau-Ponty's existential analysis provides much more than mere 
description. His focus on the continual construction of, and variable 
relations between, lived and objective space paves the way for a more 
sensitive reading of 'disordered' encounters between individuals and their 
life-worlds. 
Merleau-Ponty presents a philosophical problematic that provides both 
a framework for understanding and a nuanced vocabulary capable of 
expressing the existential trauma and spatially mediated experiences of the 
agoraphobic. He also draws our attention to the vital point that those 
·boundary' problems experienced by sufferers are neither so unique, nor 
so bizarre, if we choose to understand them in terms of a pathology of 
everyday life and existence. We are not Cartesian subjects. There are no 
fixed and immutable boundaries between self and world. The self is a project 
that needs to be constantly renegotiated and the senses provide the medium 
of this dialectic and of our orientation in social space. The experience of 
panic can arrive ·out of the blue' precisely because '(e]very sensation carries 
within it the germ of a dream or depersonalisation [ ... that] takes place on 
the periphery of my being' (PP: 215). 
What is more, Merleau-Ponty also reminds us that we are not 'ghosts in a 
machine' but embodied entities. This suggests that any therapy that 
concerns itself merely with the mind (res cogito) fails to give due weight to 
the bodily and sensory aspects of the condition, to our 'extended' selves. 
What Linda wanted most was to be 'cuddled', to have her boundaries 
recognised and reinforced. Many other sufferers too find that they can gain 
a degree of security by hanging onto someone or something. (Davidson 
forthcoming.) 
Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the sociality of space also explains why we 
are all subject to the effusion of others' spatial compositions and how 
agoraphobics' characteristic and extreme discomfort in 'public' places can 
be indirectly derived from other people22 . The presence of others and their 
projections can, for the agoraphobic at least, throw the stability of spatial 
situation into question. She can lose the essential sense that her bodily 
location is 'not one among many but the centre in relation to every location.' 
(Bannan 1967: 74) People literally populate space with their own presence 
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and constructions, causing it to become charged with their noisy, odiferous, 
colourful and tactile spatiality. The sensory phenomena that others make 
manifest has to be 'handled' by those who share their surroundings, and the 
'performance' of this task is ordinarily taken for granted. The sufferer from 
agoraphobia, however, lacks the ability to assert their own subjective 
spatiality in the face of the spaces of others. When subjected to high degrees 
of sensory stimulation, sufferers feel 'trapped'. The contesting lived spaces 
of others jar their senses, and they can become overwhelmed and anxious to 
the extent that they suffer a full-blown panic attack. This paper has shown 
that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological framework is capable of expressing 
and assisting such frightening aspects of agoraphobic existence. 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy has been described as 
an attitude of wonder in the face of the world, a constant questioning and 
desire for understanding [ ... ] in the hope of attaining some kind of 
directedness or orientation. The goal of [his] philosophy is to enable each 
of us to rediscover his [sic] situation in the world. (Spurling 1977: 5) 
As I hope to have demonstrated, Merleau-Ponty can be read as initiating at 
least a partial 'explanation' of agoraphobia, and his quest for orientation 
may have an important part to play in the sociology of mental health. 
Address for correspondence: Joyce Davidson, Department of Geography, 
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Notes 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary. 5th Edition (1975) Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
2 Westphal describes the 'impossibility of walking through certain streets or 
squares, or possibility of doing so only with resultant dread of anxiety'. (Quoted 
in Marks 1987: 323) 
3 See Gelder et al. (l 996: especially chapter 7) for a concise review of the relevant 
psychiatric literature, including discussion of the history of the concept of 
t Blackwell Publishers Ltd/Editorial Board 2000 
A phenomenology of fear 657 
agoraphobia, its aetiology, epidemiology, diagnosis and treatment. See also 
Marks (l 987: especially Chapter JO) and Gournay (l 989). 
4 Marks (l 987a) suggests that panic may only be absent in some cases because the 
person has successfully avoided any situation that might .induce it. 
5 The case study on which this paper is based is part of a much wider ongoing 
investigation of agoraphobia, through my involvement with self-help groups for 
agoraphobia sufferers in Scotland. I have conducted a series of group interviews 
with members of one group and have regularly attended a second as a partici-
pant observer. Additionally, I have conducted in-depth, semi-structured indi-
vidual interviews with twelve agoraphobic women drawn from these groups. 
The interviews have been audio-taped and transcribed with the participants' 
permission. Participants are referred to in the text by pseudonyms. 
6 On agoraphobia and gender see Fodor 1974, Brehony 1983, Tian et al. l 990, 
Bordo et al. 1998 and Davidson 2000. On gender difference in relation to wider 
mental health issues, see Busfield 1984 and 1996. 
7 Describing the symptoms of panic, Marks writes: '(t]he sufferer suddenly feels 
anxious, ill or weak; has palpitations, lightness, and dizziness in the head (as 
opposed to true vertigo); feels a lump in the throat and weakness in the legs; and 
has an illusion of walking on shifting ground. Sufferers feel unable to breathe, or 
breathe too rapidly or deeply; they fear they may faint, die, scream out loud, 
"lose control," or "go mad." Very intense panic may root the sufferer to the 
same spot until it lessens, after which she or he may run to a haven of safety - a 
friend or the home' (Marks 1987: 334). 
8 Marks (1987) claims that the phenomena are equivalent and tends to use the 
term 'depersonalization' to cover both. 
9 See Irigaray 1985 and MacPherson 1979. 
10 Intentionality, from the Latin intentio, was a medieval term reintroduced by 
Franz Bretano in the 19th century who argued that all states of mind were 
directed towards, or about some-thing. It does not necessarily imply conscious 
intent on the part of the thinker. (See Searle 1988: 3.) 
11 This involvement of the thinking subject in a project is paramount. For 
Merleau-Ponty consciousness is 'in the first place not a matter of "I think" but 
of "I can"' (PP: 137). 
12 'Lived space', appears first and most frequently in his Phenomenology of Percep-
tion. Merleau-Ponty was not in fact the first theorist to use the concept of 'lived 
space'; it was introduced by the psychologist Minkowski, in 1933, and incor-
porated some years later into the Phenomenological Psychology of Erwin Straus. 
13 Since 'spatiality is characteristic of our being in the world, there should be a 
variety of types of space according to the various modes of that commitment' 
(Bannen 1967: 99). 
14 In this sense, lived space can be conceptualised along similar lines to Leder's 
(1990) notion of the 'dys-appearing body', i.e. the body re-appears to conscious 
awareness as a result of some dys-function. (See also Csordas 1994; Williams 
and Bendelow l 998a and l 998b (especially Chapter 8).) 
15 See Dyck 1995, Dorn 1998 and Park et al. 1998 for discussion of 'disabled' 
experiences of space. 
16 Edie makes a similar point when he says that one should study extreme states of 
consciousness as 'it is sometimes easier to see in certain extreme cases what the 
normal or ordinary implies but hides' (Edie 1987: I 04). 
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd/Editorial Board 2000 
658 Joyce Davidson 
17 It is vital to reemphasisc that phenomenology's emphasis on sensations is in no 
way indicative of idealism. Merleau-Ponty never contests the existence of a real 
material world. Indeed. he writes that ·phenomenology is a philosophy for 
which the world is always ··already there·· before reflection begins - as an 
inalienable presence· (PP: vii). 
18 The experience of vertigo can also be understood in terms of a loss of balance 
between lived and objective space. (See Kirby 1996, Yardley 1997 and Quinodoz 
1997 for accounts of ·vertiginous· experience of the world.) 
19 Many sufferers share the view that agoraphobia is something you never recover 
from, but merely have to learn to live with: ·1 don't care what anybody says, 
you're never cured from agoraphobia' (Carron). 
20 Ordinarily. a panic attack will usually last somewhere between a few minutes 
and a couple of hours. though the intensity of the experience obviously makes it 
feel like much longer (Gournay 1989). 
21 One might speculate that the contrast between the depersonalisation Linda 
occasionally experienced in listening to and being ·possessed' by recorded music. 
and her ability to play music even in public places. might be connected with the 
degree to which she regards herself as responsible for (and the source of) the 
sensations she experiences. 
22 Although I use the term ·public·. it is not possible to characterise agoraphobic 
fear and avoidance in terms of a straightforward and traditional distinction 
between ·public' and ·private' space (see. for example. Lloyd 1984, Duncan 
1996, Bondi and Domosh 1998). The theorisation of agoraphobic difficulties 
requires a more subtle approach than this problematic distinction allows. 
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 r
es
po
ns
es
 t
o 
pr
oc
es
se
s 
of
 
ex
cl
us
io
n 
an
d 
m
ar
gi
na
li
za
ti
on
 b
y 
pe
rs
on
s 
w
it
h 
di
sa
bi
li
ti
es
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
fr
ui
tf
ul
 
in
 c
re
at
in
g 
a 
sp
at
ia
l 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
of
 d
is
ab
il
it
y.
 F
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 p
er
so
ns
 w
it
h 
di
sa
bi
li
ti
es
 m
ay
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 c
er
ta
in
 p
la
ce
-s
pe
ci
fi
c 
ex
cl
us
io
na
ry
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 i
n 
or
de
r 
to
 r
e-
de
fi
ne
 w
ha
t 
it 
is 
to
 b
e 
di
sa
bl
ed
 (
se
e 
e.
g.
 D
or
n 
19
98
).
 A
ls
o,
 i
n 
th
e 
pr
od
uc
ti
on
 o
f 
fo
rm
al
 a
nd
 s
ci
en
ti
fi
c 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
-
an
 e
xc
lu
si
on
ar
y 
pr
ac
ti
ce
 
in
 t
he
 a
ca
de
m
y 
-
ge
og
ra
ph
er
s 
ar
e 
w
ri
ti
ng
 a
bo
ut
 t
he
ir
 p
er
so
na
l 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
 
of
 d
is
ab
il
it
y 
an
d 
di
sa
bl
in
g 
ill
ne
ss
 a
s 
a 
w
ay
 f
or
w
ar
d 
to
 e
m
po
w
er
m
en
t 
(e
.g
. 
C
ho
ui
na
rd
 a
nd
 G
ra
nt
 1
99
5;
 C
ho
ui
na
rd
 1
99
7;
 G
ol
le
dg
e 
19
97
; 
M
os
s 
19
99
).
 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
fo
r 
th
e 
w
ay
s 
pe
rs
on
s 
w
it
h 
di
sa
bi
li
ti
es
 a
re
 p
os
it
io
ne
d 
w
it
hi
n 
so
ci
et
y 
ha
s 
id
en
ti
fi
ed
 s
ev
er
al
 o
f 
th
e 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
th
ro
ug
h 
w
hi
ch
 m
ar
gi
na
l-
iz
at
io
n 
ta
ke
s 
pl
ac
e 
(e
.g
. 
G
le
es
on
 1
99
9)
. 
L
ik
e 
ot
he
r 
ex
cl
us
io
na
ry
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
, 
m
ar
gi
na
li
za
ti
on
 o
f 
pe
rs
on
s 
w
it
h 
di
sa
bi
li
ti
es
 t
ak
es
 p
la
ce
 i
n 
bo
th
 p
ub
li
c 
an
d 
pr
iv
at
e 
sp
ac
es
 a
t 
va
ri
ou
s 
sp
at
ia
l 
sc
al
es
 (
se
e 
Si
bl
ey
 1
99
5;
 B
ut
le
r 
an
d 
B
ow
lb
y 
19
97
; s
ee
 P
ar
r 
an
d 
P
hi
lo
 (
19
95
) 
an
d 
R
ad
fo
rd
 a
nd
 P
ar
k 
(1
99
8)
 f
or
 e
xa
m
pl
es
 
in
 m
en
ta
l 
he
al
th
).
 S
oc
ia
l s
pa
ce
s 
cr
ea
te
d 
in
 a
nd
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
es
e 
m
ili
eu
s 
of
 p
ow
er
 
ar
e 
pl
ac
e-
sp
ec
if
ic
 i
n 
th
at
 a
 s
in
gu
la
r 
co
nf
ig
ur
at
io
n 
at
 a
ny
 p
oi
nt
 i
n 
ti
m
e 
is
 
as
 u
ni
qu
e 
in
 i
ts
 c
on
fi
gu
ra
ti
on
 a
s 
it
 i
s 
si
m
il
ar
 t
o 
ot
he
r 
so
ci
al
 s
pa
ce
s 
-
gi
vi
ng
 
ri
se
 t
o 
th
e 
no
ti
on
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
pr
oc
es
se
s 
of
 m
ar
gi
na
li
za
ti
on
 a
re
 s
im
il
ar
, 
bu
t 
th
e 
ou
tc
om
es
 a
re
 (
or
 m
ay
 b
e)
 d
if
fe
re
nt
. 
W
e 
to
o 
ar
e 
in
te
re
st
ed
 i
n 
m
ar
gi
na
li
za
ti
on
, 
bu
t 
in
 a
 s
lig
ht
ly
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 w
ay
. 
M
os
t 
of
 th
es
e 
w
or
ks
 (
in
cl
ud
in
g 
ou
r 
ow
n)
 f
oc
us
 o
n 
th
e 
di
sa
bl
ed
 b
od
y 
as
 a
 
su
bj
ec
t/
ob
je
ct
 t
ha
t 
is 
m
ar
gi
na
li
ze
d 
by
 s
ys
te
m
ic
 a
tt
it
ud
es
 a
nd
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
, a
s 
an
 
id
en
ti
ty
 m
ar
gi
na
li
ze
d 
on
 a
cc
ou
nt
 o
f 
a 
bo
di
ly
 i
m
pa
ir
m
en
t o
r 
di
se
as
e 
pr
oc
es
s,
 
as
 a
n 
en
d 
pr
od
uc
t.
 W
e 
pr
ef
er
 h
er
e 
to
 f
oc
us
 o
n 
th
e 
m
ak
in
g 
of
 th
at
 e
nd
 p
ro
du
ct
, 
to
 in
te
rv
en
e 
in
to
 t
he
 p
ro
ce
ss
 o
f 
m
ar
gi
na
li
za
ti
on
 a
nd
 lo
ok
 a
t t
he
 c
on
ne
ct
io
ns
 
be
tw
ee
n 
bo
di
es
 a
nd
 e
nv
ir
on
m
en
ts
. 
In
 t
hi
s 
se
ns
e,
 w
e 
ar
e 
in
te
re
st
ed
 i
n 
ho
w
 
w
om
en
 e
m
bo
dy
 m
ar
gi
na
li
za
ti
on
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
. 
